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ABSTRACT 
Various accountability issues concerning the Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies 
(MFSB) have been revealed by various parties in their reports. Being a public sector 
body adopting a corporate-styled management and representing a substantial segment of 
the public sector, MFSB are expected to discharge its accountability and promote 
transparency. One aspect of accountability and transparency is the disclosure of 
accountability information (AI) in the annual report. In light of this, the study seeks to 
obtain insights on the extent of disclosure of AI in the annual reports of MFSB. 
Drawing from the public accountability paradigm and institutional theory, three 
objectives of the study are developed:  (i) to determine the extent of  disclosure of AI in 
MFSB annual reports, (ii) to examine whether certain set of variables, namely the type 
of MFSB, board size, board composition, existence of audit committee and fiscal stress 
have significant association with the extent of disclosure as found in (i), and (iii) to 
identify the reasons for disclosure (and nondisclosure) of AI in MFSB annual reports. 
 
The study employs a mixed method research design. The data for quantitative phase 
was collected from 2008 annual reports of 106 MFSB using a disclosure index. They 
were then analysed using the General Linear Model (GLM) command for the multiple 
regression technique. Thereafter, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 
preparers and/or managers of MFSB and the meaning categorization approach was 
employed to analyse the data.  
 
It was found that MFSB provided a moderate level of disclosure of 47.8 per cent in their 
annual report, ranging from 25 to 71 per cent. The results also showed that the most 
disclosed category was Performance, followed by the Overview, Financial, Others (i.e. 
human resource, socio-environmental and main assets),  and Governance category. In 
addition, the study found that the strength of the regression model is moderate at an 
adjusted R
2
 of 0.409. Two out of five hypotheses are supported. It was established that 
there is a significant association between the extent of AI disclosure and the type of 
MFSB as well as a significant positive association between the extent of AI disclosure 
and the existence of an internal member on the board. 
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The interview revealed 53 and 58 reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure, 
respectively. Six themes emerged from both situations with three of them being similar, 
namely the nature of the data for reporting, implication of reporting, and traditions and 
practices in preparing reports. The themes unique in the case of disclosure are external 
influences, internal influences, and awareness. Among the common reasons for 
disclosure are to adapt the reporting practices of others and to enlighten stakeholders on 
MFSB functions and activities. On the other hand, the three unique themes for 
nondisclosure are demand of the information, resources, and preparers. The main 
reasons for nondisclosure is the lack of reporting benefit and insignificant data. 
 
The study provides useful inputs for both practitioners and researchers which may 
subsequently help to improve the extent of disclosure of AI and eventually enhance 
accountability and transparency among public sector entities particularly MFSB. 
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ABSTRAK (BAHASA MELAYU) 
Pelbagai isu-isu akauntabiliti mengenai Badan Berkanun Persekutuan Malaysia (MFSB) 
telah didedahkan oleh pelbagai pihak di dalam laporan mereka. Sebagai sebuah badan 
sektor awam yang mengamalkan pengurusan ala korporat dan mewakili segmen yang 
besar di dalam sektor awam, MFSB seharusnya melaksanakan akauntabiliti dan 
menggalakkan ketelusan. Salah satu aspek akauntabiliti dan ketelusan adalah 
pendedahan maklumat akauntabiliti (AI) di dalam laporan tahunan. Sehubungan itu, 
kajian ini bertujuan untuk mencapai pandangan mengenai tahap pendedahan AI dalam 
laporan tahunan MFSB. Berlandaskan paradigma akauntabiliti awam dan teori institusi, 
tiga objektif kajian telah dibangunkan: (i) untuk menentukan tahap pendedahan AI di 
dalam laporan tahunan MFSB, (ii) untuk mengkaji sama ada set tertentu pembolehubah, 
iaitu jenis MFSB, saiz lembaga pengarah, komposisi lembaga pengarah, kewujudan 
jawatankuasa audit dan tekanan fiskal mempunyai hubungan yang signifikan dengan 
tahap pendedahan sebagaimana yang ditemui dari objektif (i), dan (iii) untuk mengenal 
pasti sebab-sebab penzahiran (dan ketidakzahiran) AI di dalam laporan tahunan MFSB. 
 
Kajian ini menggunakan kaedah penyelidikan reka bentuk campuran. Data bagi fasa 
kuantitatif dikumpulkan dari 2008 laporan tahunan 106 MFSB menggunakan indeks 
pendedahan. Mereka kemudian dianalisa dengan menggunakan arahan Model Linear 
Am (GLM) untuk teknik regresi berganda. Setelah itu, 20 temu bual separa berstruktur 
telah dijalankan dengan 32 penyedia dan/atau pengurus MFSB dan pendekatan 
pengkategorian makna telah digunakan untuk menganalisis data. 
 
Hasil dapatan menunjukkan bahawa MFSB mempunyai pendedahan tahap sederhana 
sebanyak 47.8 peratus di dalam laporan tahunan mereka, dengan kepelbagaian peratus 
di antara 25 kepada 71 peratus. Keputusan juga menunjukkan bahawa kategori yang 
paling banyak didedahkan adalah Prestasi, diikuti oleh Gambaran Keseluruhan, 
Kewangan, Lain-lain (iaitu sumber manusia, sosio-alam sekitar dan aset utama), dan 
kategori Tadbir. Selain itu, kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa kekuatan model regresi 
adalah sederhana dengan larasan R
2
 pada 0.409. Dua daripada lima hipotesis disokong. 
Bukti ditemui tentang adanya hubungan yang signifikan di antara tahap pendedahan AI 
dan jenis MFSB serta adanya hubungan positif yang signifikan di antara tahap 
pendedahan AI dan kewujudan ahli dalaman di dalam lembaga pengarah. 
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Temuduga mendedahkan 53 sebab-sebab pendedahan dan 58 sebab-sebab 
ketidakdedahan. Enam tema muncul dari kedua-dua keadaan dengan tiga daripada 
mereka adalah sama, iaitu sifat data untuk laporan, implikasi pelaporan, dan tradisi serta 
amalan dalam penyediaan laporan. Tema-tema yang unik dalam hal pendedahan adalah 
pengaruh luar, pengaruh dalaman, dan kesedaran. Antara sebab-sebab yang biasa adalah 
mengikut amalan laporan organisasi lain dan untuk menyedarkan pihak-pihak 
berkepentingan mengenai fungsi dan aktiviti MFSB. Sebaliknya, ketiga-tiga tema yang 
unik untuk ketidakdedahan adalah permintaan maklumat, sumber, dan penyedia. Sebab-
sebab biasa untuk ketidakdedahan adalah kurangnya manfaat dan ketidakpentingan data. 
 
Kajian ini dapat memberi input yang berguna untuk pengamal sektor awam serta 
penyelidik yang kemudiannya boleh membantu untuk meningkatkan tahap pendedahan 
AI dan akhirnya meningkatkan akauntabiliti dan ketelusan di kalangan entiti sektor 
awam terutamanya MFSB. 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
In recent decades, there appear to be a greater call for change towards a more 
accountable and transparent government of Malaysia (Buang, 2012). The increasing 
political awareness and education level among the general Malaysian population, 
among others, are being characterised as the reasons for the Malaysian public to be 
more critical and vocal towards the government (Abdul Khalid, 2008; Yaakob et al., 
2009). Various quarters have expressed their concern and anxiety over the 
accountability issues surrounding the government (e.g. Democratic Action Party, 2008). 
In fact, many political analysts and commentators locally and internationally  have 
attributed the alarming results of the last two general elections, i.e. in 2008 and 2013, as 
the manifestation of public discontent towards the failure of the 50-year ruling 
government in upholding and fulfilling public accountability (e.g. Moten, 2009).  
 
The 2008 general election recorded the worst results for the ruling party, the National 
Front (Barisan Nasional - BN), where for the first time since 1969 lost two-thirds of 
parliamentary majority (detailed results are available at the Election Commission‘s 
website at www.spr.gov.my). There was an unprecedented major swing of votes from 
the BN to the main opposition parties which have subsequently restyled themselves as 
the Citizen‘s Coalition (Pakatan Rakyat - PR). Although BN retained its power, they 
lost five out of thirteen state assemblies. Worse still, Kuala Lumpur, which is the capital 
city of Malaysia was won by PR where 10 out of 11 of its parliamentary constituencies 
were secured by them. The Transparency International (2009) claimed that it is not 
difficult to find the link between this electoral results with the public anger on the level 
2 
 
of government transparency and accountability as the PR ran on the platform of 
transparency, accountability and governance. 
 
This remarkable political scenario was repeated in the general election conducted 
recently in May 2013. The popular vote went to the opposition allies, PR, with a 51 per 
cent majority while BN only managed to secure 47 per cent of the votes (Navarria, 
2013). PR also secured seats in 10 out of 12 state capitals in Malaysia. Despite these 
results, the BN government retains power as they won the simple majority of the 
parliamentary seats. These seats are not allocated proportionally but rather on the 
constituency level (Awang Besar et al., 2012). Analysts and observers such as Puyok 
(2013) concluded that the young, educated and urban voters are those attracted to PR‘s 
agenda of political, economic and social reform for greater public accountability. 
According to Abu Bakar et al. (2011), public grouses demonstrated through these last 
two elections should have given enough signal that various shortcomings in the 
Malaysian public sector need to be  dealt  with  and  overcome. 
 
Besides the above electoral results which imply fading public satisfaction on the 
government‘s accountability, the state of accountability of the Malaysian public sector 
can also be assessed from several external independent assessments on the country. One 
of them includes the 2012 Open Budget Survey
1
 conducted by an independent body 
namely the International Budget Partnership. The results in terms of both the ranking 
and the Open Budget Index (OBI) score
2
 are very discouraging where Malaysia was 
ranked 62
nd
 out of 98 countries and scored only 39 per cent (International Budget 
                                                
1 The Open Budget Survey measures the budget transparency and accountability in 100 countries. It is completed by independent 
researchers in the countries assessed. Ninety-five out of 125 of the questions deal directly with the public availability and 
comprehensiveness of the eight key budget documents that governments should publish at various points of the budget cycle.  
2The OBI, a simple average of the quantified responses for the 95 survey questions that are related to budget transparency. The OBI 
assigns each country a score that can range from 0 to 100 to allow for comparisons across countries and over time.  
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Partnership, 2013). These results imply that Malaysia has been providing minimal 
information on the federal government‘s budget and financial activities during the 
course of the budget year. It is more disheartening to know that there has been no 
improvement on transparency and accountability recorded as similar OBI scores were 
obtained in 2010. 
 
Another independent assessment which received much public attention is the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) conducted by the Transparency International. The 
CPI ranks Malaysia 54
th
 out of 176 countries. In terms of the corruption perception 
score, Malaysia obtained 49 per cent indicating a worrying level of corruption. In fact, 
two-thirds of the countries worldwide are obtaining scores below 50 per cent suggesting 
a serious problem of corruption worldwide (Transparency International, 2012). The 
highest score of 100 means the country is perceived to be clean from corruption, while a 
score of 0 means the otherwise. 
 
Besides those international studies, at the national level, there are a series of financial 
scandals, ‗suspected‘ frauds3 and malpractices involving public agencies, public 
officials at both the low and high level and politicians have been put under the spotlight 
(Case, 2008). These accountability concerns include the rising number of corruption, 
humongous prices paid by the government for goods and services, serious costs 
escalation, low quality delivery and delays in projects, extravagant, careless, 
unnecessary and wasteful spending, funds abuse, budget overshot, noncompliance to the 
procurement procedure, and widening national deficit (Buang, 2012; Moten, 2009; 
Nadeswaran, 2009; Puyok, 2013; Transparency International, 2009). The problems were 
unveiled by the Auditor General (A-G) yearly reports, Public Accounts Committee 
                                                
3 These cases are considered ‗suspected‘ because under the law fraud has to be proven in court based on proper investigation by the 
competent authorities. Until then, these cases can be conveniently classified as mismanagement which at least disciplinary actions 
should be taken by the department heads against the defendant (Buang, 2008). 
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(PAC) special reports, advocacy groups such as Civil Movement Against Corruption 
(GERAK) and the oppositions‘ revelations through alternative medias. All these serve 
as the common basis of public awareness on the abuse, misuse and mismanagement of 
public funds by the public bodies or their officials (Abu Bakar & Ismail, 2011; National 
Audit Department, 2009a).  
 
To a greater extent, various quarters even argued that the A-G annual report has been an 
‗annual ritual of shame‘ to the government  (e.g. Lim, 2007). Nevertheless, the larger 
public has the perception that more often than not, the implicated agencies do not 
proceed the case with any further investigations and there are a lack of disciplinary or 
punitive actions taken by the department or agency heads on perpetrators and errant 
government officials or agencies whose negligence or carelessness have led to losses to 
the government or to project failures. This perceived inaction by the public has in fact 
been recognised and endorsed by the A-G (refer to Buang (2012)). The A-G has even 
concurred that the inaction is in fact often the cause of the widespread fraud or 
negligence. What make things worse were ridiculous explanations were given by the 
public agencies or officials as a response to these exposures of their mismanagement of 
funds, even when the exposures actually came from highly credible authorities such as 
the A-G and the PAC themselves. An example of this was provided by Lim (2007): 
The Treasury claimed the purchase of 90 sets of Faber Castell technical pens at 
RM1,146.56 per set when the market price is RM160 per set is because each set 
also included a set of spare nibs and other accessories. This is wrong as the 
original purchase order did not include such accessories. Further, such 
explanations are ridiculous as it would mean that the accessories are more 
expensive than the original item, as much as almost 10 times the price of the 
original technical pens. 
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One of the high profile accountability scandals is the National Feedlot Corporation 
(NFC) case involving the former Malaysian Minister of Women, Family and 
Community Development,  Shahrizat Abdul Jalil, and her immediate family members 
who run the operation of NFC. As reported in The Sun Daily (2011): 
The NFC - which was meant to be the centre of production for beef and beef 
products in Malaysia - hit the spotlight following the publication of the 2010 
Auditor-General's Report in October and disclosures by the Opposition of 
alleged misuse of funds involving the purchase of two luxury condominiums in 
Bangsar, luxury cars, office rentals and overseas holidays for the directors' 
family members.  
The A-G's report said that the NFC was in a mess and it had failed to meet its 
target. Following the report, it was claimed that the RM250 million loan 
allocated to the company by the government was used to buy property and 
holidays. Since the disclosures, there have been calls for Shahrizat, who is also 
Wanita Umno chief, to step down. 
 
Another scandal which has been under the limelight deriving from the A-G report was 
the purchase of items and equipment at wildly inflated prices by the National Youth 
Skill Institute project, under the Ministry of Youth and Sports. For example, a cabin 
bought for RM141,900 when the market price is only RM20,000, and a car jack that 
cost RM50 was bought for RM5,471 (National Audit Department, 2007). The Treasury 
has provided some explanations as to why these prices are much higher than the market 
price but these responses appeared to many as cover-ups and ridiculous; among their 
justifications for the humongous prices were that the suppliers‘ locations are different 
from the Institute and that the price include the infrastructure cost. 
 
Additionally, in the 2010 A-G report, nine ministries were testified as spending more 
than their approved and budgeted expenditures by more than RM3.6 billion. This 
includes the Education Ministry, Finance Ministry, Health Ministry and Defence 
Ministry which have overspent by RM1.24 billion, RM772 million, RM690 million and 
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RM658 million respectively. In other situations, there have been many evidences of the 
outrageous figures in the military budget compared with the budget on healthcare or 
other urgent social services. For example, the Defence Ministry suffers an estimated 
loss of RM 6.75 billion for the purchase of six off-shore naval patrol vessels (OPVs) 
that were either delivered but not operational or still not delivered. This issue implicated 
the current Premier, Najib Razak who was the Defence Minister then and has been one 
of the issues capitalised by the opposition during the electoral campaign.  
 
The Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies (MFSB) are not spared from such abuse of 
public trusts. One such occasion is the infamous legal proceedings, the Port Klang Free 
Zone (PKFZ)
4
 fiasco which has been dubbed as one of the country‘s ‗biggest financial 
scandal of the year‘ by the Transparency International (Ong, 2013; Transparency 
International, 2009). PKFZ project is owned by an MFSB, the Port Klang Authority 
(PKA). This scandal involves the former Transportation Ministers, a number of high 
profile politicians and businesspeople. It is being investigated by the PAC. According to 
the review report by the audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, this fiasco may end up 
costing the Malaysian taxpayers RM12.5 billion while the Transparency International 
stated USD1.3billion (Transparency International, 2009). The scandal involves cost 
overruns of almost five times more than the estimated RM1 billion debt level that was 
deemed sustainable for PKA. More stunningly, many of those involved in this case have 
yet to be charged or convicted. 
 
Accountability cases in MFSB do not only involve PKA, but there were previously 
other well-publicised cases involving this type of body, for example in the Pilgrimage 
Fund, Employee Provident Fund and Farmers‘ Land Development Authority (FELDA) 
                                                
4 The project was to have the following features: a 405-hectare facility comprising 512 warehouses, 2,000 covered parking bays, 
four ofﬁce buildings, an exhibition centre and a four-star hotel. 
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(BERNAMA, 2010). One important reference on the accountability problems in MFSB 
is the A-G annual reports on MFSB which are available online on the former‘s website 
(National Audit Department, 2009a). Among the common problems highlighted were 
lack of compliance to procedures and regulations, substandard performance, weaknesses 
in implementation, and lack of competency and expertise (more discussion available in 
Section 3.4). These issues make it quite difficult for citizens to hold MFSB accountable 
for its management of the public‘s money. These incidences generally indicate that 
MFSB needs to put rigorous effort in improving its accountability and transparency as 
these problems will affect the development of the country (Office of the Auditor-
General, 2008). 
 
Despite the above elaborations on the accountability issues embroiling the public sector 
in general and the MFSB in particular, it must be acknowledged that a lot of initiatives 
have actually been undertaken to ensure an accountable Malaysian government. Some 
of the important initiatives are shown in Table 1.1. The table shows that from as early as 
the 1960s, the government has made some efforts in improving the public sector. This 
includes the introduction of the Programme and Performance Budgeting System and the 
Micro Accounting System. Beginning 1990s, more efforts were undertaken owing to the 
New Public Management (NPM) surrounding the international and then the local public 
sector (Shafie, 1996). This can be seen through the introduction of Modified Budgeting 
System (MBS) programs, the Productivity  Improvement  Initiative,  Total  Quality  
Management,  Client Charter, ISO and the benchmarking exercises (Saleh, 2008; 
Xavier, 2009). 
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Table 1.1: Major Milestones in the Malaysian Public Sector Reform 
No. YEAR INITIATIVES 
1 1968 Programme and Performance Budgeting System (PPBS) 
2 1987, 1992 Micro Accounting System (MAS) 
3 1990 Modified Budgeting System (MBS) 
4 1991 Productivity Improvement Initiative (PMI) 
5 1992 Total Quality Management (TQM) 
6 1993 Clients‘ Charter 
7 1996 ISO 
8 1999 Benchmarking 
9 2004 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for government-linked (GLC) companies 
10 2005 KPIs for all other government agencies  
11 2007 Treasury Strategic results area and strategic KPIs 
12 2007 Auditor-General‘s Star Rating on Financial Management 
13 2008 MAMPU‘s Star Rating System on Public Management 
14 2009 KPIs for Minister and Ministries 
15 2009 KPIs for jobholders in the senior echelons of public service 
  Source: Adopted from Abu Bakar & Ismail (2011) 
 
The MBS, for example, has  the  main  objective  of  improving  and  modernizing  the  
process  of resource  allocation  and  increasing  the  public  sector  managers‘ 
accountability on the basis of performance (Saleh, 2007, 2008; Xavier, 1998). There 
was a claim by the architects of the reforms that the financial management and 
accountability in public services have improved through the MBS (Malaysian 
Government, 2000). The Client‘s Charter, which also echoed the NPM, although 
narrowly focusing on front-end service delivery, has contributed toward promoting 
greater accountability for results (Xavier, 2009).  
 
In 1999, a benchmarking policy was introduced through the Development 
Administration Circular No.1  in the Malaysian public organizations to enable the 
continuous improvement culture inculcated by previous reform programs (Prime 
Minister's Department, 1999). The five types of benchmarking to be conducted by 
government bodies include:  comparison among their own units, among agencies of 
similar services, among agencies providing dissimilar services, among different sectors, 
and with international counterparts. 
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Beginning in 2004, Key Performance Indicator (KPI) initiatives were introduced with 
the government-linked companies (GLCs) as the pioneer (Mohd. Alwi & Abdul Khalid, 
2008). This initiative was claimed to have resulted in marked improvement in the 
performance of GLCs (e.g. Razak, 2008). Interestingly, the KPI are revealed to the 
public, hence indicating the GLCs commitment towards greater performance, 
transparency and accountability. It also provides some basis for stakeholders‘ feedbacks 
(Yakcop, 2006). Following that, the KPI initiative are instituted in all public agencies 
through the issuance of the Development Administration Circular No. 2 in 2005. The 
target was that by 2010 almost all public agencies in Malaysia are required to 
implement the KPI system (Economic Planning Unit, 2006). Later in 2009, KPI is also 
required for ministers, ministries and senior echelons of public services.  
 
Despite these efforts, still it was found that in some public sectors such as the local 
government, KPIs are not issued to the public and meant for internal purposes and that 
there is an absence of mechanisms to serve as the ‗carrot and stick‘ in ensuring the KPI 
is implemented successfully (Abdul Khalid, 2008). The glaring incident related to this is 
that following the Premier announcement on KPI agenda to be implemented on 
ministries, there was almost impromptus detractor by one of the ministers against 
revealing the KPIs to the public for fear of public misinterpretation (The Star Online, 
2009). This perhaps confirms the argument brought forward by several international 
researchers such as Siddiquee (2005) and Kim (2009) that although many of the 
developing countries are attempting to promote public accountability as a part of public 
sector reform, their situation remains unsatisfactory compared to advanced countries. 
They further commented that the lack of political will on undertaking political and legal 
reform is one factor for the limited success regarding public sector reform. The 
minister‘s concern was basically unfounded and can be seen as a personal strategy to get 
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away from accountability. In the UK, the publication of this information was shown to 
be valued by the public, believing that this would enhance public accountability, 
according to the UK Audit Commission (Cowper & Samuels, 2003). According to the 
Commission, it was also to improve the public image of the public sector, throwing 
positive light on their commitments toward transparent and accountable government. 
 
Another important effort promoting accountability and curbing the mismanagement of 
public funds include the implementation of the star rating system on financial 
management by the National Audit Department and on public management by 
Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU) in 
2007 and 2008 respectively. The National Audit Department rating system is also 
referred to as the Financial Management Accountability Index (FMAI). In essence, the 
FMAI is an objective ﬁnancial management assessment on all ministries and state 
governments. Marks are awarded and star ratings are given accordingly. The results will 
be used to identify areas of weaknesses while those achieving excellent rating may 
serve as role models for others. This is hoped to encourage healthy competition among 
the public sector bodies towards improving their ﬁnancial management which will 
hopefully enhance accountability, transparency, and eﬃciency in the public service 
delivery system performance (National Audit Department, 2008a). The FMAI has also 
been endorsed by external bodies such as the Transparency International as a step in the 
right direction as it shows the National Audit Department‘s seriousness in checking 
corruption and the abuse of public funds and assets (Transparency International, 2008). 
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The most recent effort by the government is the establishment of the National Key 
Results Area (NKRA) against corruption. According to the A-G, Buang (2012): 
It [The government] has established an NKRA against corruption as an 
important element in the whole Government Transformation Program (GTP) 
under which several core initiatives have been undertaken in the areas of 
regulatory and enforcement, government procurement and grand corruption. So 
we now see SPRM [i.e. Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission] and the police 
being strengthened, greater efficiency of the judiciary in disposing corruption 
cases, enforcing stiffer punishment, etc. 
 
The National Audit Department is seen to be very keen in promoting accountable 
government. The A-G has given clear cues to the government to be more transparent 
and that an accountable government should not be afraid of public scrutiny (Buang, 
2009). It has been argued that the public sector should be receptive of the notion of open 
government where public information is readily available. The entire government 
machinery, especially top-level management, should be made to fully understand the 
need for government to be accountable by publishing information set that helps them 
achieve this. As indicated earlier by the A-G, the public sector should neither be fearful 
of, nor object to, a system of effective government accountability. More importantly, 
people have the right to get access as to how their money is being managed by the 
public sector (Giroux & Shields, 1993). In turn, the public sector bodies are fully 
accountable to the public and should be transparent by disclosing
5
 the necessary 
information. 
 
1.2  Problem Statement and Aim of the Study 
Based on the preceding discussion, which highlights the numerous accountability 
concerns in the Malaysian public sector in general and MFSB in particular, as well as 
the initiatives carried out to enhance their accountability, there is a need to have a more 
objective mechanism of ensuring accountability is being discharged by the public 
                                                
5 Disclosing, reporting, publishing and communicating are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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bodies. An aspect of accountability that has hitherto not been sufficiently dealt within 
both the public domain (e.g. media, A-G and PAC reports) and literature (will be 
elaborated in Chapter 2 and 3) is the issue of transparency. Transparency is in fact one 
of the core ingredients of accountability as corruption and fraudulent cases are the 
outcome of a lack of transparency (Patrizio, 2010). According to Ho & Wong (2001), an 
aspect of transparency would be the disclosure of both mandated and voluntary 
information. Disclosure, on the other hand, can be done through various mediums 
including the annual reports which have been regarded by the literatures as the main 
tool to discharge accountability (Tooley & Guthrie, 2007).  
 
Given the above, MFSB is unique in terms of it being required to prepare and table its 
annual report to the Parliament (The Commissioner of Law Revision, 2006; Treasury, 
2007). This is not the case in other Malaysian public entities such as the local 
governments (Joseph, 2010b). In preparing the annual report, MFSB have been issued 
with a guideline in 2007, namely the Treasury Circular no. 4 (TC4/2007) by the 
Ministry of Finance through the Treasury. The aim of the TC4/2007 is partly to promote 
accountability and governance in these bodies (Treasury, 2007). This Circular is rather 
specific on items to be disclosed and the timing aspect that should be complied by 
MFSB for the submission of these documents. It is however, not known to what extent 
MFSB has followed the Circular. Besides this Circular, literature has suggested a 
number of items that should be disclosed by public bodies and demonstrated how by 
disclosing these wide range of information may help the public sector to fulfil its public 
accountability  (e.g. Tooley et al., 2010). There are also various corporate or private 
sector guidelines which may be useful for MFSB to follow in their disclosure practice 
given their unique setting as semi-governmental bodies (refer to Chapter 3 for more 
details).  
13 
 
Hence, it is necessary to see to what extent MFSB actually disclosed the required 
(mandatory) and recommended (voluntary) information that promotes and fulfil their 
public accountability in their annual reports, which have been referred to by the 
literature as accountability information (see Section 2.3.1.2 for fuller definition). Also, 
given the uniqueness and importance of MFSB as they represent a large segment of 
public sector due to their employee size, assets size and public fund size (more detail 
will be provided in Chapter 3)
6
, the study of MFSB disclosure of accountability 
information will be very meaningful. It is also worthwhile studying MFSB due to the 
various accountability concerns in these organisations. 
 
In short, this study aims to obtain an insight and understanding on the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information in the annual reports of the MFSB. 
Specifically, three research questions are developed to achieve this main objective.  
 
1.3 Research Questions and Methodology 
Based on the above problem statement and research aim, there are three specific 
research questions set to be answered by the thesis. 
 
To recap, the Malaysian government issued a guideline for MFSB for the preparation of 
annual reports and financial statements (i.e. TC4/2007) as part of its effort to promote 
accountability, transparency and governance in these bodies. Among the items required 
to be included in the statutory bodies‘ annual reports are accountability information and 
performance report (Treasury of Malaysia, 2007). Besides the TC4/2007, prior literature 
identified various disclosure items found to be important to be included in the public 
sector annual reports as a means to discharge their accountability. This study will adapt 
                                                
6 Chapter 3 will discuss this in more detail by providing some statistical data. 
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these items together with the Circular‘s items as well as several other new items deemed 
to be important in Malaysian context to see whether MFSB have or have not disclosed 
these items in their annual reports. This will determine the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the MFSB‘s annual reports. Therefore, research question 1 
(RQ1) is: What is the extent of the disclosure of accountability information in the 
Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies’ annual reports? 
 
Previous disclosure studies in both the public and the private sector tested the 
association between certain variables such as firm size, profitability and reliance on 
debt, and the extent of disclosure. It will therefore be meaningful for this thesis to 
provide additional evidence to predict association between the dependent and 
independent variables. The variables that will be included are (i) MFSB type, (ii) board 
size, (iii) board composition, (iv) existence of audit committee and (v) fiscal stress. 
They are primarily drawn from the institutional theory of isomorphism - coercive, 
normative and mimetic. Prior studies are drawn from various theoretical frameworks 
including the agency theory and the legitimacy theory. Therefore, research question 2 
(RQ2) is: Do MFSB type, board size, board composition, existence of audit committee 
and fiscal stress have significant associations with the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies’ annual reports? 
 
Besides the above variables, there could be other reasons for the disclosure or 
nondisclosure of accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB. MFSB 
managers and report preparers may have their personal and/or organisational motives 
and reasons for making any decisions on accounting choice including on reporting or 
nonreporting of information. This brings forward the research question 3 (RQ3), i.e.: 
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What are the reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure of accountability information in 
the Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies’ annual reports? 
 
Based on the above research questions, three research objectives will be addressed. The 
first objective is to determine the extent of disclosure of accountability of information in 
the annual reports of MFSB. Second objective is to examine whether certain set of 
variables namely the type of MFSB, board size, board composition, existence of audit 
committee and fiscal stress have significant association with the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB. While the third and last 
research objective is to identify reasons for the disclosure and nondisclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB from preparers‘ and/or public 
managers‘ perspective. 
 
In answering the research questions, both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
will be applied. The quantitative phase will precede the qualitative phase where RQ1 
and RQ2 will be addressed using the quantitative approach. Specifically, for RQ1, 
MFSB annual reports‘ content will be analysed using a disclosure index approach. The 
disclosure index or checklist will be developed from various sources and categorised 
into several common themes. The binary and unweighted method of scoring will be 
adopted. Following that, to answer RQ2, the association or relationship between the 
variables will be examined using the multiple regression analysis with the general linear 
model (GLM) used as the command. Later the qualitative phase come into the picture 
when answering the RQ3 where semi-structured interview will be conducted with a 
certain number of MFSB annual report preparers/managers and the meaning 
categorization approach will be adopted to analyze the interview data. 
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1.4 Significance of the Study 
The significance of the thesis can be seen in various ways. In the international context, 
this thesis is significant for several reasons. First, the thesis adds to the existing 
knowledge on the disclosure practice of public sector in developing countries as prior 
studies tend to focus on more developed nations such as the UK, the US, Australia and 
New Zealand. It  is very important to have an insight of public sector disclosure practice 
in developing nations to develop a truly comprehensive understanding of public sector 
disclosure (Goddard, 2010). In this regard, Goddard (2010) asserted that public sector 
studies in developing nations are even more important than those where research is 
vibrant namely in the developed nations. 
 
Secondly, this thesis conducted mixed method research where examination of annual 
reports disclosure is further complemented with an interview to understand the reasons 
for such disclosure practice. Most prior research has not obtained primary data such as 
interview to understand reasons for disclosure or nondisclosure.  
 
Thirdly, the thesis develops a more comprehensive disclosure index to measure the 
extent of accountability information disclosure of public sector annual reports. Through 
the index, a refined framework on disclosure practice for public agencies is developed 
as many aspects of reporting have been taken into account in developing the index 
including financial, performance, and governance disclosure. Consequently, future 
research may employ the index in other public sector settings such as local government 
and state government as well as in other countries. This may allow comparisons to be 
made across different types of public sector entities as well as across nations.  
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Fourth, relatively less tested variables in public sector studies have been used in this 
study to see their association with disclosure practice. These include governance 
variable (i.e. board composition and board size), and fiscal stress. The latter factor, for 
example may be able to provide new understanding on whether the financial resources 
of public entities has any bearing on the disclosure practice of the respective entity.  
 
Fifth, the results and findings found from this thesis is hoped to enrich both public 
sector and corporate governance literatures. In essence, it is expected to contribute 
towards understanding of the governance and accountability issues in MFSB. The 
findings may also serve as a turning point for corporate governance literature to look 
into other sectors instead of focusing on the private sector per se. 
 
The significance of this thesis can also be clearly seen in the national context (i.e. 
Malaysia). There are very limited studies in Malaysia examining the public sector 
disclosure. To the best of the researcher‘s knowledge and based on cursory examination 
of literature, it was found that there are only a handful of published studies and theses 
conducted in the area of public sector disclosure in Malaysia. Majority of these few 
available studies appear to pose some gaps in the literature, for example they do not 
cover the MFSB  except for one published study that was conducted on public 
universities, which is one type of MFSB (i.e. Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011) and one thesis 
which covers half of the existing MFSB (i.e. Azis, 2008). Also, the studies mostly do 
not examine annual reports but rather focus on other disclosure mediums such as 
financial accounts and websites. Thirdly, they do not comprehensively cover the various 
aspects of disclosure but rather limit their disclosure analysis on certain disclosure 
issues such as financial reporting or performance reporting. Fourthly, they mostly do 
not attempt to identify determinants of disclosure. All these gaps are addressed by this 
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thesis by providing evidence on MFSB through annual reports analysis based on a 
comprehensive disclosure and consequently examine the potential predictors of 
disclosure.  
 
From the practical point of view, the findings from this thesis have several implications 
and provide useful inputs for the policy makers, regulators, legislators, the respective 
ministries, MFSB themselves, as well as the larger civil society. These parties can 
benefit from the study in different ways as each of them have and should play their 
expected role in promoting greater disclosure, transparency and accountability of MFSB 
in particular and public sector in general. 
 
Based on the above discussions, this thesis is therefore expected to contribute towards 
the knowledge theoretically and practically in the field by providing further insights and 
evidences in understanding the public sector disclosure. The next section shall discuss 
the scope of the study. 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The thesis, as in any other research, is subject to certain scope. The scope of a particular 
research is set to make it more feasible and doable within various constraints such as 
limited resources including time, financial and human resources. The followings are the 
scope of this study. 
 
First, the thesis only focuses on Malaysia. Besides personal motivation due to the 
country of origin of the researcher, Malaysia was chosen due to the recent development 
in the country where there is increased concern over the perceived lack of transparency 
and accountability in the public sector. The public has called for change toward a more 
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transparent and accountable government (Abu Bakar et al., 2011) and this concern has 
been partly manifested in the most recent general election in 2008 as explained earlier. 
Further, from international viewpoint, Malaysia has been repeatedly ranked low in 
terms of accountability and transparency in various ranking system. 
 
Second, the thesis focuses on MFSB. The main motivation for selecting MFSB is due to 
the substantial amount of public money provided to these MFSB in the form of grants 
and loan to subsidize their activities
7
. Given the size of public money spent for these 
bodies, it is considered indispensable for them to report their activities and performance 
(i.e. accountability information) as a medium to discharge their accountability. Another 
reason is that there exists a clear statutory requirement for MFSB to prepare and submit 
their annual reports and accounts, together with items to be disclosed (i.e. TC4/2007). 
The issuance of TC4/2007 shows there is certain level of expectation from the policy 
makers that MFSB provide certain level of disclosure in their annual reports. It would 
be therefore interesting to see to whether the MFSB followed the guideline in their 
annual reporting. Additionally, the other type of statutory bodies in Malaysia that is the 
State Statutory Bodies (SSB) are not included in this thesis for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, almost all SSB do not produce annual reports which are the unit of analysis in 
this study and therefore it would be less meaningful to include this category of statutory 
bodies in the study
8
. Second reason is that SSB has different governance and regulatory 
structure than that of federal. The former is primarily governed by the respective states‘ 
rules and regulations whereas the latter is directly governed by the federal government 
through the Ministry of Finance and are subjected to accounting rules and regulation 
that are not necessary applicable to the former, particularly the TC4/2007 which is one 
important element in this study. 
                                                
7 More discussion on this is provided in Chapter 3. 
8 The state government prepares one annual report that comprehensively include all its departments, agencies, and statutory bodies. 
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Third, this study examines only annual reports. This is due to the assumption that 
annual reports are the main accountability medium (Tooley & Guthrie, 2007). Other 
mediums of communication (such as financial reports per se, extended/stand-alone 
performance reports, internal documents, websites, etc.) are not examined partly due to 
diverse reporting practices among MFSB as well as accessibility issues. Although it is 
undoubtedly agreed that public sector information is not necessarily communicated 
through annual reports only,  this same reason makes the accountability information 
data of each agency scattered and makes it almost impossible for an outsider to assess  
all these sources (of which some are unknown) in order to evaluate the extent of 
disclosure (Gordon & Fischer, 2008). 
 
Fourth, the thesis does not differentiate between the mandatory and voluntary items. 
Instead, it regards all items included in the disclosure index as important towards 
discharging public accountability. The results of mandatory (or rather required) and 
voluntary items are nevertheless provided in some circumstances as supplementary or 
additional findings. 
 
Fifth, it is assumed in this study that stakeholders are able to obtain copies of an entity‘s 
reports at ease. Accessibility and/or distribution of annual report, which are important 
qualitative characteristics of external reporting particularly under the public 
accountability paradigm (see Coy et al., 2001) are not the focus of the thesis.  
 
The organisation of the thesis‘s chapters is described next. 
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1.6 Structure of the Subsequent Chapters 
The thesis is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides the outcome of the review 
of the literature relevant to public sector reporting. It is concluded that there are various 
lacuna in the public sector reporting literatures hence justifies the current study.  
 
Chapter 3 invites the readers to understand the MFSB setting. This chapter is necessary 
for discussing other subsequent chapters due to the unique characteristics of MFSB as a 
public sector body which might not be familiar to many. The chapter also finds scant 
empirical evidence on public sector dislcosure studies in various aspects hence justifies 
the present study. 
 
The subsequent chapter (i.e. Chapter 4) offers the theoretical framework, the research 
paradigm, the hypotheses development and the research methodology of the thesis. It 
details out the research design of this thesis which comprises two phases, first being the 
the quantitative and later followed by the qualitative phase. 
 
The thesis then proceeds with Chapter 5, 6 and 7 which present detailed results and 
findings of RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3, respectively. Here, links are made to prior literatures 
and the theoretical perspectives of the study to see how the results and findings are 
consistent or otherwise with the former. Attempts are also made to see if the results and 
findings from the RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 supports each other. 
 
The thesis is then concluded in Chapter 8 with a brief summary on the thesis‘s main 
findings, and elaborate discussion the thesis‘s implications and recommendations to the 
relevant parties and to the theory and knowledge. The strength and limitations of the 
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thesis as well as recommendations for future research direction are then being laid out. 
The thesis finally concludes.  
 
1.7 Summary 
Despite various government initiatives for reform, the poll results of the last two general 
elections in Malaysia, the independent worldwide assessment on the country‘s 
accountability status and the reports from various credible national sources have 
suggested widespread accountability issues surround Malaysian public sector 
organisations, especially MFSB in particular.  
 
Transparency is one important aspect in discharging accountability, as the lack of 
accountability is partly the outcome of the lack of transparency. Disclosure of 
comprehensive information covering both mandatory and voluntary information as 
expected from various stakeholders, i.e. accountability information, is, in turn, an aspect 
of transparency. As a corporate public sector body, MFSB have been required to 
prepare annual reports as part of its fulfilment of public accountability. In light of this, 
and given the uniqueness as well as the size and importance of MFSB in the Malaysian 
public sector, this study is motivated to obtain further understanding on the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB.  
 
Three specific questions will be answered to achieve this main objective; they are 
related to the extent of disclosure, variables associated with disclosure and reasons for 
disclosure and nondisclosure. The mixed method approach is adopted where the 
quantitative method will be used to answer the first two RQ while the qualitative 
method is applied to answer the third RQ. 
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The study is significant in various ways. It provides additional insights on public sector 
disclosure practices in developing nations, it provides a qualitative dimension of 
disclosure practice, it develops a more comprehensive disclosure index, it tests a few 
previously less tested variables in public sector disclosure literature, it adds further to 
the public sector and governnance literature both locally and internationally and finally 
it has practical implications for practitioners and researchers. 
 
 
 
 
  
24 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This study focuses on reporting of accountability information by public organisations. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant literature on this issue. Section 2.2 begins with 
an overview of public sector reporting. This is followed with a review of studies on 
public sector reporting in Section 2.3. Here, different aspects of public sector reporting 
are discussed and the definitions of accountability information and reporting used in this 
thesis are provided. Studies focusing on public sector reporting, influential factors and 
reasons for reporting and non reporting are also examined. The chapter then proceeds 
with a review of studies on public sector reporting in the context of Malaysia in Section 
2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the literature on public sector disclosure among semi-
governmental bodies in other countries. A discussion of annual reports as a medium of 
public sector reporting is provided in Section 2.6. The chapter is concluded in Section 
2.7.  
 
2.2 Reporting of Accountability 
Public sector organisations, as agents entrusted with public resources, must reveal their 
accountability to the stakeholders. Accountability in the public sector is more 
ambiguous, complex, elusive, fragmented and heterogeneous concept than in the private 
sector (Greiling & Spraul, 2010; Ryan et al., 2002a). This is due to the multiple 
accountabilities, both to those internal to the organisation and those external as a result 
of the latter diversifying the interests and objectives of the former (Australian  National  
Audit  Office, 1997). There are many ways of classifying between the internal and 
external stakeholders. One of them is as shown in Figure 2.1, where the internal 
stakeholders include the executives, chief executive officers, board of directors, 
25 
 
minister, treasury and other regulatory bodies, parliament and auditor general. Whereas 
the external stakeholders include the taxpayers or levypayers, interest groups, suppliers 
and media. In the case of media, Chee (1991) has expressed that it has been regarded as 
an informal and external check-and-balance mechanism for public accountability. 
Public sector accountability has gained importance as a mechanism to control the use 
and abuse of power. The importance of accountability in the public sector has been 
summarised by Samaratunge et al. (2008) as follows:  
Accountability is an important means for establishing criteria to measure the 
performance of public officials, and for creating oversight mechanisms, to ensure 
that the quality of public services is improved. Lack of accountability makes a 
state weak and its public management system dysfunctional. (p. 102) 
 
 
 
Key:  
                bonds of accountability 
              - - - - - -     links of accountability 
     1           for government-owned corporations and some statutory bodies 
   2           include competitors/customers/clients/other equivalent public sector agencies 
 
Figure 2.1: Chain of Accountabilities for Departments, Statutory Bodies, 
Government-owned Corporations 
Source: Ryan et al. (2002a) 
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Consistent with the above, Coy et al. (2001) argued that there are many accountability 
mechanisms, both within and external to the institutions. They maintained that a 
government agency‘s internal line of responsibility and accountability is through the 
chief executive officer to the governing board, responsible minister and to the 
parliament. Additionally, accountability mechanisms with the external world exist 
through the general responsiveness of institutions to public and media enquiries. They 
further added that there are various ways of providing the information element of 
accountability, namely through the ―formal and informal, routine and ad hoc, written, 
spoken, electronic, and other media‖ (p.14). Similarly, Bowrey (2008) listed the key 
stakeholders of government agencies as comprising of the parliament, government 
[particularly via the Departments of Finance and Administration, treasury and prime 
minister and cabinet],  ministers, public service officers and the public. The broad 
spectrum of shareholders means that the agencies are accountable to several sectors of 
society which thus necessitates a high degree of transparency and disclosure in their 
activities. 
 
Normanton (1971, cited in Coy et al., 2001) argued that accountability per se is based 
on a hierarchical relationship and usually operates in secret. On the other hand, public 
accountability calls for openly declared facts and open debate by laymen and their 
elected representatives. Public accountability, according to him, obliges politicians, 
ofﬁcials and managements to engage openly in dialogue which calls into question what 
they are doing, and sometimes upon which that activity is founded. From here, it is clear 
that public sector entities should be accountable to a wider public instead of focusing on 
those existing on the higher strata of the hierarchy. Coy et al. (2001) succinctly 
explained this issue: 
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The public entities are owned by the public, funded from the public purse, 
including private gifts and state appropriations, and provide services to the 
community as a whole. For these reasons, the stakeholders include all members 
of the community. (p. 13) 
 
Public accountability can be achieved through effective external reporting on 
conformance and performance against its objectives. As argued by many authors, public 
accountability is seen to be a more relevant concept for public sector reporting than the 
concept of decision usefulness, unlike in the case of private sector reporting (e.g. Nelson 
et al., 2003; Mack & Ryan, 2006) (refer to Section 4.3.1). This is due to the relative 
elusiveness of the concept of ‗decision‘ in the public sector, and, the non-voluntary 
relationship between the fund providers and users in the public sector. 
 
In the context of MFSB, given its autonomy (refer to Section 3.2.3) there should be 
concern about their ability to balance between discharging public accountability and 
acting independently based on the autonomy given. This perhaps poses extra challenges 
to the MFSB management. With regards to this, Guthrie (1993) commented that the 
traditional public sector accountability is compromised when the corporate form is used 
in public sector agencies as greater attention is given to its commercial rather than its 
social objectives. Consistent with this, several authors have highlighted that there has 
been notable changes in accountability focus and mechanisms as NPM been introduced 
(Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007).  
 
NPM, according to Hood (1995) is a suite of changes to public sector management as a 
result of two doctrines, namely: (i) that the public and private sectors should be made 
less separable by aligning the private sector with the public sector, and, (ii) that rules 
within the public sector should be lessened so as to increase managerial discretion. This 
supported the notion that much of the innovation in the public sector has origins related 
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to practices in the private sector (Hood, 1991;  1995). Accordingly, NPM is manifested 
in the seven following dimensions: 
(i) unbundling of organisations into corporatized units organised by product; 
(ii) more contract-based competitive provision, with internal markets and term 
contracts; 
(iii) stress on private-sector styles of management practice; 
(iv) increased discipline and frugality in resource use; 
(v) more emphasis on visible hands-on top management; 
(vi) explicit formal measurable standards and measures of performance and 
success; and, 
(vii) greater emphasis on output controls. 
 
Among the leading public sector reformers is the UK. The scope of public sector reform 
in the UK includes a wide breath of reform namely new institutions, new frameworks of 
accountability, new management systems and processes and new accounting practices 
and procedures (Jackson & Lapsley, 2003). The major impetus of the public sector 
reforms is a new managerialism in the public sector. For example, one of the key 
reforms was the Financial Management Initiative in 1982 which focused on the 
profesionalisation of government managers. Another example of public sector reform in 
the UK is the creation of the Next Step Agencies as a result of the Next Step report in 
1988. These agencies operate based on the business excellence model. Among the 
implications of this new model is the preparation of commercial-based accounting 
reports which also include targets. 
 
Patrizio (2010), in analysing the effect of NPM-based reforms on public accountability, 
identified disclosure as an NPM strategy that can be used by public sector bodies to 
enhance their public accountability. He further argued that: 
Together with performance, transparency appears to be the key principle of 
accountability; the loss of legitimacy faced by public organisations in many 
countries pushes politicians to disclose more information in order to regain 
citizen conﬁdence‖ (p. 633).  
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Public bodies must be transparent in their organisations‘ activities and performance to 
allow stakeholders to assess their accountability level. Here a link is made between 
transparency, disclosure and accountability. In the context of public sector reform and 
NPM, Christiaens & Van Peteghem (2007) argued that disclosure, such as those made 
in the annual reports, is used as a means of evaluating the success of the reform 
implementation, and not as an independent objective per se.  
 
When discussing the relationship between transparency, disclosure and accountability, it 
is important to better understand the concept of transparency. By definition, 
transparency is ―the extent to which all … stakeholders have a shared understanding of, 
and access to ... the information they request, without loss, noise, delay and distortion‖ 
(Hofstede, 2003, quoted in Papenfuß & Schaefer, 2010, p.18). Transparency also refers 
to ―a process by which information about existing conditions, decisions and actions is 
made accessible, visible and understandable‖ (Working Group on International 
Financial Crisis, 1998). Operationally, according to Ho & Wong (2001), it refers to 
voluntary disclosure in addition to the already mandated disclosure. This is specifically 
how the concept of transparency is related to disclosure. On the other hand, the notion 
of the link between disclosure and accountability is supported by many other authors. 
Dixon et al. (1993) for example stated that better disclosure increases accountability to 
stakeholders. Ferlie & Pollitt (2005) also agreed that disclosure of information was the 
main means to provide wider and better accountability to the public. Consistent with 
this, according to Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005), many public bodies are trying to 
improve accountability through wider public disclosure.  
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Disclosure of more comprehensive information by public sector bodies is important as 
the traditional financial reporting system is inadequate in providing a complete account 
of business and governmental activities (Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2009). As part of the 
public sector reform  process which pushes for greater accountability and external 
disclosure (Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2005), public sector accounting and reporting 
needs to be partly reformed by introducing greater disclosure of both ﬁnancial and 
nonﬁnancial reporting. The nonfinancial reporting includes the reporting on 
performance, governance, sustainability, and intellectual capital among others. All these 
may be part and parcel of the accountability information and is provided on top of the 
financial information traditionally provided by organisations.  
 
At the same time, the development of reporting practices in the private sector has also 
become a push factor for public sector bodies to move forward beyond its traditional 
financial reporting practices. It can be observed that various reporting initiatives have 
taken place in the private sector both locally and internationally, which requires greater 
disclosure by corporations. An example is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and in 
the Malaysian context, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG). The 
MCCG, which was introduced and has in fact been revised for further improvement in 
2007, requires public listed companies to disclose various governance-related 
information. In some ways this development has deprived public institutions of their 
leadership as guardians of the social and economic wellbeing of its citizens as pointed 
out by Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009). Several authors (e.g. Marcuccio & Steccolini, 
2009) contended that in the public sector, addressing such issues as environmental, 
social and sustainability issues should be part of the official external reporting.  
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Loosely defined, accountability is often used as a synonym for ―good governance‖ or 
―virtuous behaviour‖ (Bovens, 2007). Accountability is claimed to be part of 
governance (Australian  National  Audit  Office, 1997). Despite this, as argued by Ryan 
& Ng (2000), the debate and literature on governance issues in the public sector has 
been relatively fragmented and limited. It has also been argued by Barrett (1997) that 
corporate governance frameworks in the public sector are similar to those found in the 
private sector: 
The principles of corporate governance are the same in both the public and 
private sectors. Good corporate governance requires clear definitions of 
responsibility and a clear understanding of relationships between the 
organisation‘s stakeholders and those entrusted to manage its resources and 
deliver its outcomes. (p. 3, as cited in Ryan & Ng, 2000)  
 
 
Hodges et al. (1996) observed the challenge to the public sector as a whole was:  
To devise systems of governance that can both provide assurance to stakeholders 
that the sector is in capable and honest hands, while at the same time, avoiding 
the negative effects of tight control and bureaucracy, to enable performance 
objectives to be achieved and improved. (p. 12)   
 
It is important for public sector agencies to provide ―comprehensive information on 
their  governance framework and practices in annual reports‖ although it may not be a 
statutory  requirement as highlighted in one of the corporate governance document 
issued by the Queensland  Audit  Office (Queensland Audit Office, 1999, p. 42). Ryan 
& Ng (2000) shared the Australian experience where public agencies are recognised for 
their governance information disclosure through the giving of awards for best corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
In short, public accountability should be an important agenda in public sector 
organisations. Its reporting has been explained as one mechanism by which this agenda 
can be achieved and fulfilled and as such should be given its due importance among 
public entities. 
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2.3 Studies on Public Sector Reporting 
This section discusses literature on public sector reporting primarily in order to identify 
the lacuna that will be filled by the current study. The issues discussed cover (i) aspects 
of reporting, (ii) extent and quality of reporting, (iii) factors influencing reporting and 
(iv) reasons for reporting and nonreporting. 
 
2.3.1 Aspects of Reporting 
Most studies on public sector reporting concentrated on specific aspects of reporting 
with the financial and performance reporting receiving greatest attention from public 
sector researchers (Ryan et al., 2002b). Financial reporting, besides being one of the 
most popular areas of research in public sector reporting literature, is also one of the 
earliest aspects of reporting to be studied. It continues to be widely researched (e.g. 
Caba Perez & Lopez-Hernandez, 2009; Stanley et al., 2008; Bolivar, et al., 2007; Gore, 
2004; Gordon, et al., 2002; Coombs & Tayib, 2000; Sanders, et al., 1994; Dixon et al., 
1991; Giroux, 1989; Ingram & DeJong, 1987; Robbins & Austin, 1986; Zimmerman, 
1977).  
 
Sanders et al. (1994) for example examined the level of financial disclosure provided by 
US municipalities in their annual reports through a survey of 439 Chief Financial 
Officers. While most studies on financial reporting focused on either private or public 
sector organisations,  Gordon et al. (2002) went a step further by making a comparison 
between the two sectors where they compared the extent of financial disclosure between 
100 US public and private higher education institutions. Coombs & Tayib (2000), on 
the other hand, conducted a country-wide comparative study where the financial 
reporting practices between UK and Malaysia local authorities were compared, using 
ten published accounts. Their basis of country selection is due to Britain‘s contribution 
33 
 
to the development of local Malaysian authority during the early stages of its 
development. 
 
Studies on financial reporting are also relatively more inclined than other reporting 
studies to assess compliance or conformance to certain accounting guidelines or 
suggestions such as the Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP), 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), Government Accounting Standard 
Board (GASB) or state-designated disclosure (e.g. Caba Perez & Lopez Hernandez, 
2009; Ingram & DeJong, 1987). This kind of reporting which includes compliance with 
regulations and fiscal integrity generally falls within the fiduciary/compliance 
accountability (Othman et al., 2008); fiduciary accountability is identified by Taylor & 
Rosair (2000) while compliance  accountability  by Stewart (1984), among others. The 
relatively large number of research focusing on financial reporting is possibly due to the 
nature of financial issues which is more regulated than other issues owing to necessary 
financial report submission by most public agencies to their higher authorities such as 
the treasury or auditor generals. An example of this is Caba Perez & Lopez Hernandez 
(2009) study of the consistency of the information presented in the public financial 
reports of MERCOSUR member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
with the IFAC recommendation of public financial reporting practices.  
 
Another area of reporting that has received much interest from public sector researchers 
is performance reporting (e.g. Gordon & Fischer, 2008; Hoque, 2008; Tooley & 
Guthrie, 2007; Janet, 2006; Christensen & Yoshimi, 2001, 2003; Wall & Martin, 2003; 
Hyndman & Eden, 2002; Carlin & Guthrie, 2001; Hyndman & Andersen, 1995; Boyne 
& Law, 1991). The importance of reporting performance information by public agencies 
has been widely recognised as part of the process of discharging accountability as 
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suggested by Hyndman & Andersen (1995). Taylor & Pincus (1999, as cited in Nichol 
& Taylor, 2001) mentioned that by the mid 1990s, annual reporting of public agencies 
was expected to capture both compliance (financial) reporting and performance 
reporting, due to the shift of focus from fiduciary to wider managerial accountability. 
Providing financial accounts per se is not sufficient for public agencies to demonstrate 
their accountability. To a greater extent, Boyne & Law (1991) emphasised that 
accountability is simply a sham when performance data is not provided by public 
agencies.   
 
Consistent with the above development and unlike in the case of financial reporting 
studies which tend to focus on compliance/conformance issues, there is greater variance 
in performance reporting studies in that it better covers both compliance/conformance 
(e.g. Gordon & Fischer, 2008) and voluntary reporting (e.g. Hyndman & Andersen, 
1995; Wall & Martin, 2003). Hyndman & Andersen (1995) for example analysed the 
annual reports of 57 UK executive agencies to determine the type and extent of 
voluntary performance reporting. They also compared their findings with their earlier 
study to identify any changes in emphasis over time. Wall & Martin (2003) on the other 
hand evaluated the voluntary KPI disclosure in the annual reports of numerous types of 
Irish public sector organisations, while Boyne & Law (1991) examined the disclosure of 
performance information in the annual reports of 165 Welsh local authorities. The 
present study covers both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Besides financial and performance reporting, another aspect of reporting which has seen 
increased attention in recent years is sustainability reporting which includes social and 
environmental reporting (e.g. Burritt & Welch, 1997; Gibson & Guthrie, 1995; Joseph, 
2010a, 2011; Joseph & Taplin, 2012; Lynch, 2010; Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2005, 
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2009; Mussari & Monfardini, 2010). The increasing number of studies in this area is 
partly due to the call made by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that given their size 
and inﬂuence, public agencies are expected to lead by example in reporting publicly and 
transparently on their activities to promote sustainability, as the public agencies also 
have a major impact on national and global progress towards sustainable development. 
An example of such studies is Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009) who investigated the 
patterns in the content of social reporting by 15 Italian local authorities. 
 
There are a number of other areas of reporting that are studied in the context of public 
sector research that remain unknown to the specialists as they have received lesser 
attention. These include governance reporting (e.g. Ryan & Ng, 2000), intellectual 
capital reporting (e.g. Schneider & Samkin, 2008), infrastructure assets reporting (e.g. 
Lee & Fisher, 2004) and rate of return reporting (e.g. Wines & Nicolson, 2000).  
 
In the case of governance reporting, Ryan & Ng (2000) reviewed the corporate 
governance section of 18 annual reports of various types of Australian public 
organisations to identify their level of governance information disclosure. Unlike in 
private sector literature, little research has been conducted on corporate governance in 
public sector settings. As such little is known concerning governance in the public 
sector. This is unfortunate given the importance of governance in the public sector as 
the cornerstone to sound stewardship, effective management, and attainment of 
performance objectives (Australian  National  Audit  Office, 1997). 
 
Whilst most prior research has tended to focus on specific aspects of reporting as 
discussed above, a review of the relevant literature has found that little research has 
been conducted with a comprehensive analysis of public sector reporting that covers 
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various aspects of reporting. It is important to determine whether public agencies have 
sufficiently discharged their accountability through reporting to their stakeholders on 
various aspects of their organisation. This is consistent with the concept of public 
accountability which advanced the idea that the public has the right to know about the 
condition, performance, activities and progress of public agencies. As such, the external 
reporting of public agencies should cover such information so as to allow the public to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of their operations and performance (Coy & 
Dixon, 2004) (refer to Section 4.3.1). The limited literature which covers this type of 
comprehensive public sector reporting has been referred to in the respective studies as 
accountability reporting/disclosure (Banks et al., 1997; Coy et al., 1993b, 1994; Ismail 
& Abu Bakar, 2011; Nelson et al., 2003; Ryan et al., 2002b; Taylor & Rosair, 2000). In 
several other research, this type of reporting has been also referred to as annual 
reporting (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004; Herawaty & Hoque, 2007). The next section 
discusses further the concept of accountability information and accountability.  
 
2.3.1.2 Defining Accountability Information and Reporting  
To date there remains no explicit definition regarding the term accountability reporting 
or disclosure despite its prior usage in a number of literature. The term accountability 
disclosure was used by Ryan et al. (2002b) and Taylor & Rosair (2000) while 
accountability reporting was used by Nichol &  Taylor  (2001) among others. Generally, 
accountability reporting or disclosure refers to the reporting of accountability 
information.  
 
Similarly, accountability information has yet to be explicitly defined by those using the 
term although its meaning is quite apparent given the context of the literature in which 
the term was used. Readers understand the term through intuition. The term has been 
used by a number of authors including Ijiri (1983), Dixon et al. (1991), Nichol & Taylor 
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(2000), Nelson et al. (2003), Coy et al. (2001) and Greiling & Spraul (2010). For the 
sake of clarification and due to its importance in this thesis, it is important to provide a 
clear and explicit definition of these terms in order to provide a clear and consistent 
understanding.  
 
Ijiri (1983) was apparently among the first to use the term accountability information. 
According to him, the aim of accountability information is to achieve fairness to both 
the accountor and accountee. It may include positive or negative information about the 
entity. Dixon et al. (1991) stated that accountability information is a broad spectrum of 
information based on an accountability framework, which may include employee 
information, safety data and environmental effects.  
 
Consistent with the previous authors, Nichol & Taylor (2000) referred to accountability 
information as information that may help government in fulfilling or discharging their 
accountability. According to them, this requires public organisations to report not only 
their intended activities or statement of objectives, but also major decisions taken and 
the rationale for those decisions, the actual outputs and outcomes, explanation of the 
variances between the targeted and actual outputs and outcomes, and the quality of 
internal controls of the organisation. Collectively, these considerations produce 
comprehensive reporting. 
 
Coy et al. (2001) emphasized that the disclosure of accountability information is 
consistent with the public accountability paradigm (refer to Section 4.3.1) which 
addresses the broad range of stakeholders who have vested interests in the well-being of 
the organisation. They further added that in regards to accountability information, as it 
may include both the positive and negative information as mentioned by Ijiri (1983), the 
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accountor may not feel comfortable disclosing the accountability information as he/she 
is usually inclined to think that information disclosure should provide a good 
impression. When highlighting the criteria of a quality annual report, Coy et al. (2001) 
emphasized that the annual report value ―rests in the provision of a wide range of 
summarized, relevant information in a single document, which enables all stakeholders 
to obtain a comprehensive understanding of a university‘s objectives and performance 
in ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial terms‖ (p. 14). 
 
Greiling & Spraul (2010) explained that accountability information in the public sector 
may have a symbolic function. It symbolises the competence of the supplier of the 
information and reaffirms their social virtue. In light of this, providing accountability 
information may help public bodies gain public confidence and trust.  
 
Based on the literature reviewed thus far, the term ‗accountability information‘ is 
defined in this thesis as follows:  
A broad range of information about an organisation including its 
objectives, structure, financial, performance, governance and 
other information which enable all stakeholders to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of an organisation in order to meet 
a public accountability perspective. 
 
  
As accountability information covers various types of information, the reporting of it 
(i.e. accountability reporting or disclosure) would then accordingly cover broad aspects 
of reporting or disclosure. This may include financial reporting, performance reporting, 
governance reporting, social and environmental reporting, intellectual capital reporting 
and others. Accordingly, the discussion on accountability reporting in this thesis may 
cover those aspects of reporting.  
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To sum up, prior studies have focused primarily on financial and performance reporting. 
More recent developments have seen sustainability reporting receive greater attention 
by researchers, while studies on other aspects of reporting such as on governance, 
intellectual capital, infrastructure assets remain limited. At the same time, there appears 
to be a dearth of research analysing public sector reporting more comprehensively by 
covering many different aspects of reporting referred to as accountability reporting by 
this study and a number of previous researches. Given the importance of the public 
accountability agenda among public organisations, accountability reporting is deemed 
an important mechanism towards fulfilling this agenda.  
 
The next section provides a more in-depth understanding on the extent and quality of 
various aspects of reporting among different types of public sector organisations across 
the globe.  
 
2.3.2 The Extent and Quality of Reporting 
A number of studies have been conducted to assess public sector reporting practices. 
These studies vary in numerous ways including in terms of aspects of reporting (e.g. 
financial, performance, governance) (refer to Section 2.3.1), research settings (e.g. local 
government, universities, government departments), countries (e.g. the UK, Australia, 
New Zealand, India), measurement of disclosure (e.g. disclosure index, survey) and 
disclosure medium (e.g. annual reports, websites, financial accounts). 
 
Among the earlier studies that focused on public sector reporting practices is that by 
Singh & Bhargava (1978) in India. Their study focused on both financial and 
nonfinancial disclosure which they referred to as quality of disclosure. Their disclosure 
index which was adapted from a private sector study by Singhvi & Desai‘s (1972) 
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comprised of 36 items which was developed from literature as well as expert 
(comprising chartered accountants, financial experts and financial managers) opinions 
and suggestions. The findings of their study suggested no uniformity in the disclosure of 
information of 1972/3 annual reports of 40 Indian central trading and manufacturing 
public sector enterprises. In particular, they reported that the quality of disclosure varied 
from enterprise to enterprise with half of the enterprises disclosing  between  40  and  50  
per cent of total  information, two-thirds of the companies disclosed  between  20  and  
40  per  cent of total information while 12 per cent of the enterprises disclosed between 
10 and 20 per cent of total information. 
 
In 1980s, most public sector reporting studies tested the influence of certain factors on 
reporting practices. These studies are discussed in Section 2.3.3. Another early study on 
public sector reporting is that by Gray & Haslam (1990) who examined the corporate 
reports (including financial statements and annual reports) of British universities for 
five years from 1982/3 to 1986/7. Gray & Haslam used a disclosure index which 
incorporated certain financial disclosures and performance indicators recommended and 
suggested by the CVCP (1984) and  CVCP (1985). From their sample of 89 and 64 per 
cent of the financial statements and annual reports of 60 universities, Gray & Haslam 
concluded that external forces had a marked effect on reporting practices.   
 
A year later, Boyne & Law (1991) analysed 165 annual reports, representing 66 per cent 
of 37 Welsh districts published between 1981/2 and 1988/9. They used a checklist of 
performance indicators based on the stages of the local authority production process. 
The checklist contained 20 items with 9 categories, namely input, throughput, output 
quantity, efficiency, output quality, process quality, outcomes, citizenship and 
commentary. Most of the performance indicators reported are related to input while 
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effectiveness and consumer satisfaction were not reported at all. They concluded that 
their annual report on performance was generally of poor quality. 
 
In 1991, Dixon et al. (1991) extended Gray & Haslam‘s (1990) disclosure index by 
incorporating requirements by the New Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA). They 
developed another index containing 52 items with 9 groups. By using a dichotomous 
and unweighted disclosure measurement approach, Dixon conducted a longitudinal 
study of a 5-year period (1985 to 1990) to assess any changes in disclosure within the 
period in the annual financial reports of seven New Zealand universities. Their results 
revealed a substantial improvement of two universities that were in line with NZSA, 
and little or no change by the other five over the study period.  
 
Not long after, Coy et al. (1993b) revised Dixon et al.‘s (1991) index. Among the main 
changes made in their alternative accountability disclosure index (AD-score) was the 
scoring system itself. From a simple index using ‗present or absent‘ scoring system, 
AD-score was made to include a 3-point qualitative scoring system (1=poor, 
3=excellent) to reflect the quality of the disclosure of each item. Each item was also 
assigned a weight (1=low importance and 3=high importance) based on criteria such as 
whether the item is considered crucial to the achievement of accountability tenets. The 
AD-score index contain 43 items with 8 categories. Coy et al. (1993b) conducted a 
similar analysis to that of Dixon et al. (1991) by using both indexes on a larger sample 
of 33 New Zealand educational institutions. They found that the scoring systems were 
found to be significantly different in 1990 and that the disclosure level was 
approximately 10 percentage points lower when the AD-score index was used. The AD-
score also changed the rankings of some of the universities.  
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The AD-score was then further revised by Coy et al. (1993a) and widely known as the 
modified accountability disclosure (MAD) index. The index contained 26 items with 4 
categories, namely overview, service performance, financial performance, and physical 
and financial condition. Each disclosure was ranked on a 0 to 5 qualitative scale.  
 
The MAD index has since gained prominence in the context of public sector disclosure 
literature as it has been adapted and externally validated in different countries by other 
researchers including in Australia and Canada (Nelson et al., 1997), England (Banks et 
al., 1997), Canada (Banks & Nelson, 1994; Nelson et al., 2003) and Malaysia (Ismail & 
Abu Bakar, 2011). Besides that, although developed for the university setting, the MAD 
index was also adapted in different settings including schools (Tooley & Guthrie, 2007), 
museums (Wei et al., 2008) and local governments (Ryan et al., 2002b). The adoption 
arose due to ―a common desire in these countries for information disclosures about the 
items in the MAD index.‖ (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 39) 
 
By way of illustration, Banks et al. (1997) employed the MAD index in their review of 
financial statements and annual reports of universities in England, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland (EWNI) over the 1992 to 1994 period. The sample comprised of reports from 
53, 59 and 73 per cent of 84 universities for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994 respectively. 
They reported no statistically significant change throughout the years. When comparing 
their results with those from New Zealand (Coy et al., 1993b) and Canada (Banks & 
Nelson, 1994), the universities  in EWNI  were found to have lower disclosure levels 
than their counterparts in New Zealand but higher disclosures when compared to the 
Canadian universities. New Zealand had higher disclosure due to the existence of the 
New Zealand Education Amendment Act (1990). Their results also demonstrated that 
the ―established‖ universities tended to have better quality disclosure than ―new‖ 
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universities (i.e., former polytechnics) in the categories of service performance and 
financial performance. The results revealed an overall lack of quantity or quality of 
disclosure, hence the need for greater disclosure if the universities are to satisfy 
increasing demands for greater public accountability. 
 
Another similar study employing similar index is that by Nelson et al. (1997) who used 
the MAD index on universities in two countries, namely Australia and Canada for the 
1993 to 1995 period. Their results appear to support that of Banks et al.‘s (1997) where 
no significant changes are detected in both quantity and quality of disclosure over the 
study period. Further, they found evidence of higher disclosure in Australian 
universities than its counterpart in Canada, both at aggregate levels and by major 
categories for each of the study years. A similar study was conducted by Banks et al. 
(1997) whereby greater disclosure was needed in order for universities of both countries 
(i.e. Australia and Canada) to meet public accountability. 
 
In Canada, Banks & Nelson (1994) conducted a longitudinal study on financial 
disclosure by Ontario universities for a six-year period from 1988 to 1993. By applying 
the MAD index on the presidents‘ annual report and audited financial statements of 16 
universities, the study concluded that the universities‘ disclosure was consistent with the 
Canadian Association of University Business Officers (CAUBO, 1984) reporting 
guidelines but insufficient to be consistent with the  accountability tenets developed in 
the Broadhurst (1993) and Gibbins et al. (1992) reports. A decade later, Nelson et al. 
(2003) tracked the universities disclosure from 1988 to 2000 also using the MAD index 
by using an annual sample of between 75 and 90 per cent of 48 Canadian universities. 
Results for the first eight years of the study period corroborated the findings by earlier 
authors who used a similar index (i.e. Banks et al., 1997; Nelson et al. 1997). Very little 
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change was observed in accountability disclosures. However, for the remaining years 
beginning in 1997, significant annual improvements were detected. The reasons for the 
changes were also investigated using the interview method (refer to Section 2.3.4). 
Among the reasons include increased fund raising by the universities and pressure by 
the public and government for universities to become more accountable. 
 
As indicated earlier, the MAD index has also been adapted in different public sector 
settings. Ryan et al. (2002b) for example adapted it in the context of the local 
government in Queensland. Using the annual reports of the largest 36 councils as their 
data base, the results of the study indicated that although the quality of reporting by 
local governments has improved over time, councils generally do not report information 
on aspects of corporate governance, remuneration of executive staff, personnel, 
occupational health and safety, equal opportunity policies, and performance 
information. 
 
Upon realizing the limitations inherent in the MAD index, Coy & Dixon (2004) revised 
the index and named it the Public Accountability Index (PAI). Among the main 
differences between the MAD and PAI indices are that the latter is crafted with 
parametric statistical properties whereby it incorporates a polychotomous approach with 
a zero to inﬁnity scale to assess items thus generating index numbers that have interval 
(or even ratio) properties. This enables the usage of parametric statistical analyses. 
Additionally, the PAI is regarded by its developers Coy & Dixon (2004) as a more 
comprehensive index than MAD and includes 58 items compared with 26 in the MAD-
score. This is owed to the approach used to develop PAI, that is, using stakeholder 
opinions captured via a delphi exercise and driven by the public accountability 
perspective. Despite the claimed superiority of the PAI over the MAD index, Coy & 
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Dixon (2004) found similar results of the PAI to the MAD-scores when applied to the 
1996 and 2000 New Zealand university annual reports.  
 
Besides the MAD and PAI indices, which can be regarded as a relatively widely-used 
index in public sector disclosure studies, other authors have also developed their own 
index to suit their scope of study (refer to Table 4.8 in Section 4.8.3). For example, 
following the approach of Coy & Dixon (2004) in developing PAI where a disclosure 
index is constructed through a participatory stakeholder consultation process, Schneider 
& Samkin (2008) applied a similar approach to assess the extent and quality of 
intellectual capital disclosures in the annual reports of the New Zealand local 
authorities. Applying their 26-item index which comprised of three categories, namely 
internal, external and human capital to the 2004/5 reports of 82 authorities showed that 
the intellectual capital reporting in the reports varied. Internal capital was the most 
reported category followed by external capital and finally human capital. They also 
found that joint ventures/business collaborations and management processes were the 
most reported, while intellectual property and licensing agreements the least reported. 
 
On the other hand, Ryan & Ng (2000) developed their own unique classificatory 
scheme derived from government documents of corporate governance, namely the 
Australian National Audit Office‘s (ANAO) Applying Principles and Practice of 
Corporate Governance in Budget Funded Agencies (Australian  National  Audit  Office, 
1997). The aim was to test the applicability of five corporate governance principles 
(leadership, management environment, risk management, monitoring, accountability) 
across various types of Australian public agencies, namely local governments, statutory 
bodies, state government departments and government owned corporations. Based on a 
content analysis of the corporate governance section in the 1998 annual reports of 20 
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agencies (5 agencies in each of the four categories), their results showed that the 
monitoring principle of governance which covers internal control received most 
disclosures while accountability principle appears to be the category that suffers from 
the most deficiency. They also found that government owned corporations achieved 
better disclosure practices in most governance principles than other public sector bodies.  
 
Similar to Ryan & Ng (2000) who based their index on certain official documents, Caba 
Perez & Lopez Hernandez (2009) created an informational transparency index based on 
the minimum requisites for the information to be provided in the annual financial public 
report of MERCOSUR member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay), 
as recommended by the IFAC with reference to the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSAS) references 1 and 2. The index is used to compare the 
index items with the public reports of 2006 of these four countries. It was discovered 
that the quality of these reports failed to meet IPSAS standards of information 
disclosure, suggesting the implementation of important changes involving the reports as 
well as its content. 
 
Likewise, Herawaty & Hoque (2007) applied a disclosure index derived from the 
disclosure requirements issued by the Australian Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet on the ―Requirements for annual report for departments, executive agencies and 
FMA Act bodies‖ to assess the 2005-2006 annual reports of 56 Australia government 
departments. The index, which comprises 47 mandatory and 20 voluntary items, is 
divided into eight broad categories. Voluntary disclosure level was found to be higher 
than the mandatory disclosure. Further, disclosure areas including human resources, 
asset management, external scrutiny, purchasing, and contracting showed low levels of 
disclosure. 
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Another example of a study that developed a classiﬁcatory scheme based on the 
literature is the study by Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009). Marcuccio & Steccolini 
developed a scheme which combined the ―internal‖ and the ―external‖ perspectives of 
the public organisations‘ activities to describe the extended performance reporting 
(EPR) practices by local Italian authorities. From their content analysis of the 2002 
social reports of 15 local authorities, the study found no common approach towards 
EPR by those entities. It did however demonstrate that local Italian authorities made s 
significant attempt to publish performance information to stakeholders particularly 
concerning their social and economic development.  
 
A study by Caba Perez et al. (2008) based its index on both official guidelines as well as 
prior research. They combined between the approaches used by other authors. 
Interestingly, their sources for index development were derived from guidelines and 
research not only in the context of the public sector but also that of the private sector 
(e.g. International Accounting Standards Committee, Financial Accounting Standards 
Board), resulting in a tri-dimensional disclosure index comprised of information 
content, qualitative characteristics of information and accessibility. They examined the 
extent of ﬁnancial information made available by 65 Spanish municipalities on their 
web sites during January 2007 and concluded that municipalities have not been 
sufficiently disclosing their financial information on the internet. 
 
Following Caba Perez et al. (2008), Blanco et al. (2011) also constructed their index 
using prior research and official documents. The index which comprised of 53 items 
including mandatory items was used to evaluate the quality and quantity of information 
published in the annual reports and in the ﬁnancial statements of Canadian local 
governments in 2003 with a comparison in 2005. The results showed an overall low 
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disclosure index with significant improvements in 2005 compared to 2003 and 
significant differences across the country. 
 
Gordon & Fischer (2008) on the other hand measured the extent of disclosure using a 
survey method. They examined the extent of performance reporting by public and not-
for-profit US colleges and universities using survey data provided by the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers. The questionnaire was 
completed by 292 respondents from its member institutions in the year 2003/4. The 
most common performance measures reported by colleges and universities included 
enrolment, persistence and graduation statistics.   
 
Yang (2008) went further in the context of performance reporting by publicising the 
concept of honest performance reporting. According to them, honest performance 
reporting ―exists when an organisation or its leaders purposefully report performance 
results to stakeholders truthfully, responsibly, and in a timely manner‖ (p. 82). Based on 
the survey items developed in the US and with the help of a panel of ﬁve experts on 
performance management and survey methodology, their findings suggested that the 
level of honest reporting by top managers in 12 Taipei district governments, as 
perceived by employees and middle managers, was not very high.  
 
To sum up this section, it is safe to say that prior studies have generally found not very 
encouraging results regarding the extent and quality of disclosure among public sector 
organisations. Studies also appear to have focused on specific research settings 
primarily the local governments and public universities. Country-wise, most studies 
were conducted in the more developed economies such as in the UK, US, Australia and 
New Zealand. 
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2.3.3 Factors Influencing Reporting 
Studies have been conducted to determine factors influencing public sector 
organisations to report information from before the 1980s. Earlier published studies 
tended to focus on factors influencing financial disclosures and were mainly conducted 
on the US public sector (e.g. Baber & Sen, 1984; Giroux, 1989; Ingram, 1984; Ingram 
& DeJong, 1987; Robbins & Austin, 1986; Zimmerman, 1977) except for a few (e.g. 
Singh & Bhargava, 1978). 
 
Zimmerman‘s (1977) study which was conducted on US municipalities is among the 
earliest study on factors influencing reporting practice. By using the length of the report 
and auditor type as his measure for quality reporting, Zimmerman found that the 
council/manager form of government was more likely to adopt higher quality reporting 
methods than the strong mayor form of government.  
 
Unlike most studies conducted prior to the 1990s which focused on US financial 
disclosure, Singh & Bhargava (1978) concentrated on the disclosure of both financial 
and non-financial information (which were referred in their study as disclosure quality) 
in the context of India. Their study found the quality of information disclosure was 
associated with the nature of the industry. In particular, companies manufacturing 
capital goods disclosed most information while those engaged in rehabilitation of sick 
industries and technical consultancy services saw poor disclosure. It should be noted 
however that organisational patterns on the other hand were not associated with 
disclosure quality. In other words, government companies and public corporations 
disclosed similar information.  
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Later, Baber & Sen (1984) found sufficient evidence to support their general claim that 
political agents in the US state government adopted standard financial reporting 
practices (namely, the Governmental Accounting, Auditing and Financial Reporting) to 
reduce costs arising from ‗political‘ factors, namely the (i) intraparty competition, (ii) 
wages to state officials, (iii) debt financing, (iv) legislator turnover and (v) bureaucratic 
restrictions. No conclusive evidence however can be made based on their study due to 
the non-significant associations between the variables and reporting practices. 
 
Ingram (1984), unlike Baber & Sen (1984) who focused on political incentives, focused 
on economic incentives in testing the determinants of financial disclosure. His study 
examined the financial disclosure in 50 US state government annual financial reports 
and found the extent of disclosure was greatly affected by the demands and needs for 
information exhibited by constituents and administrators than recommendations in 
accounting disclosure standards. Specifically, positive associations were found between 
(i) voters‘ incentives to monitor government finances, (ii) internal incentives of 
appointed administrators to monitor political behaviour, (iii) incentives to reduce debt 
costs and (iv) higher-paid administrative personnel and financial accounting disclosure.  
 
Unlike the above studies which used simple measures for their disclosure index, 
Robbins & Austin (1986) used both simple and compounded measures and compared 
their results. Based on 99 annual reports for the year 1981/2 of US cities, they provided 
evidence that regardless of whether simple or compound measure were used to measure 
the disclosure quality in government financial reports, (i) city government form 
(mayoral versus manager/council), (ii) reliance on debt, and, (iii) reliance on federal 
funds remain significant variables.  
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Ingram & DeJong (1987) on the other hand focused on the effects of state disclosure 
regulations on the financial reporting practices of US local governments. Based on the 
cities‘ annual reports for 1981 and 1982, in addition to correspondence with city 
financial managers for 544 cities, the findings suggested that disclosure practices of 
cities in the states that do not regulate local government practices did not differ 
significantly from the practices of cities in the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) regulated states.  
 
Another earlier study that focused on factors influencing financial disclosure is that by 
Giroux (1989). Giroux modelled the relationship between financial disclosure quality of 
97 US cities‘ 1983 annual financial reports and annual operating budget and political 
and economic incentives of the groups actively involved in the governmental processes 
of municipalities. They found that each group with political power had only limited 
influence on disclosure quality.  
Similar to studies prior to the 1990s, studies in the 1990s also appear to have focused on 
financial reporting. However, besides concentrating only on the US public sector (e.g. 
Cheng, 1992; Dixon et al., 1991; Sanders et al., 1994), focus has now expanded to other 
countries such as New Zealand (e.g. Dixon et al., 1991), Australia (e.g. Lim & 
Mckinnon, 1993) and Belgium (e.g. Christiaens, 1999). Studies have also been 
expanded to other public sector settings besides the state or local government such as 
higher educational institutions (e.g. Dixon et al., 1991).  
 
In New Zealand, Dixon et al. (1991) analysed the 1988 and 1989 annual financial 
accounts of seven universities in New Zealand and found timeliness as having 
significant influence on the comprehensiveness or compliance of financial reporting. In 
other words, the more quickly a report is published, the more compliant it is to the 
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reporting guidelines as promulgated by the New Zealand Society of Accountant 
(NZSA).  
 
One study attempted to develop a model for the factors influencing disclosure using a 
more advanced statistical technique. Cheng (1992) hypothesized four categories of 
factors as influencing the US state government‘s choice of financial disclosure, namely 
(i) socioeconomic factors, (ii) political system factors, (iii) characteristics of the 
bureaucracy, and, (iv) factors that represent other external demands and constraints. 
They used the LISREL (Linear Structural Relations) methodology to test their model 
based on the 1986 financial reports of all 50 US states. Support was found implying that 
the choice of accounting disclosure of state governments depended on factors in the 
political environment and on institutional forces.   
 
To date, the common approach for studies on factors influencing disclosure has been to 
use secondary reports. However, few authors have opted to use survey or census data to 
explore the issue of reporting (e.g. Allen & Sanders, 1994; Copley, 1991; Sanders et al., 
1994). An exception to this is the study by Allen & Sanders (1994) that was based in a 
mail survey gathered from 439 US cities that found that (i) participation in the 
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Certificate of Achievement for 
Excellence in Financial reporting and (ii) the Chief Financial Officer professional 
orientation significantly increased levels of financial disclosure whereas other factors, 
namely city size and externally mandated GAAP compliance were not significant 
factors. Sanders et al. (1994) found similar results and reported: 
Municipal efforts to promote a climate of openness and responsiveness are 
associated with the amount of financial disclosure indirectly through the 
professional activities of the CFO and through participation in the GFOA's 
Certificate of Excellence Program.  Specifically, cities that have adopted a code 
of ethics have a more professionally-knowledgeable CFO and are more likely to 
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participate in GFOA's Certificate of Excellence in Financial Reporting. Both of 
these factors are strongly associated with increased financial disclosure. (p. 77) 
 
Copley (1991) on the other hand, used census data on 262 US municipal governments 
available in the US Census Bureau‘s Survey of Governments, namely the Annual 
Financial Statistics as well as a unique database developed by Ingram & Robbins (1987) 
and found that independent auditors,  seeking  to  maintain  a  reputation  of  higher  
quality,  positively  influenced  the level  of  financial  disclosures  appearing  in  their  
clients‘  financial  statements.  
 
A study by Christiaens (1999) used both annual reports and survey data in his study to 
explore factors influencing reporting compliance in the Belgium public sector. The 
study involved the examination of 100 1995 annual reports and a verbal survey 
conducted on 18 Belgian municipalities and found that the (i) municipal experience, (ii) 
professional accounting consultants‘ support, (iii) accounting staff graduated at 
provincial school or participated in training courses, (iv) training per person and (v) 
municipal size had positive relationships with reporting compliance. Other factors such 
as the reliance on debt, municipal wealth, accountant and auditor being related parties, 
regional treasurer, education level of accounting staff, the membership of professional 
accounting organisation and bookkeepers with business accounting experience were not 
significant factors. 
 
Beginning from the 21
st
 century, it was observed that studies on factors influencing 
disclosure had further grown to cover more than the financial aspects of reporting (e.g. 
social reporting by Tagesson et al. (2011) such as performance reporting by Smith 
(2004), environmental reporting by Ribeiro & Aibar-Guzman (2010) and covered more 
countries besides the US (e.g. Sweden by Tagesson et al., 2011). For example, the study 
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by Smith (2004) examined determinants of non-financial performance reporting in US 
cities the reported that socioeconomic status, press coverage, and reliance on debt 
concerning US voters were factors influencing nonfinancial performance reporting 
practice. Factors such as CFO quality, form of government, political competition, fiscal 
stress, existence of internal auditors were not significant factors. Furthermore, two 
factors limited the growth of US cities, namely i) variability in practice, and ii) 
managerial resistance. Data for this study was gathered from annual financial reports 
(128), adopted budgets (111), and any other publicly available document containing 
performance measures (16) as well as a mail survey (204). 
 
Yang (2008), on the other hand, studied potential determining factors of honest 
performance reporting through a mail survey of 684 Taipei government employees 
comprising of performance specialists, senior managers and regular administrators. The 
study found that supportive external environments and harmonious internal 
environments were likely to enhance stakeholder participation and innovation culture, 
which, in turn, encourage honest performance reporting. 
 
In the context of social reporting, Tagesson et al. (2011) found that the extent of social 
disclosures among Swedish municipalities was associated with size, tax base, tax rate, 
ﬁnancial performance and political majority. Their study was based on 2006 annual 
reports of all 290 Swedish municipalities and archived data from ofﬁcial statistics 
supplied by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities. Marcuccio & Steccolini 
(2009) on the other hand reported that the type of activities performed and the local 
authorities‘ strategic priorities were significant factors influencing the content of the 
social reports. Their study was based on 2002 social reports of all 15 Italian local 
authorities.  
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Besides social and performance reporting, factors that influence disclosure which covers 
a wider aspect of reporting, namely accountability reporting have also been studied. 
Ryan et al. (2002b) for example referred to accountability reporting as quality reporting 
or the type of reporting which reflects the key features of ‗best practice‘ disclosures 
conduct examination on 2007 to 2009 annual reports of 36 Australian local councils. 
They reported a positive correlation between the size of the local government and the 
quality of reporting. However, the quality of disclosures did not appear to be correlated 
with the timeliness of the reports. 
 
Despite the growing scope of reposting issues, a number of studies in the 21
st
 century 
remain focused on financial disclosure (e.g. Gore, 2004). Gore (2004) examined the 
impact of GAAP regulated and unregulated disclosure on US municipal governments in 
Michigan and Pennsylvania respectively. He reported that managers of unregulated 
disclosure have bond market-induced incentives to disclose information. On the other 
hand, in regulated disclosure environments, the findings suggested that regulation only 
induces additional disclosures for low-debt governments and not on high-debt 
governments. Gore‘s study was based on 175 financial reports for the year-end 1995 of 
both states. A study by Giroux & McLelland (2003) found that governance structure 
was a significant variable influencing accounting disclosure in 1983 and 1996 annual 
reports of 92 US cities. In particular, cities with council–manager structure maintained 
superiority over those with mayor–council structure for accounting disclosure. 
 
Studies have also combined between both private and public sector reporting (e.g. 
Gordon et al., 2002; Gordon & Fischer, 2008). In the context of colleges and 
universities for example, Gordon et al. (2002) examined the 1994 annual reports of 100 
US institutions of higher education and found that: 
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Institution size and public/private status were associated with total extent of 
disclosure but leverage and audit ﬁrm size were not signiﬁcant. Extent of 
disclosure of non-ﬁnancial performance information was associated with high 
tuition rates and low dependence on tuition revenue and with state auditors as 
opposed to public accounting ﬁrm auditors. Highly visible institutions, those 
larger in size or audited by the state, disclosed more information. Moreover, 
some institutions used a corporate-style report to better promote their interests. 
(p. 235) 
 
 
A later study by Gordon & Fischer (2008) suggested that both the extent and the 
effectiveness of performance reporting among 262 public and not-for-profit US colleges 
and universities was influenced by the (i) level of education provided, and (ii) the 
regional accreditation agency. At the same time, the extent of disclosure was also 
associated with the size, while the effectiveness of disclosure was associated with the 
extent of disclosure. Their study was based on the survey data provided by the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers.   
 
Further, due to the advancement of technology whereby reporting is no longer limited to 
hardcopy reports but is also published through websites, studies on public sector 
disclosure have also taken a similar direction whereby studies have been conducted by 
examining public sector websites and the factors influencing its disclosure (e.g. Bolivar 
et al., 2007; Laswad et al., 2005). Laswad et al. (2005) reported that leverage, municipal 
wealth, press visibility, and type of council were associated with the internet ﬁnancial 
reporting practices of local authorities in New Zealand.  
 
Several studies on internet financial disclosure have been carried out in Spain (e.g. 
Bolivar et al., 2007; Caba Perez et al., 2008). Bolivar et al. (2007) for example found no 
clear demographic or socioeconomic characteristic that can characterize the Spanish 
regional governments with better financial disclosures on their websites. However, 
regional governments with high financial disclosures appear to be those with highest 
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percentage of homes having internet access. In a separate study by the same group of 
authors conducted in the context of municipalities a year later (i.e. Perez et al. (2008)), 
reported that of all factors tested, only the cost of debt and household‘s access to the 
internet appear to have some influence in internet ﬁnancial disclosure in their studies on 
Spain municipalities. Factors which used to be found as influencing paper-based 
reporting, namely political competition, fiscal pressure, population size, reliance on 
state/regional funds, citizens‘ education level, were no longer significant in internet 
reporting.  
 
Another study on internet financial disclosure was conducted on the US municipalities 
by Groff & Pitman (2004). Groff & Pitman concluded that the size of the government 
plays an important role in internet financial reporting. In addition to intra-country 
studies, internet financial disclosure has also been conducted across groups of countries. 
Bolivar et al. (2006) for example compared the approaches taken by Anglo-Saxon, 
South American and Continental European central governments in making financial 
disclosures through the internet. Their findings suggest that administrative culture was 
the influential factor in determining how a particular country used the web for financial 
disclosure. 
 
Studies have also grouped annual report disclosures into different types and tested them 
against potentially influential factors. For example, Taylor & Rosair (2000) 
dichotomized disclosure items into two different groups, namely fiduciary and 
managerial accountability-based disclosure. Based on their examination of the annual 
reports of Australian state government departments, they found that:  
The extent of both fiduciary and managerial accountability-based disclosure 
provided by government departments is influenced by those user groups that 
directly participate in the decision processes of the department (e.g., Treasury, 
the Minister, the CEO and lobby groups), not by the ultimate accountees of 
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governments (e.g., taxpayers and recipients of public goods and services). 
Further, the extent of a government department's exposure to political costs 
(measured by size of organisation) is found to be related to the amount of 
fiduciary, but not managerial, accountability-based disclosure.  
(Taylor & Rosair, 2000, p. 77) 
 
From the above literature, it can be summarised that various factors have been tested by 
the literature in determining their influence on public sector disclosure. Roughly, the 
factors can be categorised into different types, namely political, social, financial, 
institutional, and governance factors. Table 2.1 provides illustrative examples of factors 
included within each category
9. For instance, political competition, voters‘ participation, 
legislative power and interest group competition are political factors tested by prior 
studies on public sector disclosure. 
 
Table 2.1:  Factors for Disclosure  
Themes Factors 
Political  political competition 
voter participation 
legislative power 
interest group competition 
government size 
Social public media 
interparty competition 
Activity 
voter wealth 
regional culture 
internet access 
voter demographic  
Financial  reliance on debt 
government wealth 
reliance on federal 
Institutional  professionalism  
population size 
staff demographic  
government type 
staff selection 
IT sophistication 
Governance governance power 
accounting quality 
system endorsement 
audit quality 
code of ethics 
disclosure regulation 
 Source: Adapted from Abu Bakar & Saleh (2011a)  
 
                                                 
9 The thesis has produced one journal article  (i.e. Abu Bakar & Saleh, 2011a)  related to this issue. For further elaboration on the 
issue, please refer to the cited article. The article is the product of preliminary study to identify factors studied on public sector 
disclosure. 
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The factors included above can be referred to or termed differently in different papers. 
Below are some examples of different terms used by different papers (refer to Table 
2.2). For example, voter participation is also termed as electoral competition by a 
separate study. 
 
Table 2.2: Factors for Disclosure and the Equivalent Terms 
No. Factors  Other Terms Used 
1 voter participation electoral competition 
2 legislative power parliamentary competition 
3 interest group 
competition 
interest-group strength 
4 government size institution size & wealth/internal ability/total assets/total revenues/no. of 
employees 
5 public media internet visibility/press visibility/press/strength of press 
6 activity industrial/geographic coalition/firms' activity/company town 
7 voter wealth voters' socio-economic level/income per capita/citizens' wealth/ 
socioeconomic characteristics/socioeconomic development and diversity 
8 regional culture administrative culture 
9 internet access internet access in households/technology 
10 voter 
demographic  
voters' level of education/demographic characteristics 
11 reliance on debt cost of debt/debt/leverage/the use of debt financing/bond market 
interaction/contracting/capital market 
12 government 
wealth 
city wealth/municipal wealth/municipal resources/fiscal pressure/financial 
condition 
13 reliance on federal state-regional funds/state and federal intergovernmental transfers/federal 
influence/tuition dependence & tuition rates 
14 professionalism  COE participation/ CFO informed 
15 population size complexity of government 
16 staff demographic  demographic of public officials /education/salaries & wages/experience/ 
bureaucracy needs and abilities/bureaucratic power/statutory or bureaucratic 
restrictions/experience/training/professional support 
17 government type form of government/council type/type of institution/administrative culture / 
public vs. private U&C 
18 staff selection administrative selection process  (selection of auditor, accounting system 
administrator, appointive power of governor) 
19 IT sophistication e-politician/website design/IT sophistication 
20 governance power governance structure/corporate governance structure/power of governor 
21 accounting quality quality of accounting disclosure/qualitative characteristics of accounting 
information/timeliness/performance reporting 
22 system 
endorsement 
endorsement of the most advanced governmental financial information 
systems 
23 audit quality outside audit/audit firm size 
24 disclosure 
regulation 
GAAP disclosure regulation/GAAP state /non GAAP state/state regulation/ 
state disclosure practices 
Source: Adapted from  Abu Bakar & Saleh (2011a)  
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From this section, it can be summarized that early studies on factors influencing 
disclosure tend to focus on financial disclosure in the US public sector before gradually 
expanding to others reporting aspects (namely the sustainability and performance 
reporting) and to other developed countries (e.g. New Zealand and Australia) and 
European countries (e.g. Belgium). The research settings of these studies appear to 
concentrate mainly on the local and state governments with a few others on universities. 
Secondary reports such as the annual reports have been the common approach to gather 
data for these studies although mail surveys and census data have also been used. The 
21
st
 century shows the beginning of studies on public sector Internet disclosure. Factors 
which have been tested are diverse and can be grouped into several themes namely 
financial, political, social, institutional and governance factors. There appears to be only 
a handful of study examining the factors potentially influencing accountability 
reporting. The next section will discuss public sector studies which attempt to identify 
reasons for the reporting and nonreporting of information. 
 
2.3.4 Reasons for Reporting 
Besides focusing on disclosure level and factors influencing the disclosure, prior studies 
have also attempted to understand the reasons for such disclosure. Several authors such 
as Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005) have proposed that interviews are conducted with 
public managers to enrich the analysis on factors influencing the public sector 
disclosure practice. To date however, only a very limited number of studies have used 
interviews as a means to gather a different set of data to better understand the reporting 
practices of public sector organisations (e.g. Chatterjee et al. (2012); Christensen & 
Skaerbaek (2007); Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005); Nelson et al. (2003)). Below are the 
reviewed literature which has documented possible reasons for public sector reporting 
or non-reporting in various contexts. In the context of accountability reporting, Nelson 
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et al. (2003) interviewed 36 Canadian university personnel and found that among the 
reasons for increased accountability disclosure were increased fund raising by the 
universities and pressure by the public and government for universities to become more 
accountable. Additionally, the board of governors also played a role in changing 
accountability reporting. Nelson et al. (2003) also found that a change in accounting 
pronouncements appear to have had little effect on the improved accountability 
disclosure.  
 
The most recent study to identify reasons for public sector non-reporting is by 
Chatterjee et al. (2012). Their interviews with three preparers of New Zealand local 
authorities‘ annual reports revealed that reasons behind the non-reporting of required 
infrastructure information in annual reports were: preparers‘ access to inside 
information, lack of community interest in this document, lack of resources, lack of 
time due to time pressure, no legislative requirements, uncertainty of whether the 
reporting of additional information than those required by legislation will be  approved  
by  the  auditor  and  lack  of  space  in  annual  reports.   
 
At least three studies focusing on reasons for reporting and nonreporting were 
conducted in European countries such as Italy (e.g. Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2005; 
Mussari & Monfardini, 2010) and Denmark (e.g. Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007).  For 
example, in Italy, interviews were conducted by Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005) with 12 
preparers of social and environmental report (SER) in Italian local authorities revealed 
that both the (i) socio-psychological (which relates to the willingness to signal the 
innovativeness and progressiveness of the management techniques adopted by other 
departments or other local authorities) and (ii) techno-economic forces (which relate to 
the search for improvements in ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial performance through better 
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accounting, reporting and management systems) combine to shape the SER 
phenomenon. Their findings supported the concept of managerial fashion proposed by 
Abrahamson (1996) which combines both the technical/rational explanations of the 
adoption of management practices and ‗institutional‘ practices.  
 
Another Italian study focusing on social reporting in their local authorities is by Mussari 
& Monfardini (2010). Mussari & Monfardini pointed out that disclosure was made to 
regain lost trust from citizens as a result of prior accountability issues. Disclosure may 
serve as a useful tool for organisations to address issues highlighted by media and 
public concerns. They argued that social reporting practice in local authorities is a 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour, whereby the local authorities try to highlight to the 
management or governance of local welfare and policies on their potentials as well as 
on the peculiarity of their managerial approach. It is also used as a sign of their higher 
level of efﬁciency and socially responsible behaviour. 
 
In the case of Denmark, it was a cross-country study where Christensen & Skaerbaek 
(2007) interviewed ten public sector personnel in either the central agencies or reporting 
agencies of Denmark and New South Wales, Australia. They found that nondisclosure 
of other performance measures besides the traditional input and output measures and 
significant stories was to avoid public criticism of the accountability reform as well as 
to hinder central agencies from opportunities to identify objects for cost cutting. This is 
consistent with the arguments of Lee & Fisher (2004) that potential loss of competitive 
advantage may lead to reduced levels of disclosure. 
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It is noted that very limited literatures are available to explain the disclosure practice in 
public sector entities in terms of why information are reported or not reported using 
qualitative approach such as interviews. Additionally, unlike studies on the level and 
quality of disclosure (refer to Section 2.3.2) and factors influencing it (refer to Section 
2.3.3), studies identifying reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure was not dominated 
by the US. This is possibly due to the fact that US studies, as noted by Goddard (2010), 
are more inclined toward positivistic research. Further, reasons for financial reporting 
were not studied; rather, these studies focused on other reporting aspects including 
social reporting, infrastructure reporting and accountability reporting. This is possibly 
because financial information disclosure is more regulated leaving less room for 
discretion for preparers. Next section discusses public sector reporting studies 
conducted in the Malaysian context. 
 
2.4 Studies on Public Sector Reporting in Malaysia
10
  
Most studies on Malaysian public sector disclosure were published in the 21
st
 century 
(e.g. Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011; Joseph, 2010a; Nichol & Taylor, 2001) with the 
exception of a few (Tayib et al., 1999). Local authorities appear to receive most 
attention in Malaysian public sector disclosure research; a scenario which can be 
observed in the international context as well (refer to Section 2.3). One of the earliest 
studies on Malaysian public sector disclosure was conducted by Tayib et al. (1999) in 
the context of financial reporting in local authorities. Tayib et al. focused on the demand 
for reporting where the needs and demands of local Malaysian taxpayers for published 
financial information were investigated. Based on a sample of 305 local taxpayers in 
                                                 
10 The thesis has produced one journal article (i.e. Abu Bakar & Saleh, 2011b)  related to this issue., and therefore more discussion 
on the issue is to be referred to that article. The article is a bibliographic review on public sector accounting research conducted in 
Malaysian context. In the article, the area of research, research settings, methods adopted by research on Malaysian public sector 
were identified and classified. The literatures included journal articles, masters‘ dissertations and doctoral theses in most of these 
classifications. It was found that there exist various gaps in the literatures on Malaysian public sector accounting. One of them is 
lack of studies on reporting. 
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three local authorities, the study found a large expectation gap between the taxpayers‘ 
needs for information in the financial accounts and the actual financial reporting 
practices of local authorities. The results also found that the availability of financial 
information may influence taxpayer compliance behaviour in terms of their willingness 
to pay local tax demands. 
 
In addition to Tayib et al., several other authors conducted their reporting studies on 
local authorities although their focus of reporting differed. The aspects of reporting 
researched thus far included sustainability reporting (e.g. Joseph, 2010a, 2011; Joseph 
& Taplin, 2012) and performance reporting (e.g. Tooley et al., 2010). Consistent with 
Tayib et al. (1999), Tooley et al. (2010) also focused on the demand for reporting by 
Malaysian local authorities. Their study however moved to performance reporting 
instead and surveyed a larger group of stakeholders comprising of both internal and 
external stakeholders instead of solely focusing on taxpayers like in Tayib et al.‘s 
(1999). Based on 666 returned surveys representing a response rate of 38 per cent, the 
study revealed that there was a general demand by respondents that a broader set of 
performance information should be publically communicated, which includes 
quantitative and qualitative information as well as financial and non-financial 
performance information. 
 
Unlike Tayib et al. (1999) and Tooley et al. (2010) who focus on demand aspect of 
information, Joseph (2010a) examined the supply aspects of reporting, in particular, the 
supply of sustainability information in the websites of local authorities. Based on a 
content analysis of 139 websites, their study revealed low levels of disclosure for 
sustainability information. Furthermore, the findings suggested that more economic 
information should be published as compared to social and environmental information. 
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Disclosure of sustainability activities, despite being positive, had little impact due to the 
lack of financial information attached to it. 
 
In a follow-up study, Joseph (2011) examined why Malaysian district councils did not 
report sustainability information on their websites. Her study, unlike many researches in 
this area which applied a quantitative approach, was qualitative whereby a case study 
approach was used. Based on semi-structured interviews with six interviewees from 
three district councils and by using institutional theory as its theoretical guide, it was 
reported that: 
Internal and external organisational factors influenced the non-reporting of 
sustainability information on council websites. In institutional theory, the lack of 
commitment shown by the top management in implementation sustainable 
development program appears to discourage the promotion of normative 
isomorphic pressure for disclosing sustainability information on websites. There 
is evidence of coercive isomorphism relating to website bureaucratic procedures, 
but, not relating to disclosure of sustainability information. 
(Joseph, 2011, p.1)   
 
Using a similar research approach by using case study and semi-structured interviews, 
Joseph & Taplin (2012) explained the role of mimetic isomorphism, an element of 
institutional theory, in relation to reporting sustainability information on 16 local 
authority websites. The study reported that all except one council mimicked the 
sustainability information found on the websites of both local and international 
councils. However it should be noted that such as act aimed at adopting innovation on 
sustainability activities rather than reporting format.  
 
Besides local authorities, studies on Malaysian public sector disclosure have also 
focused on other government entities including the federal government (e.g. Nichol & 
Taylor, 2001) and the state government (e.g. Mucciarone & Neilson, 2011). A study by 
Nichol & Taylor (2001) is possibly the only study that has examined disclosure across 
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the various Malaysian federal government units and is possibly the only study to have 
conducted a longitudinal examination of public sector disclosure in Malaysia. Based on 
Hyndman & Andersen‘s (1995) framework, Nichol & Taylor produced a scheme 
comprising two mutually exclusive categories, namely performance and accountability 
information that refers to managerial accountability and fiduciary accountability 
respectively. The changes in the extent of disclosure of these two categories of 
information in the annual public accounts of the various federal government entities 
including its ministries for the years 1985 (30 entities/reports) and 1995 (19 
entities/reports) were examined. The general findings showed that there was little to 
negative change in the extent and quality of disclosure over the 10 years. Further, 
disclosure on statement of objectives and strategies appear to have been given increased 
weight and emphasis, whereas disclosure on quantified results was lacking. It was 
concluded that the public‘s ability to assess the annual performance and the discharge of 
accountability of Malaysian federal government entities as well as the Malaysian 
government on the whole remain limited. 
 
Unlike Nichol & Taylor (2001) who used secondary data, Mucciarone & Neilson (2011) 
obtained their data using surveys and semi-structured interviews with the senior finance 
officers of the Malaysian federal and state government departments in order to assess 
the disclosure of performance indicators in government departments. Based on 37 
survey cases, representing a 21.7 per cent response rate, they reported that government 
departments consider the disclosure of efficiency information in annual reports 
important in discharging the government‘s accountability. Further, based on interviews 
conducted with twelve departments, it was found that two of the departments did not 
disclose any performance indicators in their annual report whereas six departments 
claimed to report all the eight performance indicators (i.e. efficiency, effectiveness, 
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output, outcome, time, quality, quantity and cost). Additionally, the mostly disclosed 
indicator by Malaysian departments is the quantity indicator. 
 
Besides federal and state government as the focus of study, the study of public sector 
disclosure in Malaysia has also covered one type of federal government agency, namely 
public universities (e.g. Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011). Ismail & Abu Bakar‘s (2011) study 
slightly differed from other Malaysian public sector disclosure studies in terms of the 
coverage of reporting mediums it examined. Their study analysed both the hardcopy 
annual reports and websites. Using the items listed in the TC4/2007 and selected items 
from the widely used MAD index developed by Coy et al. (1993a), Ismail & Abu Bakar 
evaluated the extent of accountability information disclosure of eleven Malaysian public 
universities. The findings revealed that accountability information disclosure was very 
low in the universities‘ websites compared to their annual reports. Disclosure of 
accountability information also appeared higher in the established universities‘ group 
compared to new universities. 
 
Besides the public universities, which is one type of federal statutory bodies in 
Malaysia, there is also a study on Malaysian public sector disclosure which covers more 
than this type of federal statutory bodies (e.g. Azis, 2008). Azis (2008) in her Master‘s 
thesis studied the reporting practice of 2005/4 annual reports of 62 federal statutory 
bodies. Based on three different disclosure indices, her findings generally indicated that 
the disclosure level is average and is still far behind the developed countries. It was 
reported that not all statutory bodies comply to the reporting requirement as suggested 
in the Treasury Circular 15/1994. At the same time, the chairman‘s statement focused 
on the disclosure of the management of the organisation, and followed by the customers 
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or target groups and government. The study also revealed that more than 90 per cent of 
studies on statutory bodies disclosed more than half of the performance measures.  
 
There seems to be very few published studies on factors influencing disclosure in the 
Malaysian public sector; the few studies available appear to be unpublished doctoral 
studies (i.e. Johl, 1993; Joseph, 2010b; Mucciarone, 2008). In his doctoral thesis, Johl 
(1993) examined the factors influencing the level of disclosure reflecting financial 
accountability in the financial reports of government entities in Malaysia. Based on his 
analysis of 62 financial reports of federal, state and local governments, the study 
reported that financial reports by government entities in Malaysia lacked financial 
accountability with significant variations in the disclosure level reflecting accountability 
across government entities. Long term debt and form of government are associated with 
the level of disclosure reflecting accountability whereas size in terms of assets and 
revenue were not significant factors.  
 
In her doctoral thesis Mucciarone (2008) studied factors influencing performance 
indicator disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian government departments. Based 
on her content analysis of the 2003/2004 annual reports of thirteen Malaysian and 
thirteen Australian government departments, she reported that oversight bodies, 
organisational size, citizenry, bureaucrats accounting ability and their salary had no 
influence on the performance indicator disclosure. However, culture appears to have 
influenced the disclosure of the performance indicator. 
 
The most recent unpublished doctoral study on factors influencing disclosure in 
Malaysian public sector was carried out by Joseph (2010b). Her study focused on 
factors influencing sustainability disclosure on local government websites. Based on her 
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analysis of the 139 websites, it was revealed that size (logrevenue), jurisdictions, 
internal goals and the LA21 program were significant explanatory variables in 
influencing sustainability disclosure. 
 
To sum up, there appear to be very limited studies on Malaysian public sector reporting. 
Additionally, the available studies tend to focus on specific aspects of reporting such as 
sustainability, performance and financial reporting. The majority of the studies also 
concentrated on the local authorities, while the other two higher-tiered governments, 
namely the federal and the state government are less researched. Published studies on 
the reporting practices are also almost non-existent on the federal or state statutory 
bodies. A similar situation was found in the case of studies investigating the factors 
influencing disclosure in Malaysian public sector organisations. There also appears to 
be a dearth of qualitative studies that attempt to understand the reasons for reporting and 
nonreporting by Malaysian public sector bodies. The literature review also revealed that 
the supply of information by public sector entities is generally lacking and thus does not 
meet the stakeholders‘ demand. 
 
2.5 Studies on Public Sector Reporting in Semi-government Bodies (Outside  
 Malaysia) 
 
In countries besides Malaysia, there are quite a number of public sector disclosure 
studies conducted in the context of semi-government bodies such as statutory authorities 
and executive agencies (refer to Section 3.2.1 for discussion on different terms used by 
different countries with regards to its semi-governmental organisation). Prior to the 21
st
 
century, studies on disclosure in the UK executive agencies could be regarded as having 
received the most attention compared to their counterparts in other parts of the world 
(e.g. Hyndman & Andersen, 1995; Hyndman & Anderson, 1998; Pendlebury et al., 
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1994; Rutherford, 1996) although one of the earliest studies was conducted on statutory 
authorities in Australia (i.e. Lim & Mckinnon, 1993). Further, most studies tended to 
focus on performance disclosure  (e.g. Hyndman & Andersen, 1995; Taylor, 2006).  
 
One of the pioneering studies to be conducted was that by Lim & Mckinnon‘s (1993) on 
the statutory authorities in Australia, consistent with the fact that Australia was said to 
be the pioneer for this form of public entity (McCrae & Aiken, 1988). They examined 
the relationship between political visibility and voluntary disclosure. The political 
visibility item was proxied by total assets, total revenues, number of employees and 
parliamentary debate coverage. Based on their analysis on the 1984 annual reports of 50 
commercial and semi-commercial statutory authorities in the Australian State of New 
South Wales, there was an evident positive relationship between political visibility and 
their voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial information of a non-sensitive 
nature. However, no positive correlation was found for the sensitive nature of 
information, implying that statutory authorities distinguish between sensitive and non-
sensitive information in the voluntary disclosure of information in managing their 
political visibility. 
 
A year later, a study was conducted on the UK executive agencies‘ reporting practices 
by Pendlebury et al. (1994). Based on the analysis of 1992 annual reports of 53 
executive agencies, which focused on financial accounting information and performance 
measures/indicators, the findings suggested that the form and content of annual reports 
and accounts are diverse and thus not useful for comparison purposes (i.e. comparing 
either between one agencies‘ reports with another or with the private sector). The 
variation in financial reporting appeared to have been influenced by the trading fund 
status and not by agency size or length of time as agency. As for the reporting of 
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performance measures, there was little evidence that the competitive position of an 
agency influenced their performance measure selection. 
 
In the following year in 1995, another research on the UK executive agencies was 
conducted that focused on performance reporting. Hyndman & Andersen (1995) 
analysed 1991/2 annual reports of 57 agencies and it was revealed that the majority of 
the agencies provided no or little performance information including efficiency, 
effectiveness, inputs, outputs and results. In particular, almost half (42%) of the 
agencies did not report efficiency measures at all, whereas only 14 per cent of the 
agencies provided comparable effectiveness figure. Nevertheless, they noted a 
considerable improvement in the performance reporting as compared to their earlier 
study, i.e. Hyndman & Andersen (1992). 
 
Three years later, Hyndman & Anderson (1998) conducted a study similar to their 1995 
study except that they now analysed annual reports of four different periods, namely 
those published during or before 1990/1 (29 reports), the 1991/2 (57 reports), 1992/3 
(71 reports) and 1993/4 reports (88 reports). They reached conclusions similar to their 
earlier except that the percentage of the agencies that did not report efficiency measures 
at all slightly increased to 43 per cent from 42 per cent, whereas the percentage of 
agencies providing comparable effectiveness figure reduced by 6 per cent to 8 per cent. 
 
Unlike most reporting studies on semi-governmental bodies which analyse secondary 
reports, Rutherford (1996) adopted the survey method. He conducted a survey on the 
structure and content of the published financial statements of 50 UK executive agencies 
entering the Fifth Pricewaterhouse Best Agency Report and Accounts Competition 
(covering 1993/4 financial statements), representing 58 per cent of the 92 agencies 
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existing at the time. Their findings suggested that applying the private sector GAAP to 
executive agencies may introduce gaps and inconsistencies in the reporting across 
agencies due to the difference in their nature of events and transaction. The non-
uniformity nevertheless, according to them, may not affect the fundamental integrity 
and the basic usefulness of the agencies/financial statements. 
 
In a follow up study four years later, Rutherford (2000) examined the 1996/1997 reports 
of 44 executive agencies submitted to the Eighth Price Waterhouse Best Agency Report 
and Accounts Competition. His study‘s findings suggested that more standardization of 
performance indicators needed to be undertaken by agencies to enhance their 
comparability and this must not be done without addressing the uniqueness of each 
agency. 
 
Later, Hyndman & Eden (2002) who based their analysis on matched sets of corporate 
plans (covering a three- to five- year period), annual business plans and annual reports 
of 24 executive agencies, attempted to identify whether performance reporting in 
executive agencies‘ annual reports was tied to the agencies‘ stated targets and 
objectives. They found that agencies linked their performance planning process to the 
performance reporting process, and in return, this facilitated better management and 
accountability.  
 
Unlike most previous studies on semi-governmental disclosure which have focused on 
either secondary reports or the survey method, Taylor (2006) combined both of these 
method. Her study identified how performance reporting affected the autonomy of 
statutory bodies in Hong Kong and Singapore and how it benefited other stakeholders. 
Using the responses received from (mostly) senior officials of ten Hong Kong and six 
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Singapore statutory bodies, and their respective annual reports and strategic plans 
available on websites, she concluded that: 
Any increased operational autonomy enjoyed by statutory bodies as a result of 
performance reporting arrangements has had only a negligible impact on the 
participation of citizens in the affairs of those bodies and on their accountability 
to citizens. (Taylor, 2006, p. 289) 
 
 
There are at least two studies which have examined the reporting practices of statutory 
bodies together with other public units (i.e. Janet, 2006; Ryan & Ng, 2000). Janet 
(2006) examined performance information disclosure in the Australian government 
trading enterprises which included statutory authorities and state-owned corporations. 
Based on her analysis of the 1998 to 2002 annual reports of a selected government 
trading enterprises (fourteen to twenty entities in each year), the findings suggested a 
lack of uniformity and performance reporting in those entities. Information on 
effectiveness, service quality, achievement of social objectives and comparative non-
financial performance were varied and inconsistent. 
 
Ryan & Ng (2000), on the other hand, studied governance disclosure of public sector 
bodies comprising of government-owned corporations, state government departments, 
local governments and statutory bodies. They content analysed the corporate 
governance section of 20 agencies 1998 annual reports (five agencies in each of the four 
categories), and found that the disclosure of corporate governance was piecemeal. 
Additionally, government-owned corporations showed greater disclosure than their 
counterparts in the public sector. 
 
In short, studies on reporting in semi-governmental bodies appear to focus on the more 
developed countries particularly the UK and Australia. The most researched area was 
performance reporting, followed by financial reporting and there was at least one study 
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conducted on governance reporting. The next section discusses the role and importance 
of annual reports as an accountability medium. 
 
2.6 Annual Report as a Medium of Reporting  
Accountability reporting may be conducted through various avenues including media 
release, mailings to citizen groups, websites, and annual reports (Taylor, 2006). Annual 
reports need to be seen in their context as only one means of discharging accountability 
(Sinclair, 1995). Nevertheless it has been regarded in the literature as the main medium 
of information dissemination in the public domain and therefore an accountability tool 
(Tooley & Guthrie, 2007; Wall & Martin, 2003; Wei et al., 2008). Annual reports are 
considered to be yearly statements by a public sector entity required under some 
legislation or regulation (Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007). They usually comprise of 
activity reports and financial reports (Garcia et al., 2002) (refer to Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Components of Annual Reports 
Source: Garcia et al. (2002) 
 
 
Many government stakeholders are interested in public sector annual reports and 
accounts. Lapsley (1992) divided the stakeholders into internal and external users (refer 
to Figure 2.3)
11
. Internal users may include government officers and members. The 
external group may be divided into two types; (i) those who have direct and regular 
access to the document (e.g. parliament, auditor general, auditors, the responsible 
                                                 
11 This classification of stakeholders is slightly different with Ryan et al. (2002a) classification as explained earlier in Figure 2.1. 
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minister, ministry of finance, external experts who may be hired by the bodies such as 
governing boards/ committees/ councils), and (ii) those who have limited resources to 
access the documents (e.g. clients and client groups, the general public, pressure groups, 
media) (Lapsley, 1992; Taylor, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Internal groups of potential user 
 External group of potential users with direct, regular access to organisation information 
 External groups of potential users with limited resources to access organisation information 
 
Figure 2.3: A Layered Schema of Stakeholders of Annual Reports and Accounts 
Source: Adapted from Lapsley (1992) 
 
 
According to Nelson et al. (2003), the annual report is the cornerstone of public and 
parliamentary scrutiny. Annual reports can be seen as an attempt to make the 
performance of the public sector auditable (Power, 1996). It is said to be the 
accountability acquittal required under the NPM (Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007). Lim 
& McKinnon (1993) mentioned that annual report regulations will considerably 
improve the level of responsibility of authorities to parliament and enhance their 
efficiency and effectiveness. According to Coy et al. (2001), annual report is the only 
document that is available to all stakeholders on a routine (yearly) basis. 
 
One disadvantage of annual reports is that it requires large investment by the reporting 
agencies (Christensen & Skaerbaek, 2007). Studies have raised concern on the lack of 
users of the report or little public interest in it (Nelson et al., 2003). Despite this, 
Likierman (1992, as cited by Nelson et al. 2003) argued that the public interest and 
clients, client groups, general public, pressure groups, media 
parliament, auditor general, auditors,  
central government (ministers, ministry of finance, 
treasury), hired experts 
 
officers  
members 
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disclosure quality is really a ‗chicken and egg‘ situation where poor-quality reports 
themselves may cause a lack of stakeholders‘ interests. Hence, the problem can be 
eventually overcome by increasing the quality of disclosure, and by addressing more 
stakeholders. Sinclair (1995) reinforced this by arguing that for annual reports to be 
effectively achieving its broad accountability purpose, managers of reporting agencies 
should target their disclosures much more directly towards the general citizens and 
broader group of audiences (refer to Section 4.3.1). Unfortunately, studies have found 
that annual reports are less directed towards stakeholders besides those within the 
government itself (e.g. Taylor & Rosair, 2000).  
 
A variety of disclosure medium has been investigated in prior studies. Among the most 
researched mediums of disclosure is annual reports (e.g. Clarke et al., 2009; Coy & 
Dixon, 2004; Gordon et al., 2002; Herawaty & Hoque, 2007; Schneider & Samkin, 
2008; Singh & Bhargava, 1978; Taylor & Rosair, 2000). Besides annual reports, other 
disclosure mediums that are studied include websites (e.g. Gandia & Archidona, 2008; 
Groff & Pitman, 2004; Laswad et al., 2005; Papenfuß & Schaefer, 2010), financial 
reports (e.g. Caba Perez & Lopez Hernandez, 2009; Cheng, 1992; Gore, 2004; Robbins 
& Austin, 1986), performance report (Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2009) and budget papers 
(Carlin & Guthrie, 2001). Some studies have even examined more than one disclosure 
medium (e.g. Bolivar et al., 2007; Giroux, 1989; Hoque & Adams, 2008; Smith, 2004). 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that annual reports serve as one of the most 
important public accountability mediums. 
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2.7 Summary 
In summary, the review of the international and Malaysian literature in this field 
revealed several gaps in the literature. First, there is a lack of study on a more 
comprehensive aspect of reporting, namely the accountability reporting or the disclosure 
of accountability information, as many studies tended to focus on certain aspects of 
reporting per se mainly the financial and performance reporting; this gap is addressed in 
this thesis as the central issue of the study. Secondly, there appear to be a dearth of 
recent studies on reporting in semi-governmental bodies, as most prior studies tend to 
focus on local governments; therefore the present study attempts to add evidence to the 
literature from this unique type of organisation. Thirdly, there was a lack of public 
sector disclosure studies on less developed countries, on Asian countries and on 
Malaysia itself as most studies were conducted in the context of a more developed 
nations. It is hoped that this study, which focuses on Malaysia, will fill this particular 
gap in the literature.  
 
Fourth, it was reported by the majority of these studies that there was a generally low 
level and quality of disclosure across various public sector organisations both locally 
and internationally. As such, this study further explores this issue in RQ1 to determine 
whether a similar situation applies in the context of the Malaysian public sector 
organisations, in particular the Federal Statutory Bodies and the focus will be on the 
level of disclosure. Fifth, there is a dearth of studies that identify factors influencing 
disclosure of accountability information, and those available have not focused on 
statutory bodies and as such have not tested factors addressing the unique characteristics 
of these type of bodies. This gap is addressed by this study in RQ2. Sixth, it was 
revealed from the literature review that there is a dearth of public sector disclosure 
studies on the reasons for reporting or nonreporting that adopt a qualitative method 
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particularly using interview for a more comprehensive understanding on the issue. This 
study addresses this research gap in RQ3.  
 
Finally, this chapter has discussed the importance of annual reports as a medium for the 
public sector to discharge its accountability to its stakeholders. In the next chapter, the 
MFSB which is the central research setting of this thesis is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MALAYSIAN FEDERAL STATUTORY BODIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed literature on the forms and extent of disclosure in public sector 
organisatons. This thesis focuses on disclosure in the Malaysian Federal Statutory 
Bodies (MFSB). Chapter 3 provides an overview of MFSB and awards particular 
attention on lacunas in existing accounting and reporting research in the context of 
MFSB. The chapter begins with a general overview of MFSB in Section 3.2. It includes 
the definition of MFSB, its position in the Malaysian public sector, the distinguishing 
features of MFSB, the size and financial performance of MFSB as well as the financial 
relationship between MFSB and the Malaysian federal government. The chapter then 
proceeds with a discussion on the accounting and reporting requirements required of 
MFSB in Section 3.3. This covers the Treasury Circular No.4/2007, accounting basis 
and standards of MFSB, the submission and tabling of accounts and annual reports of 
MFSB and the minimum disclosure requirements. Section 3.4 provides some discussion 
and examples on the accounting and accountability issues in MFSB. This is then 
followed with Section 3.5 which discusses prior literature on MFSB in regards to 
accounting and reporting. 
 
3.2 Overview of Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies   
3.2.1 Definition of MFSB 
MFSB is defined by the Statutory Bodies (Accounts and Annual Reports Act 1980) (Act 
240) as: 
Any body corporate, irrespective of the name by which it is known, that is 
incorporated pursuant to the provisions of federal law and is a public authority or 
an agency of the Government of Malaysia but does not include a local authority 
and a body corporate that is incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 (part 1, 
para.2, pg.6). 
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MFSB are established with the aim of achieving specific government objectives 
(Ahmad et al., 2009). They can be generally classified into five non-mutually exclusive 
categories based on their roles and functions (Treasury, 2007): (i) regulatory, (ii) 
research and education, (iii) socioeconomic, (iv) public utilities, and, (v) business 
enterprises. However, as these categories are not mutually exclusive, it implies that one 
statutory body may be classified into more than one category.  
 
Public entities with a similar nature with that of MFSB exist in other parts of the world, 
albeit using different names (Hill et al., 1989). Australia is said to be the pioneer of this 
form of public entity (McCrae & Aiken, 1988). In Australia, such public entities are 
commonly called statutory authorities. By 1979 there were 241 statutory authorities in 
Australia. The emergence of these entities was mainly due to the country‘s recognition 
that the ministerial department was an inappropriate organisation for some public sector 
functions particularly in the commercial field (McCrae & Aiken, 1988). In other 
countries, including Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, the term used is statutory 
bodies, whereas in the UK, these types of entities are named as executive agencies. 
Other countries name them public corporations. According to Hill et al. (1989):  
[Despite the different terms used in different countries], essentially, however, 
the form is similar - that of a body established by law to operate outside the 
departmental organisation, with specific powers, functions and objectives, 
controlled by a board or commission with a good deal of freedom to recruit staff 
and operate on a day-to-day basis without ministerial intervention, but 
responsible to the legislature through the relevant Minister.  
 
 
For the purpose of this study, these terms (i.e. statutory bodies, statutory authorities, 
executive agencies, public corporations) may be used interchangeably wherever it is 
appropriate to discuss this type of organisation in general and not specifically pertaining 
to the Malaysian context. It is also important to understand where MFSB stands within 
the Malaysian public sector. This is discussed next. 
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3.2.2 The Position of MFSB in the Malaysian Public Sector  
The Malaysian government consists of three tiers of government namely the federal, the 
state, and the local government (refer Figure 3.1). The federal government is the highest 
tier in the government, followed by the state and lastly the local governments or local 
authorities. MFSB are part of the federal government. At the state government level, 
there are statutory bodies as well. However, the focus of this study is limited to the 
MFSB and does not include state statutory bodies. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Tiers of Government in Malaysia 
 
The federal government consists of ministries that are the highest body in the federal 
administrative machinery (Rauf et al., 2008) (refer Figure 3.2).  At present, there are a 
total of 25 federal ministries in Malaysia. Under each ministry, there are departments as 
well as public enterprises. Departments are in charge of carrying out most functions of 
the ministries (Ahmad et al., 2009). Examples of federal government departments are 
the Private Education Department and Technical Education Department under the 
Ministry of Education to name a few. 
Federal 
Government  
State 
Governments 
Local 
Authorities  
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Figure 3.2: Structure of the Malaysian Federal Government 
 
The other arm of the federal ministries besides the federal departments is the public 
enterprises. In the government administrative machinery, ministries, departments, and 
public enterprises are also known as government agencies (Ahmad et al., 2009). A 
public enterprise is an organisation which is public in purpose but run as a profit-
making entity. Based on official records, approximately 200 public enterprises were 
established during the National Economic Policy (NEP) period, i.e. from 1970 to 1990 
(Ahmad et al., 2003). The establishment of many public enterprises during that period 
was largely to fulfill the two objectives of NEP, namely; (i) to eradicate poverty and (ii) 
to restructure society, as stated by Ahmad et al. (2003, p.204): 
The implementation of the NEP was in the hands of the public sector as the 
private sector was not in a position to do so. The government announced that it 
would go into the private sector in order to help achieve the NEP‘s objectives. 
Thus, an increasing number of statutory bodies and public enterprises were 
created for this purpose. They were headed and assisted by persons seconded 
from civil services. 
 
Public enterprises may be statutory or non-statutory bodies. Non-statutory bodies are 
established in accordance to the Companies Act 1965 (Rauf et al., 2008). They are 
purely business ventures with socio-political objectives (Ahmad et al., 2009). The 
FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT  
Ministries 
Departments Public Enterprises 
Non-statutory Bodies Statutory bodies 
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Urban Development Authority and the Heavy Industries Corporation are examples of 
such bodies. Some have been transformed into commercial companies in which they 
became financially-independent while at the same time still being closely monitored by 
the government particularly in regards to financial matters (Rauf et al., 2008). One 
example is the National Electricity Board which was later privatised and renamed 
Tenaga Nasional. 
 
On the other hand, statutory bodies are mostly established under a Parliamentary Act 
specific for that particular MFSB or for a group of MFSB with similar activities. One 
such example is universities. All public universities, which are MFSB, are established 
under the Universities and College Universities Act. One important difference between 
a statutory body and a non-statutory body is that the latter is not subjected to  
government control and is free to have service schemes of their own for their staff (Rauf 
et al., 2008). 
 
Each MFSB is placed under the jurisdiction of a respective Ministry as stated in their 
respective establishment Acts (i.e. parliamentary Act) or Ministerial Functions Act 1969 
(Act 2) revised in 1999. For example, the University of Malaya is under the Ministry of 
Higher Education. Another example is the Employee Provident Fund which is under the 
Minsitry of Finance. Most ministries have their own MFSB. As of 2011
12
, there are a 
total of 124 MFSB under various ministries. Table 3.1 shows the number of MFSB 
within each ministry in the year 2011.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 This is the latest data available. 
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Table 3.1: Number of MFSB in Each Ministry 
No. Ministry No. of MFSB 
1 Ministry of Higher Education 23 
2 Ministry of Finance 11 
3 Ministry of Transport 11 
4 Prime Minister's Department 11 
5 Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities 8 
6 Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry 8 
7 Ministry of Rural and Regional Development  7 
8 Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperative And Consumerism 6 
9 Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture 5 
10 Ministry of Youth and Sports 5 
11 Ministry of Defence 4 
12 Ministry of International Trade and Industry 4 
13 Ministry of Education 3 
14 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 3 
15 Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water 3 
16 Ministry of Human Resources 2 
17 Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development 2 
18 Ministry of Works 2 
19 Ministry of Federal Territories and Urban Wellbeing 2 
20 Ministry of Tourism 1 
21 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovations 1 
22 Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1 
23 Ministry of Health 1 
24 Ministry of Home Affairs 0 
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0 
 Total 124 
Source: Prepared by the author with reference to the 2011 Auditor General‘s report on MFSB  
 
MFSB is a unique type of public sector organisation and are in several ways different 
from the other mainstream public sector entities; below are some of its important 
characteristics.  
  
3.2.3 Distinguished Features of MFSB 
In general, MFSB are mandated to carry out government policies professionally and 
effectively through various programmes and activities (National Audit Department, 
2008).  Among the important features of MFSB are the following: 
a) Separate legal entity  
MFSB are separate legal entities and therefore can sue and be sued. In many cases, 
they may invest, raise capital, borrow and lend within the terms of their statutes. 
Statutory bodies may also set up corporations under subsidiary legislation for 
specific purposes (Hill et al., 1989). 
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b) Part of the public service  
MFSB are considered part of the public service as most MFSB adopt the procedures 
of public services (although they are not obliged to adopt them) pertaining to 
appointment, terms and conditions of service, remuneration systems, pension and 
other retirement benefits similar to employees in the public service (Rauf et al., 
2008). As a case in point, the salary scales determined by the respective minister of 
an MFSB are often similar to those pertaining to the mainstream public service of 
Malaysia (Hill et al., 1989). Nevertheless, a small group of MFSB, particularly those 
whose activities are more business-oriented and are relatively financially stable such 
as the MARA Education Foundation, are given the freedom to set up their own 
policies and procedures pertaining to appointments, terms, and conditions of service. 
 
c) Given greater autonomy than government departments 
Compared to the departmental undertakings under ministries, MFSB are given far 
more autonomy both financially and managerially (Mohamad & Karbhari, 2009; 
Othman, 2005).  Ministerial control over MFSB is relatively limited. In this regard, 
Hill et al. (1989) pointed out that ministers do not exercise day-to-day financial 
controls over statutory bodies and is not involved in the routine administration of 
such bodies. In essence, the power of the relevant minister is more towards 
determining that the overall policies and activities of the MFSB are in accordance 
with the provisions of any enabling legislation, or of its Memorandum and Articles 
of Association (Hill et al., 1989). The term used for the highest administrative post 
in most MFSB is Director General. Others use terms such as Chief Executive 
Officer, General Manager, Vice Chancellor, Chief Executive, Secretary, Executive 
Director, Managing Director, Chairman, Governor, President and Director
13
. 
                                                 
13
 This was discovered during the course of this study; more specifically while examining the annual 
reports of MFSB included in the sample. 
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d) Board governed 
Almost all MFSB are governed by a board. This resembles the organisations in the 
corporate sector. Although in majority of cases the board is called the board of 
directors, there are instances when the MFSB board is called other names including 
Board of Governors, Board of Trustees, Board of Management, the Authority, the 
Council, and the Commission
14
. The number and composition of members serving 
on the board varies among MFSB as has been set out in the respective establishment 
Act of the MFSB. In most MFSB, the non-executive directors almost exclusively 
dominate the governing board with a majority of MFSB (i.e. almost 72 per cent) 
(refer to Section 6.2.2) has only one inside board member that is the CEO  himself. 
This is consistent with observation by few prior authors in their study (e.g. Adawi & 
Rwegasira, 2011; Gordon et al., 2002) and in line with recommendation by Jensen 
(1993) that the only inside board member should be the CEO. This kind of board 
composition has been referred to as the ‗supermajority independent‘ board by 
Bhagat & Black (2002). In effect, the board independence in MFSB has far 
exceeded the recommendation by the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance on 
public listed companies that requires at least one-third of board members are non-
executive. However, it is quite consistent with the Malaysian central bank 
requirement on development financial institutions  that only a maximum of two 
senior officers may be allowed to serve on its board (Central Bank of Malaysia, 
2010). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Similarly, this was also discovered during the course of this study; more specifically while examining 
the annual reports of MFSB included in the sample. 
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e) A balance between government control and managerial flexibility 
Another characteristic of MFSB is that there is a balance between governmental 
control and managerial flexibility. This is reflected in the composition of its board 
members which include representatives from the Treasury, the ministry/ies 
concerned, politicians and persons knowledgeable in the relevant fields of activity of 
the corporation (Hill et al., 1989). The government influence can also be seen in the 
the appointment and removal of board members and the chairman of the board 
which is mainly the prerogative of the responsible minister although in rare cases, 
where stated by law, the prerogative of His Majesty the King of Malaysia.  
 
The above are among the important criteria of MFSB. The size and financial 
performance of MFSB are discussed in the following section. 
  
3.2.4 Size and Financial Performance of MFSB  
As indicated earlier, as of 2011, the number of MFSB was 124. Table 3.2 below 
indicates the increasing trend in the number of MFSB on a yearly basis with the total 
increase from year 2003 to 2011 is 24. 
 
Table 3.2: Number of Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies (2003 to 2011) 
Year No. of MFSB 
2011 124 
2010 119 
2009 118 
2008 118 
2007 118 
2006 109 
2005 103 
2004 101 
2003 100 
Source: Prepared by the author based on the list of MFSB provided in the appendix section of the 2003-
2011 Auditor General‘s report on MFSB  
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In terms of employment, MFSB employed a total of 114,281 personnel
15
 (refer Figure 
3.3). This represents almost 7 per cent of the public servants working in various 
government agencies which totalled 1,648,977 (Public Service Department, 2012). 
Public servants, including MFSB employees, deliver a wide range of services to the 
public, to businesses and other parts of the public sector.  
 
                 
 
Figure 3.3 : Malaysian Labour Force  
Source: Prepared by the author from Public Service Department (2012) and Department of Statistics 
(2012) 
 
Furthermore, the total workforce of MFSB constitute approximately 1 per cent of the 
total national workforce which totalled 12,284,400 (Department of Statistics, 2012). 
The number  of MFSB workforce (i.e. 114,281) appears to be the third highest when 
compared to the other types of government agencies, namely the state public service, 
state statutory bodies and local authorities (refer Table 3.3).  
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 All data provided in this chapter is based on the latest available data. 
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Table 3.3: Numbers of Public Servants in Government Agencies 
Government agencies 
(No. of agencies) 
Number of public 
servants 
Percentage of public 
servants 
Federal public service (144) 1, 301,822 78.9% 
State public service (247) 153,354 9.3% 
Federal statutory bodies (86) 114,281 6.9% 
State statutory bodies (112) 19,034 1.2% 
Local authorities (145) 60,486 3.7% 
Total 1, 648, 977 100% 
Source: Public Service Department (2012) 
 
In terms of financial performance, MFSB contributed approximately a net income of 
RM42.4 billion in 2011 (refer Table 3.4) (National Audit Department, 2011b). Despite 
the huge net surplus, data indicates that a quarter of MFSB are suffering deficits in the 
same year with a total deficit amount near to RM681 million. Although the deficit 
amount has reduced by approximately RM88 million from the previous year, it is still 
considered a huge amount. Additionally, the number of MFSB suffering deficits in 
2011, i.e. 30 MFSB, also appear to be the second highest since 2006. Table 3.4 indicates 
the overall financial performance of MFSB in terms of surplus, deficit and net income 
amounts for ten subsequent years.  
 
Table 3.4: Statistics on MFSB Financial Performance 
 SURPLUS INCOME (A) DEFICIT INCOME (B) NET INCOME (A+B) 
Year RM 
(million) 
No. of 
MFSB 
RM 
(million) 
No. of 
MFSB 
RM 
(million) 
Total 
MFSB 
included 
2011 43,104.82 92 (680.97) 30 42,423.85 122 
2010 42,068.62 83 (768.99) 36 41,299.63 119 
2009 41,752.07 95 (697.15) 23 41,054.92 118 
2008 28,056.14 91 (1,015.29) 24 27,040.85 115 
2007 35,241.65 93 (577.75) 17 34,663.90 110 
2006 22,004.54 83 (361.57) 21 21,642.97 104 
2005 20,089.56 70 (369.11) 31 19,720.45 101 
2004 17,121.40 54 (1,461.55) 46 15.659.85 100 
2003 15,626.22 68 (587.73) 32 15,038.49 100 
2002 n/av n/av n/av 24 4,400.00 96 
Source: Prepared by the author based on a content review of 2003 to 2011 Auditor General‘s reports 
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Besides the financial performance, it is also critical to understand how MFSB relates to 
the Malaysian government financially. This is discussed below. 
 
3.2.5 The Financial Relationship between MFSB and the Malaysian Government  
Many MFSB receive subsidies from the government in the form of full or partial 
exemptions from payment of tax on profits (Hill et al., 1989). A case in point is the 
National Art Gallery, which receives tax exemptions for all kinds of income (not 
including dividend income) in line with the announcement made in the 2001 Budget; 
prior to 2001, they received only partial exemption, i.e. 70 per cent. 
 
In addition to subsidies through tax exemption, some MFSB financially rely either 
partly or wholly on assistance from the federal government to subsidize their 
programmes and activities. As highlighted by Hill et al. (1989) in his study on the 
Malaysian public enterprise, this is because, except for a few, the income received by 
most MFSB from their own activities is generally inadequate mainly due to their 
service-oriented nature. The financial assistance from the federal government may be in 
the form of grants, subsidies and loans. Operating grants are given by the government to 
MFSB as assistance to help MFSB cover their operating expenditures including the 
payment for salaries and allowances to officers and other operational costs such as 
utilities, transportation and administration (National Audit Department, 2010b).  
 
Data shows that the majority of MFSB have been receiving operating grants from the 
federal government (refer to Table 3.5). In 2011 for example, two-third (81 out of 122) 
of MFSB received operating grants amounting to RM16.5 billion. This represents 
almost 20 per cent of the total income of MFSB. The amount as well as percentage of 
operating grants over total income had been steadily increasing for at least nine years 
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(i.e. 2003-2011) although it slightly dropped in 2010. This shows that MFSB need 
government grants to subsidise their operational costs in order to implement their 
planned activities (National Audit Department, 2011a).  
 
 
Table 3.5: Proportion of Self-generated Income and Operating Grant in MFSB 
Total Income 
Year 
Own income 
(A) 
Operating grant 
(B) 
Total income 
(A+B) 
No. of MFSB 
receiving 
operating  
grant 
Total MFSB 
assessed RM 
(billion) 
% 
RM 
(billion) 
% 
RM 
(billion) 
2011 66.41 80.1 16.50 19.9 82.91 81 122 
2010 63.47 80.8 15.05 19.2 78.52 79  118 
2009 58.93 79.1 15.57 20.9 74.50 75  115 
2008 48.78 81.2 11.31 18.8 60.09 78  115 
2007 50.9 83.3 10.20 16.7 61.10 66  110 
2006 43.21 83.7 8.39 16.3 51.60 n/av n/av 
2005 38.17 83.6 7.47 16.4 45.64 59  101 
2004 33.19 84.6 6.04 15.4 38.96 60  100 
2003 32.44 84.9 5.78 15.1 38.22 59  100 
2002 25.47 82.7 5.33 17.3 30.80 58  96 
2001 22.31 83.7 4.33 16.3 26.64 n/av n/av 
Source: Prepared by the author based on content review of the 2003 to 2011 Auditor General‘s report 
 
Although the amount of grants received by MFSB from the government is substantial, 
they also generate their own income, which represents a substantial proportion of their 
total income. For example, in 2011, self-generated income constituted 80.1 per cent of 
MFSB total income (refer to Table 3.5). Examples of such income include income 
generated through their economic activities, which include investments in subsidiaries, 
equities, securities, bonds, foreign currencies exchange, fund management, fixed 
deposit, lending, academic fees and the sale of products and services (National Audit 
Department, 2011a). A marginal amount includes contributions received from non-
government agencies. These are different sources of income for MFSB. 
 
In the next section, the accounting and reporting rules and guidelines of MFSB are 
discussed. 
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3.3 Requirements on Accounting and Reporting of MFSB 
Generally, MFSB have their own set of instructions; some of which are government 
regulations suitably adopted by them for use. These instructions are generally approved 
by the relevant minister or board of MFSB to be adopted by them (Hill et al., 1989). 
Additionally, MFSB are not compelled to adopt government circulars and Treasury 
instructions unless the circulars or instructions are specifically related to them (National 
Audit Department, 2008c). One circular that is specifically related to MFSB is the 
Treasury Circular No.4/2007 (TC4/2007), which is discussed next. 
 
3.3.1 Issuance of the Treasury Circular No.4/2007 
This Circular, the TC4/2007 – which was issued by the Ministry of Finance - is a 
guideline
16
 on the preparation and presentation of annual reports and financial 
statements of statutory bodies. Its purpose is to identify minimum disclosure 
requirements in the MFSB annual report and to inform on the accounting standards that 
should be accepted by MFSB (Rauf et al., 2008). It has been issued partly as a medium 
to enhance accountability and governance in all MFSB (Treasury, 2007). The Circular 
has been implemented effective at the end of the 2007 financial year. It revises and 
replaces the previous circular namely the Treasury Circular No.15/1994 which in turn, 
had previously replaced Treasury Circular No. 4/1988. This initiative originally started 
in 1985 when MFSB were required to follow the "Guidelines for the Form and Standard 
of Financial Statements of Statutory Bodies" issued by the Treasury. Prior to that, there 
were no guidelines that guide MFSB in the preparation of their financial statements and 
annual reports, and hence, each MFSB had been responsible for the form of their own 
financial statements (Hill et al., 1989). 
 
                                                 
16 Although termed as guideline, a phone interview carried out at the early stage of the study with a Treasury officer in charge of the 
Circular reveals that the Circular is of mandatory in nature. 
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3.3.2 Accounting Basis and Standards of MFSB 
In terms of their accounting basis, MFSB are required to prepare their financial 
statements based on an accrual basis for each financial year. For most MFSB, their 
financial year ends on the 31st December, except for selected MFSB, that end their 
financial year on other dates (National Audit Department, 2011a).  
 
MFSB can have their own financial procedures, systems and procedures and decide 
their accounting policies in so long as they do not contradict the approved accounting 
standards (National Audit Department, 2008b). In this respect, the TC4/2007 requires 
MFSB to adhere to the accounting standards issued by the Malaysian Accounting 
Standard Board (MASB), either the Private Entity Reporting Standards (PERS) or the 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) depending on the characteristics of the MFSB 
(Treasury of Malaysia, 2007). Table 3.6 below specifies those characteristics.  
 
Table 3.6: Accounting Standards Based on MFSB Characteristics 
PERS FRS 
CAN be adopted by: 
 Those MFSB without subsidiaries,  
OR, 
 Those MFSB having non-public listed 
subsidiaries that are not required to submit their 
financial statements to the Securities Commission 
(SC) and Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM). 
MUST  be adopted by: 
  Those MFSB with public listed subsidiaries and 
required to submit financial statements to the 
Securities Commission (SC) and Central Bank of 
Malaysia,  
OR, 
 Those financial institutions MFSB which are 
regulated by the Development Financial 
Institutions Act (DFIA) 
 
MFSB are also required to submit and table its financial accounts and annual reports. 
This is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3.3 Submission and Tabling of Accounts and Annual Reports 
The Circular TC4/2007 requires that annual reports and financial statements of MFSB 
are tabled to the Parliament. The whole process, from the financial year end to the 
tabling of annual reports and financial statements to the Parliament, should be 
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completed within one year (Treasury, 2007). The Circular provides a comprehensive 
step-by-step process with accompanying datelines to be followed by MFSB for this 
purpose. Details of the process are shown in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: Process for the Preparation and Submission of MFSB Annual Reports 
and Financial Statements 
STEP PROCESS FLOW DATELINE* 
1 Preparation of Annual Report and Financial Statements Between January and April 
2 Presentation of Annual Report and Financial Statements 
(Unaudited) in Board of Directors meeting 
Not later than 25 April 
3 Statutory declaration by the officer primarily responsible for 
the financial management of MFSB 
Before 30 April 
4 Provide the Annual Report and Financial Statements to the 
Auditor General 
Not later than 30 April 
5 Received the Audited Financial Statements from the Auditor 
General 
Not later than 31 July 
6 Presentation of Annual Report and Audited Financial 
Statements in Board of Directors meeting 
Not later than 15 August 
7 Provide the signature for the statements to be attached with 
Financial Statements, namely: 
a ) Statement of Chairman and a member of Board of Directors 
(Company account); 
b) Statement of Chairman and a member of Board of Directos 
(Group account); 
c) Statutory declaration by the officer primarily responsible for 
the financial management of MFSB 
Not later than 15 August 
8 Provide the duly signed Annual Report and Financial 
Statements to the Auditor General 
Not later than 22 August 
9 Issuance of Auditor General Certificate by the Auditor General Not later than 30 August 
10 Provide the Annual Report and Audited Financial Statements  
to the Cabinet 
Not later than 31 October 
11 Table the Annual Reports and Audited Financial Statements in 
Parliament 
Not later than 31 December 
*Assumption is that the financial year-end of the MFSB is on 31 December. For MFSB with financial year end date is not 31 
December, necessary changes to the date shall be made (Treasury, 2007). 
Source: Treasury of Malaysia (2007) 
 
The Statutory Bodies Act (Accounts and Annual Reports) 1980 (or Act 240)  
emphasises  a time limit for the preparation and submission of financial statements and 
annual activity reports (National Audit Department, 2009a). In particular, it regulates 
the time limit for the: (i) preparation and submission of financial statements to the A-G 
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for an audit no later than 30th June
17
 (i.e.within 6 months) of the following year, and, 
(ii) submission of audited financial statements, the A-G‘s report (if any) and annual 
(acitivity) report to the respective Ministers one (1) month after the certification. 
Consequently, the respective Ministers are required to table these documents to the 
Parliament as soon as practicable. Here, the time limit was not specified. Act 240 
specifies that the audit of the financial statements is subject to the Audit Act 1957. 
 
In this regard, the TC4/2007 has however, given a slightly stricter time limit. Although 
Act 240 allows a 6-month period between the end of the financial year and the 
submission of financial statements, TC4/2007 allows only 4 months (i.e. 31st April of 
the following year
18
). This is to expedite the preparation and tabling of the financial 
statements to a date no later than 31 December of the next financial year (National 
Audit Department, 2004, 2008). Earlier parliamentary tabling may allow stakeholders to 
assess the performance of MFSB in a more clear, complete and relevant manner 
(National Audit Department, 2008). Concurrently, the National Audit Department has 
set its vision, mission and client charter to certify the financial statements within 4 
months from the date the financial statements were received (National Audit 
Department, 2004). 
 
The issue on the preparation and tabling of accounts and annual reports by MFSB has 
also been addressed by another circular, namely the Treasury Circular Number 10 of 
2008 (TC10/2008) on the Establishment of the Role and Responsibilities of Financial 
Management and Accounting Committee in Federal Government. This circular 
highlighted that one of the main role and in fact reason for the establishment of the 
Financial Management and Accounts Committee in MFSB is to monitor and ensure that 
                                                 
17 This is assuming that the financial year ends on the 31st December. In the case those MFSB with different financial year end dates, 
adjustments to the date shall be made accordingly. 
18 The same assumption is made, i.e. the financial year end of the MFSB is 31st December. If financial year end is other than that, 
adjustments shall be made according to the date of 31st April. 
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MFSB observe various accounting and reporting-related regulations relevant to them 
including the TC4/2007. This is a response to the issue raised in the A-G‘s annual report 
on the repeated delays by MFSB in the preparation and presentation of their financial 
statements and annual reports.  
 
The General Circular Letter Number 1 of 1995 (GCL1/1995) on Preparation of Annual 
Summary Report of the Financial Status and Performance of Federal Statutory Bodies 
on the other hand requires the chief executive of each MFSB to submit to their 
respective Ministers an annual summary report of the financial status and performance 
within 3 weeks after the financial year end. This summary should not exceed three 
pages according to the General Circular Letter Number 6 of 2004 (GCL6/2004) on the 
amendment to the GCL1/1995. Following that, the Secretary Generals of the respective 
ministries are to compile these reports for all its MFSB and submit them together with 
the cabinet notes to the Cabinet, Prime Minister Department. This is to be done by 31 
January each year. It is also a requirement that the Ministry provide comments to the 
documents submitted (i.e. annual summary report of the financial status and 
performance) by MFSB to them.  
 
The content of the annual reports of MFSB are partly subjected to the TC4/2007 as 
discussed next. 
 
3.3.4 Minimum Disclosure Requirements  
The TC4/2007 outlines the minimum disclosure requirements of the annual report for 
all MFSB. According to the Circular, annual reports have to disclose at minimum 
information on the following: (i) corporate information, (ii) background information of 
the entity, (iii) chairman report, (iv) report on government assistance, (v) analysis of 
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financial performance, (vi) performance reports, (vii) audited financial statements, and, 
(viii) other information. At present, although different MFSB serve different functions, 
the guideline provides a standard list of minimum disclosure requirements that applies 
across all bodies except the performance report category (i.e. category vi) where 
different sectors of MFSB have different lists of items (Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011). 
Besides the above-mentioned regulations, there are also other financial-related 
regulations related to MFSB, as discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3.5 Other Regulations 
Other financial-related regulations relevant to MFSB include (i) the Audit Act 1957, (ii) 
Development Administration Circular (DAC) Number 1 of 2007: Implementation of 
Computerised Standard Accounting System at Federal Statutory Bodies - ―Standard 
Accounting System for Government Agencies (SAGA)‖ (DAC1/2007), and (iii) 
Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) accounting standards (either the PERS 
or FRS). All these rules and regulations are to be followed by all MFSB unless 
exemptions are awarded for special cases.  
 
Based on the above discussions on the accounting and reporting systems and 
requirements required of MFSB,  it can be safely said that there are proper guidelines in 
place provided by the respective authorities in Malaysia that allow MFSB to fulfill their 
accountability to stakeholders. In many cases, it seems to be consistent with the rules 
and regulations imposed on Commonwealth Statutory Authorities in Australia (for more 
discussion, see for example, Bowrey, 2008).  
  
The next section discusses the accounting and accountability problems and issues as 
highlighted in certain publicly accessible reports.  
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3.4 Accounting and Accountability Issues in MFSB 
As indicated in Chapter 1, there are various accounting and accountability issues that 
have been highlighted in the annual A-G‘s report of MFSB (National Audit Department, 
2010a, 2010b, 2011a). One of them is related to their financial statements; for example 
four MFSB received qualified audit certificates and five received unqualified audit 
certificates with emphasis of matter for their 2011 financial statements (National Audit 
Department, 2011a). This is despite the fact that these financial statements are prepared 
in accordance to the accounting standard of FRS and PERS. Among the reasons 
identified by the National Audit Department for the issuance of qualified audit 
certificate are unverifiable and the questionable figures presented and unjustified 
reconciliation.  
 
Other than issues related to accounting figures, there also appear to be issues related to 
the financial performance of MFSB subsidiaries. For example, it was highlighted in the 
2010 A-G‘s report on MFSB that MAJUIKAN, a subsidiary company established under 
LKIM (a MFSB) is suffering increasingly huge loss from RM1.21 million in 2007 to 
RM17.38 million in 2010. At the same time, MAJUIKAN is increasingly in huge debt 
with LKIM from  RM17.53 million in 2007 to RM35.95 million in 2010. The money 
owed is primarily used to finance MAJUIKAN‘s operation and investment activities 
(National Audit Department, 2011c). This has resulted in the subsidiary of MFSB 
becoming a liability to the government. Another example is in the case of the 
DAWAMA, a subsidiary under the DBP (a MFSB). DAWAMA was found to be 
suffering from huge outstanding debt and has not submitted their accounts to DBP 
starting from year 2003 through to 2008, and worst still, DAWAMA did not prepare 
financial statements for two consecutive years after that. Issues also exist in MFSB‘s 
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offices abroad where the A-G‘s report revealed several financial management 
weaknesses including on receipts, payments and assets management. 
 
Weaknesses in the implementation of projects and activities of MFSB was also 
highlighted by the National Audit Department in their report. The implementation 
problems include delay in project completion, unsatisfactory work quality, increase in 
projects cost resulting to the government not getting value for money for the money 
spent, nonachievement of the projects‘ objectives and the targetted impact to the target 
groups. Among the reasons identified by the National Audit Department for these 
problems are lack of monitoring and supervision by MFSB, lack of technical expertise 
and MFSB giving full authority to their external consultant/contractors, and lack of 
coordination among agencies involved.  
 
The National Audit Department has suggested several moves that should be taken by 
MFSB to address their weaknesses and problems. Both preventive and corrective 
measures should be taken to avoid and improve any future and current weaknesses 
respectively. The moves include improving on implementation of programmes and 
activities, improving on asset management including its maintenance, control and 
monitoring, taking disciplinary action and imposing surcharge on negligent staff, 
improving on equipment procurement to avoide wastage, be firm on contractors and 
vendors including imposing penalty on their nonperformance and noncomformance, and 
establishing a check-and-balance system including widening the scope of internal audit 
to include performance audit on projects and activities (National Audit Department, 
2011a). 
 
 
100 
 
Given the various accounting and accountability issues that exist in MFSB as briefly 
discussed above, there is a need to examine an important aspect of accountability 
namely the disclosure aspect, that have not been examined by the relevant government 
authorities such as the Treasury or A-G. It is important to examine this disclosure issue. 
Disclosure is in fact one of the ways MFSB can discharge its public accountability. 
Prior studies on MFSB disclosure has also been rather limited as discussed below.  
 
3.5 Studies on MFSB Accounting and Reporting 
To date, from the researcher‘s limited knowledge, there is at least one study which has 
covered a large number and different types of MFSBs (i.e. Azis, 2008) (as discussed 
earlier in Section 2.4). In most cases, MFSB accounting and reporting studies in 
Malaysia have focused on universities; either covering a group of universities (e.g. 
Azhar, 2005; Azhar & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Ismail, 1999; Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011; 
Tayib & Hussin, 2005; Wahid, 1997; Zakaria et al., 2006), or specific universities such 
as the Northern University of Malaysia (e.g. Mustafa, 2000) and Universiti Teknologi 
MARA (e.g. Abd Rahman, 2002). This situation where many studies focusing on 
universities has also been the trend for international public sector accounting research as 
observed by Broadbent & Guthrie (2008) in their bibliographic review of international 
public sector accounting research where they found a high proportion of public sector 
accounting studies are on universities. 
  
Additionally, most studies on public universities has covered issues on management 
accounting including management accounting practices (e.g. Joseph, 2000), 
management accounting techniques (e.g. Azhar, 2005),  performance measurement (e.g. 
Abd Rahman, 2002; Azhar & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Ismail, 1999), budgeting practices 
(e.g. Tayib & Hussin, 2005) and  activity-based accounting and management (e.g. 
Wahid, 1997). Besides management accounting, MFSB studies also covered other 
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issues including the internal audit (e.g. Zakaria et al., 2006) and financial accounting 
(e.g. Mustafa, 2000). From the researcher limited knowledge, at least one study on 
public universities covers reporting or disclosure issue (i.e. Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011) .  
 
Most of the above studies except for a few (e.g. Azhar & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Tayib 
& Hussin, 2005; Zakaria et al., 2006) are either unpublished doctoral or masters theses, 
and as such limit the ability of the researcher to obtain further insight on their methods 
and findings. Nevertheless, at least two of the published studies highlighted the lack of 
significant difference between Malaysian public and private institutions of higher 
learning; one in their use of performance measurements for management accounting 
functions (Azhar & Abdul Rahman, 2009) while the other in the perceptions of the 
respective management on the role of internal auditors and the important audit areas 
(Zakaria et al., 2006). Similarly, Tayib & Hussin (2005) reported that public universities 
do adopt some of the characteristics of good budgeting practices as practiced by the 
private sector. These findings arepossibly due to the corporatization of public sector 
entities which makes them somehow resembles the private entities.  
 
The preceding discussion has indicated the lack of studies on accounting and reporting 
in the context of MFSB. Studies on MFSB tend to focus on management accounting 
issues and on the limited type of organisation, i.e. universities. As universities only 
represent around 15 per cent (19 out of 124) of the total MFSB (National Audit 
Department, 2011a), focusing on this type of organisation will not give a fair and 
comprehensive picture of accounting practices and accountability status in MFSB as a 
whole. This is because MFSB are in fact diverse in terms of its functions and roles, and 
universities only represent one type of MFSB, i.e. the research and education type. 
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Further, focusing on management accounting provides only a ‗single side of the coin‘ as 
management accounting deals mainly with the internal aspect of the organisation.  
 
This paucity in relevant studies on MFSB is despite the many accountability problems 
in these organisations as documented in the A-G‘s reports annually. This makes it more 
difficult to draw a more complete picture of the status of accountability in this type of 
organisation. Therefore, it is argued that more research on MFSB - particularly on 
disclosure practices - is needed and it is hoped that this research will serve this purpose. 
 
3.6 Summary 
MFSB are semi-governmental agencies established by the federal government under a 
particular ministry to achieve specific government objectives. There are various types of 
MFSB with differences in the nature of their activities. MFSB are separate legal entities, 
part of the public service, awarded with greater autonomy than government department, 
governed by a board and have a balance between governmental control and managerial 
flexibility. Over the years, the number of MFSB has increased. There are many financial 
and management issues surrounding MFSB including that a quarter of MFSB suffer 
from deficit according to the latest data. MFSB finance their operation from government 
grants and/or its own income. Generally, one-fifth of all MFSB income are from the 
government  and two-third of MFSB receive government grants.  
 
MFSB have their own set of rules and regulations; some are adopted from the 
mainstream public sector regulations while others are specifically related to MFSB, 
such as the TC4/2007. This circular is important as it guides MFSB on the preparation 
and presentation of annual reports and financial statements. There are various issues or 
problems related to the accounting and accountability of MFSB which are documented 
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by the A-G‘s report annually. Despite that, it appears that there is a dearth of studies 
focusing on MFSB justifying the need of the current study to fill this particular gap by 
the literature. 
 
The next chapter discusses the theoretical framework, the research paradigm, the 
hypothesis development and the research methodology of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies (MFSB) to set 
the context of the study. This chapter outlines the theoretical framework, the research 
paradigm, the hypothesis to be tested as well as the research methodology of the thesis. 
It begins with a discussion on the existing theoretical perspectives adopted by studies 
that address public sector reporting in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, the theoretical 
perspective of the thesis is elaborated. This includes the public accountability paradigm 
and the institutional theory. In Section 4.4 the research paradigm, namely the 
pragmatism paradigm, which drives this thesis is presented. The chapter then proceeds 
with a discussion on the mixed method research model employed in this thesis as 
detailed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 develops the hypotheses for the thesis while Section 
4.7 presents the hypotheses diagrammatically. Section 4.8 outlines the research design 
of the first phase of the thesis, i.e. the quantitative phase and then followed by Section 
4.9 which explains the research design of the second phase of the thesis, i.e. the 
qualitative phase, before drawing to a conclusion in Section 4.10. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Perspectives Related To Public Sector Reporting 
A review of the relevant literature reveals that various theories were applied to explain 
or understand public sector reporting behaviour. Examples of such theories are provided 
in Table 4.1. Among the reasons cited for the diversity of different theories are the 
absence of a unifying theory that can exhaustively explain all the factors (Smith, 2004) 
and explain disclosure patterns (Campbell et al., 2006). To a certain extent, this 
reasoning appears to be true given that some studies apply more than one theory to 
enable better justifications and more meaningful discussion (e.g. Herawaty & Hoque, 
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2007). In addition, the mere dependence of some studies on prior research and intuitive 
reasoning (e.g. Ingram & DeJong, 1987) may reflect the insufficieny of any single 
theory to explain and justify reporting practices in the public sector setting. A study by 
Jacobs (2009) found that 34 per cent of public sector accounting research do not apply 
any theory at all while the remaining majority predominantly used the institutional 
theory. 
 
Table 4.1: Example of Theories Applied in Public Sector Reporting Literature 
Theories / Models / Frameworks  Authors Applying the Theory 
Agency theory Bolivar, et al. (2007) 
Gandia & Archidona (2008) 
Laswad, et al. (2005) 
Perez et al. (2008) 
Yang (2008) 
Public accountability paradigm /  
Public sector reform 
Coy & Dixon (2004) 
Ryan et al. (2002b) 
Tooley et al. (2010a,b) 
Contingency theory Christensen & Yoshimi (2003) 
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009)* 
Institutional theory Mussari & Monfardini (2010) 
Hoque (2008) 
Public choice theory Giroux (1989) 
Herawaty & Hoque (2007)* 
Incentive theory Perez et al. (2008) 
Legitimacy theory Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009) * 
Stakeholder theory Herawaty & Hoque (2007)* 
Game theory Umehara & Ohta (2009) 
Efficient citizenship theory McCall (2009)* 
Bureaucratic politics theory McCall (2009)* 
Democracy theory McCall (2009)* 
Politico-economic model of positive accounting theory Cheng (1992)  
Smith (2004) 
Economic model Gordon & Fischer (2008) 
Balance scorecard (BSC) framework   Wei et al. (2008) 
No theory Carlin & Guthrie (2001) 
Ingram & DeJong (1984) 
*combine two or more theories 
 
The theoretical perspectives used for this thesis are discussed next. 
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4.3 Theoretical Perspectives for the Thesis 
Consistent with the argument on the insufficiency of a single theory in explaining and 
understanding reporting practices, in this thesis, two theoretical perspectives are used 
namely, (i) the public accountability paradigm, and, (ii) the institutional theory. Both 
these theories are used in a complementary manner to provide a more complete picture 
of accountability reporting practices in MFSB. Figure 4.1 below summarises the 
relationship between the two theoretical perspectives and their roles in addressing RQ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Theoretical Perspectives of the Thesis 
  More directly used to answer RQ 
Less directly used to answer RQ  
 
In essence, the public accountability paradigm is useful in answering RQ1. In particular, 
in the context of this thesis it will define what is referred to as ‗accountability 
information‘. The paradigm is useful mainly to develop the disclosure index which will 
be used to measure the extent of disclosure. While this paradigm is useful and important 
in providing an understanding of the issue of accountability disclosure (i.e. related to 
RQ1), using this paradigm per se may not be sufficient to explain certain factors 
regarding disclosure. The institutional theory is therefore needed to contribute to the 
understanding of how various factors combine in the initiation of reporting. The theory 
is especially useful in providing a strong basis for the hypothesis development (i.e. 
related to RQ2) as well as in interpreting, explaining and understanding the findings of 
RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 
Theoretical perspectives 
Public accountability Institutional theory 
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the interviews (i.e. related to RQ3). It is hoped that the integration of both influences 
(i.e. public accountability and institutional theory) will provide a richer meaning and 
better understanding of the issue. The next section shall discuss the public 
accountability paradigm in more detail. 
 
4.3.1 Public Accountability Paradigm  
Public accountability is a concept that has primarily been discussed in the context of 
government entities (see for example Coy et al., 2001; Kim, 2009; Ranson, 2003). It 
connotes the answerability of public officials to the public for their actions and inactions 
for which they are subject to both external and internal sanctions (Romzek, 2000). It is 
based on the premise of ‗right to know‘ by the society  and as such relevant information 
is owed to the public (Coy et al., 2001; Pallot, 1992) (refer to Section 2.2). Compared to 
other forms of accountability
19
, public accountability is ―a more informal but direct 
accountability to the public, interested community groups and individuals‖ (Tyhnne & 
Goldring, 1987, as cited in Sinclair, 1995, p. 225).  
 
The notion that public accountability framework as a useful framework for public sector 
external reporting was advocated by a few authors including Coy et al. (2001). They 
argued that a public accountability paradigm would include important features of a 
stewardship perspective, as well as accommodating the decision usefulness perspective. 
Prior to 1970s, the focus of external reporting was on the stewardship paradigm.  The 
stewardship concept is an ancient religious concept which focuses on moral obligations 
and responsibilities and emphasizes beyond economic and financial interest. Chen 
(1975) however expressed that the concept has not been understood in its original sense 
by the modern society due to the capitalism and industrialisation and hence identified 
two stewardship function in the context of external reporting as understood by modern 
                                                 
19 Sinclair (1995) for example identified five forms of accountability: political, managerial, public, professional and personal. 
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societies, which covers the responsibilities of institutions to the society (primary 
stewardship) and stockholders (secondary stewardship). In this respect, Coy et al. 
(2001) argued that the public accountability framework is consistent with Chen‘s (1975) 
concept of primary stewardship responsibility to society: ―at a fundamental level, all 
property is owned by the whole of society‖ (Coy et al., 2001, p.6). According to Coy et 
al. (2001), the similarity between the stewardship and public accountability is their hold 
to the concept of justice, truth and fairness that balances the interest of owners and the 
steward (principal and agent respectively).  
 
Coy et al. (2001) also believed that public accountability is more suitable in the public 
sector compared to the decision-usefulness paradigm, which first appeared in 1970 after 
‗taking over‘ the stewardship paradigm. Decision usefulness paradigm implies that 
organisations must only satisfy users who have specific (and primarily economic) 
decisions to make with respect to the reporting entity. The public accountability 
paradigm take away this unnecessary constraint and hence argued to be better capable 
of addressing the widespread demand for greater accountability of public institutions 
and officials by the wider public. As argued by Ijiri (1983), this framework is fair for 
both parties (the accountor and accountee) as its objective of reporting, unlike in the 
decision-usefulness paradigm where reporting is user-oriented. This allows public 
officials and institutions to explain and justify their acts and performance in managing 
public funds and hence avoid unjustified criticisms of public sector entities from a 
poorly uninformed public (Likierman, 1992, as cited in Coy et al., 2001). At the same 
time, it allows the public to get information they need concerning how their money is 
managed and spent.  
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Consequently, according to this paradigm, stakeholders include ―all those with a 
legitimate economic, social, or political interest in the organisation‖ (Coy et al., 2001, p. 
14). The audience of external reports such as the annual reports, would therefore not 
only include ―all those for whom decision usefulness is relevant‖ (Coy et al., 2001, p. 
15), but also extends to a much more comprehensive group of stakeholders. To fulfil the 
public accountability perspective, public organisations must ensure ―the reporting of 
comprehensive information about the condition, performance, activities and progress to 
all those with social, economic and political interests‖ (Coy & Dixon, 2004, p. 81).  
 
Consistent with this, as well as due to the inclusiveness of stakeholders under the public 
accountability paradigm, annual reports will serve as an important component of the 
overall public accountability framework (Ryan et al., 2002b; Tooley & Guthrie, 2007) 
as it is the only comprehensive statement available to all stakeholders on a routine basis 
(Boyne & Law, 1991; Coy et al., 2001). Consistent with the public accountability 
paradigm, Coy et al. (2001, p. 14) emphasised that a valuable annual report include ―a 
wide range of summarised, relevant information in a single document, which enables all 
stakeholders to obtain a comprehensive understanding of [an entity‘s] objectives and 
performance in financial and non-financial terms‖. In the case of MFSB, their 
accountability obligations are extensive and must address multiple information 
dimensions (financial, performance, governance, etcetera) due to their impact on the 
lives of many citizens, both as service recipients and the providers of the large amounts 
of public resources consumed. Accordingly, it has been one of the commonly adopted 
frameworks in public sector disclosure research and in several cases has been used as 
the only framework (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004; Ryan et al., 2002b; Tooley et al., 2010).  
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From the preceeding discussion, this thesis therefore adopts the public accountability 
paradigm as it recognises the entitlement by a diverse group of stakeholders to 
comprehensive information of a reporting entity from the annual report produced by the 
respective entity. The next section will discuss the institutional theory, that is the 
complementary theory used for the thesis alongside with the public accountability 
paradigm. 
 
4.3.2 Institutional theory  
Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991) has been applied in accounting 
research by a good number of authors both in the private and public sectors (e.g. 
Bebbington et al., 2009; Bowrey, 2008; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Collin et al., 2009; Modell, 2001). Early research which applied institutional 
theory was largely concerned with not-for-proﬁt and public sector organisations, such as 
schools, hospitals and other governmental organisations (Scapens, 2006). Despite this 
its application to public sector reporting can nevertheless be regarded as relatively 
limited (e.g. Hoque, 2005; Mussari & Monfardini, 2010; Ryan et al., 2002a).  
 
Institutional theory can be defined as ―a way of thinking about formal organisation 
structures and the nature of the historically grounded social processes through which  
these structures develop‖ (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 508). The theory suggests that   
organisations are both inﬂuenced by and can inﬂuence the society in which they operate  
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1992). Institutional 
theory draws on a much broader set of discourses from the  social sciences (Baxter & 
Chua, 2003) and focuses on something more subtle that is shaped by a more complex 
range of factors (Bebbington et al., 2009) instead of being based on the model of 
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rational action which considers organisational activities as something managers 
purposely initiate to achieve carefully considered outcomes.   
 
According to  Barretta & Busco (2011, p. 217), ―the theory has been used – especially 
in public sector settings – to challenge the assumption that adoption is driven purely by 
economic rationality. The institutional theory therefore, was argued by some researchers 
to represent a major departure from competing accounting theories (Frumkin, 2004) 
which are relatively more commonly adopted by researchers, such as the agency theory 
(Greiling & Spraul, 2010) and the transaction costs economics or resource dependence 
theory. To a greater extent, the theory has been classified under the alternative or critical 
accounting theory together with few other theories such as Marxist tradition, the 
Frankfurt School, Giddens‘s theory of structuration and a Foucauldian approach (e.g. 
Greiling & Spraul, 2010). Nevertheless, some researchers (e.g. Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Collin et al., 2009) regard institutional theory as being complementary to 
economic theory in general and resource dependency theory in particular. It is however 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss further on this issue. The next section 
discusses the key components of the institutional theory. 
 
4.3.2.1  Legitimacy  
One of the key tenets of the institutional theory is legitimacy. The institutional 
legitimacy approach suggests that organisations have to appear legitimate to their  
broader constituencies and stakeholders to secure the resources they need for their  
continued survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional practices therefore ―serve 
to create legitimacy rather than fulﬁl a functional role‖ (Jacobs & Jones, 2009, p. 14). In 
other words, organisational changes may not be driven solely by the need to compete 
and be efficient, but rather by the need to gain legitimacy and enhance survival 
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(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977). This is more so in the context of 
public organisations where the classic measure of performance profit is traditionally 
missing, requiring their managers to deal more with pressures for legitimacy than for 
efficiency (Fernández-Alles & Llamas-Sánchez, 2008). 
 
To gain this legitimacy, organisations must be seen to conform to what is expected of 
them. What constitutes appropriate or acceptable (or legitimate) economic behaviour is 
in turn, determined by the social character displayed by the economic activities in that 
society, because organisations operate within a social framework  of  norms, values  and  
assumptions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It thus focuses on the social contract that exists 
between the organisation and society (Deegan, 2000). As a result, the economic actions 
and practices of the economic agents (i.e. organisations) are structured and moulded in 
the social processes in which they operate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). This is 
when the concept of homogeneity or isomorphism occurs, which is discussed next. 
 
4.3.2.2  Isomorphism 
Isomorphism is described as ―a constraining process that forces a unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions‖ (Hawley  1968,  
as  cited  in  DiMaggio  &  Powell 1983, p.149). Simply put, it refers to the process 
through which one organisation tends to resemble others in the same sector (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991). Institutional theorists are concerned with understanding why  
organisations are similar and why  there  is  homogeneity  in  organisational  forms  and  
practices  (e.g.  DiMaggio  &  Powell 1983). 
 
In explaining the concept of isomorphism, institutional researchers (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001) have highlighted three specific elements of institutional  
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pressures or mechanisms that tend to drive similarities in organisational practices, 
namely (i) coercive isomorphism; (ii) mimetic isomorphism and (iii) normative 
isomorphism. According to Scapens (2006, p. 13), the approach to use isomorphism in 
explaining organisational conformity has been used in public sector management 
accounting research  ―to  study  the  ‗non-rational‘ and sometimes ceremonial use of 
accounting information‖. Scott (2001) indicates that the three institutional types of 
isomorphism are rarely separate but often function together in the  generation of 
legitimacy. This is further agreed by Frumkin (2004, p.285) where he opined that, ―the 
three mechanisms can overlap and intermingle, but they tend to derive from different 
conditions‖. He further adds that: 
At an analytic level, only coercive isomorphism is linked to the environment 
surrounding the organisational field. Mimetic and normative processes are 
internal to the field and help explain the spread of roles and structure. When 
organisations are subjected to outside coercive scrutiny, evaluation, and 
regulation, they tend to react defensively and gravitate toward isomorphic 
transformation. (p.205) 
 
In essence, while coercive isomorphism is ―a push factor that imposes specific 
institutional regulations upon a social group‖ (Beckert, 2010, p. 155), the other two 
isomorphisms are pull factors where organisations ―are pulled toward existing 
institutional models‖ (Beckert, 2010, p. 157). The main difference between the two pull 
factors (mimetic and normative) is that under the mimetic isomorphism ―imitation is 
motivated by disorientation rather than by conviction that the model to be imitated is 
superior‖ (Beckert, 2010, p. 158).  
 
Below are further explanations and examples of the three types of isomorphism. 
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a) Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism occurs due to regulative and political inﬂuences which stem 
from pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are 
dependent for resources or support, and also by cultural expectations of society where 
they operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The influences may be either formal or non-
formal. The formal pressures occurs when ―the change is a consequence of an order 
coming from a hierarchically superior entity‖ (Mussari & Monfardini, 2010, p. 489). An 
example of this can be found in a study by Hoque (2008) wherein he identified 
regulatory institutions and their four legislative frameworks for the Australian public 
sector‘s annual report (i.e. the Public Service Act 1999, the Auditor General Act 1997, 
the Commonwealth  Authorities and Companies Act 1997, and the Financial 
Management and Accountability  Act 1997) as coercive pressures as they shape the 
design and use of performance measures within the Australian government 
organisations. 
 
The non-formal influence, on the other hand, occurs when organisations experience 
expectations and persuasions as a force toward compliance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) 
and hence they change to adopt to the expected behaviours potentially only as ritualistic 
conformity. Mussari & Monfardini (2010) provide an example of this in a study 
wherein they highlighted that this kind of pressure is evident in the Italian public sector 
organisations when the organisations perceive that the stakeholders pressure them to 
voluntarily report their social information as a fundamental requisite for them to 
maintain legitimacy. 
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b) Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations seek to copy or imitate the practices 
of other similar organisations in their field which have been perceived to be more 
legitimate and successful, so that legitimacy can be maintained, or  uncertainty  can  be  
reduced  at  less  cost  (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This imitation process is mainly 
triggered when there are uncertainties in the environment for example where 
organisational   technologies   are   poorly   understood   and   goals   are   ambiguous 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In political literature, this process is called policy transfer 
or policy learning (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996 , as quoted in Jacobs & Jones, 2009). An 
example of mimetic isomorphism is illustrated by Ryan et al.‘s (2002a, p. 62) study. 
Ryan et al. explain that ―if entry into the Queensland Annual Reporting Award (QARA) 
is considered to be a socially accepted behaviour and organisations enter it in order to  
protect their legitimacy by not standing out as being different, then this motive would be 
consistent with the concept of mimetic isomorphism‖. 
 
c) Normative Isomorphism 
The normative isomorphism stems mainly from professionalization, which can occur 
through the two drivers that can result in a change in organisational practices and 
professional behaviours. The two drivers are formal university education and the  
creation of cross-organisational professional associations or networks (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). In both cases, professional staff undergo relatively uniform training, and 
then carry the ideas they learnt to the different organisations that employ them (Pollitt, 
p. 938). It is the commonality of cultural and educational values associated with  
professional orientation which leads organisations to isomorphic behaviours in certain 
ways (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Mussari & Monfardini (2010) provided an example 
of normative isomorphism in the context of public sector delivery. They pointed out that 
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normative isomorphism is basically the new managerialism induced by public sector 
reforms and inﬂuence the role of local governments in local public service delivery.  
 
4.3.2.3  The Utility of Institutional Theory 
There are various benefits of applying institutional theory in understanding 
organisational practice. Among others, the theory is ―very useful in drawing attention to 
the need to recognise the way in which organisations tend to conform to what they 
perceive as the expectations of their broader environment‖ (Scapens, 2006, p. 13). 
Additionally, compared to the legitimacy theory, institutional theory has better 
explanatory potentialities (Unerman et al., 2007, as quoted by Mussari & Monfardini, 
2010) as it takes into consideration various internal and external factors shaping 
organisational practice. The theory also recognizes that management is able to use 
discretion over their actions (Oliver, 1991, as quoted in Scapens, 2006) and as a result, 
there may be significant differences between their formal structure and their actual day-
to-day work activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Further, some authors (e.g. Ryan et al., 
2002a) highlighted that institutional theory is not only useful to understand similarities, 
but is also helpful in comparing the diverse practices of different groups of 
organisations belonging to different sectors or nations (e.g. Beckert, 2010). More 
precisely, Ryan et al. (2002a, p. 64) posit that:  
Institutional  theory  directly  addresses  the  unique  political  and  social  forces  
upon organisations and while it is normally used to explain  similarity  in  
practices ... , the theory has the capacity to explain differences in policies and 
practices across different organisational sectors.  
 
In the context of the public sector, Hoque (2005) has clearly stated the applicability of 
institutional theory in understanding public sector reform, as follows: 
There  is  the  view  that  many  public  sector  entities  are  currently  
undergoing signiﬁcant reforms, not to achieve greater economic efﬁciency but 
for the purpose of legitimising  themselves  to  different  forms  of  institutional  
pressure  or  inﬂuence (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Lapsley, 1999; Hoque et 
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al., 2004). Seen in such a context, the reform process in the public sector may 
not be completely economically rational, but rather could be a ―window 
dressing‖ of organisations. (p. 370) 
 
 
Given the usefulness of institutional theory and the importance of public accountability, 
both of them will be used as the theoretical lens of the thesis (refer to Section 4.6, 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The next section shall discuss the research paradigm of this thesis. 
 
4.4 Research Paradigm: Pragmatism 
A research inquiry should be based on a certain identifiable research paradigm
20
, which 
is intrinsically shaped by the concepts of ontology, epistemology and methodology
21
  
(Guba & Lincoln, 1998). These three elements are intimately related as they provide an 
interpretative framework that guides the entire research process including strategies, 
methods and analysis (Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Krauss, 2005). 
 
This thesis adopts the pragmatism paradigm, which can be traced to American scholars 
such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). This paradigm is defined by Tashakkori & Teddlie (2003, p. 713) as: 
A deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as ―truth‖ and ―reality‖ 
and focuses instead on ―what works‖ as the truth regarding the research 
questions under investigation. It rejects the either/or choices associated with the 
paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed methods in research, and 
acknowledges that the values of the researcher play a large role in interpretation 
of results.  
 
The pragmatism paradigm is often said to be the most philosophical orientation 
associated with mixed method research (Bryman, 2006; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  
This is because this paradigm offers a third choice that embraces both sides of the 
constructivism-positivism paradigm debate in interaction with the research question and 
                                                 
20 Paradigm refers to the ―basic belief system or world view that guides the investigation‖ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 105). 
21 Ontology refers to the philosophy of reality (Krauss, 2005). Epistemology is how we come to know about the reality whereas 
methodology on the other hand is the identified practice utilised to attain the knowledge of the reality (Krauss, 2005). 
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real-world circumstances. Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) have summarized the 
characteristics of the pragmatism paradigm - in contrast to other four alternative 
paradigms (i.e. constructivism, transformative, postpositivism and positivism) - as 
follows (refer Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Expanded Paradigm Contrast Table Comparing Five Points of View 
DIMENSIONS OF 
CONTRAST 
CONSTRUCTIVISM TRANSFORMATIVE PRAGMATISM POSTPOSITIVISM POSITIVISM 
METHODS Qualitative Both Qualitative and 
Quantitative; community of 
participants involved in 
method decisions 
Both Qualitative and 
Quantitative; researchers 
answer questions using best 
methods 
Primarily Quantitative Quantitative 
LOGIC Inductive Both inductive and 
hypothethico-deductive 
Both inductive and 
hypothethico-deductive 
hypothethico-deductive hypothethico-deductive 
(originally inductive) 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
(researcher/participant 
relationship) 
Subjective point of view Both objectivity and 
interaction with participants 
valued by researchers 
Both objective and 
subjective points of view, 
depending on stage of 
research cycle 
Modified dualism Objective point of view 
(dualism) 
AXIOLOGY  
(role of values) 
Value-bound inquiry All aspects of research 
guided by social injustice 
Values important in 
interpreting results 
Values in inquiry, but their 
influence may be controlled 
Value-free inquiry 
ONTOLOGY  
(the nature of reality) 
Ontological relativism-
multiple, constructed 
realities 
Diverse viewpoint 
regarding social realities; 
explanations that promote 
justice 
Diverse viewpoints 
regarding social realities; 
best explanations within 
personal value systems 
Critical realism (external 
reality that is understood 
imperfectly and 
probabilistically) 
Naive realism (an 
objective, external reality 
that can be comprehend) 
POSSIBILITY OF 
CAUSAL LINKAGES 
Impossible to distinguish 
causes from effects; 
credibility of descriptions 
important 
Causal relations that should 
be understood within the 
framework of social justice 
Causal relations, but they 
are transitory and hard to 
identify; both internal 
validity and credibility 
important 
Causes identifiable in a 
probabilistic sense that 
changes over time; internal 
validity important 
Real causes temporally 
precedent to or 
simultaneous with effects 
POSSIBILITY OF 
GENERALIZATION 
Only ideographic 
statements possible; 
transferability issues 
important 
Ideographic statements 
emphasized; results linked 
to issues of social 
inequality and justice 
Ideographic statements 
emphasised; both external 
validity and transferability 
issues emphasized 
Modified nomothetic 
position; external validity 
important 
Nomothetic statements 
possible 
Source: Tedlie & Tashakkori (2009, p. 88) 
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The choice of this paradigm is partly a response to Goddard‘s (2010) proposal to 
researchers on contemporary public sector accounting research in which he promotes 
the use of multiparadigmatic methodologies particularly between positivist and 
interpretive approaches, arguing that it may lead to a deeper and more comprehensive 
understanding of the subject area. It is argued that the pragmatism paradigm adopted in 
this thesis represents a paradigmatic approach that locates somewhere between 
positivism and interpretivism-constructivism as reflected in Table 4.2. It is important to 
note that pragmatists believe that ―epistemological issues exist on a continuum, rather 
than on two opposing poles‖ (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 90). Teddlie & 
Tashakkori (2009, p. 90) further elaborated:  
At some points during the research process, the researcher and the participants 
may require a highly interactive relationship to answer complex questions. At 
other points, the researcher may not need interaction with the participants, such 
as when testing a priori hypothesis using quantitative data that have already 
been collected or when making predictions on the basis of a large-scale survey. 
 
Method-wise, the pragmatists believe that either quantitative or qualitative method is 
useful, and its choice would depend on the statement of research questions and the 
ongoing phase of the inductive-deductive research cycle (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
This is because they believe that research on any given question at any point in time 
falls somewhere within the inductive-deductive research cycle, as explained by Teddlie 
& Tashakkori (2009, p. 89): 
Research may start at any point in the cycle: Some researchers start from 
theories, minitheories, or conceptual frameworks, whereas others start from 
observations of facts. Regardless of where the researcher starts, a research 
project typically travels through the cycle at least once. In practice, instead of 
starting from a theory, many researchers build a conceptual framework on the 
basis of current research literature, minitheories and intuition. This process can 
be highly inductive. 
 
Consistent with the above, variables-wise, pragmatists decide what they want to study 
based on what is important within their personal value system (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
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2009). It was argued that pragmatists behaviours are in fact ―consistent with the way 
many researchers actually conduct their studies, especially those research that has 
important societal consequences‖ (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 90). The next section  
discusses the research method adopted in this thesis namely the mixed method. 
 
4.5 Research Method: Mixed Method 
Consistent with the research paradigm adopted, the methodology adopted in this 
research is both quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative method is used to answer 
the first two RQs (i.e. extent of disclosure and factors influencing it) while the 
qualitative method is adopted to answer the third or last RQ (i.e. reasons for 
disclosure/nondisclosure). In this thesis, qualitative inquiry is used apart from the 
quantitative approach as it accepts the complex and dynamic quality of the social world 
and due to the ability of qualitative inquiry to yield rich information not obtainable 
through the quantitative method  (Hoepfl, 1997).   
 
Mixed methods research
22
 - which combines quantitative and qualitative approach - is 
chosen as it offers great promise in providing greater insights and expanded 
understanding of the research problem, thus enhancing the quality of the study 
(Creswell, 2009). Utilizing either the quantitative or the qualitative approach per se is 
inadequate to address the complexity of the problems in social sciences. Mixed method 
research, owing to the perceived legitimacy of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, may address the complexity of research problems by utilizing the strengths 
of both quantitative and qualitative research (Creswell, 2009). Furthermore, mixed 
method is also useful in research involving content analysis as highlighted by 
Neuendorf (2002) that only with an integrated approach to data collection can 
                                                 
22 By definition, mixed method research is ―the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study‖  (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 
17) 
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applications of content analysis aspire to the highest goal, i.e. explanation. Consistent 
with this, of late, there is evidence of growing interest in the mixed methods approach in 
disclosure studies (e.g. Joseph, 2010b).  
 
An example of the disclosure studies using mixed method approach is that by Joseph 
(2010b). Joseph studied sustainability reporting in Malaysian local government websites 
using first the quantitative and then followed by the qualitative approach. The 
quantitative approach involved determining the level of disclosure using both the 
content analysis as well as the disclosure index method, and then followed by testing 
five variables that may potentially influence the disclosure level. Whereas the 
qualitative method in her study involved interviewing the local authorities‘ officers on 
their reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure of sustainability information on their 
website. 
 
There are at least six strategies for researchers to choose from in conducting a mixed 
method research (Creswell, 2009). The six strategies are: (i) sequential explanatory 
design, (ii) sequential exploratory design, (iii) sequential transformative design, (iv) 
concurrent triangulation design, (v) concurrent embedded design, and (vi) concurrent 
transformative design. The present study employs the sequential explanatory mixed 
method design, which starts with the quantitative (Phase 1) followed by the qualitatitive 
(Phase 2) approach. It slightly modifies Creswell‘s (2009) sequential explanatory mixed 
method design which regards the quantitative phase (i.e. the first phase) as having 
stronger priority than that of the qualitative (i.e. the second phase). In this thesis, both 
the quantitative and qualitative phases are given similar priority. Creswell (2009) 
mentions that the drawback of placing equal priority to both phases is the longer time 
required for data collection. Nevertheless, due to the benefits of mixed method design, 
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this strategy is chosen despite it being emotionally taxing and extraordinarily time 
consuming. Figure 4.2 provides a description of the steps involved in this type of 
design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Sequential Explanatory Mixed Methods Design 
 
In Phase 1 of the study, annual reports were examined using a disclosure index that was 
developed from various sources. The aim is to determine the level of disclosure of the 
accountability information in the annual report of MFSB (i.e. RQ1). Then the 
association between five factors (i.e type of MFSB, board size, board composition, audit 
committee existence, fiscal stress) with the level of disclosure are analysed using the 
multiple regression analysis (i.e. RQ2).  
 
In Phase 2, semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior managers or 
preparers of MFSB annual reports to gain a deeper understanding on the motivations to 
and hindrance from reporting accountability disclosure items in the annual reports (i.e. 
RQ3). This phase aims to enhance and clarify the insights that are suggested from the 
earlier phase.  Table 4.3 below summarizes the research method and data source for 
each research question. 
 
 
 
 
QUAN 
Data  
Collection 
 QUAN 
Data 
Analysis 
 QUAL 
Data  
Collection 
 QUAL 
Data 
Analysis 
PHASE 1: 
QUANTITATIVE 
PHASE 2: 
QUALITATIVE 
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Table 4.3: Research Question, Research Method and Data Source 
Phase No. Research Question 
Research 
Method 
Data 
source 
Phase 1 RQ1: What is the extent of the disclosure of accountability 
information in the Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies‘ 
annual reports? 
Quantitative Annual 
Report 
2008 
 RQ2: Do MFSB type, board size, board composition, 
existence of audit committee and fiscal stress  have significant 
associations with the extent of disclosure of accountability 
information in the Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies‘ 
annual reports? 
Phase 2 RQ3: What are the reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure 
of accountability information in the Malaysian Federal 
Statutory Bodies‘ annual reports? 
Qualitative Interview 
 
 
The hypotheses development of the thesis are presented next. 
 
4.6  Hypotheses Development 
Before proceeding to discuss the research design, the hypothesis developed for 
answering RQ2 is first discussed. In this thesis, five variables (i.e. type of MFSB, board 
size, board composition, existence of audit committee and fiscal stress) are 
hypothesized for testing. The choice of the variables are made after taking into 
consideration several factors, including (i) the unique nature of MFSB in the context of 
the public sector that may influence disclosure (e.g. corporate-style management), (ii) 
the different aspects of internal and external environments of MFSB which may 
influence disclosure (e.g. contextual, governance, financial), (iii) the three institutional 
isomorphisms that may help to explain disclosure practices (i.e. coercive, normative, 
mimetic), as well as (iv) the availability of data. The last reason is in line with the fact 
that in the public sector, the challenge is to obtain data for the independent variable for 
all units of analysis. The number of variables included is related to the number of 
MFSB that is effectively included as a sample (i.e. 106) (refer to Section 4.8.7.3). 
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Table 4.4 below summarizes the basis for the selection of variables for this thesis. The 
dependent variable is the extent of disclosure of accountability information in MFSB 
annual reports. Almost all variables have rarely been tested in the context of public 
sector disclosure literatures except for the fiscal stress variable. 
 
Table 4.4: Basis of Variables Selection 
Variable Uniqueness of MFSB Category Isomorphism 
Type of MFSB MFSB are established for various purpose and thus 
varied in terms of their core activities 
Contextual Normative 
Board size MFSB operate in  corporate manner Governance Coercive, 
Mimetic 
Board 
composition 
MFSB operate in  corporate manner Governance Coercive  
Existence of 
audit committee 
MFSB operate in  corporate manner Governance Coercive, 
Mimetic 
Fiscal stress MFSB financial status is important as most of them  
(two-thirds) receive money from the government or 
public (e.g. through licensing, fees imposed on 
public, etc.) and one-quarter are suffering deficits 
Financial Mimetic  
 
4.6.1 Hypothesis One: Type of MFSB 
Quite a number of previous studies on public sector disclosure have examined the 
relationship between type of public sector organisation and disclosure (e.g. Ingram & 
DeJong, 1987; Laswad et al., 2005; Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2009; Robbins & Austin, 
1986). For example, in the context of local government, studies have tested the 
association between the disclosure practices and the forms of organisation based on the 
categories of the district-municipal versus regional-city councils (e.g. Laswad et al., 
2005). Another example is in the study by Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009) where they 
differentiated between provinces and municipalities, as these two types of local 
authorities are involved in different types of activities whereby the former is more 
involved in regulation and financial transfer while the latter deals more with providing 
direct services to the community. These studies have shown mixed results. Some found 
that there exist different levels of disclosure in different types of government 
organisations (e.g. Ingram & DeJong, 1987; Laswad et al., 2005; Robbins & Austin, 
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1986) while others didn‘t consider it a significant factor in determining disclosure (e.g. 
Joseph, 2010b).  
 
In the context of MFSB, each organisation can be regarded as being unique as each 
operates with specific objective(s). However, generally, they can be classified into 
several types based on the nature of their core activities. For example, the TC4/2007 has 
categorised MFSB into at least five (non-mutually exclusive) types namely (i) 
regulatory, (ii) research and education, (iii) socio-economic, (iv) public utilities, and, (v) 
business enterprises (Treasury, 2007). Although this classification is useful in providing 
an estimate of the activities under which MFSB may possibly be categorised, the list is 
nevertheless not comprehensive and inclusive. No attempt was made by the circular or 
any party (e.g. the government or any researcher) to identify under which category each 
MFSB falls into and as such the classification is still subject to further modification. 
This study has made efforts to further improvise and refine this classification in order 
for it to be more mutually exclusive as well as comprehensive and inclusive. The aim is 
to see the extent to which MFSB differs from each other in terms of their core 
objectives. Hence, a careful analysis of the annual report of each MFSB has been made 
by examining their objective section. From this process, the thesis has been able to 
produce eight categories of MFSB, namely: (i) transportation, (ii) 
banking/finance/fund/investment, (iii) research and development/education, (iv) 
scholarship/foundation, (v) regulatory, (vi) area/regional development, (vii) socio-
economy, and (viii) others. Table 4.5 below presents the types of MFSB and its 
respective source of reference for categorisation purposes. 
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Table 4.5: Types of MFSB and Its Source of Reference 
Types of MFSB  Source Reason Example 
Regulatory  TC4/2007 Clear classification CCM 
Research and education TC4/2007 Clear classification UM 
Socio-economy TC4/2007 Although the category 
can be interpreted 
differently, this refers 
to those MFSB dealing 
with poverty 
alleviation 
FELDA 
Public utilities* TC4/2007 Only one MFSB falls 
under this type 
N/A 
Business enterprise* TC4/2007 Difficult to determine 
the criteria of MFSB 
falling under this 
category 
N/A 
Transportation Analysis of 
MFSB annual 
report on the 
aim or main 
objective 
section 
Clear classification RAC 
Banking/finance/ 
fund/ investment 
Clear classification EPF 
Scholarship/foundation Clear classification YTR 
Area/regional 
development 
Clear classification KESEDAR 
Others One of its kind/small 
in number 
SENILUKIS 
 *excluded by the thesis as MFSB category 
 
Given the diverse nature of operations among MFSB as identified from the eight 
categories developed above, it is expected that MFSB would have different extents of 
accountability disclosure depending on the activities they undertake. From the 
perspective of institutional theory, this can be explained using the concept of normative 
isomorphism. As stated by Beckert (2010), normative isomorphism is when imitation is 
the result of a belief that a model is superior as well as that it is internally rather than 
externally motivated. For example, in the case of MFSB, which fall under the research 
and development/education, some may imitate others in the preparation of their annual 
report, without any external pressures. Possibly, full-fledged universities (e.g. 
University of Malaya) are perceived as superior in their model of annual report and 
disclosure of accountability information, and thus, the rest in  the group, such as 
research institutions (e.g. Malaysian Institute of Road Safety Research) and educational 
institutions (e.g. Cooperative College of Malaysia) would imitate the annual reports of 
the universities. Furthermore, normative isomorphism also suggests that similar 
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professional training among the members of the organisational field results in 
homogeneity. Here, it is possible that because the members are involved in similar 
activities and training as researchers and educators, the level of disclosure of 
accountability information in their annual report is also homogeneous. 
 
Additionally, different types of MFSB may have different levels of disclosure of 
accountability information. For example, regulatory MFSB might not have as much 
institutional pressure to show high levels of disclosure of accountability information in 
their annual reports as socio-economy and area/regional development MFSB because 
they themselves is already a form of governing body and hence subjected to relatively 
less scrutiny by others (e.g. the Treasury). 
 
In line with the above argument, it is therefore expected that different types of MFSB 
will have different levels of accountability disclosure in their annual reports. Since the 
level of disclosure for each of the eight types of MFSB are not clear, i.e. which types 
have greater or lesser levels of disclosure, the hypothesis is thus non-directional. The 
first hypothesis, in its alternate form, is therefore: 
H1: There is an association between the extent of disclosure of accountability 
information in the annual reports of MFSB and the type of Malaysian Federal 
Statutory Bodies. 
 
4.6.2  Hypothesis Two: Board Size 
In the literature regarding private sector disclosure, board size has been studied as one 
of the governance-related variables that influence disclosure (e.g. Al-Akra et al., 2010; 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Indra, 2010). Studies have shown mixed results. For 
example, Al-Akra et al. (2010) and Indra (2010) found a positive relationship between 
board size and disclosure while Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) found otherwise. There is 
also a degree of inconsistency in the opinions and findings of previous research on the 
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size of effective boards (Indra, 2010). For example, Jensen (1993) suggested that size 
should be limited to seven or eight while Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggested ten as the 
maximum number but stated that eight or nine is preferred. This inconsistency for the 
size of an effective board size is reflected in practice where the recommended board size 
as proposed by various organisations vary. Examples are listed in Table 4.6 below
23
.  
 
Table 4.6 : Example of Recommended Board Size 
Year Issuer Description  
Board size 
Min Max 
1992 Lipton & Lorsch 
(1992) 
Literature Nil 
 
10 
(preferred: 8 or 9) 
1993 Jensen (1993) Literature Nil 7/8 
1997 Jordan 1997 Company Law No. 22 3 13 
1998 Spain Olivencia report  5 15 
2006 Malaysian Putrajaya 
Committee 
Green book on board effectiveness 
in GLC 
Nil 10/12 
2007 Malaysian Securities 
Commission 
Malaysian Code on Corporate  
Governance for PLC 
Company decides 
2010 Malaysian Central 
Bank 
Development financial institution 7 Nil 
 
The majority of prior studies argued that smaller boards are more likely to function 
effectively (e.g. Adusei, 2011; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Yermack, 1996). According to these studies, large boards 
destroy corporate values and monitor activities less effectively (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 
2007) as well as increases problems of communication and coordination (Jensen,1993; 
Yermack, 1996). In essence, it decreases the board‘s ability to control management, 
thereby leading to problems stemming from the separation of management and control.  
                                                 
23 In private sector settings, there are numerous requirements and proposals for effective board sizes (Indra, 2010). In Al-Akra et 
al.‘s (2010) study, it was stated that Jordanian 1997 Company Law No. 22 requires that the size of the board should be comprised of 
a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 13 directors. The Olivencia Report (1998) in Spain suggested that the optimal number of 
directors is between 5 and 15 (Olivencia Report, 1998, as quoted in Lara et al., 2007). Malaysian 2007 Code on Corporate 
Governance does not specify the number but indicates that ―every board should examine its size, with a view to determining the 
impact of the number upon its effectiveness‖ therefore leaving each company to decide its own effective board size. Another 
example is the Malaysian Putrajaya Committee, where they have set that board size for Government-Linked companies (GLC) to be 
not more than 10 or 12 (PCG, 2006). On the other hand, Malaysian central bank while not setting any maximum number, has set the 
minimum number of directors on the board of the development financial institutions to be seven (Central Bank of Malaysia, 2010).  
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In public sector settings, the board size is not a widely tested variable given the nature 
of this sector which does not generally embrace the concept of a governing board as a 
governance mechanism except in certain corporate-like public agencies such as MFSB 
itself. A study by Gordon et al. (2002) found that there was a negative but insignificant 
relationship between board size and disclosure in the context of US colleges and 
universities.  
 
Drawing from the perspective of institutional theory, MFSB with smaller board sizes 
are expected to show higher levels of disclosure. This can be explained using the 
concept of informal coercive isomorphism. While the adoption of private sector 
governance structures and practices (such as governing board) by public sector entities 
as well as the board size is part of coercive pressure as stipulated in the respective Acts 
of each MFSB, the actual implementation of the governance mechanism by the MFSB 
is only to adopt the expected behaviours of the society and potentially only as ritualistic 
conformity, hence informal coercive isomorphism. In contrast, the management of 
MFSB with more board members may have a greater tendency to feel satisfied with 
their formal governance structure rather than the actual day-to-day governance practice 
in their organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). They may be less likely to provide more 
accountability information compared to MFSB with smaller board sizes. In other words, 
practicing good governance is part of a process of legitimising themselves in the society 
(Bowrey, 2008).  
 
Besides informal coercive isomorphism, adoption of the governing board mechanism by 
the public sector from private sector practices can also be described as mimetic 
isomorphism. Their motivation behind MFSB imitation of private sector practices (in 
terms of the governing board) could be due to their lack of own governance mechanism 
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historically, and not because they believe it is a good mechanism for governance 
(Beckert, 2010). A similar form of logic applies here wherein MFSB with larger board 
members due to their large board size are more likely to disclose less accountability 
information as they are more easily contented towards surface adoption than those 
MFSB with smaller board sizes.   
 
Consistent with the above argument it is expected that board size will have a negative 
relationship with the extent of disclosure of accountability information. Hence, the 
hypothesis, in its alternate form, is stated as:  
H2: There is a negative relationship between the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB and the board size. 
 
 
4.6.3 Hypothesis Three: Board Composition
24
 
Board composition in this thesis refers to the proportion of internal and external 
directors representing a board. It is partly related to the concept of board independence, 
which refers to the proportion of independent directors on the board.  The general claim 
is that higher board independence relates to a more effective board (John & Senbet, 
1998). Various corporate governance guidelines issued worldwide for private sector 
required that external directors should make up at least one-third of the board 
membership (e.g. Code of  Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China and 
Malaysia) and at the same time there should be a balance between these two groups 
(internal and external directors) so as to avoid any group dominating the board‘s 
decision making (Securities Commision, 2007). Consistent with this, some authors 
                                                 
24 This thesis had considered board independence as one of its variable but had not proceeded with that idea due to several reasons; 
(i) the inclusion of board independence alongside board size appears to be redundant as they are highly and significantly correlated 
as found from a preliminary analysis using a Pearson correlation coefficient, (ii) in public sector settings, higher number of 
independent directors do not necessarily mean ‗actual‘ board independence due to their possible affiliation with politicians  as has 
been demonstrated by  Calabrò & Torchia (2011). Thus, the credibility of the independence of the independent directors is still 
questionable, (iii) difficulty to identify independent nonexecutive director as a considerably high proportion of nonexecutive 
members are  nonindependent directors and thus not independent. This is because many are current senior  public  servants  serving 
either at the ministerial level or at other government agencies, (iv) on average, the proportion of external members represents 84.7% 
of the board membership (with a range of 66 to 100%). Given that the optimum board independence is 50-60%, it is thus felt that 
the variable board independence is not suitable to be tested in this thesis. 
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found empirical evidence that for a board to be effective, the board independence  
should be just between 50 to 60 per cent (Garg, 2007) and not a ‗supermajority‘ group 
(John & Senbet, 1998). 
 
In the context of MFSB however, it appears that there is a trend of ‗supermajority‘ 
external directors with most MFSB having only their CEO on the board as internal 
representative
25
. Moreover, about one-quarter of MFSB do not have any single internal 
director representing the management on the board.  It is argued here that the presence 
of at least one representative such as the CEO from the management is necessary to 
allow for a more effective board decision making. The presence of internal 
representative is also crucial to act as an effective liaison between the board and the 
management on issues such as the practice of governance and disclosure. A study by  
Adawi & Rwegasira (2011) has documented evidence that a governing board 
comprising a mixed of internal and external director will show greater disclosure as 
compared to those having only external directors. Consistent with this, some other 
studies have also shown the evidence that organisation with outsider-dominated board 
has low disclosure level  (e.g. Eng & Mak, 2003; Gul & Leung, 2004) although there 
are also studies which found otherwise  (e.g. Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Huafang & Jianguo, 
2007).  
 
Drawing from institutional theory, the positive relationship between high disclosure and 
existence of internal directors can be explained using the concept of coercive 
isomorphism – both the formal and informal  isomorphism. The coercive isomorphism 
may exist because internal director is more inclined to be more conscious towards 
meeting external disclosure guideline such as TC4/2007 (formal coercive isomorphism) 
as well as pressures from stakeholders (informal coercive isomorphism) as they are 
                                                 
25 This is based on a preliminary analysis conducted by the thesis. For more detail, please see Section 6.2.2. 
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more likely to be subjected to greater responsibility and scrutiny than external directors 
for violating it. The process is part of a legitimisation process of acceptance within the 
system. This may bring the internal directors to become more persuasive in encouraging 
the rest of the board members to effectively monitor disclosure practice of MFSB and 
the board hence may be more likely to be more committed towards enhanced disclosure. 
These formal and informal pressures of formal and informal expectations and 
persuasions create a force for them to exhibit greater disclosure (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, it is expected that MFSB differ in their levels of 
disclosure of accountability information depending on whether there is an internal 
director in their board. Specifically, the thesis argues that at minimum, there should be 
at least one executive member on the board to allow greater disclosure. A 100 per cent 
board ‗independence‘ in MFSB will not be useful for the practice of disclosure in 
MFSB. The formal hypothesis, in its alternate form, is stated as: 
H3: There is a positive association between the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB and the existence of 
an internal member on the board. 
 
4.6.4 Hypothesis Four: Existence of an Audit Committee 
The audit committee has been claimed in private sector setting to be an important and 
effective corporate governance mechanism or attribute to monitor and encourage 
internal control and management commitment as well as compliance towards greater 
transparency and disclosure (Al-Akra et al., 2010; Yuen et al., 2009). Nevertheless, 
according to Kalbers & Fogarty (1998), the mere existence of an audit committee does 
not necessarily translate into better financial reporting quality. The characteristics of 
audit committee (including independence, frequency of meetings, size, members‘ 
expertise and financial literacy) is said to be part of the reason for the ability of the audit 
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committee to inﬂuence a reduction of the information withheld hence enhanced 
disclosure (Davidson et al., 2005; Menon & Deahl Williams, 1994). This explains why 
literature in this area show mixed results concerning the association between audit 
committee existence and disclosure level
26
. 
 
Since audit committee is not commonly established in public sector settings except for 
in organisations such as MFSB, there is a paucity of studies testing the influence of 
existence of audit committee on disclosure levels in public sector literature. In the 
private sector literature, studies have largely found support for the positive relationship 
between the existence of the audit committee and disclosure practices (e.g. Al-Akra et 
al., 2010; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011; Barako et al., 2006; Ho & Wong, 2001; Yuen et 
al., 2009). There are also however, some studies which found negative or no association 
(e.g. Forker, 1992; Samaha, 2010). Samaha (2010), for example, found a nonsignificant 
negative association between existence of audit committee and disclosure of corporate 
governance information among Egyptian companies. 
 
In the context of MFSB, the audit committee can be observed in some MFSB due to 
their adoption of corporate style management. In Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) requires public listed companies to establish an audit 
committee (MCCG, revised 2007)
27
. Despite the majority of previous studies showing a 
positive relationship between the audit committee and disclosure level, this thesis 
expects otherwise (i.e. a negative relationship). Most studies on the relationship 
between audit committee and disclosure are on private sector, hence the context is 
different than the present study. This thesis expects that the establishment of an audit 
                                                 
26 Although it is recognized by the thesis that it would be better to test the relationship between audit committee characteristics (such 
as independence, meetings frequency and size) and disclosure level, these variable cannot be tested effectively in the case of MFSB 
due to the very limited disclosure on audit committee is available in their annual reports. 
27 The Code has also outlined specific requirements on the charactaristics of the audit committee including the minimum size (i.e. 
three), the composition (i.e. number of  executive and independent members), members‘ financial expertise and association with 
accounting bodies. 
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committee in MFSB is simply to legitimise themselves by adopting private sector 
mechanisms and that implementation is far from ideal. This parallels the reasonings 
given for the board size variable (refer to Section 4.6.2).  
 
As in the previous hypothesis on board size, this expectation can be explained using the 
institutional theory perspective using the logic of coercive and mimetic isomorphism. 
Like governing boards (refer to Section 4.6.2), the establishment of audit committes in 
public sector organisations is an adoption by the public sector from the private sector. 
While it is true that formal coercive isomorphism exists due to the respective Acts and 
regulations in some MFSB which requires the establishment of audit committee, 
informal coercive isomorphism may drive its implementation. Specifically, the 
establishment of audit committees in MFSB is more for legitimising themselves. MFSB 
may form audit committees for their image value (Menon & Deahl Williams, 1994). As 
such, those MFSB having audit committees may feel that they have sufficiently fulfilled 
their governance obligations and hence are less likely to commit towards high levels of 
disclosure of accountability information and vice versa. 
 
Using mimetic isomorphism, MFSB with audit committees adopt this practice from the 
private sector because they lack their own governance mechanisms (Beckert, 2010). 
MFSB that fulfil obligations of formal governance structures through the establishment 
of an audit committee may be less likely to strive in the fulfillment of actual governance 
practices, including the commitment towards greater levels of accountability disclosure.  
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Given the preceding arguments primarily based on the institutional theory, a negative 
association between the existence of audit committees and the disclosure of 
accountability information is expected. Again, this is despite the fact that large number 
of studies found positive association. The hypothesis, in its alternate form, is stated as: 
H4: There is a negative association between the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB and the existence of 
an audit committee. 
 
 
4.6.5 Hypothesis Five: Fiscal Stress 
The last variable included in this thesis is the fiscal stress of MFSB. Few studies on 
public sector disclosure have incorporated this variable in their studies (e.g. Caba Perez 
et al., 2008; Smith, 2004). The results are however mixed; while Ingram (1984) found 
that disclosure is becoming more important as the fiscal pressure increases, a study by 
some authors (e.g. Smith, 2004; Perez et al., 2008) found that fiscal stress is not 
significantly associated with disclosure. 
 
In this thesis, it is expected that MFSB with higher fiscal stress would disclose more 
accountability information. This expectation is parallel to Ingram‘s (1984) findings. 
MFSB with higher fiscal stress will try to legitimise themselves or justify their financial 
position among their stakeholders as well as the members of the organisational field by 
disclosing more accountability information. This expectation can be explained using the 
institutional theory perspective, particularly mimetic isomorphism. They will copy the 
practice of others due to their own disorientation and uncertainties in their own 
environment on how best to  disclose accountability information so as to protect their 
legitimacy at the same time help them avoid being further scrutinised by the 
stakeholders as in the case of suffering a deficit for example. These MFSB are also 
expected to be more motivated to disclose accountability information as it may 
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legitimise their position from the perspective of the fund provider which may later help 
them to raise their fiscal condition to a better status. 
 
Given the preceding, a positive relationship between the fiscal stress of MFSB and the 
disclosure of accountability information is expected. Hence, the hypothesis, in its 
alternate form, is stated as: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB and the fiscal stress. 
 
4.6.6 Control Variable: Size of MFSB 
To test the main hypotheses, organisational size is included as a control variable in the 
model. Organisational size is a variable that has frequently been used in both private 
sector as well as public sector studies for explaining disclosure practices. In the context 
of the public sector, size have been found to be positively associated to various 
disclosure practices including social disclosure (e.g. Tagesson et al., 2011), 
accountability disclosure (e.g. Ryan et al., 2002b)  and  financial dislocuse (Gordon et 
al., 2002; Magann, 1983). One can expect that larger organisations will have greater 
disclosure levels for several underlying reasons as discussed in prior literature. The 
reasons include (i) the economies of scale; which relates to the cost of gathering, 
collecting and reporting information  (Laswad et al., 2005), (ii) greater number and 
more diversified staff; which enables them to train specialists in the different matters 
related to the annual reports (Christiaens & Van Peteghem, 2007) (iii) the number of 
activities; where larger organisation have relatively more activities and thus have more 
information to be reported. This in turn, may motivate them to disclose more so as to 
show that they are acting optimally in managing the organisation (Anam, 2009), and 
(iv) political visibility; which make larger organisations more susceptible to 
management-stakeholders conflicts, hence larger organisations are motivated to dislcose 
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more information to reduce the potential conflicts that may occur between the 
management and stakeholders
28
. It is therefore for these reasons that size is controlled in 
testing the variables of disclosure levels in this thesis. 
 
The next section presents the summary of hypotheses and control variable in a diagram. 
 
  
                                                 
28 In the context of MFSB, an example of a large organisation is FELDA. Due to its large size, as reflected in the wide range of 
activities it is involved in (e.g. plantation, manufacturing, etcetera), and the wide geographical area it covers, FELDA has been 
subjected to greater public scrutiny. Accordingly, it is expected that FELDA would disclose more accountability information than 
the relatively smaller MFSB. 
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4.7 Conceptual Schema of the Hypotheses 
From the previous discussion, five hypotheses were developed. Figure 4.3 below 
presents the conceptual schema of the thesis addressing the hypotheses to be tested and 
the control variable related to RQ2.  
 
 
INDEPENDENT       DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES       VARIABLE 
      
               
                
   H1        
                 
               
   H2 (-)                                                     
                                                     
                   
   H3 (+) 
 
 
   H4 (-) 
 
 
   H5 (+)                                          
                         
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Conceptual Schema of the Hypotheses for Research Question 2 
 
The research design of the thesis comprises of both the quantitative and the qualitative 
method. The quantitative phase was first conducted. It is presented in the next section. 
 
Type of MFSB 
Board Size  
Board 
Composition  
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Fiscal Stress 
Size of MFSB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent of 
Disclosure of 
Accountability 
Information in 
Annual Reports 
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4.8 Research Design (Phase 1: Quantitative) 
This section discusses the research design for answering RQ1 and RQ2. This phase 
draws on the annual reports of MFSB as its data source. The following section 
discussed the population and sample of the study. 
 
4.8.1 Population and Sample  
Based on the 2008 A-G‘s report, there is a total of 118 MFSB. The list of all the 118 
MFSB was obtained from the National Audit Department‘s (NAD) official portal at the 
web address of http://www.audit.gov.my (refer to Appendix 4_1).  However, for some 
reason, as stated in Table 4.7, the effective population or sample for the thesis is only 
111. The reasons for a smaller number of effective population compared to the original 
population are provided in Table 4.7. Due to the limited population, all the MFSB in the 
effective population can be included in the study. This means no sampling was 
necessary. The annual reports as the source of data for answering RQ1 and RQ2 are 
discussed next. 
 
Table 4.7 : Effective Population of the Thesis 
Description Quantity 
Total MFSB in 2008  118 
MFSB ceased to become MFSB by 2010  (during data collection  phase)
 29
 (1) 
MFSB receiving exemption from preparing and tabling annual report and financial 
statement
30
 
(1) 
MFSB is part of another MFSB, thus no annual report is prepared for  the ‗sub-MFSB‘31 (3) 
MFSB only start producing annual report since 2009
32
 (1) 
MFSB do not produce annual report
33
 (1) 
Effective Population  111 
 
                                                 
29 Malaysian Industrial and Development Authority (MIDA) had ceased to become a MFSB since year 2009. 
30 Golf Subang Corporation was given an exemption by the Cabinet from preparing and tabling its financial statements and activities 
report for 1968 to 1999 as it will be dissolved indefinitely. To date, there has been no feedback on the status of this statutory body. 
Golf Subang needs to apply for further exemption from 2000 until 2009 (National Audit Department, 2009b). 
31 There are three MFSB which falls under this category; (i) Johor Port Authority (Tanjung Pelepas) is part of Johor Port Authority, 
(ii) Penang Port Commission (Teluk Ewa) is part of Penang Port Commission, and, (iii) Malacca Port Board is part of Klang Port 
Authority. The financial statements of these ‗sub-MFSB‘ are however available within the annual reports of their respective main 
MFSB. 
32 National Academy of Arts, Culture and Heritage (ASWARA) was established in 2006. It starts producing its first annual report on 
year 2009 onwards. Prior to that, information on its activity are passed to the Ministry (Source: Personal communication with 
ASWARA official). 
33 Malaysia Land Survey Board (JURUUKUR) does not produce annual report. (Source: Personal communication with 
JURUUKUR official) 
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4.8.2 Source of Data: Annual Reports 
The study focuses solely on annual reports. To answer RQ1 and RQ2, the annual report 
for the year 2008 is examined. This is the year after the issuance of the Treasury 
guideline No.4/2007. The analysis has been limited to the year 2008 and not year 2009 
or onwards due to the inavailability of data (Gore, 2004). At the time data collection 
was undertaken (i.e. June to December 2010), most MFSB are yet to table their 2009 
annual reports to the Parliament and therefore annual reports are not yet officially and 
publicly available. This was communicated by the MFSB officials to the researcher 
through either telephone or email conversations. Furthermore, disclosure policies appear 
to remain relatively constant over time and therefore justifies the one-year period as 
highlighted by Botosan (1997). 
 
The thesis does not include other agency communication mediums such as websites, 
brochures and internal documents. This decision was made based on the assumption that 
annual reports are regarded as the main medium of information dissemination by public 
agencies to their stakeholders (Wall & Martin, 2003; Wei et al., 2008) (refer to Section 
2.6). Being a public-motive document, annual reports are also usually more accessible 
to researchers (Woodward, 1998, in Unerman, 2000).  Also, the fact that all MFSB are 
required to produce annual reports every year makes it possible to have greater 
consistency in the analysis of the results. On the other hand, other agency 
communication mediums may differ not only across agencies but also within the same 
agency over a period of time. This makes these non-annual report documents as 
virtually impossible to be completely identified and accessed and therefore the 
completeness of the data gathered from these documents cannot be firmly determined 
(Gordon & Fischer, 2008). All these may have some adverse impact on the analysis of 
results by making it more difficult and less meaningful. Focusing only on annual reports 
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is consistent with prior studies such as those by Schneider & Samkin (2008), Gordon et 
al. (2002), Coy & Dixon (2004) and Ryan et al. (2002b). The method of collecting 
annual reports is elaborated in the next section. 
 
In this study, annual reports were obtained through several means. The following steps 
were followed: 
Step 1: The first option was by searching the softcopies from the websites of the MFSB. 
 
Step 2: If the annual report was not available on the MFSB website, the second option 
was by making a request to the respective MFSB through either emails, letters or 
telephone calls. Due to the cost factor, the researcher starts by sending emails (Wei et 
al., 2008). Emails were first sent to the corporate affairs department and if there was no 
response after a week, it was sent to the finance department. 
 
Step 3: If there was no response after two emails with a two-week gap, letters were sent. 
Letters were also sent to those MFSB that have no websites and/or when email 
addresses are not identifiable from the World Wide Web. Letters were first directed to 
the corporate affairs department. After around one month of nonresponse, a second 
letter was sent to the chief executive office. 
 
Step 4: If no response was received from the letter request, telephone calls were made.  
 
From the above steps, some annual reports were received through mail. It was in either 
the hardcopy form, in CD or in both forms. However, some MFSB did not prefer to 
mail copies of annual reports even when the researcher was willing to send them self-
addressed envelopes with paid postage. These MFSB required or suggested the 
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researcher to either: (i) buy from their office, (ii) collect personally from their offices, 
(iii) access from the researcher‘s institutions‘ library, or (iv) access from the respective 
MFSB libraries.    
 
For other annual reports that were still not available despite the above efforts, the next 
option was to search for the annual reports at the National Library. Due to the 
availability of ‗Inter-library loans‘ among Malaysian public libraries, inter-library loans 
was made between the researcher‘s institution and the National Library. In addition, a 
few annual reports were obtained from other public sector researchers who have 
obtained MFSB‘s 2008 annual report. 
 
Overall, the whole process of requesting and obtaining took the researcher 
approximately seven months. Dixon et al. (1991) underwent a similar experience. The 
difficulty of getting access to government annual reports has been acknowledged by 
many other previous authors (e.g. Dixon et al, 1991; Banks & Nelson, 1994). Common 
problems include annual reports were not available on website, no information on 
website on how public can get access to annual reports and other sources of 
performance information and that the public needs to make special requests to get 
annual reports with valid justifications (Taylor, 2006). Even when special requests were 
made, there is no guarantee they can access the annual reports as excuses such as no 
more copies are available are commonly given (Taylor, 2006). 
 
The next section elaborates on the approach used by the study in collecting data for 
RQ1 and RQ2, namely the disclosure index approach. 
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4.8.3 Disclosure Index Approach 
The focus of the thesis (i.e. the dependant variable) is the extent of disclosure. 
Disclosure is an abstract concept which cannot be measured directly (Cooke & Wallace, 
1989). However, an indication of the level of disclosure can be obtained by using a 
surrogate measuring device. According to existing literature, authors used various 
methods to measure disclosure including employing disclosure index, practice index 
(e.g. Cheng, 1992), disclosure checklist (e.g. Boyne & Law, 1991), content analysis by 
incorporating textual analysis (e.g. Clarke et al., 2009; Hoque, 2008) and indicator 
analysis (e.g. Carlin & Guthrie, 2001). In addition, readily available survey  data (e.g. 
Gordon & Fischer, 2008), questionnaire survey (e.g. Yang, 2008), and case studies (e.g. 
Christensen & Yoshimi, 2001, 2003) have also been employed. 
 
According to Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006), the two main approaches in measuring 
disclosure is the content analysis and disclosure index. While content analysis measures 
the abundance of disclosure, disclosure index measures occurrence of the item (Joseph 
& Taplin, 2011). A study by Joseph & Taplin (2011) used both approaches in 
measuring sustainability disclosure in the websites of Malaysian local councils and 
found that the disclosure index is a more predictable measurement of disclosure. This 
was evidenced in the higher adjusted R squared value as well as more significant 
independent variables. 
 
Despite the distinction between these two approaches, content analysis and the 
disclosure index can be seen as non-mutually exclusive approaches. This is consistent 
with Marston & Shrives (1991) in Tooley & Guthrie (2007) which says that the 
disclosure index is in fact a form of content analysis. In line with this relationship 
between content analysis and the disclosure index, in this thesis, these two elements are 
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used in harmony whereby in analysing the content of annual reports, the disclosure 
index is used as an instrument.  
 
As suggested by Cooke (1991), the disclosure index comprises of items that are 
expressed as a ratio of the actual scores compared to the scores which are expected to be 
earned. It is therefore created to measure the relative level of disclosure by an entity. 
The disclosure index is primarily used to measure the occurrence or presence or 
richness of disclosed items (McCracken, 1988). 
 
Various approaches have been used by prior public sector disclosure studies in 
developing their disclosure index. This include incorporating the disclosure 
requirements as specified by various guidelines provided by professional, authoritative 
and regulatory bodies, and adaptation or adoption of other authors‘ guidelines. Table 4.8 
below summarizes some of the approaches used by prior studies in developing their 
index.  
 
Some authors have also identified their index with specific labels. Among the labels 
given include the SPADI or School Performance Accountability Index by Tooley & 
Guthrie (2007), the LGA Index or Local Government Accountability Index by Ryan et 
al. (2002b) and the MAD or the Modified Accountability Index by Coy et al. (1993b). 
Despite the usefulness of the disclosure index in this thesis, the common caution applies 
where ―measuring of information disclosures cannot be carried out in a precise scientific 
way‖ and that ―research subjectivity cannot be completely removed, nor is it reasonable 
to expect that it can be‖ (Marston & Shrives, 1991, p. 208). Necessary measures 
however will be undertaken to address the subjectivity issues in this research (refer to 
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Section 4.8.9). The detail on the development of the disclosure index used for 
answering the RQ1 and RQ2 is presented next. 
 
Table 4.8: Summary of Approaches Used by Prior Studies to Develop Disclosure 
Index 
Approach Example of Studies Using the Approach 
Balance scorecard 
approach 
Wei et al. (2008) 
Stakeholder opinions or 
Delphi exercise  
Coy & Dixon (2004); Coy et al. (1993b); Engstrom (1988) 
Review of literature Coy & Dixon (2004); Coy et al. (1993b); Gore (2004); Robbins & Austin 
(1986) 
Based on anticipated 
user needs  
Giroux (1989) 
Analysis of annual 
reports /current practice 
Coy et al. (1994) 
Guidelines provided by 
professional, 
authoritative and 
regulatory bodies 
 IFAC-IPSAS (e.g. Caba Perez & Lopez Hernandez, 2009) 
 Public Finance Act 1989 (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004) 
 Ministry of Education 1991 (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004) 
 Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 1994 (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 
2004) 
 New Zealand Society of Accountants (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004) 
 Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET) 1994 (e.g. 
Coy & Dixon, 2004) 
 Performance Indicators Task Force 1989 (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004) 
 Australian Institute of Management 1984 (e.g. Lim & Mckinnon, 1993) 
 Parliament of New South Wales 1984 (e.g. Lim & Mckinnon, 1993) 
 US GAAP/GASB (e.g. Gore, 2004)  
 Standard & Poor‘s 1986 (e.g. Gore, 2004) 
 Treasury circulars (e.g. Azis, 2008; Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011) 
Adopt or adapt the 
disclosure index from 
prior studies 
 Gordon et al. (2002) adapted the index from Engstrom (1988) 
 Tooley & Guthrie (2001, 2007), Wei et al. (2008), Ryan et al. (2002b), 
Banks et al. (1997), Nelson (1997), Nelson et al. (2003) employed Coy et 
al.‘s (1993b) index 
 Ingram & DeJong (1987) employed Robbins & Austin‘s (1986) index. 
 Dixon et al. (1991) adapted Gray & Haslam (1990) items. 
 
In short, based on the preceding discussion, the thesis focuses on the extent of 
accountability disclosure in the annual reports of MFSB and this will be measured using 
a disclosure index. The index is developed based on the public accountability paradigm 
which regard that the society - and not only those who need to make certain decision 
(primarily economic) - has the right to information (refer to Section 2.2 and 4.3.1). As 
there is no agreed theoretical framework or guidelines on the number and the selection 
of items to be included in a disclosure index (Wallace et al., 1994), this thesis has 
employed six steps in developing the disclosure index.  
147 
 
Step 1: The study reviewed the disclosure requirements in the TC4/2007
34
. The Circular 
classified the disclosure requirements into eight (8) main categories, namely (i) 
corporate information, (ii) background of MFSB, (iii) chairman report, (iv) report on 
government assistance, (v) analysis on financial performance, (vi) performance report, 
(vii) audited financial statements, and, (viii) other information. This study carefully 
decomposed the disclosure requirements within each category and transformed them 
into specific disclosure items. From this process, a total of 107 items were extracted. 
Following that, the disclosure items were translated into English as the circular is in 
Bahasa Melayu (the Malay language).  
 
In the subsequent steps, changes are made to the disclosure items where some existing 
items are removed while some others are added. This is made based on the premise that 
there is a deficiency of using information containing only required disclosure items 
(Copeland & Ingram, 1983). Therefore, consistent with Robbins & Austin (1989) and 
Allen & Sanders (1994), several items were selected for inclusion in the disclosure 
index on the basis that they are being useful, but not currently required to be disclosed 
by TC4/2007. In the following steps, the selection of item was made based primarily on 
anticipated user needs of accountability information (e.g. Giroux, 1989).  At almost 
each step, the existing eight categories are revised accordingly. Besides that, 
subcategories are also introduced by classifying the items into subgroups so as to 
produce a more meaningful index. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 This Circular  is on  the ―Guideline for Preparation and Presentation of Annual Reports and Financial Statements of Statutory 
Bodies‖ (Treasury, 2007) 
148 
 
Step 2: Modifications of disclosure items were made to the index developed in step 1 
based on a review made of other Malaysian statutory requirements including the 
General Circular Letter No. 6 of 2004
35
  (Prime Minister's Department, 2004), the 
Development Administration Circular No. 2 of 2005
36
 (Prime Minister's Department, 
2005), the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance
37
 (Securities Commision, 2007) 
and Treasury Circular Number 10 of 2008
38
 (Treasury, 2008). The recommendation of 
the IFAC Public Sector Committee (IFAC Public Sector Committee, 2001) has also 
been incorporated. Among the additions made in this step is the inclusion of additional 
financial ratios and governance items. New categories such as the governance category 
are also being included into the index. 
 
Step 3: Additional modifications to the disclosure items were made to the disclosure 
index developed in step 2 based on a thorough inspection of other relevant public sector 
disclosure indexes in the prior studies (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004; Gray & Haslam, 1990; 
Herawaty & Hoque, 2007; Joseph, 2010a; Lim & Mckinnon, 1993; Ryan et al., 2002b; 
Schneider & Samkin, 2008; Tooley et al., 2010; Wall & Martin, 2003; Wei et al., 2008). 
Additional items such as staff recognition through awards and new categories such as 
human resource are at this point introduced. 
 
Step 4: Few more items were considered based on a review of the MFSB annual reports. 
This is consistent with the approach taken by Tooley et al. (2010). An example is the 
item governing ministry and the respective Minister‘s message. Categories and 
subcategories remain as it is here. 
 
                                                 
35 This Circular is on ―Preparation of annual summary report of the  financial status and performance of federal statutory bodies‖. 
This Circular is useful to incorporate relevant financial and performance information. 
36 The Circular is on ―Guideline on establishing key performance indicators (KPI) and implementing performance assessment at 
Government agency‖. 
37 The Code is originally meant for public listed companies. 
38 The Circular is on ―Establishment, role and responsibilities of financial management and accounting committee in federal 
government agencies‖. 
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Step 5: Modifications to remove items that may not be applicable to some MFSB were 
then made. The applicability of an item may be determined by understanding the overall 
business of MFSB through their annual report and/or website. This is necessary so as to 
avoid penalising MFSB who do not disclose items not applicable to them. For example, 
items related to branch or subsidiaries were removed as not all MFSB have 
branches/subsidiaries. Furthermore, all items related to government assistance were also 
removed as not all MFSB receive financial assistance as indicated in the A-G Report 
(refer to Section 3.2.5). In this step, a combination of analysis of the available annual 
reports (e.g. Tooley et al., 2010), intuition, trial and error and judgement were 
undertaken, consistent with Dixon et al. (1991). Although this approach may introduce 
subjectivity, this is important to ensure the relevance of disclosure items to all MFSB 
and to achieve number of disclosure items that is within a reasonable limit. Categories 
and subcategories are again revised at this step due to the removal of the disclosure 
items. Example is the removal of report on government assistance category. 
 
Step 6: The draft index was sent to six experienced researchers in public sector 
disclosure. The experienced researchers were from Australia (1), New Zealand (1), US 
(1) and Malaysia (3).  The aim is to validate the general framework of the index 
regarding the scoring system and the adopted categories and to determine the clarity of 
the index (Anam, 2009; Coy & Dixon, 2004). As a result, the index was further 
modified to incorporate their comments which include elimination of items which may 
result to double counting and reclassification of items into different categories. 
Additional modifications were made to the labels (names) given to categories and 
subcategories as well as the disclosure items themselves to enhance their clarity. The 
outcome of this step is 110 accountability disclosure items. 
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A list of 110 disclosure items was finalised. The disclosure index is divided into five 
categories and 24 subcategories. The categories are (i) overview, (ii) governance, (iii) 
financial, (iv) performance and (v) others. To avoid confusion with indices used in other 
studies, the adapted index used in this study is referred to as the Accountability 
Disclosure Index for Statutory Bodies or ADIS (refer to Appendix 4_2). 
 
4.8.4  Measurement of Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the thesis is ‗the extent of disclosure of accountability 
information in the annual reports of MFSB‘. The ‗extent‘ is defined here as the total 
amount of disclosure in order to measure the 'how much' component of the first research 
question. In other words, the thesis identifies the presence of the disclosure items in the 
annual report of individual MFSB. This means once an instance is found for a particular 
checklist item, the search would immediately stop for that item. The presence or 
existence, instead of frequency of occurrence, of data is applied. The thesis also did not 
cover the quality aspect of the disclosure. 
 
Secondly, the thesis adopts the dichotomous or binary method of scoring each 
disclosure item. This method is chosen instead of the polychotomous or qualitative scale 
method (e.g. Coy & Dixon, 2004; Coy et al., 1993b, 1994; Robbins & Austin, 1986; 
Ryan et al., 2002b) as this thesis is interested in determining the presence of information 
and extent of disclosure and not in the quality or value of disclosure. The binary method 
is also consistent with many prior studies (e.g. Dixon et al., 1991; Gordon et al., 2002; 
Gore, 2004; Ingram & DeJong, 1987; Ismail & Abu Bakar, 2011; Lim & Mckinnon, 
1993; Robbins & Austin, 1986; Tooley & Guthrie, 2007).  
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Thirdly, the thesis adopted the unweighted approach for scoring each of the disclosure 
items therefore assuming that all items are equally important. This method was used in 
many previous studies (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Gandia & Archidona, 2008; Ismail & Abu 
Bakar, 2011; Wei et al., 2008). There are at least three important reasons for choosing 
this approach instead of the weighted index. Firstly, the scoring bias that may be 
associated with the arbitrary assignment of weight to each disclosure item. This reason 
is exacerbated with the lack of previous studies on disclosure (Wei et al., 2008) related 
to MFSB. It is presumed that the subjectivity of arbitrarily assigning weight to items is 
relatively higher than the subjectivity of assuming that all items are equally important 
(Anam, 2009). Secondly, there are difficulties in conducting the practitioners‘ and 
users‘ weighting process (Wei et al., 2008). This is assuming that weights are not 
arbitrarily assigned but rather based on empirical studies that gather the users‘ 
perception on the importance of each disclosure item through survey for example. Time 
and cost factors limit the ability to conduct such surveys. Thirdly, there is a lack of 
material increase in explanatory power nor additional value found in the results of prior 
studies using weighted index when they use a duplicate sets of data and test them using 
an unweighted index (e.g. Firth, 1980; Gordon et al., 2002; Robbins & Austin, 1986; 
Ryan et al., 2002b). This is despite the claim that a weighted index is superior and 
intuitively more appealing  than an unweighted index (Botosan, 1997). 
 
Consistent with Ismail & Abu Bakar (2011), the total disclosure (TD) score is 
mathematically expressed as follows:  
     TD = ∑ di 
where TD is total disclosure for a MFSB; d = 1, if the item di is disclosed; and d = 0, if 
the item di is not disclosed.  
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The Disclosure Index (DI) for each MFSB is equal to TD/n, where n is the number of 
items (i.e. 110). To provide for comparability among MFSB, each MFSB's measure is 
converted into a percentage (i.e. 100%). 
 
All the steps undertaken in the thesis were firstly examined via a pilot study, which will 
be detailed in a later section. This was to ensure the robustness of the disclosure index 
instrument developed in the thesis. 
 
4.8.5 Measurement of Independent and Control Variables 
This section discusses the independent variables and their measurement. As discussed 
earlier, there are five independent variables in this study. 
 
Type of MFSB: MFSB are categorised into eight (8) categories according to their core 
activity or objective (refer to Section 4.6.1). The data is hence non-metric and available 
in the objective section of the annual report.  
 
Board Size: The measurement for this variable is the number of directors on the board at 
the end of the financial year. This measurement is consistent with previous studies such 
as Adawi & Rwegasira (2011) and Gordon et al. (2002). The data is metric. This 
information is available in the annual reports of each MFSB. 
 
Board Composition: A ‗1‘ is assigned if the board is composed of both internal and 
external directors  with a minimum of one internal director. A ‗0‘ is assigned when all 
board members are outsiders. The data is therefore nonmetric. Information on board 
composition is available from the annual reports of MFSB. 
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Existence of an Audit Committee:To measure the existence of an audit committee, a ‗1‘ 
is assigned  if an audit committee exists and ‗0‘ if otherwise. The data is nonmetric. 
This information is available from the annual reports of each MFSB. 
 
Fiscal Stress: This variable is measured by the ratio of the surplus/profit (or deficit/loss) 
to total revenue, multiply by -1. This measurement implies that the  higher the value, 
higher the stress. This measurement is consistent with previous studies including Smith 
(2004). The data is metric. This information is available in the income statement which 
is part of the MFSB annual report.  
 
The control variable, i.e. size of MFSB, is measured by total assets at the end of the 
financial year in the Malaysian currency namely the Ringgit Malaysia (RM). Measuring 
the size of public organisations using total assets is consistent with prior studies such as 
Gordon & Fischer (2008). Although there are many ways to measure an entity‘s size 
(e.g. total revenue, total employees, total expenditure), total assets is used not only due 
to the data availability (compared to total employees, for example) but more importantly 
because it gives a measure of the total resources which have come under the authority's 
control over time (Lim & Mckinnon, 1993). This is a metric variable and is available in 
the annual reports of MFSB.  
 
Table 4.9 below summarizes the variables and their measurements. Few modifications 
to these original measurements will be made during the regression diagnostics exercise 
which will be explained in Section 4.8.7.3. 
  
154 
 
Table 4.9: Summaries of Variables in this Study 
Variable 
 
Acronym Measurement/ 
Operationalization 
Variable type Source of 
Information 
Dependent variable     
Disclosure extent DI Ratio of total disclosure to  
total disclosure items 
Metric Annual report 
Independent variables     
MFSB type TYPEMF 8 categories as developed by 
the thesis 
Nonmetric Annual report  
Board size BODSIZE Number of board members at 
the end of financial year 
Metric 
 
Annual report 
Board composition BODCOM ‗1‘ if at least there is 1 
internal director on the board 
‗0‘ if otherwise 
Nonmetric Annual report 
Audit commmittee 
existence 
AUDCOM ‗1‘ if audit committee exist; 
‗0‘ if otherwise 
Nonmetric Annual Report 
Fiscal stress FISCSTR (Surplus (Deficit)/Total 
revenue)*(-1) 
Metric Annual report 
Control variable     
MFSB size SIZEMF Total assets Metric Annual Report 
 
4.8.6 Coding Instrument 
An internal instrument was developed to guide the content analysis procedure and help 
assure consistent coding. This is consistent with Gordon et al. (2002) who included the 
relevant disclosure items from the Engstrom (1988) study as well as organisational 
characteristics and certain monetary amounts. Similarly, in this thesis, the internal 
instrument containing the disclosure items/index, independent variables items and 
several other MFSB characteristics. The latter is useful in order for the thesis to describe 
the features of MFSB as available in Chapter 3. The statistical method used for RQ1 
and RQ2 is elaborated next. 
 
4.8.7 Statistical Method 
Data pertaining to the dependent variable, independent and control variables were 
analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software version 19.0. 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics, multiple regression analysis and the 
general linear model approach, regression diagnostics and sensitivity analysis conducted 
by this study. 
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4.8.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics is useful to explore and understand the data (SPSS Inc., 1999). 
Among the descriptive statistics used are the frequency distribution and other most 
commonly used statistics associated with frequencies including the measure of location 
(e.g. mean, median) and measure of variability (e.g. range, standard deviation). 
 
4.8.7.2 Multiple Regression Analysis and General Linear Model (GLM) command 
The multiple regression statistical analysis was conducted to analyse the relationship 
between the independent variables and dependant variable using the univariate general 
linear model (hereafter referred to as GLM) command in SPSS
39
 instead of the normal 
SPSS regression command. In essence, regardless of which command is used, they will 
both yield similar results and conclusion (more discussion in provided in next section) 
although the statistics used and outputs
40
 shown may be in different form. All linear 
models (t test, ANOVA, regression, GLM) for that matter will lead us to similar results 
(Campbell, 2002; Park, 2009). Table 4.10 compares the different statistics used among 
several linear model procedures.  
 
Table 4.10: Comparison of the T-test, One-way ANOVA/GLM and Linear 
Regression (OLS) 
 
    Source: Adopted from Park (2009) 
 
                                                 
39 More conceptual discussion on GLM is provided in Appendix 4_3. The key point in the discussion in the Appendix is that The 
Big Four test (t tests, ANOVA, correlation and multiple regression) are  all part of  GLM  and therefore  they are all systematically 
related. Among these tests, regression is the most general technique while the other tests are special cases of GLM  (Aron et al., 
2009). Thus,  similarly, in the thesis, when the GLM command is used it implies that all the big four test may be conducted 
simultaneuously.  
40. For example, the  regression model reports the mean difference as the coefficient of the dummy variable (grouping variable) 
(Park, 2009) 
156 
 
The reason why GLM command is utilized is mainly because it allows the researcher to 
avoid the tedious process of programming or coding the categorical (nonmetric) 
variables into the dummy variables for the purpose of converting them into metric 
variables (Garson, 2012a; Grace-Martin, 2009; Stockburger, 1998). Given that in this 
thesis there are three nonmetric variables
41
 out of the five independent variables, and, 
that there are many levels within one of the nonmetric variables (i.e. eight types of 
MFSB) makes GLM the most appropriate procedure to be utilised. The GLM 
automatically creates dummy coded variables for these variables in order to make them 
behave like metric variables and accordingly performs the appropriate statistical 
analysis (Petty & Cuganesan, 2005; Stockburger, 1998). Hence, it does not matter in the 
GLM statistical technique or computer program whether the independent variable is 
metric or nonmetric (McNeil et al., 1996) - unlike in other SPSS procedure such as 
regression or ANOVA - because both types of data can be included in GLM. What 
researchers need to do is to identify the nature of their variables and then enter them 
accordingly in specific boxes under the GLM command. Specifically, any non-metric 
variable is entered into ‗Fixed Factors‘ box while metric variable will go into 
‗Covariate‘ box42 (Chen et al., 2003; Grace-Martin, 2009). It also does not matter 
whether the variable is something being manipulated or controlled for in the model 
(Grace-Martin, 2012b). In essence, for research containing numerous metric and 
nonmetric independent variables and with numerous categories in its non-metric data 
such as in this thesis, the GLM is the way to go as it may prevent the labour-intensive 
process of coding variables (Hendersen, 1998). Another advantage of using GLM is that 
an unbalanced design and zero cell value are not problematic (with Type IV sum of 
squares) (Hendersen, 1998; IBM Corporation, 2011; Park, 2009).  
 
                                                 
41 The nonmetric or categorical IVs are MFSB type, board composition and existence of audit committee. 
42
 If an independent variable has only two categories (e.g. gender), a perfectly valid/equivalent result will be obtained regardless of 
whether it is entered as a Fixed Factor or as a Covariate (Taylor, 2011). 
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Given the above, we may see that the GLM is indeed a very flexible procedure 
(Hendersen, 1998). It is useful to answer all parametric (including regression, ANOVA 
and ANCOVA) and most nonparametric research hypothesis investigating one (or 
more) criterion variable (Grace-Martin, 2009; Hendersen, 1998; McNeil et al., 1996). 
This is partly because the GLM approach does not distinguish between ANOVA and 
correlational procedures (such as regression) in their underlying analysis (Leech et al., 
2005; McNeil et al., 1996). The GLM approach recognizes that the two procedures 
differ only in the form of their output (Meyers et al., 2006).  
 
 
In fact, as discussed in Appendix 4_3, the ANOVA, correlation, regression as well as 
descriptive statistics are themselves merely computational simplifications of GLM 
which were developed by statisticians before the widespread availability of the 
computer and statistical software. Nowadays, with the advancement of technology, 
GLM will be a better approach as it is able to answer most research hypotheses with one 
command (McNeil et al., 1996). The researcher is then free from wondering if the 
―correct‖ statistical analysis is known or if the desired research hypothesis can be stated 
in such terms that one of the few statistical tests known by the researcher can be used to 
answer that hypothesis (McNeil et al., 1996). 
 
However, the limitation of SPSS GLM compared to SPSS regression is that some of the 
options available from the latter procedure are not available in the former (Hendersen, 
1998). This includes the standardised regressions beta coefficients, multicollinearity 
diagnostics, stepwise and hierarchical method, partial plots and detection of outliers 
(Garson, 2012a; Hendersen, 1998). In the case of stepwise regression, there is no 
stepwise analysis in GLM because the procedure was developed for continuous 
variables (McNeil, 1996). However, the insignificant variables can be dropped manually 
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as suggested by Chinna (2012). Hence, to obtain some of these statistical results which 
are not available under GLM, they can either be handled manually or by using other 
commands besides the SPSS GLM (Chinna, 2012) (for example, refer to Section 6.3.1). 
In accounting literature, only a handful of studies used GLM (e.g. Astami & Tower, 
2006; Joseph, 2010b; Petty & Cuganesan, 2005; Tower et al., 1999) and therefore this 
study may contribute to the literature regarding the usefulness of the GLM approach. 
 
With respect to the statistics used in GLM which covers both regression and ANOVA, 
partial eta-square (eta
2
) is also used alongside R
2
 to account for the variance in the 
dependent variable (Meyers et al.,2006). The partial eta-square (eta
2
) is shown for both 
the model and for each independendent variable. The R
2 
under the regression procedure 
will equal the model‘s partial eta squared from the GLM regression model when the 
relationships are linear, but will be higher than R
2
 when the relationships are nonlinear. 
Hence, using GLM enable researchers to test the linearity assumption indirectly. 
Reporting this strength-of-effect (the R
2
 and eta
2
) is important as it provides the 
researcher and readers with some grounding in how effectively each of the independent 
variables functioned in the study. In most research studies, the strength-of–effect that 
are found are not ordinarily large (Meyers et al., 2006). Meyers et al. stated that 0.09, 
0.14, and 0.22 are small, medium, and large eta-square respectively. 
 
Parameter estimates is the term used in GLM, which is similar to the unstandardized (b) 
coefficient in normal regression command. The b coefficients in the regression model, 
which is run under ordinary regression command (Analyze-Regression-Linear) and the 
parameter estimates, which is run under GLM command (Analyze-General Linear 
Model-Univariate) show identical results (Garson, 2012a). Except that under regression 
command, b coefficients are default output while under GLM, researchers need to ask 
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for it (Option-Parameter estimates). The parameter estimates are based on dummy 
coding with the last category omitted, and correspond to the results shown where the 
last category was omitted (Chen et al., 2003). 
 
F test is also used. It will provide a single result (p-value) for the hypothesis related to 
factors that makes interpretation much easier. Nevertheless, the p-values of each levels 
of factors are also available. 
 
The regression model representing relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables is depicted in the following equation:  
DIi = αi +  ƅ1TYPEMF1i + ƅ2TYPEMF2i + ƅ3TYPEMF3i +  
  ƅ4TYPEMF4i + ƅ5TYPEMF5i + ƅ6TYPEMF6i + ƅ7TYPEMF7i +  
ƅ8TYPEMF8i + ƅ9BODSIZEi + ƅ10BODCOMi + ƅ11AUDCOMi + 
ƅ12FISCSTRi + ƅ13SIZEMFi + ei 
 
 
where 
DIi  = Total disclosure index 
TYPEMF1i = 1 if Type 1 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF2i  = 1 if Type 2 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF3i = 1 if Type 3 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF4i  = 1 if Type 4 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF5i  = 1 if Type 5 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF6i = 1 if Type 6 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF7i = 1 if Type 7 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
TYPEMF8i  = 1 if Type 8 of MFSB, 0 otherwise   
BODSIZEi  = Number of board members 
BODCOMi  = 1 if at least one internal director on the board, 0 otherwise   
AUDCOMi  = 1 if audit committee exists in MFSB, 0 otherwise   
FISCSTRi          =        Surplus (Deficit) over Total revenue, multiply by -1 
SIZEMFi  = Total assets in MFSB   
 
where 
i  = MFSB number 
α   = constant 
ƅ  =  coefficient 
e  = error term 
 
The next section shall elaborate the regression diagnostics conducted in this study. 
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4.8.7.3  Regression Diagnostics 
According to Pallant (2005), multiple regression is one of the fussier of the statistical 
techniques. There are at least three conditions (minimum sample size, absence of 
multicollinearity and lack of influence of outliers) and three assumptions (normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity) that need to be satisfied to run regression analyses. This 
section briefly describes these conditions and assumptions as well as report their results 
to determine whether regression analysis is suitable and can be run for this current 
study. 
 
a) Minimum Sample Size 
Tabachnick & Fidell (2007) give a formula for calculating sample size requirements, 
taking into account the number of independent variables that the researcher wish to use: 
N > 50 + 8m (where m = number of independent variables). The importance of this 
requirement is for generalizability of the sample. In this thesis, however, 
generalizability will not be a major concern owing to the proximity of the thesis sample 
size (more than 95%) to the population. 
 
Nevertheless, the thesis fulfilled the minimum sample size requirement to run the 
regression. It consists of a sample size of 106, which is 8 cases above the minimum 
requirement of 98, i.e. 50 + (8*6). 
 
b) Tests on Multicollinearity  
Independent variables that are highly collinear (i.e. linearly related) can cause problems 
in estimating the regression coefficients (Chen et al., 2003). Three separate tests are 
used to identify multicollinearity among variables.  
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Relationship between Covariates 
A correlation test is used to test the degree of relationships between the covariates. The 
problem exists if independent variables are highly correlated with each other at correlation 
values exceeding 0.9, according to Tabachnick & Fidell (2007)
43
. Table 4.11 presents the 
correlation matrix for the three covariates. This table shows that the correlation values 
ranged between -0.135 and 0.044 with the highest correlation existing between 
BODSIZE and SIZEMF. From these values, there is no evidence of multicollinearity as 
the threshold value of 0.9 (Pallant, 2005) has not been exceeded by any of the variables, 
suggesting that all the covariates can be retained
44
. On the other hand, the FISCSTR has 
a negative and significant
45
 relationship with BODSIZE, suggesting the larger the size 
of the board, the lesser the fiscal stress they face.  
 
Table 4.11 : Correlations between Covariates 
 BODSIZE FISCSTR SIZEMF 
BODSIZE 1   
FISCSTR -0.135* 1  
SIZEMF 0.044 -0.050 1 
                              *Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level  
 
Relationship between Covariate and Factors 
This section discusses the relationship between covariates and factors. One-way 
ANOVA test is used to determine whether the covariates (both metric independent and 
control variables, i.e. BODSIZE, FISCSTR, and SIZEMF) is significantly related to the 
factors (TYPEMF, BODCOM and AUDCOM)
46
. This is consistent with Tower et al. 
(1999) and Joseph (2010b). Referring to row 1, the eight types of MFSB are 
significantly related to the FISCSTR (refer to Table 4.12). Some types of MFSB tend to 
                                                 
43 For factors, this thesis presented contingency tables but not with the aim of testing multicollinearity but rather simply to obtain a 
general insight on the association among factors.   
44 On a separate note, McNeil et al. (1996) recommend that researchers ignore the notion that only uncorrelated variables are to be 
used. They argued that the real world is never fashioned that way and what is more important is the effect of the predictor on the R2 
the ultimate value. If the  R2 is significantly increased by the inclusion of a correlated predictor variable, then by definition that 
variable is a good variable (in that set of predictor variable). 
45 Many authors in this area suggest that statistical significance should be reported but ignored (Pallant, 2005). 
46 The common reason cited in literature for running ANOVA analysis is to compare whether there is any difference among levels of 
categorical/nonmetric independent variables in relation to the metric dependant variable. The thesis, however, is of the position that 
ANOVA is also part of correlational test and are part of a global general linear model (Thompson, 2008) as discussed in Appendix 
4_3 and therefore can be used to find relationship between variables. 
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have significantly more (or less) FISCSTR. Referring to row 2, there are no significant 
relationships between the composition of board members in MFSB and its respective 
BODSIZE, FISCSTR or SIZEMF. Based on row 3, there appears to be no significant 
relationship between MFSB with audit committees or without audit committees and 
BODSIZE, FISCSTR and SIZEMF. In other words, regardless of whether or not there 
are audit committees in the MFSB, there appears to be no difference among them in 
terms of either board size, level of fiscal stress or MFSB size. 
 
Table 4.12: Relationship between Covariates and Factors 
Covariates BODSIZE 
p -value 
FISCSTR  
p -value 
SIZEMF  
p-value Factors 
TYPEMF 0.078 0.013** 0.176 
BODCOM 0.768 0.072 0.269 
AUDCOM 0.846 0.497 0.237 
                *, ** refers to significant at 1% and 5% respectively 
 
Similar to the discussion on the relationship between covariates, the thesis believes that 
the significant relationship found between two independent/control variables should not 
be a major concern in so long as they are not measuring the same concept.  
 
Relationship between Factors 
For factors, Cramer‘s V test is used to test the association between them. This test is 
used because it can handle variables having more than two categories (Field, 2009). Its 
interpretation is similar to correlation test. A contingency table is presented to tabulate 
the frequencies among the three factors (TYPEMF, BODCOM and AUDCOM) (refer to 
Table 4.13, Appendix 4_4). Based on the table, there appears to be some empty cells. 
According to Garson (2012b), the widely accepted rule of thumb is that no cell in factor 
space should be 0 and 80% of cells should be greater than 5 as it may affect the 
generalizability of the findings (where having very few cell counts will result in very 
few subjects to generalize). In fact, the researcher  should  not  generalize  at  all when  
there  are  any  0  cells  or  more  than  20%  of  cells  under  6 (Garson, 2012b). 
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Nevertheless, the GLM procedure utilised in this thesis overcame this problem through 
the Type IV sum of squares option
47
. 
 
From the Cramer‘s V test, there appears to be a significant association between (i) 
TYPEMF and BODCOM, and (ii) TYPEMF and AUDCOM (p<0.01), with Cramer‘s 
statistic is 0.452 and 0.497 respectively, out of a maximum value of 1, representing a 
medium association between the variables. However, the association between 
BODCOM and AUDCOM is not significant (p>0.05) with Cramer‘s statistic of 0.444, 
again indicating medium association. Hence, there appears to be no strong or perfect 
relationship between factors.  
 
c) Test on the Influence of Outliers 
An outlier is a case with an extreme value on a variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Outliers can be found in both dependent and independent variables (Pallant, 2005) for 
both metric and nonmetric variables (Meyers et al., 2006). They lead to results that do 
not generalize except to another sample with the same kind of outlier
48
.  Outliers that 
exert undue influence on the coefficients need to be removed (Chen et al., 2003). 
Consistent with Tabachnick & Fidell (2007), the thesis detects outliers using boxplot and 
later compare between the original mean and the 5% trimmed mean
49
 of the variable in 
order to decide whether the subject can be retained or need to be removed. If there is 
little difference between the original and trimmed mean, then the outliers will be 
retained. Otherwise, the data will be transformed so that the outliers are more in line 
with the rest of the data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
 
                                                 
47 In this thesis, however, although  the three contingey tables above contains cells with 0 and below  6, generalizability should not 
be an issue of concern owing to the proximity of the thesis sample size (more than 95%) to the population as discussed earlier. 
48 Again, generalizability will not be the major concern for this thesis given the proximity of sample size to population. 
49 To arrive to 5% trimmed mean, SPSS removes the top and bottom 5 per cent of the cases and recalculates a new mean value.  
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The boxplots of all four covariates (BODSIZE, FISCSTR, SIZEMF, and 
DISCLOSURE INDEX) (refer to Figure 4.5, Appendix 4_4) and three factors 
(TYPEMF, BODCOM, and AUDCOM) (refer to Figure 4.6, Appendix 4_4) shows 
some outliers. However, only two of them (FISCSTR, SIZEMF) demonstrated a 
signficant difference between the original and trimmed mean, indicating the 
nonfulfilment of this regression condition and is thus a potential candidate for variable 
transformation.  
 
d) Tests on Normality 
The assumption is that residual/errors should be normally distributed
50
. A common 
cause of non-normally distributed residuals is non-normally distributed dependent 
and/or independent variables (Chen et al., 2003; Meyers et al., 2006; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Hence, screening variables should lead to the same conclusions as 
screening residuals (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Consistent with this argument, this 
thesis will conduct the normality assessment on variables/residuals using the Shapiro-
Wilk (S-W)
51
 test, histogram and Q-Q plots. For nonmetric variables, the distributions 
in each will be assessed and not the overall distribution (Field, 2009). If there appear to 
be normality violations, the data will be transformed accordingly as a remedy.  
 
Referring to Table 4.14 in Appendix 4_4, the values of skewness and kurtosis for all 
variables except for three variables (BODSIZE, FISCSTR, and SIZEMF) are below the 
threshold of 2 indicating that the normality assumption is met for all variables except 
for those three. Similar result were found from the Shapiro-Wilk test where the W 
statistic is significant for those three covariates only (refer to Table 4.14, Appendix 
4_4). These statistical assessments are further supported by an assessment on 
                                                 
50 Some researchers believe that linear regression requires that the independent and dependent variables be normally distributed 
whereas in actuality, it is the residuals that need to be normally distributed  (Chen et al., 2003; Field, 2009; Grace-Martin, 2012a). 
51 S-W test is the most powerful in detecting departures from normality (Meyers et al., 2006). 
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histograms and normal Q-Q plots. Histograms show that those three variables are 
positively skewed with SIZEMF and FISCSTR showing almost an L-shaped 
distribution (refer Figure 4.7, Appendix 4_4). Similar results were also found using Q-Q 
plots where the Q-Q plots of those three variables do not have data points falling on or 
very near the diaognal line indicating nonnormal distribution (refer Figure 4.7, 
Appendix 4_4). 
 
Based on the assessment on outliers and normality, three covariates (BODSIZE, 
FISCSTR and SIZEMF will be transformed accordingly (refer to Table 4.15). 
Remedying normality first may assist in meeting other statistical assumptions as well 
(Hair et al., 2010). This is because often when nonnormality is indicated, it also 
contributes to violations of other assumptions. This approach is consistent with the 
suggestions of most statisticians (e.g. Meyers et al., 2006). 
 
Table 4.15: Summary of Assessment on Outliers and Normality 
Variable Outlier Normality tests Normality 
Issue 
Final  
Remedy  Boxplot Skewness & 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-
Wilk 
Histogram Q-Q 
plot 
TYPEMF √ √ √ √ √ n/a  
BODCOM √ √ √ √ √ n/a  
BODSIZE √ √ X X X Positive 
skew 
log10 
AUDCOM √ √ √ √ √ n/a  
FISCSTR X X X X X Positive 
skew 
inverse 
SIZEMF X X X X X Positive 
skew 
log10 
DI √ √ √ √ √ n/a  
√ = fulfil the assumption, may retain the variable in its original form 
X= do not meet the assumption, a potential candidate for variable transformation 
 
 
e) Test on Homoscedasticity and Linearity  
Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that the residual/error variance should be 
constant (Chen et al., 2003). For metric data, this means that the variance in the 
dependent variable should be stable or roughly, the same at all values of another 
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variable. For this kind of data, heteroscedasticity is not fatal in the sense that the 
analysis weakens but is not invalidated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). For nonmetric 
data, the assumption means that the variance should be about the same in each of the 
level (Field, 2009). If heteroscedasticity is present, the heteroscedastic variables will be 
transformed to remedy the unequal dispersion of variance (Hair et al., 2010). Linearity 
on the other hand is the assumption that the relationships between the independent 
variable and the dependant variable should be linear (Chen et al., 2003). 
 
Homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions can be simultaneously checked with the 
normality assumption using scatterplot through the analysis of residuals between 
predicted DV values (*ZRESID) and error of prediction (*ZPRED) (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). This is done twice in this thesis - before and after the screening of each 
variable as described above - to demonstrate the effect of transformation. If all 
assumptions are met, the residuals will be nearly rectangularly distributed with a 
concentration of scores along the centre. 
 
Initial screening of residuals (before variables transformation) is run and the resulting 
scatterplot shows that the assumptions were not sufficiently met, as residuals are not 
roughly rectangularly distributed with a concentration of scores along the centre (refer 
to Figure 4.8, Appendix 4_4). This confirms the need for variable transformation as 
discussed earlier. 
 
A separate test for linearity is also conducted where the bivariate scatterplots for each 
combination of metric variables were examined, consistent with Meyer et al. (2006). 
Scatterplots that are elliptical or oval shaped are indicative of linearity between two 
variables. If nonlinear relationship is detected, one or both variables will be transformed 
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in order to achieve linearity respectively (Hair et al., 2010). Based on the matrix 
scatterplot, the overall shape of each bivariate scatterplot is not oval before the 
transformation process (refer Figure 4.9, Appendix 4_4) indicating lack of linearity 
between variables and hence the need for transformation.  
 
f) Transformation of Variables 
In multiple regressions, the best solution may require transforming more than one 
independent variable, and that each independent variable may actually require a 
different transformation (LaLonde, 2012). There are at least two reasons why 
researchers should pay more attention to transformed variables (McNeil et al., 1996); (i) 
transformed variables may increase the R
2
, and (ii) the cost of transforming is 
negligible. However, transformation of raw data may not necessarily effect the residuals 
of which what normality and homoscedasticity is about (Field, 2009). Of course, we can 
never perfectly meet the assumptions of statistical methods, but we should at least do so 
approximately, and when interpreting results, we must bear in mind the degree to which 
assumptions are met. To the extent that assumptions are imperfectly met, estimates of 
statistics such as r, R
2
, the weights and p-value will be somewhat compromised 
(Thompson, 2008). Nevertheless, when assumptions are violated, we can still have a 
perfectly good model for our data and also draw conclusions about our sample, but not 
beyond it (Field, 2009). 
 
One way to avoid the possibility of making confusing or misleading statements 
pertaining to transformed data is to provide the reader with the original variable‘s 
statistical context (e.g. minimum, maximum values or means and standard deviations 
reported in raw score values) (Meyers et al., 2006) (refer to Section 6.2). 
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BODSIZE was first transformed using the square root function as its nonnormality is 
not that substantial. However, this type of transformation does not seem to work well 
with the data in improving its normality, therefore, the logarithmic transformation, 
specifically the base 10 logarithm (log10)
52
 is applied (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) (refer 
to Figure 4.10, Appendix 4_4). For FISCSTR, even the log10 does not seem to improve 
the normality (refer to Figure 4.10, Appendix 4_4) due to the severity of the 
nonnormality of the data, hence the inverse or reciprocal transformation was applied. 
Because the smallest value on FISCSTR  was  -0.97 (refer Section 6.2.1), a constant of 
1.97 is added to all of the cases before the transformation to make the smallest number 
in the data set positive or at least one (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This is 
because we cannot get a log value of zero or negative numbers. Inverse transformation 
is found to improve the normality of FISCSTR (refer Figure 4.10, Appendix 4_4). For 
SIZEMF, the log10 transformation has improved its normality consistent with many 
prior research (refer to Figure 4.10, Appendix 4_4). In sum, assessment of 
logBODSIZE, invFISCSTR and logSIZEMF using histogram and Q-Q plot showed that 
the normality assumption was met. 
 
g) Tests on Assumptions after Transformation 
After the transformation process, the overall shape of each bivariate scatterplot in the 
matrix scatterplot is oval (refer Figure 4.9, Appendix 4_4), indicating enough linearity 
are depicted between variables. Hence, the variables are linearly related.  
 
At the same time, no heteroscedasticity in the variables is detected. Homoscedasticity 
can be tested using Levene‘s test on individual variables. The GLM command provides 
option to run Levene‘s test for the homogeneity of variance for each independent 
                                                 
52 Logarithmic transformation includes ‗base 10‘ logarithms and ‗natural (base e)‘ logarithms. Regardless of which we use, they 
have exactly same effect on the data. However, log10 is more easier to interpret (De Veaux et al., 2005). 
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variable across all level combinations of the between-subjects factors, for between-
subjects factors (Garson, 2012a). The Levene statistic is not statistically significant 
(F(23,82) = 0.976, p>0.05) (refer to Table 4.16, Appendix 4_4), telling us that there are 
equal variances across levels and thus the homogeneity of variances assumption  is met. 
 
At the same time, the scatterplot analysis of the residuals shows that residuals are not 
clustered at zero (refer Figure 4.8, Appendix 4_4). Instead they are roughly 
rectangularly distributed with a concentration of scores along the center. This indicates 
that the errors are normally distributed, the variances of the residuals are constant, and 
the residual is relatively uncorrelated with the linear combination of predictors, hence 
indicating that normality, homoscedasticity and linearity were sufficiently met after the 
transformation process.  
 
Based on the above tests, all the conditions and assumptions of running regression has 
been taken care of and thus the data are fit and ready to be used for regression analysis. 
The results for regression analysis can also be generalised beyond the study sample. The 
next section discusses the sensitivity analysis for answering the RQ2. 
 
4.8.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity tests or robustness checks were undertaken to ensure the robustness of 
results found from the second research question of the thesis (refer to Section 6.7). This 
involved determining whether changes of measurement in board size, fiscal stress and 
the MFSB size would have impacted differently on the overall results. The trial analysis 
involving the disclosure index used in this study is presented next. 
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4.8.8 Trial Analysis of Disclosure Index 
For the purpose of examining the dependent variable measurement and to assess the 
ability of the disclosure index to distinguish between various levels of reporting, the 
ADIS was pretested on 11 of the 111 annual reports, representing 10 per cent of the 
effective population. This is consistent with prior studies such as Gordon et al. (2002) 
who included 10 annual reports of their 100 sample (i.e. 10 per cent) for pretesting 
purposes.   
 
Table 4.17 below shows the extent of disclosure of accountability information in the 
annual reports of all 11 MFSB using the disclosure index. Results from the pilot test 
suggested that no change should be made to the items included in the disclosure index 
instrument. The instrument is able to capture the various levels of disclosure exist in 
different MFSB. 
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Table 4.17: Disclosure Level of Accountability Information 
No. MFSB Disclosure index 
1 MFSB1 40.87 
2 MFSB11 41.74 
3 MFSB21 46.96 
4 MFSB31 33.91 
5 MFSB41 50.43 
6 MFSB51 53.91 
7 MFSB61 40.87 
8 MFSB71 48.70 
9 MFSB81 43.48 
10 MFSB91 37.39 
11 MFSB111 42.61 
 
The next section pertains to the reliability test conducted on the dependant variable of 
the study. 
 
4.8.9 Reliability Test on the Dependent Variable  
To address the issue of subjectivity inherent in the analysis of annual reports 
(Steenkamp & Northcott, 2007) (refer to Section 4.8.3), two scorers were used. This 
process is to ensure the reliability of the disclosure index instrument and the data 
collected from the annual reports. One scorer is the researcher herself, while the other is 
an experienced public sector accounting researcher who has conducted and published a 
similar type of analysis on annual reporting. Due to time and financial constraints, the 
thesis did not adopt the approach used by prior studies in that they used two scorers for 
collecting the data for all MFSB followed by a reconciliation for each case (e.g. Ryan et 
al., 2002b; Tooley & Guthrie, 2007; Wall & Martin, 2003; Wei et al., 2008). In this 
thesis, the other scorer was provided with the 11 randomly selected annual reports of 
MFSB together with the coding sheet. This is consistent with Gordon et al. (2002) who 
took 10 samples of annual reports. This is roughly 10 per cent of the sample population 
which is consistent with Joseph (2010b). Both scorers independently examined the text, 
and comparisons were then made. There was no statistically significant difference 
between scores. Hence, the findings of the study for RQ1 (refer to Chapter 5) can be 
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regarded as reliable. The next section discusses the research design for phase 2 of the 
study which involves the qualitative phase. 
 
4.9 Research Design (Phase 2: Qualitative) 
The second phase of the study mainly answers RQ3, i.e. what are the reasons for 
disclosure or nondisclosure of accountability information in the annual reports of 
MFSB. This phase applies the qualitative approach and uses interviews as its data 
collection method. This section discusses in detail the research design for this phase of 
the study. 
 
Qualitative research is ―an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct 
methodological traditions of inquiry that explores a social or human problem‖ 
(Creswell, 1998, p. 15).  This tradition of inquiry can be broadly defined as ―any kind of 
research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other 
means of quantification‖ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 17). Qualitative research allows 
researchers to produce findings arrived from real-world settings where the 
"phenomenon of  interest  unfold  naturally" (Patton, 1990, p. 39). The main strength of 
qualitative research is that it yields data that provide depth and details to create 
understanding of the phenomena and of the lived experiences (Bowen, 2005). 
Qualitative research is the most appropriate approach to answer RQ3 because of its 
inductive nature. 
 
Inductive process is defined as a process ―where researchers gather data to build 
concepts, hypotheses or theories rather than deductively deriving postulates or 
hypotheses to be tested (as in positivist research)‖ (Merriam, 2002, p. 5). The inductive 
nature of the qualitative research allows exploration of issues in a more flexible manner 
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compared to the quantitative tradition. It allows the ideas or the categories to arise from 
the data rather than placing a pre-existing framework on the data (Mayan, 2001).  
 
Hence, the qualitative method is suitable to be used when exploring a new phenomenon 
of interest about which little is yet known (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and when current 
literature and theory is lacking (Eisenhardt, 1989), such as in the present case. In 
addition, it is useful to gain more in-depth information that may not be adequately 
described or interpreted using quantitative research design (Hoepfl, 1997). In short, the 
qualitative method  has the ability to describe a phenomenon in more detail (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) as compared to the quantitative method which primarily focuses on causal, 
correlation, and experimental investigations (Cavana et al., 2001). For the reasons 
above, qualitative research design is deemed to be the most appropriate method to 
answer RQ3. 
 
4.9.1 Type of Qualitative Research: Basic Interpretive Qualitative Research 
There are various types (also called forms, traditions, designs, approaches, strategies or 
genres by various authors) of qualitative research (see for example Creswell, 1998; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Among the qualitative research types include: (i) basic 
interpretative qualitative research, (ii) phenomenology, (iii) grounded theory, (iv) case 
studies, (v) ethnographic study, (vi) narrative analysis, (vii) critical qualitative research, 
(viii) postmodern research, (ix) biographical, (x) historical, (xi) participatory, and (xii) 
clinical. This present research falls under the first type, i.e. the basic interpretative 
qualitative research. 
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According to Merriam (2002), basic interpretive and descriptive qualitative research 
exemplifies all the characteristics of the qualitative research type (ii) to (viii) above. The 
characteristics are as follows:  
(i) the researcher strives to understand the meaning that people have constructed 
about their world and their experiences (i.e. how people make sense of their 
experience);  
(ii)  the researcher as the primary instrument for data  collection and data analysis;  
(iii) the process is inductive; and, 
(iv) the outcome of the strategy is descriptive (i.e. words including quotes, rather 
than number are used to convey what the researcher has learned about a 
phenomena). 
 
In essence, the basic interpretative and descriptive qualitative study allows the 
researcher to identify the recurring patterns or common themes that cut across the data. 
Data for this type of inquiry is collected through interview, observations or document 
analysis. The findings, on the other hand, will be presented and discussed in an 
elaborate manner, using references to the literatures that framed the study in the first 
place (Merriam, 2002). 
 
4.9.2 Data Collection: Semi-structured Interview 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in an effort to obtain a deeper understanding 
of the motivations of disclosure (and non-disclosure) in the annual reports of MFSB (i.e. 
RQ3). In essence, semi-structured interviews are ―designed to have a number of 
interviewer questions prepared in advance but such prepared questions are designed to 
be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer cannot be planned 
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in advance but must be improvised in a careful and theorised ways‖ (Wengraf, 2001, p. 
5). 
 
This design facilitates a detailed understanding of revealed issues and contradictions 
found in the analysis of the results of Phase 1. In semi-structured interviews, the 
interviewer introduces the topic, then guides the discussion by asking specific questions. 
The main advantage of using this type of interview is that the interviewer is free to 
probe and explore within the predetermined inquiry areas and therefore more flexible 
and comfortable for both the interviewer and interviewee (Hoepfl, 1997). In total, 20 
interviews were conducted in the month of July and August 2011. 
 
4.9.3 Sampling Strategy: Purposeful Sampling 
This research adopts the purposeful (or purposive) sampling strategy. Purposeful 
sampling is ―a nonprobability sampling design in which the required information is 
gathered from special or specific targets or groups of people on some rational basis‖ 
(Sekaran, 2003, p. 422). This sampling strategy - which is a dominant sampling strategy 
in qualitative research - seeks information-rich cases which can be studied in depth 
(Patton, 1990). The purposeful samples are often selected using the expert judgement of 
researchers (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  
 
There are at least sixteen types of purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990). This study has 
employed the maximum variation sampling (sometimes called maximum diversity or 
maximum heterogeneity sampling) method. Under this method, the aim is to sample for 
heterogeneity in order to seek representativeness of the sample. It allows not only 
thicker descriptions of each sample or case, but also the identification of shared patterns 
that cut across cases (Hoepfl, 1997). Consequently, findings of the interview can be 
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applied to a greater range of situations by readers or consumers of the research 
(Merriam, 2002).   
 
4.9.3.1 Sample Size 
Purposeful samples are typically small – usually 30 or fewer cases (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009).  In interview studies, it was observed that the number of interviews 
tend to be around 15 ± 10 (Kvale, 1996) although in general, there appears to be no 
agreement or strict criteria about sample size in qualitative studies (Patton, 1990). 
Nevertheless, previous researchers tend to decide on the number of interviews based on 
at least three factors: (i) the time available for the research, (ii) the resources available 
for the research, and, (ii) the law of diminishing returns (Kvale, 1996). 
 
Similarly, in this study, the above three factors were taken into consideration in 
determining the sample size, besides considering the common practice of qualitative 
sample size as stated in the discussion above (i.e. 10, 15 and 30).  It was decided in this 
study that 20 MFSB  as the suitable number of sample size that will be able to supply 
varied and detailed accounts for the purpose of this study (Burnard, 2004). This number 
(i.e. 20) would represent nearly 20 per cent (20/111) of the MFSB effective population.  
 
4.9.3.2 Preliminary Step Prior to Purposeful Sampling Process  
Prior to selecting the 20 samples of MFSB using  the purposeful sampling strategy, the 
approach  used in this thesis was to contact all MFSB of which annual reports‘ have 
been analysed in Phase 1  to identify their willingness to participate as interviewee. This 
approach is consistent with Chatterjee et al. (2012) who sent their invitation to 
participate in interview to preparers of infrastructure information of all 73 New Zealand 
local authorities. In this thesis, this is done in anticipation that there might be some 
organisations that might refuse to participate and therefore getting the information on 
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their willingness to participate is best done – from the researcher‘s opinion- in advance, 
rather than after choosing them based on purposeful sampling. This approach is 
believed to be more time and resource effective while at the same time allows the 
researcher to see the level of openness by the public sector organisation towards the 
public. 
 
The preliminary steps involve the following: 
 A letter (refer to Appendix 4_5), together with a self-addressed envelope and reply 
form (refer to Appendix 4_6) were sent to the heads of 102 MFSB on 26
th
 May 
2011, to seek their willingness to allow interviews be conducted at their 
organisations. The MFSB included are those for which their annual reports have 
been analysed in Phase 1. The remaining 16 MFSB were not included due to the 
lack of availability of their disclosure index to allow any meaningful analysis with 
the interview findings. It was requested that the reply is made within two weeks 
upon receipt of the letter and that the tentative interviewees‘ names and contacts are 
provided (in the case where the organisation is willing to be interviewed) in the 
reply form to allow further arrangements by the researcher. 
  
 After three and a half weeks (i.e. 19 June 2011), replies from 44 MFSB were 
received. 40 MFSB indicated their willingness to participate while 4 MFSB 
declined. Figure 4.11 summarizes the outcome from the preliminary sample 
selection process. 
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Figure 4.11: Summary of Preliminary Sample Selection Process for Interview 
 
The outcome of the preliminary step shows the researcher‘s earlier expectation was to a 
certain extent supported. Positive responses were received from only approximately 
39.2 per cent (i.e. 40 out of 102) of MFSB that received the letter, therefore indicating a 
somewhat low level of ‗openness‘. Upon determining the number of MFSB who were 
willing to participate in the interviews during this preliminary step (i.e. 40), the 
purposive sampling strategy was applied to the organisations. This is discussed in the 
next section. 
 
4.9.3.3 Basis of Sample Selection 
As discussed earlier, purposeful sampling involves selecting certain units or cases 
―based on specific purposes rather than randomly‖ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 
713). In this present study, the 20 MFSB were chosen based on several basis or 
characteristics including:  
(i) Results of disclosure index from  Phase 1: The interviewees comprise those that 
demonstrated high level of disclosure as well as low level of disclosure. The 
highs and lows were determined based on a cut-off point deriving from the mean 
score of disclosure index of all 102 MFSB from Phase 1.  
Total MFSB 
 118  
Request Sent  
102  
Responded  
44 
Willing 
 40 
Not willing 
 4 
Did not respond  
58 
Not sent  
16 
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(ii) Size of MFSB: The sample include the (relatively) large, small and medium-sized 
MFSB 
(iii) Geographical location: Mainly due to financial and time constraint,  MFSB 
located more than 30km away from the researcher‘s location were excluded. 
Thus, those outside the Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of 
Putrajaya and Selangor state were excluded from the sample. 
(iv) Availability of participants within the 2-month interview period: Since the 
researcher was constrained by time for completing the doctoral research within a 
certain period of time, those MFSB which were unable to be interviewed within 
the 2-month time (i.e. July and August 2011) were excluded. 
(v)  Manageability in terms of the number of sites (Bowen, 2005). 
(vi) Type of MFSB: It is ensured that the MFSB selected does not come from one 
single Ministry or type. For example in terms of type, financial institutions and 
universities are included as sample.  
(vii) Factors tested in Phase 1: Some MFSB are included in the sample for 
possessing unique characteristics tested during Phase 1. This includes having 
large or small board size or having an audit committee or otherwise. 
 
Table 4.18 below presents the list of MFSB selected as sample, their disclosure scores 
as well as characteristics based on factors tested in Phase 1. From the above procedure, 
the sample include a good mixture of type, board size, internal director, audit 
committee, fiscal stress and assets of MFSB. The detail processes involved in data 
collection using purposeful sampling strategy is explained in Section 4.9.4. 
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Table 4.18: Detail Characteristics of MFSB Involved in Interview 
MFSB  DI
a 
Type of MFSB Board 
Size
b 
Internal 
Director
c 
Audit 
Committee
d 
Surplus/ 
Deficit 
Assets
e 
MFSB4 Low Foundation/Scholarship Small No No Deficit Small 
MFSB19 High Transportation Small Yes No Surplus Small 
MFSB114 High Area/regional development Small Yes Yes Surplus Large 
MFSB21 Low Transportation Small Yes No Surplus Large 
MFSB27 High Research & Development, & Education Large Yes No Surplus Small 
MFSB85 47.27 Research & Development, & Education Small Yes Yes Surplus Large 
MFSB13 High Research & Development, & Education Small Yes Yes Surplus Small 
MFSB57 Low Research & Development, & Education Large No No Surplus Large 
MFSB59 High Others Small No No Surplus Small 
MFSB44 High Banking, Finance, Fund, Investment Small No Yes Surplus Large 
MFSB63 High Socio-economy Large Yes Yes Surplus Large 
MFSB80 High Research & Development, & Education Small Yes Yes Surplus Large 
MFSB78 High Regulatory Large Yes No Surplus Small 
MFSB38 High Banking, Finance, Fund, Investment Small No No Surplus Large 
MFSB94 Low Research & Development, & Education Small Yes No Surplus Large 
MFSB109 High Regulatory Small Yes Yes Surplus Large 
MFSB64 High Regulatory Large Yes No Deficit Large 
MFSB47 Low Others Large No No Surplus Small 
MFSB56 High Research & Development, & Education Large Yes No Surplus Large 
MFSB48 Low Others Large No No Surplus Small 
a.DI: High or low is determined by the cut-off point using median of 47.27 (refer Section 5.3). 
b.Board Size: Small or large is determined by the cut-off point using median of 9.5 (refer Section   
   6.2.1.1). 
c.Internal Directors:Yes is when there is at least 1 internal board member, 0 if otherwise. 
d.Audit committee: Yes when there is an audit committee, 0 if otherwise. 
e.Assets: Small or large is determined by the cut-off value of the median, RM254,164,159.00 (refer to  
   Section 6.2.1). 
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4.9.4 Process Involved in Data Collection and Analysis 
Figure 4.12 provide the summary of the process involved in data collection for the 
qualitative phase. 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Summary of Data Collection Process 
 
The four main steps involved in collecting data under the qualitative phase are as 
follows: 
Step 1: Make Appointment and Brief Each MFSB 
Once the MFSB and their respective interviewees were identified (during the 
preliminary step), a telephone call or email was made to the contact person in each 
MFSB to confirm on the interview date, time and location. The contact person may 
sometimes be the interviewee him/herself or another person assigned by the MFSB to 
liaise, coordinate and arrange for the interview appointment.  
 
 
STEP 1:  
Make Appointment and Brief Each 
MFSB 
STEP 2: 
Send Necessary Documents as 
Preparation for the Interview 
STEP 3:  
Conduct the Interview 
STEP 4:  
Transcribe the Interview 
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It was conveyed that the interview would be brief, lasting about 30 to 60 minutes and 
anonymity would be guaranteed. Additionally, the interviewer also explained the kind 
of answer sought, how complete it should be, and in what terms it should be expressed 
as suggested by Cooper & Schindler (2003). It is crucial to convey this to the potential 
interviewees so that they understand what is expected from them.  
 
Step 2: Send Necessary Documents as Preparation for the Interview  
All 20 MFSB were then sent four items (through their contact person) via either email 
or normal mail. The items were:  (i) participation information statement (refer Appendix 
4_7), (ii) interview guide (refer Appendix 4_8), (iii) consent form (refer Appendix 4_9), 
and, (iv) the disclosure index/checklist (refer Appendix 4_2). 
 
The participation information statement contains a brief and straightforward description 
of the study and the roles of the interviewee. It also includes the voluntary nature of the 
interviewee‘s participation as well as the confidentiality of the interview data. It is 
important to provide participants with this information because interviewers are asking 
the respondents access to their lives, their minds, [and] their emotions (Lofland & 
Lofland, 1984, as quoted in Hoepfl, 1997).  
 
The interview guide or schedule on the other hand is a list of questions or general topics 
that the interviewer plans to explore during interview. The advantages of using an 
interview guide is that it makes interviewing multiple subjects more systematic and 
comprehensive, in addition to ensuring good use of limited interview time (Hoepfl, 
1997). The questions were primarily based on the quantitative phase (i.e. phase 1) as 
well as the literature review in Chapter 2. 
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The consent form consists of obtaining the voluntary participation of the subject and 
reassuring the participants about their definite rights - prior, during and after the 
interview - thus counteracting potential undue influence and coercion (Kvale, 1996; 
McCracken, 1988). The form is to be signed by the interviewee immediately prior to the 
interview. It also include the agreement by the interviewee to allow the interview be 
audio-recorded. 
  
Step 3: Conducting the Interview  
It was first ensured that all interviewees have read the participation information 
statement and consent form prior to the interview. All interviewees provided their 
cooperation by signing the consent form and giving their permission for the interview to 
be audio-recorded. The main advantage of recording interviews is that it allows the 
researcher to concentrate on the topic and the dynamics of the interview (Kvale, 1996) 
rather than on the note-taking activity (Hoepfl, 1997). Additionally, it ensures greater 
authenticity of the interview data than hurriedly written notes might. The language used 
in the interviews was either English, Malay or a mixture of both Malay and English. 
 
Twenty (20) MFSB participated in the interviews which ran over a two-month period, 
i.e. from 4th of July to 25th of August 2011 (refer Table 4.19). Interviews were 
conducted once for each MFSB with no pilot interview conducted earlier nor follow-up 
interview conducted after the session. Therefore, there was a total of twenty (20) 
interview sessions. This took almost 20 interview hours with the duration of each 
interview ranging from thirty minutes to one hour and fourty minutes. The length of the 
interviews per MFSB depended on how much information the participant(s) in each 
MFSB were willing to share and how much time they were willing to spend.   
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Table 4.19: Interview Schedule and Duration 
No MFSB 
Date 
(year 2011) 
Time Duration 
1 MFSB4 4 July 1100-1210 1hr 10m 
2 MFSB19 7 July 0910-1000 50m 
3 MFSB114 8 July 1530-1620 50m 
4 MFSB21 11 July 0925-1035 1hr 10m 
5 MFSB27 12 July 1030-1125 55m 
6 MFSB85 14 July 1045-1205 1hr  20m 
7 MFSB13 19 July 1035-1155 1hr  20m 
8 MFSB57 21 July 1420-1535 1hr  15m 
9 MFSB59 25 July 1045-1125 40m 
10 MFSB44 25 July 1450-1610 1hr  20m 
11 MFSB63 26 July 1030-1115 45m 
12 MFSB80 1 August 1035-1120 45m 
13 MFSB78 3 August 1445-1515 30m 
14 MFSB38 4 August 1010-1100 50m 
15 MFSB94 4 August 1515-1545 30m 
16 MFSB109 5 August 0905-0935 30m 
17 MFSB64 9 August 1055-1205 1hr  10m 
18 MFSB47 10 August 1430-1505 35m 
19 MFSB56 23 August 1400-1510 1hr 10m 
20 MFSB48 25 August 1430-1610 1hr 40m 
   Total Duration 
1155 minutes  
(=19hrs 15m) 
 
Step  4: Transcribing the Interview 
After each interview session, the recordings were immediately transcribed verbatim into 
computer files. The first transcript was as complete and unedited as possible particularly 
to avoid missing out the valuable clues to the state of mind and the state of feelings of 
the informant (Wengraf, 2001). Next, the ‗cleaned up‘ versions were produced, 
particularly the grammatical errors in the transcripts were corrected, consistent with the 
concept of transcribing which involves ―translating from an oral language, with its own 
set of rules, to a written language with another set of rules‖ (Kvale, 1996, p. 165).  
 
The transcriptions of the 20 interviews took over a month of the researcher‘s time and 
resulted in over  300 single-spaced pages of transcripts. Those interviews conducted in 
other than English language were translated and their meanings were checked so as to 
ensure accuracy. The transcripts were stored in both hard and soft copies. 
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4.9.4.1 The Interview Guide 
In this research, there are a total of four main questions included in the interview guide 
(refer to Appendix 4_8). This is in line with Creswell‘s (2007) recommendation that the 
semi-structured interview should not be more than five or six general questions. 
Question 1 to 3 are mainly to obtain overview on the perception and/or experience of 
MFSB on three main issues; (i) accountability information, (ii) annual report, and,  (iii) 
Treasury Ciruclar No.4/2007, respectively. Question 1 was aimed to gauge the 
perceptions of interviewees on the responsibility of public sector organisations in 
general, and FSB, in particular, in supplying accountability information in the annual 
report to their stakeholders. Question 2 is related to the extent of how annual reports 
have been used by the MFSB as a medium of discharging their accountability. Sub-
questions that were also asked to achieve this include the aims of annual reporting in 
their organsiation, the main/ target audience of their annual reports and  the accessibility 
of the annual reports. Question 2 also addresses the issue of the processes that MFSB 
went through in the preparation of annual report. It indirectly discuss the challenges 
faced by them during these processes, and whether any references were made to others‘ 
annual reports. Question 3 was formulated to understand the extent to which they follow 
the Treasury Circular No.4/2007. It also touched on whether the Circular was relevant 
and/or useful to their organisation, whether they regard the Circular as mandatory or 
voluntary, and whether more guidance were needed to adopt the circular. 
 
Question 4 focuses on the main issue of the qualitative phase, i.e. to answer RQ3. It 
asks questions on the motivations/reasons/incentives of disclosing accountability 
information, as well as the reasons/hindrance/challenges/problems faced, for not 
disclosing the accountability information. In asking questions, items were carefully 
selected from the disclosure checklist to solicit interviewees‘ explanation on their 
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reason for disclosure and/or nondisclosure. Different MFSB may be asked different 
disclosure items depending on whether they disclosed or do not disclosed the item. The 
item to be explained may be chosen by the interviewee themselves or the interviewer. 
Prior to asking Question 4, interviewees were presented with their disclosure index 
results including their overall score as well as the detailed results on whether they 
disclose each of the 110 disclosure items in the checklist. This practice, which is 
consistent with Coy et al. (1993b), is to allow for the validation of the results in RQ1 as 
well as to assist the study in indentifying appropriate respondents to the ‗why this item 
is disclosed?‘ and ‗why this item is not disclosed?‘ questions. The study received no 
negative feedback regarding their disclosure results implying they generally agreed with 
the scores received from the annual report review process. The total average scores for 
each disclosure items obtained by the study for all MFSB were also presented to the 
interviewees for the benefit of benchmarking by the individual MFSB.  
 
4.9.4.2 Data Analysis Procedure 
Data analysis can be generally defined as the process of transforming data into research 
results (LeCompte, 2000). In qualitative data analysis, it is a process that requires some 
creativity and flexibility as it involves working with data, organising it, breaking it into 
manageable unit, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important 
and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others (Bogdan & Biklen, 
1982). Kvale (1996) differentiated five main approaches to qualitative data analysis: (i) 
meaning condensation, (ii) meaning categorization, (iii) narrative structuring, (iv) 
meaning interpretation, and (v) generating meaning through ad hoc methods. In this 
thesis, the qualitative data analysis follows the meaning categorization approach. The 
advantage of this approach is that it makes possible some checks for interviewer and 
coder reliability due to its quantification process. It is also therefore in line with, but not 
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limited to, a positivist emphasis on quantification of facts in the social science (Kvale, 
1996). 
 
The meaning categorization approach implies that the interview is coded into categories. 
In this approach, long statements are condensed to simple categories, resulting in a 
production of a few tables and/or figures which comprises the frequencies of the 
categories in the interview data (Kvale, 1996). Some categories were developed in 
advance based on the literatures and the variables tested in quantitative phase. This 
allows the study to revisit the hypothesis tested in the quantitative phase. Categories can 
also arise during the analysis and in this case, the categories‘ terms will be from the 
interviewees‘ own idioms (Kvale, 1996). The meaning categorization approach is also 
variable-oriented where the focus is towards extracting variable–related information, 
and therefore it suits the study‘s aim of conducting interview (i.e. to identify 
motivations of disclosure/nondisclsoure). Additionally, consistent with Creswell‘s 
(2009) recommendation, the qualitative data analysis: 
Is conducted concurrently with gathering data, making interpretations, and 
writing reports.  While interviews are going on, for example, the researcher may 
be analyzing an interview collected earlier, writing memos that may ultimately 
be included as a narrative in the final reports, and organizing the structure in the 
final report. (p. 184) 
 
 
The categorization and coding process was conducted manually using word processor, 
i.e. the Microsoft Word 2007. Advanced qualitative analysis software packages such as 
NVivo or Nudist were not used mainly due to financial and time constraints. With 
regards to time, despite the fact that these software packages can reduce the amount of 
time spent on analysing qualitative data, the process of learning and familiarising 
oneself to optimise the use of such packages is in itself time-consuming (Woods & 
Roberts, 2000). The quality of the interview findings has been reasonably well taken 
188 
 
care of with the application of several techniques, and this is elaborated in the next 
section. 
 
4.9.5 Quality of the Interview Findings 
A study  needs to be valid, reliable, and conducted in an ethical manner to ensure its 
findings are worth to be looked into (Merriam, 2002). Apart from that, it is also 
important for a study to have the ability to be confirmed by the audience of the research. 
These are in fact the criteria of which the value or quality of any research is judged, be 
it qualitative or quantitative research. To attain or meet certain standard of a quality 
qualitative research, there are a number of strategies that can be employed. These 
strategies are discussed together with five issues: validity, reliability, external 
validity/generalizability, confirmability and ethics. 
 
Validity (or Credibility) 
In qualitative literature, the concept of validity has been referred to as credibility, 
trustworthiness and authenticity (Creswell & Miller, 2000). This thesis has adopted the 
―member checks‖ technique (Hoepfl, 1997) where the transripts and the conclusion 
made from the interviews were returned to participants to ask them to ascertain and 
corroborate the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A total of 9 MFSB responded and 
validated the transcripts and conclusions were finalised. Despite only 45 per cent of the 
MFSB responded, it is reasonable to assume that all the other 11 transcriptions were 
accurate. Another procedure adopted was by presenting negative and discrepant 
information that runs counter to the themes. By presenting this contradictory evidence, 
the account becomes more realistic and hence valid (Creswell, 2009). Peer review is 
another strategy. It involves discussions with supervisor regarding the process of study, 
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the congruency of emerging findings with the raw data and tentative interpretations 
(Merriam, 2002). 
 
Reliability (or Dependability) 
Qualitative reliability indicates that the researcher‘s approach is consistent across 
different researchers and different projects (Gibbs, 2007). In qualitative research, it is 
sometimes called dependability or consistency (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The 
dependability of the study was addressed by: (i) peer review process, (ii) checking 
transcripts to make sure that they do not contain obvious mistakes made during 
transcribing (Gibbs, 2007), (iii) making sure that there is not a misallayment in the 
meaning of the codes during the coding process. This is accomplished by constantly 
comparing data with the codes and by writing memos about the codes and their 
definitions (Gibbs, 2007), and, (iv) documenting as many steps as possible regarding the 
procedures taken during data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003). This last step is also 
called the audit trail – a method suggested by Guba & Lincoln (1981). This process 
allows independent readers to authenticate the findings of a study by following the trail 
of the researcher.  
 
External validity / Generalizability (or Transferability) 
Generalizability or external validity refers to the ability to generalize findings accross 
different settings (Hoepfl, 1997).  It is one of the main criticisms made by the opponents 
of qualitative research and consequently has been a major challenge faced by novice 
qualitative researcher to justify their qualitative inquiry. In qualitative research, it has to 
be understood that the concept of generalizability is used in a more limited sense, as it is 
not the aim of this type of research to generalize findings beyond those individuals, sites 
or places under study (Gibbs, 2007). In fact, the value of qualitative research lies in the 
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particular description and themes developed in context of a specific site (Creswell, 
2009). Accordingly, terms such as transferability, extrapolation, naturalistic 
generalization and retrospective generalization  (Hoepfl, 1997)  have been used by 
qualitative researchers to imply the ‗particularity‘ notion (i.e. particular description and 
themes developed in context of a specific site) rather than ‗generalizability‘ as it was 
conventionally understood under quantitative research.  
 
The transferability of the findings obtained from a particular qualitative research 
depends on the degree of similarity between the original case and the case to which it is 
transferred (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A researcher thus will not be able to decide 
whether their findings are transferable to another settings.  It is primarily the 
responsibility of the readers or the one doing the generalizing. Thus, one had to know 
the characteristics of both context (i.e. the ‗sending‘ and ‗receiving‘ entity) to 
understand how transferable the results are (from the sending to the receiving entities) 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The original researcher can only provide limited 
information that would allow the readers sufficient information to determine whether 
the findings are transferable to another situation or case (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
 
Consistent with the above, this thesis has: (i) provided detailed, rich or thick 
descriptions of the qualitative procedures, and, (ii) tried to link the findings of the study 
to a broader theory (Yin, 2003), i.e. institutional theory and public accountability 
framework. These techniques allow readers or consumers of the research to determine 
the transferability of the thesis‘s findings to other settings or into a broader theory 
altogether respectively. In addition, maximum variation sampling was also employed. 
This involves purposefully seeking variation or diversity in sample selections to allow 
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findings to be applied to a greater range of situations by readers or consumers of the 
research (Merriam, 2002). 
 
Confirmability (or Objectivity) 
Due to the fact that qualitative research relies on interpretation and therefore value-
laden, several authors such as Lincoln & Guba (1985) and Patton (1990) have preferred 
to avoid the terms and futile debates about objectivity versus subjectivity but rather 
strives for confirmability or emphathic neutrality (Hoepfl, 1997). Confirmability refers 
to the extent to which the product of the inquiry is confirmable. This includes whether 
the results are grounded in data, whether the inferences are logical, whether there is 
inquirer bias, and so forth (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). In essence, confirmability 
requires the researcher to demonstrate neutrality in the  interpretations of the research 
data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), through a  confirmability audit for example. 
Confirmability/validation audit steps or approaches undertaken by the researcher is the 
provision of an audit trail consisting of: (i) raw data (e.g. original interviews in softcopy 
audio file, interview transcripts), (ii) analysis notes (e.g. notes made during the process 
where phrases/ sentences/ paragraphs were analysed and assigned to differrent codes 
and themes), and (iii) personal notes (e.g. short notes taken during interviews). These 
audit trails are kept in either softcopies or hardcopies or both, whichever is applicable 
and necessary. 
 
Ethics 
The final but possibly the most important criteria of a good quality qualitative research 
is the observation of the ethical aspects of research (Merriam, 2002).  To a large extent, 
most of the previous criteria are indeed highly reliant on the researcher‘s conduct of 
ethics. This is mainly because in qualitative research, the researcher is the main 
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instrument; hence without the researcher‘s being ethical throughout the research, from 
the data collection up to the dissemination of the findings, including during interaction 
with participants, all the strategies designed to ensure the validity and reliability may 
prove pointless (Merriam, 2002).  
 
A few specific strategies have been adopted in this research to ensure an ethical research 
was conducted, including (i) providing the participation information statement and 
consent form in advance at least one week prior to the interview so that the participants 
are able to deliberate on the actual purpose of the study and their rights and 
responsibilities prior, during and after the interview, (ii) obtaining participants‘ consent 
to audio-record  the interview, and, (iii) endeavouring to ensure privacy and protect 
respondents from any potential harms (Merriam, 2002) such as to remove their actual 
names and organisations in the research reports.  
 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework, research paradigm, hypothesis 
development and the the research methodology of the thesis. Public accountability and 
institutional theory are used in complementary manner as the theoretical lens of the 
thesis. Based on the pragmatism paradigm that asserts that either quantitative or 
qualitative method is useful, the mixed method approach is adopted to answer the three 
RQs. The chapter also discussed the research design of the study which involved two 
phases, i.e. quantitative and qualitative research. The quantitative phase addressed RQ1 
and RQ2 while the qualitative phase addressed RQ3.  
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The extent of disclosure of accountability information (RQ1) is determined by analysing 
the content of the 2008 annual reports of 106 MFSB using a disclosure index approach. 
The 110-item disclosure index or checklist which was developed from various sources 
and categorised into five main categories and 24 subcategories adopted a binary and 
unweighted method of scoring. It has passed through the validity, reliability and pilot 
test. The disclosure extent result was then used as the dependant variable for RQ2. 
 
The association between the five variables - namely the type of MFSB, board size, 
board composition, audit committee existence and fiscal stress, together with the size of 
MFSB as the control variable - and the disclosure extent (RQ2) were examined using 
the multiple regression analysis with the general linear model (GLM) as the command. 
All the conditions and assumptions of the multiple regression technique were checked 
and satisfied. The robustness check was also performed. 
 
To understand why disclosure of accountability information is performed or not (RQ3), 
20 semi-structured interview were conducted with MFSB annual report preparers. The 
type of qualitative research adopted is the basic interpretive qualitative research with 
maximum variation purposeful sampling as its sampling strategy. Several strategies 
have been undertaken to ensure the quality in the findings of the interview. The 
meaning categorization approach was adopted to analyze the interview data. 
  
The next chapter discusses the results of the content analysis (RQ1). 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
INFORMATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical framework and the research methodology 
of the thesis. This chapter discusses the results and findings of RQ1, i.e. ―What is the 
extent of disclosure of accountability information in MFSB annual reports?‖. It begins 
with the background of the data analysis in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides the 
descriptive results of the dependent variable of this thesis. Section 5.4 closely 
scrutinises the results from which a more detailed discussion ensues. This includes a 
breakdown of the results according to the five categories of disclosure. In Section 5.5, 
the results of the disclosure are differentiated according to the items required by 
TC4/2007 and the other items included in the index. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Background to Data Analysis 
Overall, a total of 106 annual reports were collected from the 111 MFSB (refer to Table 
5.1), representing 95.5 per cent of the applicable population. This is despite various 
attempts made to obtain all of the annual reports as discussed in Section 4.8.2 (refer also 
to Table 5.2). The sample size is comparable to prior studies such as Herawaty & Hoque 
(2008) and Stanley et al. (2008) who managed a 113 (50%) and 105 (84%) sample, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.1: Availability of MFSB Annual Reports 
Availability Total Percentage 
Available 106 95.5%  
Not available 5 4.5%  
Total Effective Population 111 100 .0% 
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Almost a quarter (24.3%) of the annual reports were obtained from the MFSB website 
(refer to Table 5.2). This figure represents the number of MFSB that publish their 
annual reports online. When compared with (i) statutory bodies in Hong Kong (80%) 
and Singapore (67%) as found by Taylor (2006), and (ii) local authorities in New 
Zealand (40%) as reported by Laswad et al. (2005), this sample percentage possibly 
suggests that the level of ‗proactive openness‘ among MFSB remains relatively low. 
Most annual reports (40.5%) were collected by post from the MFSB upon request by the 
researcher. Given that an official letter is demanded with accompanying proofs (e.g. 
student ID and supervisors‘ official letter), it appears that some MFSB require the 
potential reader of their annual report to have valid justifications to access their reports 
and are unwilling to disclose their operations to just anyone.  
 
Table 5.2: Sources of MFSB Annual Reports 
Sources of Annual Reports Frequency Percentage  
Posted by MFSB 45 40.5%  
On MFSB website 27 24.3%  
Collected from MFSB 10 9.0%  
Access from MFSB library 4 3.6%  
Access from researcher‘s libraries 6 5.4%  
       
         22.5%    
        did not 
          respond 
From other researchers 6 5.4% 
Access from National Library 4 3.6% 
From National Audit Department 4 3.6% 
Not obtained  5 4.5% 
Total Effective Population 111 100%  
 
Furthermore, 22.5 per cent of the MFSB did not respond to the requests made to obtain 
their reports. This rate is considered high if compared to a study on US public 
universities by Gordon et al. (2002) which recorded a 100 per cent response rate. Hence, 
perhaps MFSB need to make some improvement on the accessibility of their annual 
reports to the public. The nonresponse rate experienced in this study is however 
consistent with the nonresponse rate recorded in a study by Giroux & McLelland (2003) 
on US large municipalities (24 and 20% in year 1983 and 1996 respectively) and is 
better than a study on New Zealand schools by Tooley & Guthrie (2007) (60% decline 
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rate). In the context of MFSB, we can observe a slight improvement in the response rate 
as the previous study on MFSB 2004/2005 annual report by Azis (2008) recorded a 
nonresponse rate of 31 per cent. This scenario may well echo the observation by Coy et 
al. (1994) regarding New Zealand public tertiary institutions where in the 1990s annual 
reports were beginning to be perceived as a marketing device. In their study, annual 
reports were seen as a promotional device to win public support for their programs and 
activities, unlike the preceding decade (in 1980s) where it was regarded as corporate 
secrets. Despite the improvements, MFSB may need to make further improvements 
related to their distribution and publication of annual reports online in order to allow for 
greater accessibility by the public.  
 
5.3 Disclosure Index Results  
This section addresses the first research question on the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB, which is measured using a 
disclosure index. Table 5.3 presents information on the minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation of the disclosure index (DI).  
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistic of the Disclosure Index 
Items 
Total Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard  
Deviation 
Total Disclosure  110 52.566         52 27 78 9.195 
Disclosure Index (%) 100 47.787 47.27 24.55  70.91 8.359 
 
Table 5.3 shows that on average, 53 out of 110 items were disclosed representing 47.8 
per cent of the total disclosure items. This provides a DI of 0.478. The range of items 
disclosed by MFSB is between 27 and 78 (25 and 71%). This may indicate a moderate 
level of accountability disclosure. MFSB4 shows the least disclosure with 27 items 
reported while MFSB102 has the greatest disclosure with 78 items. MFSB is a small 
foundation/scholarship type of MFSB while MFSB102 is a socio-economy type of 
MFSB. 
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Comparing the DI with prior studies on accountability disclosure in public sector annual 
reports indicates that MFSB annual reports have a relatively low disclosure index (DI). 
Ismail & Abu Bakar (2011) for example found a 0.75 index score in their study on 
Malaysian universities‘ (which is part of MFSB) annual reports. Coy & Dixon (2004) 
on the other hand, found a disclosure score of 0.66 in their analysis of the annual reports 
of New Zealand universities for the year 2000. They also found an index score of 0.46 
for 1992. This figure is similar to the results reached in this research that is 0.478. In 
light of these prior findings, perhaps MFSB disclosure practices in Malaysia are 20 
years behind the more developed countries such as New Zealand. Nevertheless, there 
are studies that found lesser DI. For example, a study on Canadian universities for the 
year 2000 by Nelson et al. (2003) found a DI of 0.36 and Tooley & Guthrie‘s (2007) 
study on New Zealand schools showed a DI of 0.429. It should be noted however that 
comparing one finding against another should be performed with caution as each 
research is subjected to different settings, scope, time and index. 
 
Additionally, most MFSB disclose 40 to 50 per cent of the items in the disclosure index 
(refer to Table 5.4), suggesting a moderate level of disclosure among MFSB on average. 
One MFSB disclosed 70 to 80 per cent (i.e. MFSB102) and two MFSB (i.e. MFSB4 and 
MFSB43) disclosed less than 30 per cent. Notably, both MFSB4 and MFSB43 are 
foundation/scholarship type of organisation.  
 
Table 5.4: Distribution of Disclosure Scores 
Scores range (% of disclosure index) No. of MFSB %  in the sample 
20.01 - 30% 2 1.9 
30.01 - 40% 16 15.1 
40.01 - 50% 50 47.2 
50.01 - 60% 32 30.2 
60.01 - 70% 5 4.7 
70.01 - 80% 1 .9 
Total 106 100.0 
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5.4 Disclosure Index Results by Category  
This section discusses the results for RQ1 in detail whereby the scores for each 
disclosure items are presented based on their respective categories, namely the 
Overview, Governance, Financial, Performance and Others category. The discussion 
focuses on items which stand out within their respective categories as well as 
subcategories, for example those showing highest and/or lowest disclosure scores. The 
results of the Overview category are presented first. 
  
5.4.1 Overview (8 groups, 38 items) 
The mean for the Overview category is 56.7 per cent (refer to Table 5.5). For this 
category, the content page (ADIS1) appears to be available in the annual reports of all 
MFSB. This is consistent with Herawaty & Hoque‘s (2007) findings. Additionally, 
under this category, six items were disclosed by more than 90 per cent of MFSB. These 
items are (i) content page (ADIS1) (100%), (ii) address (ADIS5) (92.5%), (iii) 
role/function/main activities (ADIS12) (91.5%), (iv) chairman name (ADIS18) (99.1%), 
(v) CEO name (ADIS19) (95.3%), and (vi) name of board members (ADIS32) (99.1%). 
All these items except ADIS1 are required by TC4/2007 and could thus constitute the 
main reason for disclosure by MFSB. 
 
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Overview Category 
ADIS 
No. 
Discosure Item Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage 
 BACKGROUND OF ANNUAL REPORT (GROUP1)   
1 Content page 106 100% 
2 Index/ glossary 6 5.7% 
3 Statutory process timeliness: annual report submission to 
Minister/Parliament 
5 4.7% 
4 Public accountability timeliness: annual report publication 7 6.6% 
 Mean for Background Of Annual Report  29.2% 
 ACCESS INFORMATION (GROUP2)   
5 Address of registered office 98 92.5% 
6 Contact information (Telephone/fax/email) 87 82.1% 
7 Webpage 90 84.9% 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
8 Business hours 2 1.9% 
 Mean for Access Information  65.3% 
 BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY BODIES (GROUP3)   
9 Year of establishment 88 83.0% 
10 Parliamentary Act under which MFSB was established 88 83.0% 
11 Governing ministry 59 55.7% 
12 Role/ function/ main activities 97 91.5% 
 Mean for Background of MFSB  78.3% 
 COMPANY OBJECTIVES AND PHILOSOPHY 
(GROUP4) 
  
13 Vision and Mission 93 87.7% 
14 Values/ethics/philosophy 34 32.1% 
15 Aims/ goals/objectives  90 84.9% 
16 Client charter 35 33.0% 
 Mean for Company Objectives And Philosophy 59.4% 
 CORPORATE INFORMATION (GROUP5)   
17 Organisation chart 89 84.0% 
18 Chairman: name 105 99.1% 
19 Chief Executive: name 101 95.3% 
20 External auditor 29 27.4% 
21 Main bank(s) 17 16.0% 
22 Main lawyer(s) 4 3.8% 
23 List of main events in the year 59 55.7% 
 Mean for Corporate Information  54.4% 
 CHAIRMAN AND CEO MESSAGES (GROUP6)   
24 Overall comments on programmes, activities and projects 
(PAP) of MFSB  
69 65.1% 
25 Achievements and financial status of PAP of MFSB & compare 
with previous years 
57 53.8% 
26 Events that influence the performance of PAP  of MFSB 77 72.6% 
27 Future  prospects and corporate strategies 68 64.2% 
28 Growth and development of PAP 64 60.4% 
29 Acknowledgement to contributors of  the SB success 76 71.7% 
30 Minister message 16 15.1% 
31 Chief executive message 62 58.5% 
 Mean for Chairman And Ceo Messages  57.7% 
 BOARD OF DIRECTORS (GROUP7)   
32 BOD: members‘ name 105 99.1% 
33 BOD: secretary 41 38.7% 
34 BOD: organisation represented 76 71.7% 
35 BOD: members' term end/start 68 64.2% 
 Mean for Board Of Directors  68.4% 
 SENIOR EXECUTIVES (GROUP8)   
36 Senior management: name and designation 91 85.8% 
37 Senior management: education and qualification 19 17.9% 
38 Senior management: skils and experience (know-how) 7 6.6% 
 Mean for Senior Executives  36.8% 
 OVERALL MEAN FOR OVERVIEW CATEGORY 56.7% 
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The least disclosed item under the Overview category is business hours (ADIS8) with 
only two MFSB reporting this item (1.9%). Conveniently, it is not required by 
TC4/2007. Among the reasons for the lack of disclosure of business hours by MFSB, as 
highlighted during the interview in Phase 2, is the difficulties in data 
collection/presentation (refer to Section  7.4.1.3), information is already available in the 
organisation‘s website (refer Section 7.4.2.1) and financial constraint (refer to Section 
7.4.5.1). 
 
Further, six items were disclosed at a rate of less than 10 per cent by MFSB. These 
items are (i) index/glossary (ADIS2) (5.7%), (ii) statutory process timeliness (ADIS3) 
(4.7%), (iii) public accountability timeliness (ADIS4) (6.6%), (iv) MFSB business 
hours (ADIS8) (1.9%), (v) main lawyers (ADIS22) (3.8%), and (vi) senior management 
skills and experience (ADIS38) (6.6%). One reason for the lack of disclosure of main 
lawyers (ADIS22) is because MFSB regard this item as not relevant to their 
organisation, as indicated during the interview in Phase 2 (refer to Section 7.4.1.2). 
Further, the disclosure of senior management skills and experience (ADIS38) (6.6%) is 
much lesser than the findings by Schneider & Samkin (2008) in the context of New 
Zealand local authorities who found that work-related knowledge is disclosed at a rate 
of 20 per cent. 
 
In terms of groups of disclosure items, on average, the highest disclosure is related to 
GROUP 3 which relates to information on the background of MFSB with a score of 
78.3 per cent. Three out of four items under GROUP 3 have a disclosure level of above 
80 per cent. These items are (i) establishment year (ADIS9) (83%), (ii) Parliamentary 
Act (ADIS10) (83%), and (iii) the main activities of MFSB (ADIS12) (91.5%). The last 
two items are both required under TC4/2007. Disclosure on ADIS10 (83%) is 
201 
 
substantially higher than Ismail & Abu Bakar‘s (2011) study on Malaysian public 
universities (part of MFSB) (54.5%), whereas disclosure rates of main activities 
(ADIS12) (91.5%) is slightly lower than that of Ismail & Abu Bakar (2011) which 
found that all public universities disclosed ADIS12. In all MFSB, this information 
(ADIS9, 10, 12) can be found in the first 10 pages of their reports. Parent ministry (in 
Group 3) (ADIS11) was disclosed by slightly more than half of the MFSB. The 
moderate level of disclosure for this item is partly because it is not among the item 
required to be disclosed by the TC4/2007, as indicated by the interviewees in Phase 2 
(refer to Section 7.4.2.2).  
 
The group under the Overview category with the lowest disclosure level is GROUP 1. 
GROUP 1 relates to the background of annual reports and has a disclosure level of 29.2 
per cent. For this group, three out of four items have disclosure levels under 7 per cent. 
These items are (i) index/glossary (ADIS2) (5.7%), (iii) statutory process timeliness 
(ADIS3) (4.7%), and (iii) public accountability timeliness (ADIS4) (6.6%). Regarding 
the index/glossary (ADIS2), the result (5.7%) is much too low compared to Herawaty & 
Hoque‘s (2007) study of Australian government departments (50%). This low 
disclosure has been partly explained by one MFSB during the interview in Phase 2 in 
that the information is pertinent to be provided by new or unique organisations (refer to 
Section 7.3.6.1), implying that the information adds less value to MFSB which are not 
new or of less unique in its operation. Regarding the statutory process timeliness 
(ADIS3) and public accountability timeliness (ADIS4), one reason for the lack of 
disclosure was provided during the interview, i.e. MFSB has no exact information about 
it as the report submission is made by their parent organisation (refer to Section 
7.4.1.3). It is also due to their lack of control on the timeliness of the report publication 
(refer to Section 7.4.6.1).  
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Another item to note is the ADIS6 regarding contact information. What has been found 
here (82.1%) is relatively higher than what was found in Nelson et al.‘s (2003) study on 
Canadian universities (78%) and Tooley & Guthrie‘s (2007) study on New Zealand 
schools (65%). 
 
Overall, for the Overview category, there is a satisfactory level of disclosure with more 
than 50 per cent disclosure scores and that all items are disclosed by at least 2 MFSB 
and at least 1 item is disclosed by all MFSB. Hence, it can be safely said here that users 
of the report may obtain a moderate level of general overview of MFSB by reading the 
latters‘ annual reports.  
 
5.4.2 Governance (4 groups, 17 items) 
The mean for disclosure for Governance is 19 per cent, which is relatively low (refer to 
Table 5.6). This result is consistent with the observation by Ryan & Ng (2000) that 
there is a lack of reporting on governance practices by public entities. Only three out of 
17 items in this category have scores above 25 per cent. These items are (i) the review 
and/or appraisal on effectiveness of risk management (ADIS54) (77.4%), (ii) number of 
board meetings per year (ADIS41) (44.3%), and (iii) board of director‘s remuneration 
policy or total amount (ADIS45) (36.8%). Risk management (ADIS54) and the 
frequency of board meetings (ADIS41) are recommended for disclosure by listed 
companies by the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). This suggests 
that MFSB have taken heed of this advice, perhaps in light of their importance as a 
mechanism towards achieving good corporate governance. The disclosure level for risk 
management (ADIS54) in this study is higher than the 66 per cent level found by 
Herawaty & Hoque (2007). The high level of disclosure for risk management is partly 
due to the emphasis given by the audit committee of MFSB as expressed during the 
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interview in Phase 2 (refer to Section 7.3.5.3), whereas the findings on a board‘s 
remuneration policy and amount (ADIS45) does not fully support Ryan et al.‘s (2002) 
study which concluded that this information is generally revealed.  
 
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics of the Governance Category 
ADIS 
No. 
Disclosure Item Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage 
 BOARD OF DIRECTORS GOVERNANCE (GROUP9)   
39 BOD: members' education and qualification 24 22.6% 
40 BOD: members' skills and experience of nonexecutive 
director 
21 19.8% 
41 BOD: number of meetings per year 47 44.3% 
42 BOD: meeting dates 26 24.5% 
43 BOD: attendance summary  18 17.0% 
44 BOD: meeting attendance of each individual director   15 14.2% 
45 BOD: remuneration policy or total amount  39 36.8% 
46 BOD: remuneration amount listed by person 2 1.9% 
 Mean of Board Of Directors Governance  22.6% 
 SENIOR MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE 
(GROUP10) 
  
47 SM: remuneration amount of CEO 4 3.8% 
48 SM: remuneration amount of other senior executives (total or 
individual) 
10 9.4% 
49 SM: how nature and amount of remuneration of senior 
executives is determined 
0 0.0% 
 Mean of Senior Management Governance  4.4% 
 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNT COMMITTEE 
(GROUP11) 
 
50 FMAC: members' name 17 16.0% 
51 FMAC: required number of meetings 4 3.8% 
52 FMAC: number of meetings 15 14.2% 
53 FMAC: effectiveness of FMAC in handling financial issues 1 0.9% 
 Mean for FMAC  8.7% 
 INTERNAL AUDIT (GROUP12)   
54 Review and/or appraisal on effectiveness of risk 
management  
82 77.4% 
55 Review/appraisal of internal control systems 18 17.0% 
 Mean for Internal Audit  47.2% 
 OVERALL MEAN FOR GOVERNANCE  CATEGORY  19.0% 
 
None of the MFSB discloses information regarding the amount and method the 
remuneration of senior executives is determined (ADIS49). This finding is consistent 
with that of Herawaty & Hoque (2007) in the sense that the item is the least disclosed 
item under their governance category. In spite of this, their study reported that almost 
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half of the Australian government departments disclosed this item, therefore indicating 
a much worse position in the case of MFSB.  
 
In terms of groups of disclosure items (there are 4 groups under this category), on 
average, the group with the highest disclosure (47.2%) is GROUP 12 which is 
concerned with internal audit information. The two items under this group are based on 
MCCG recommendation. One concerns risk management (ADIS54) and the other 
concerns internal control (ADIS55). Information on risk management (ADIS54) shows 
high levels of disclosure (77.4%). This is consistent with the study by Ryan & Ng 
(2000) which found 13 (72%) out of 18 public agencies in Queensland disclosed this 
information. Interestingly, in their study, all five statutory bodies were found to have 
disclosed this information. The adequate disclosure found in the current study may be 
attributed to the substantial attention given by the MCCG on this particular issue. 
 
Surprisingly, the results show that internal control (ADIS55) has a disclosure level of 
only 17 per cent. The result is much less than findings by Ryan & Ng (2000) who found 
83 per cent disclosure on internal control by various public agencies in Queensland. It 
was indicated by an interviewee in Phase 2 that disclosure of certain information 
reflects its importance in the organisation (refer to Section 7.3.1.2). Hence, the low level 
of disclosure of internal control information in MFSB reports may serve as indication of 
the relatively low importance attached to internal control function by MFSB, as 
compared to Queensland public agencies for example. However, comparing the current 
study‘s result to Ryan et al.‘s (2002) study on Queensland local governments, MFSB 
disclosure level on internal control and hence importance attached to it is still high as 
the former study found a disclosure mean of only 0.48 out of 5 with a maximum score 
of 9.6 per cent for this item.  
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The least disclosed group under the Governance category is GROUP 10 which focused 
on information on senior management governance with a disclosure level of only 4.4 
per cent. All three items under this group (i.e. ADIS47, 48 and 49) have less than 10 per 
cent disclosure levels. For ADIS47 which concerns CEO remuneration amounts, only 
3.8 per cent of MFSB disclosed this item. This is consistent with the findings by Ryan 
et al. (2002) who found that only one council from three years of study (i.e. 1997 to 
1999) disclosed this information. They concluded that salaries of higher management in 
local councils are generally not made public. In their study, Ryan et al. found that the 
scores for disclosure on remuneration of councillors and/or executives decreased over 
the three years with a mean of 2.69 out of a possible score of 5 (54%). Results for the 
amount of remuneration of other senior executives (total or individual) (ADIS48) shows 
that 9.4 per cent of MFSB disclosed the item. This is almost half of the rate found by 
Schneider & Samkin (2008) in their study where 17 (21%) out of 82 New Zealand local 
authorities disclosed the item. Dixon et al. (1991) argued that the importance of 
breaking down salaries figures is to enable users to identify where an organisation 
staffing priorities lay. In the context of the current study, the information is also 
important to determine whether there is any mismanagement of public funds by 
‗overpaying‘ the senior executives.  
 
Overall, for the Governance category, there is a relatively much lower level of 
disclosure than the Overview category with less than 20 per cent disclosure scores. This 
category also appears to be the least disclosed category in the index (refer to Section 
5.4.6). Additionally, there is one item that was not disclosed by any MFSB as well as no 
one item was disclosed by all MFSB. Hence, it can be safely said here that MFSB do 
not sufficiently provide governance information in their annual reports (more discussion 
in Section 5.4.6).  
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5.4.3 Financial (4 groups, 20 items) 
The overall mean for the Financial category is 55.2 per cent (refer to Table 5.7). All 
MFSB disclosed four of the items under this category namely the (i) balance sheet 
(ADIS56), (ii) income statement (ADIS57), (iii) statement of chairman and a board 
member for the group accounts (ADIS62), and (iv) statutory declaration by the officer 
primarily responsible for the financial management (ADIS63). This result is similar to 
Dixon et al. (1991) study who found only two (out of 52) items, namely the balance 
sheet and operating statements are disclosed by all seven New Zealand universities 
across five years (1985-1989).  
 
Additionally, another four items (not including the four items above) were disclosed by 
more than 90 per cent of MFSB. The items are (i) statement of changes in equity 
(ADIS58) (98.1%), (ii) cash flow statement (ADIS59) (99.1%), (iii) notes to the 
financial statement (ADIS60) (99.1%), and (iv) auditor general certificate (ADIS61) 
(99.1%). All these eight items are among the financial items required to be disclosed by 
the TC4/2007. With regards to the auditor general certificate (ADIS61), a study on 
internet financial reporting of Spain‘s city councils by Caba Perez et al. (2008) found 
that only 1.5 per cent of the ﬁnancial information that was reported annually was 
accompanied by the corresponding audit certificate. 
 
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Category 
ADIS 
No. 
Disclosure Item Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage 
 AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (GROUP13)   
56 Balance sheet 106 100.0% 
57 Income statement 106 100.0% 
58 Statement of changes in equity 104 98.1% 
59 Cash flow statement 105 99.1% 
60 Notes to the financial statement 105 99.1% 
 Mean For Audited Financial Statements  99.2% 
 ACCOMPANYING CERTIFICATE AND STATEMENT 
(GROUP14) 
  
61 Auditor general certificate 105 99.1% 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
62 Statement of Chairman and a Board member for the Group 
accounts 
106 100.0% 
63 Statutory declaration by the officer primarily responsible for the 
financial mgmt. 
106 100.0% 
 Mean for Accompanying Certificate And Statement 99.7% 
 ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(GROUP15) 
  
64 Comparison figures/charts: on assets used  44 41.5% 
65 Comparison figures/charts: on various source of finance  74 69.8% 
66 Comparison figures/charts: on reserve 33 31.1% 
67 Comparison figures/charts: on noncurrent liabilities 19 17.9% 
68 Comparison figures/charts: on sales/receipts and gross profit 
margin 
62 58.5% 
69 Comparison figures/charts: on surplus/deficit or profit/loss 48 45.3% 
 Mean for Analysis Of Financial Performance 44.0% 
 FINANCIAL RATIOS (GROUP 16)   
70 Current ratio (Current assets/Current liabilities) 11 10.4% 
71 Liquidity ratio (Liquid assets/Current liabilities) 11 10.4% 
72 Debt asset ratio (Total debt/Total assets) 10 9.4% 
73 Proprietor‘s ratio (Total equity / total liability) 6 5.7% 
74 Total equity/total asset 8 7.5% 
75 Assets turnover ratio 2 1.9% 
 Mean for Financial Ratios  7.5% 
 OVERALL MEAN FOR FINANCIAL CATEGORY  55.2% 
 
The group with the greatest disclosure is related to financial statements‘ accompanying 
certificate and statements (GROUP14) and closely followed by audited financial 
statements (GROUP13) with a score of 99.7 per cent and 99.2 per cent respectively. All 
items in GROUP14 and 13 are required by the TC4/2007. Furthermore, all items in 
GROUP13 are also recommended by IPSAS 1 and 2 of IFAC
53
 to be provided in the 
government‘s annual public financial reports (IFAC, 2011). This may explain the very 
high disclosure level of these two groups. The results from this study are very much 
higher than those found by Caba Perez & Lopez Hernandez (2009) in their study on the 
annual public financial reports of the central government of MERCUSOR countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), where none of these countries include all 
the information in GROUP13 as proposed by IPSAS 1 and 2 of IFAC. 
 
                                                 
53 According to IPSAS 1 and 2 of the IFAC, a complete set of financial statements should include the following statements: (a) 
statement of financial position – a balance sheet or statement of assets and liabilities; (b) statement of financial performance;  
(c) statement of changes in net assets/equity; (d) cash flow statement; and (e) accounting policies and notes to the financial 
statements.  
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On the other hand, financial ratios (GROUP16) is the least disclosed group with a score 
of only 7.5 per cent. This finding is lower than prior studies. For example, Stanley et al. 
(2008) found that financial ratios are commonly disclosed by Queensland local 
authorities whereby 68 (65%) out of 105 local authorities disclosed them. Similarly, 
Tooley & Guthrie (2007) found that 24 per cent of New Zealand schools reported their 
financial ratios. The disclosure of financial ratios is required by either the TC4/2007 or 
the GC6/2004 in the annual report and the annual summary report
54
 respectively. The 
TC4/2007 requires the disclosure of debt assets ratio (ADIS72) and assets turnover ratio 
(ADIS75). Regardless of such requirements, the disclosure levels for these two ratios 
appear to be very low with 9.4 per cent and 1.9 per cent respectively. The other four 
ratios (i.e. current ratio (ADIS70), liquidity ratio (ADIS71), proprietors‘ ratio (ADIS73) 
and ratio on total equity/total fixed asset (ADIS74)) plus the debt assets ratio (ADIS72) 
are required to be disclosed by GC6/2004 in the annual summary report. All these ratios 
are disclosed by less than 11 per cent of MFSB. The lack of disclosure is due to various 
reasons including the lack of authority to obtain the data by the report coordinator (refer 
to Section 7.4.6.1), lack of understanding or misunderstanding of the financial ratios 
among preparers (refer to Section 7.4.6.4), MFSB perception that financial ratios are not 
relevant to them (refer to Section 7.4.1.2) and lack of users of the information (refer to 
Section 7.4.4.1).   
 
Overall, for the Financial category, the mean disclosure slightly lower than the 
Overview category but higher than the Governance category with more than 50 per cent 
disclosure scores (refer to Section 5.4.6). Additionally, four items were disclosed by all 
MFSB. Hence, it can be safely said here that MFSB has moderately provided financial 
information in their annual reports (more discussion in Section 5.4.6).  
                                                 
54 Annual summary report of MFSB is a 3-page summary on MFSB overall performance in terms of financial management, 
operational efficiency and effectiveness and output quality  to be submitted and tabled in the Cabinet meeting by the respective 
MFSB  Minister (Prime Minister's Department, 2004) 
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5.4.4 Performance (4 groups, 20 items) 
The overall mean for the Performance category is 57.6 per cent (refer to Table 5.8). This 
result is consistent with Wei et al.‘s (2008) study which found a performance 
accountability disclosure score of 61 per cent (55 out of a maximum possible of 90). 
This category is the most disclosed category of information in the index (refer to 
Section 5.4.6), partly owing to the fact that performance information are perceived by 
MFSB as the ones that interest the public most, as highlighted by interviewees in Phase 
2 (refer to Section 7.3.4.4). 
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics of the Performance Category 
ADIS 
No. 
Disclosure Item Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage 
 KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (GROUP17)   
   76 Key Performance Indicators 44 41.5% 
77 Compare targeted KPI and actual achievement (in 
figure/percentage) 
29 27.4% 
 Mean for Key Performance Indicators  34.4% 
 CUSTOMER/ EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION (GROUP18) 
78 Customer satisfaction  18 17.0% 
79 Staff satisfaction  5 4.7% 
80 No. of complaints received on MFSB 17 16.0% 
81 No. of valid complaints resolved 15 14.2% 
 Mean for Customer/ Employee Satisfaction Indicator  13. 0% 
 OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM/ACTIVITIES/PROJECTS (PAP) (GROUP19) 
82 Objective and description of each PAP 101 95.3% 
83 Implementation progress of each PAP 100 94.3% 
84 Problems encountered in the implementation 34 32.1% 
85 Factors (internal/external)influencing current performance  89 84.0% 
86 Future plans 66 62.3% 
 Mean for Overview Of Program/Activities/Projects (Pap)  73.6% 
 PERFORMANCE OF PAP (GROUP20)   
87 Input: Financial resources  84 79.2% 
88 Input: Non-financial resources applied to a PAP 85 80.2% 
89 Output 104 98.1% 
90 Impact 76 71.7% 
91 Efficiency 31 29.2% 
92 Effectiveness 84 79.2% 
93 Productivity  89 84.0% 
94 Compare between actual and target performance 65 61.3% 
95 Compare between current and previous year 85 80.2% 
 Performance of PAP  73.7% 
 OVERALL MEAN FOR PERFORMANCE CATEGORY  57.6% 
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There are three items with disclosure levels above 90 per cent. These items are (i) 
objectives and descriptions of programmes, activities and projects (PAP) (ADIS82) 
(95.3%), (ii) implementation progress of each PAP (ADIS83) (94.3%), and (iii) output 
of PAP (ADIS89) (98.1%). The high disclosure of ADIS82 and ADIS89 is perhaps 
partly due to these items being required by the TC4/2007. In a study by Tooley et al. 
(2010) on Malaysian local government, ADIS89 is listed as among the top 20 
performance items which are perceived to be very important by stakeholders. Assuming 
stakeholders‘ information requirements from the Malaysian public sector is similar 
across different types of entities (e.g. local government and MFSB); we may say that 
the high disclosure of ADIS89 has partly met the stakeholders‘ information 
requirement.  
 
On the other hand, the least disclosed item under the Performance category is staff 
satisfaction (4.7%). This finding is consistent with Wei et al.‘s (2008) study that found 
an even worse scenario whereby none of the museums in the UK and New Zealand 
disclosed this information in their annual reports. As pointed out by the interviewees in 
Phase 2 of the study, the nondisclosure of staff satisfaction is due to various reasons 
including  the lack of data (refer to Section 7.4.1.3), data privacy issues (refer to Section 
7.4.1.4) and avoiding the feeling of uneasiness among members of organisation (refer to 
Section 7.4.2.5). 
 
In terms of groups, the group with the highest disclosure level is GROUP 20, which 
relates to performance of PAP (73.7%). The high disclosure for this group is partly 
contributed by the compliance of MFSB to the respective Ministry‘s requirement (refer 
to Section 7.3.4.1). This is closely followed by GROUP19 regarding the overview of 
PAP (73.6%). Generally, it is a relief to see information on performance (GROUP 20) is 
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well reported except in the case of the efficiency of PAP (ADIS91) (29.2%). The scores 
obtained for efficiency (ADIS91) are much lower than the 69.1 per cent found by 
Gordon & Fischer (2008) in the case of US higher institutions. There should be more 
reporting on efficiency as this item is also among the top 20 items required by 
stakeholders as identified by Tooley et al. (2002). During the interview in Phase 2, it 
was indicated that one reason for the nondisclosure of efficiency information is related 
to the difficulties in measuring the efficiency itself (refer to Section 7.4.1.3). On the 
other hand, a comparison between actual and target (ADIS94) is also comparatively low 
compared to that of Tooley & Guthrie (2007) which found that all 17 New Zealand 
schools reported this information. Besides this, the findings are consistent with the 
study by Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009) as the output measures (98.1%) are disclosed 
more than the input measures (80.2%). The output and input measures in Marcuccio & 
Steccolini (2009) are 60 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the group with the least disclosure level is the customer/staff 
satisfaction (GROUP18) (13%). Even the item within this group showing the highest 
disclosure, namely customer satisfaction (ADIS78), showed a disclosure level by MFSB 
of only 17 per cent. This is much lower than the findings in Wei et al.‘s (2008) study 
where customer satisfaction scored 2.88 (out of a maximum possible score of 5), i.e. 58 
per cent. In addition, the score achieved for ADIS78 may not be a favourable situation 
as a prior study by Tooley et al. (2010) found that customer satisfaction was perceived 
by Malaysian local government stakeholders as very important information. Again, 
assuming the scenario is the same in other public entities in Malaysia, the results by 
ADIS78 need to improve substantially in order for MFSB to enhance its accountability 
to the stakeholders. 
 
212 
 
Overall, for the Performance category, the mean disclosure is the highest compared to 
the remaining four categories (refer to Section 5.4.6). Among the reasons cited during 
the interview in Phase 2 are that the performance of MFSB is among the issues of 
public concern (refer to Section 7.3.4.4) and hence MFSB should response to it by 
reporting the information in their annual report (refer to Section 7.3.4.5). Nevertheless, 
despite being the most disclosed category of accountability information, it can only be 
concluded that the Performance information were moderately disclosed by MFSB in 
their annual reports, owing to the disclosure scores of only near to 60 per cent.  
 
5.4.5 Others (3 groups, 15 items) 
This category has an overall mean of 34.6 per cent (refer to Table 5.9). Only one item 
under this category has a disclosure level of above 80 per cent namely statistics on 
staffing (ADIS96) which scored 82.1 per cent. This figure is almost similar to the 
findings by Herawaty & Hoque (2008) who found that this item is disclosed by 85.7 per 
cent of Australian government departments and is the most disclosed item under human 
resource practices.  
Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics of the Others Category 
ADIS 
No. 
Disclosure Item Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage 
 HUMAN RESOURCE (GROUP21)   
96 Statistics on staffing (e.g. total staff, vacancies) 87 82.1% 
97 Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention 52 49.1% 
98 Equal opportunity employment (e.g. staff by 
race/gender/age) 
8 7.5% 
99 Statistics on training and development 
courses/programmes for staff 
72 67.9% 
100 Achievements/impact of staff training and 
development activities (general/each) 
23 21.7% 
101 Staff recognition through awards/rewards/titles 46 43.4% 
102 Staff recognition: Names of awards/titles/rewards 
recipients 
20 18.9% 
 Mean for Human Resource  41.5% 
 SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL (GROUP22)   
103 Internal/external social responsibility efforts/activities  78 72.9% 
104 Financial information on social responsibility issues 
(budget/cost) 
50 46.7% 
105 Internal/external environmental protection 
efforts/activities 
29 27.4% 
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Table 5.9 (continued) 
106 Financial information on environmental issues 
(budget/cost) 
5 4.7% 
 Mean for socio-environmental   37.9% 
 MAIN ASSETS (GROUP23)   
107 List of main assets: location 20 18.9% 
108 List of main assets: ownership 15 14.2% 
109 List of main assets: size (area) 20 18.9% 
110 List of main assets: description/type 27 25.5% 
 Mean for Main Assets  19.3% 
  OVERALL MEAN FOR OTHERS CATEGORY  34.6% 
 
The least disclosed item under this category is the financial information on 
environmental issues (ADIS106) with a score of 4.7 per cent. This is somewhat 
consistent with studies in other settings such as in the case of Joseph (2010a) who found 
that only 3 per cent of Malaysian local governments report this information. 
Additionally, the next leased disclosed item after ADIS106 is information on equal 
employment opportunity (ADIS98) with a disclosure level of only 7.4 per cent, partly 
contributed by the lack of users of that information as expressed during interview in 
Phase 2 (refer to Section 7.4.4.1). The low disclosure found in this study is far below 
the findings by Schneider & Samkin (2008) which reported a mean score of 2.1 out of 5 
for this item among 82 New Zealand local authorities. Interestingly, in New Zealand 
schools, Tooley & Guthrie (2007) reported that this information is almost non-existent 
in their annual reports.  
 
Notably, all the three groups under this category (i.e. human resource, socio-
environmental and main assets) were disclosed by less than 45 per cent of MFSB. The 
least disclosed group concerns properties or main assets (GROUP23) (19.3%). This is 
much lower than what was found by Tooley & Guthrie (2007) where information on 
property was disclosed by all 17 New Zealand secondary schools. Here, it can be said 
that the requirements of TC4/2007 on the disclosure of MFSB main assets and 
properties are not closely observed by the majority of the MFSB although during the 
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interview it was indicated by MFSB disclosing this information that the reason it is  
disclosed is simply because it is required by the Circular (refer to Section 7.3.4.1). 
Overall, the mean disclosure for the Others category is higher only than the Governance 
category but lower than the other three categories of the index (refer to Section 5.4.6).  
 
5.4.6 Summary of the Five Categories 
This section summarizes the figures from Table 5.5 to 5.9. The disclosure levels of each 
category ranges from 19 per cent (Governance category) to 57.6 per cent (Performance 
category) with two out of five categories scoring less than 50 per cent, i.e. Governance 
and Others category (refer to Table 5.10). This finding is unlike the study by Ismail & 
Abu Bakar (2011) which found that all their disclosure categories have index disclosure 
scores of above 50 per cent. The low governance-related information is expected as the 
disclosure items for this category were partly drawn from MCCG, a code which is not 
directed towards a government agency such as MFSB. Despite this, it is argued that 
since MFSB are expected to carry out government policies professionally and 
effectively through various programmes and activities (National Audit Department, 
2008), necessary measures such as being more open in its disclosure of governance 
information is deemed necessary and appropriate to allow necessary scrutiny and more 
effective action of boards, as pointed out in the report by Cadbury Committee (1992). 
The importance of governance disclosure as described here suggests much opportunity 
for MFSB to pursue with greater effort towards more governance disclosure in their 
annual reports. 
 
Table 5.10: Overall Mean by Category 
Category Mean Rank Minimum ADIS No. Maximum ADIS No. 
Overview  56.7% 2 2 (1.9%) ADIS8 106 (100%) ADIS1 
Governance  19.0% 5     0 (0%) ADIS49 82 (77.4%) ADIS54 
Financial  55.2% 3 2 (1.9%) ADIS75 106 (100%) ADIS56,ADIS57, 
ADIS62,ADIS63 
Performance  57.6% 1 5 (4.7%) ADIS79 104 (98.1%) ADIS89 
Others  34.6% 4 5 (4.7%) ADIS106 87 (82.1%) ADIS96 
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The findings suggest that MFSB reporting is not based on the decision-usefulness 
paradigm as financial disclosure does not appear to have been given too much emphasis 
comparatively (refer to Section 2.2.1 on decision-usefulness paradigm). Given that other 
categories of disclosure such as performance and overview are higher on their level of 
disclosure, it implies that the prime objective of MFSB reporting may not be simply to 
meet the needs of those with a commercial relationship with them (i.e. decision 
usefulness), rather a wider range of interested users. Hence public accountability 
paradigm is observed here as the reporting framework of MFSB. 
 
Table 5.11 below shows the minimum and maximum number of items in the disclosure 
index that are disclosed by each MFSB according to category. It shows that there are 
five and one MFSB that do not disclose a single disclosure item related to governance 
and performance respectively. The table also shows that none of the MFSB disclose all 
disclosure items under a particular category. 
 
Table 5.11: Minimum and Maximum Number of Items Disclosed by Each MFSB 
Category No. of  
Items 
Minimum MFSB Maximum MFSB 
Overview 38 7 
(18.4%) 
MFSB4 30 
(78.9%) 
MFSB44 
Governance 17 0  MFSB28, MFSB40, 
MFSB54, MFSB65 
MFSB82 
13 
(76.5%) 
MFSB37 
Financial 20 6 
(30.0%) 
MFSB36 19 
(95.0%) 
MFSB51, MFSB80, 
MFSB84, MFSB87, 
MFSB92, MFSB102  
Performance 20 0  MFSB43 19 
(95.0%) 
MFSB89, MFSB114 
Others 15 1 (6.7%) MFSB25, MFSB60 
MFSB71 
12 
(80.0%) 
MFSB102 
 
The study also found that there is one item which was not disclosed by any of the 
MFSB, namely the item on how the amount and nature of remuneration of senior 
executives is determined (ADIS49) which falls under the governance category (refer to 
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Table 5.12). On the other hand, all MFSB disclosed five disclosure items namely 
ADIS1, ADIS56, ADIS57, ADIS62 and ADIS63. 
 
Table 5.12: Number of Disclosure Items with 0 and 100 per cent Mean Disclosure 
Mean Frequency Disclosure Items 
0 per cent 1 item 
ADIS49   SM: how nature and amount of renumeration of senior 
                executives is determined 
100 per cent 5 items 
ADIS1     Content page;  
ADIS56   Balance Sheet;  
ADIS57   Income Statement;  
ADIS62   Statement of Chairman and a Board member;  
ADIS63   Statutory declaration by the officer primarily responsible for  
                the financial management;    
 
5.5 Disclosure Index Results by Item Type  
Out of the 110 disclosure items in the Disclosure Index (DI), 45 are required to be 
disclosed by the TC4/2007. These items are referred to as mandatory items and the 
index related will be referred to as the Mandatory Disclosure Index (MDI). The 
remaining 65 disclosure items in the DI which are not required by TC4/2007 will be 
referred to as the Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI). The VDI includes items 
recommended by public sector literature and/or other disclosure guidelines (as 
explained in Chapter 4) for disclosure by public sector organisations to the stakeholders. 
The thesis provides additional analysis to determine the extent of disclosure of MDI and 
VDI.  
 
5.5.1 Mandatory Disclosure Index (MDI) 
Table 5.13 below shows that on average, there are 29 items (out of 45 items) disclosed 
which represents 65 per cent of the MDI items. This entails an MDI score of 0.6478, 
with a range of 0.33 to 0.91, which may indicate a relatively high level of accountability 
disclosure compared to the DI as discussed in Section 5.3 (DI of 0.478). The MDI score 
found in this study is consistent with the results by Herawaty & Hoque (2007) who 
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content analysed the annual reports of Australian government departments and found 
the mean for their mandatory index is 0.58.  
 
Table 5.13: Descriptive Statistic of the MDI 
Required Items Total Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
No. of Items Disclosed 45 29.15 15 41 4.849 
Disclosure Index (%) 100 64.78 33.33 91.11 10.777 
.  
Table 5.14 below shows the disclosure level for each of the MDI items. The table also 
compares the results of the MDI in this study with that of Azis (2008). Azis conducted 
content analysis on 49 required items extracted from the earlier version of TC4/2007 
(i.e. TC15/1994) and applied them on the 2004 or 2005 annual reports of 62 MFSB. It 
appears that out of the 45 required items of this study, 20 items (44.4%) show an 
increase in the disclosure level, 12 items (26.7%) show a decrease, and 4 items (8.9%) 
remains at 100 per cent disclosure level and the remaining 9 items (20%) are not 
comparable as they are not available in Azis‘s (2008) index. As such, we may roughly 
say that the situation improved over the 2004/2005 to 2008 period.  
 
Table 5.14: Descriptive Statistics of the MDI by Item and Category 
No. ADIS 
No. 
Disclosure Item Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage Azis 
(2008) 
+/- 
Overview     
1   5 Address of registered office 98 92.5% 65.0%  + 
2 10 Parliamentary Act under which FSB was 
established 
88 83.0% 87.0% - 
3 12 Role / function 97 91.5% 81.5% + 
4 15 Objectives  90 84.9% 90.0% - 
5 17 Organisation chart  89 84.0% 85.0% - 
6 18 Chairman 105 99.1% 98.0% + 
7 19 Chief Executive  101 95.3% 100% - 
8 20 External auditor 29 27.4% 11.0% + 
9 23 List of main events in the year 59 55.7% 58.0% - 
10 24 Chairman message: Overall assessment on 
programmes, activities and projects (PAP) of 
FSB 
69 65.1% 94.0% - 
11 25 Chairman message: Achievement and financial 
status of PAP and compare with previous years 
57 53.8% 66.0% - 
12 26 Chairman message: Events that influence the 
performance of PAP 
77 72.6% 44.0% + 
13 27 Chairman message: Future  prospects and 
corporate strategies 
68 64.2% 60.0% + 
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Table 5.14 (continued) 
14 28 Chairman message: Growth and development 
of PAP 
64 60.4% 60.0% + 
15 29 Chairman message: Acknowledgement to 
contributors of  the FSB success 
76 71.7% 65.0% + 
16 32 BOD: members‘ name 105 99.1% 100% - 
17 36 Senior management: name and designation 91 85.8% 76.0% + 
  Mean of Overview Cateogory  75.6%   
Governance     
18 42 BOD: meeting dates 26 24.5% 16% + 
19 43 BOD: attendance summary 18 17.0% n/a n/a 
  Mean of Governance Category  20.8%   
Financial     
20 56 Balance sheet 106 100.0% 100% 0 
21 57 Income statement 106 100.0% 100% 0 
22 58 Statement of changes in equity 104 98.1% 100% - 
23 59 Cash flow statement 105 99.1% 100% - 
24 60 Notes to the financial statement  105 99.1% 100% - 
25 61 Auditor general certificate 105 99.1% 100% - 
26 62 Statement of Chairman and a Board member 
for the Group accounts 
106 100.0% 100% 0 
27 63 Statutory declaration by the officer primarily 
responsible for the financial mgmt 
106 100.0% 100% 0 
28 64 Comparison figures/charts: analysis on assets 
used  
44 41.5% 5.0% + 
29 65 Comparison figures/charts: analysis on various 
source of finance 
74 69.8% 10.0% + 
30 66 Comparison figures/charts: analysis on reserve 33 31.1% 2.0% + 
31 67 Comparison figures/charts: analysis on 
noncurrent liabilities 
19 17.9% 2.0% + 
32 68 Comparison figures/charts: analysis on 
sales/receipts and gross profit margin 
62 58.5% 6.0% + 
33 69 Comparison figures/charts: analysis on 
surplus/deficit or profit/loss 
48 45.3% 3.0% + 
34 72 Debt asset ratio 10 9.4% n/a n/a 
35 75 Assets turnover ratio 2 1.9% n/a n/a 
  Mean of Financial Category  66.9%   
Performance     
36 82 Objective and description of each PAP 101 95.3% 85.0% + 
37 83 Implementation progress of each PAP 100 94.3% 85.0% + 
38 84 Problems encountered in the implementation 34 32.1% 13.0% + 
39 85 Factors (internal/external) influencing current 
performance 
89 84.0% n/a n/a 
40 86 Future plans  66 62.3% n/a n/a 
41 90 Impact 76 71.7% 47.0% + 
  Mean of Performance Category  73.3%   
Others     
42 107 List of main assets: location 20 18.9% n/a n/a 
43 108 List of main assets: ownership 15 14.2% n/a n/a 
44 109 List of main assets: size (area)  20 18.9% n/a n/a 
45 110 List of main assets: description/type  27 25.5% n/a n/a 
  Mean of Others Category  19.3%   
  OVERALL MEAN FOR REQUIRED ITEMS 64.78%   
+ (-): the percentage of disclosure is higher (lower) in this study compared to Azis‘s (2008) study 
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Since there are some 12 items (26.7%) which show lesser disclosure levels from Azis‘s 
(2008) index, this, taken together with the 0.6478 MDI, may suggest that that MFSB 
still have a long way to go in complying with the TC4/2007. Perhaps more monitoring 
and enforcement are needed by the Treasury or respective ministry to ensure better 
compliance to this circular. At the same time, this finding supports what has been 
highlighted by prior studies on the Malaysian public sector in that there is a lack of 
enforcement although rules and regulations appear to be in place (e.g. Abu Bakar et al., 
2011; Siddiquee, 2002).  
 
5.5.2 Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI) 
Table 5.15 shows that on average, there are 23 items (out of 65 items) disclosed which 
represents 36 per cent of the VDI items. This entails to a VDI score of 0.3602, with a 
range of 0.17 to 0.57. 
 
Table 5.15: Descriptive Statistic of the VDI 
Other Items Total Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
No. of Items Disclosed 65 23.42 11 37 5.680 
Disclosure Index (%) 100 36.02 16.92 56.92 8.739 
 
The results show a very low extent of disclosure for the recommended items (36%). 
This is unlike the results reached in the study by Herawaty & Hoque (2007) and Lim & 
McKinnon (1993) wherein the voluntary disclosures reached a score of 65 per cent and 
55.8 per cent respectively. As suggested by Clarke et al. (2009), the low results in the 
present study could perhaps be due to voluntary disclosure not being subject to content 
regulation and audit. Low scores on voluntary disclosures may suggest that report 
preparers are not interested in communicating to readers the full extent of their 
operations and are merely focused on fulfilling their statutory role instead (Clarke et al., 
2009). This should be seen as an opportunity for MFSB to further explore and improve 
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on the areas and items that are recommended for disclosure by public sector literature or 
other disclosure guidelines such as the MCCG.  
  
Table 5.16 below shows the extent of disclosure for each of the recommended items. It 
can be observed that for the Financial category, the disclosure mean is much lower than 
what was found for the full index (refer to Table 5.10 in Section 5.4.6), owing to the 
very low disclosure level for the four ratios which are not required by the TC4/2007.  
As pointed out earlier (refer to Section 5.4.3), one reason for the low level of disclosure 
for such ratios is that MFSB felt that liquidity ratio for example are not relevant for 
them as non-profit oriented organisations (refer to Section 7.4.1.2). Mean disclosure for 
the other categories of information under the VDI do not differ as much as the Financial 
category than the full index. 
 
Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics of the VDI by Item and Category 
No. ADIS 
No. 
Disclosure Items Frequency 
(n=106) 
Percentage 
Overview 
1 1 Content page                                                                  106 100.0% 
2 2 Index / glossary 6 5.7% 
3 3 Statutory process timeliness 5 4.7% 
4 4 Public accountability timeliness 7 6.6% 
5 6 Contact information 87 82.1% 
6 7 Webpage  90 84.9% 
7 8 Business hours 2 1.9% 
8 9 Year of establishment  88 83.0% 
9 11 Governing Ministry 59 55.7% 
10 13 Vision  / Mission 93 87.7% 
11 14 Values / philosophy 34 32.1% 
12 16 Client charter 35 33.0% 
13 21 Main bank(s) 17 16.0% 
14 22 Main lawyer(s) 4 3.8% 
15 30 Minister message 16 15.1% 
16 31 CEO message 62 58.5% 
17 33 BOD: secretary 41 38.7% 
18 34 BOD: organisation represented 76 71.7% 
19 35 BOD: members' term end/start 68 64.2% 
20 37 Senior management: education and qualification 19 17.9% 
21 38 Senior management: skills and experience 7 6.6% 
  Mean of Overview Cateogory  41.4% 
Governance   
22 39 BOD: members' education and qualification 24 22.6% 
23 40 BOD: members' skills and experience of nonexecutive 
director 
21 19.8% 
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Table 5.16 (continued) 
24 41 BOD: number of meetings per year 47 44.3% 
25 44 BOD: meeting attendance of each individual director 15 14.2% 
26 45 BOD: renumeration policy (including allowances and 
other entitlements) 
39 36.8% 
27 46 BOD: renumeration amount listed by person 2 1.9% 
28 47 SM: Renumeration amount of CEO 4 3.8% 
29 48 SM: renumeration amount of other senior executives (total 
or individual) 
10 9.4% 
30 49 SM: how nature and amount of renumeration of senior 
executives is determined 
0 0.0% 
31 50 FMAC: members' name 17 16.0% 
32 51 FMAC: required no. of meetings 4 3.8% 
33 52 FMAC: number of meetings 15 14.2% 
34 53 FMAC: effectiveness of FMAC in handling financial 
issues 
1 0.9% 
35 54 IA: review / appraisal on effectiveness of risk 
management 
82 77.4% 
36 55 IA: review / appraisal of internal control systems 18 17.0% 
  Mean of Governance Cateogory  18.8% 
Financial   
37 70 Current ratio 11 10.4% 
38 71 Liquidity ratio 11 10.4% 
39 73 Proprietor's ratio 6 5.7% 
40 74 Total equity / total asset 8 7.5% 
  Mean of Financial Cateogory  8.5% 
Performance   
41 76 Key Performance Indicators 44 41.5% 
42 77 Compare targeted KPI and actual achievement  29 27.4% 
43 78 Custormer satisfaction  18 17.0% 
44 79 Staff satisfaction 5 4.7% 
45 80 No. of complaints received on FSB 17 16.0% 
46 81 No. of valid complaints resolved  15 14.2% 
47 87 Input - financial resource 84 79.2% 
48 88 Input - non-financial resources 85 80.2% 
49 89 Output 104 98.1% 
50 91 Efficiency 31 29.2% 
51 92 Effectiveness 84 79.2% 
52 93 Productivity 89 84.0% 
53 94 Compare between actual and target performance 65 61.3% 
54 95 Compare between current and previous year 85 80.2% 
  Mean of Performance Category  50.9% 
Others   
55 96 Statistics on staffing 87 82.1% 
56 97 Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention 52 49.1% 
57 98 Equal employment opportunity information 8 7.5% 
58 99 Statistics on training and development courses/ 
programmes for staff  
72 67.9% 
59 100 Achievements/impact of staff training and development 
activities (general/each) 
23 21.7% 
60 101 Staff recognition: awards/titles/rewards 46 43.4% 
61 102 Staff recognition: recipients of awards/titles/rewards  20 18.9% 
62 103 Internal / external social responsibility efforts/ activities 78 72.9% 
63 104 Financial information on Internal / external social resp 
activities 
50 46.7% 
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Table 5.16 (continued) 
64 105 Internal / external environmental protection 
efforts/activities 
29 27.4% 
65 106 Financial information on environmental issues (budget / 
cost) 
5 4.7% 
  Mean for Others Category   40.2% 
  OVERALL MEAN FOR RECOMMENDED ITEMS  36.01% 
 
5.5.3 Summary for Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Table 5.17 summarises Table 5.15 and Table 5.16. From this table, it appears that 
MFSB are more concerned with disclosing the mandated items than the voluntary items 
due to the higher percentage of disclosure for the MDI (64.78%) compared to that of the 
VDI (36%). This provides a huge opportunity for MFSB to further improve their 
disclosure practices so as to fulfil the information needs of their diverse stakeholders. 
From Table 5.17 we may also say that the MDI and VDI disclosure items contributed 
26.5 and 21.3 per cent respectively to the 47.8 per cent of overall extent of disclosure 
that was earlier found for all the items in the index as presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.17: Contribution by the MDI and VDI to the DI 
Type of Item No. of 
items 
(A) 
Percentage of 
disclosure 
(B) 
Contribution towards 
total disclosure 
(D=B*A/C) 
Percentage of 
contribution 
(F=D/E) 
Mandatory 45 64.78% 26.5% 55.4% 
Voluntary  65 36.01% 21.3% 44.6% 
All Items 110 (C)  47.8% (E) 100.0% 
 
 
Table 5.18 shows that in all three cases (i.e. whether the 110 items are put together as an 
index, or only the MDI or VDI items are included), the Performance and Overview 
category occupy either the first or the second place indicating their relatively high 
disclosure. At the same time, the Financial, Others and Governance categories occupy 
the last three places indicating less disclosure in these three categories. This finding is 
almost contradictory to prior studies such as that of Tooley & Guthrie (2007) in which 
the Financial category was found to be the most disclosed area of disclosure, followed 
by the Performance and the Overview category. The difference of results found between 
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this current study and Tooley & Guthrie‘s (2007) is partly due to the different indices 
used. A comparison between findings with the relevant prior literature should be 
undertaken with caution since the items within each category may differ from one study 
to the other as it largely depends on how the researcher looks at the individual item. 
 
Table 5.18: Ranks of Categories 
Category Rank for Full DI 
(Rank) 
Rank for Mandatory DI 
(Rank) 
Rank for Voluntary DI  
(Rank) 
Overview 2 1 2 
Governance 5 4 4 
Financial 3 3 5 
Performance 1 2 1 
Others 4 5 3 
 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter addressed RQ1, which is concerned with the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information. Overall, 106 (95.5%) annual reports were collected from 
MFSB. The mean score of the DI is 47.8 per cent indicating a moderate level of 
disclosure of accountability information. By category, the highest disclosure is found in 
the Performance category, followed by Overview, Financial, Others and finally 
Governance category, suggesting MFSB are more willing to share their performance 
information and less committed in exhibiting their governance issues. Disclosure levels 
of each category ranges from 19 per cent (Governance category) to 57.6 per cent 
(Performance category) with Governance and Others category scoring less than 50 per 
cent. By item type, the mandatory and voluntary DI shows a mean score of 64.8 and 36 
per cent respectively, suggesting that MFSB are more willing to disclose the mandated 
items than the voluntary items. The following chapter discusses the results for RQ2, 
which is concerned with the factors that influence the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXTENT OF 
DISCLOSURE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the extent of disclosure of accountability information 
(which answer RQ1). This chapter proceeds to discuss RQ2, i.e. ―Do type of MFSB, 
board size, board composition, existence of audit committee and fiscal stress have 
significant associations with the extent of disclosure of accountability information in the 
annual reports of MFSB?‖.  It begins with a discussion of the descriptive statistics of all 
independent and control variables in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 then presents the 
regression results, followed by the summary of the hypotheses results in Section 6.4. 
This is followed by a discussion of the results for additional regression analyses 
involving the sub-indexes in Section 6.5. Greater discussion on each variable tested in 
the hypotheses is provided in Section 6.6, followed by the regression results for the 
robustness check in Section 6.7. The chapter then concludes in Section 6.8. 
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the independent variables of the study 
which comprises of covariates and factors
55
. The next section discusses the descriptive 
statistics for the covariates of the study. 
 
6.2.1 Covariates 
There are three covariates in this thesis comprising of two independent variables (i.e. 
board size and fiscal stress) and one control variable (i.e. size of MFSB). The following 
is the descriptive statistics of the covariates (refer to Table 6.1). 
                                                 
55As explained earlier in Section 4.8.7.2, the term covariate and factors in this thesis refers to any continuous and categorical 
predictor variable in the model respectively, whether it‘s just a control variable or the important predictor in the research hypothesis 
(Grace-Martin, 2012b).  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates 
Descriptive Statistics BODSIZE FISCSTR Total Assets 
Mean  10.75 0.3249 RM9,083,826,660.04 
Minimum 5 -0.97 RM3,494,440.00 
Maximum 31 39.60 RM353,584,984,000.00 
Mode 8 n/a n/a 
Median 9.5 -0.1031 RM254,164,159.00 
Standard Deviation 4.410 3.8842 RM48,100,593,688.158 
 
a) Board Size (BODSIZE) 
Table 6.1 shows that the governance structure of the MFSB is characterized by a board 
of 10 to 11 directors on average, ranging from 5 to 31 with most MFSB (24.5%) having 
8 members sitting on their board (median 9.5). The average board size of MFSB is 
consistent with the Italian local authorities (11) and the Malaysian government-linked 
companies (GLC) (10) in studies by Calabrò & Torchia (2011) and Mohamad et al. 
(2012) respectively. However, if compared to listed firms in Malaysia (7.3) and 
Singapore (5.5), as well as in the UAE (7.7), as found by Mak & Kusnadi (2005) and 
Adawi & Rwegasira (2011) in their studies respectively, the average board size of 
MFSB is higher. However, there are other cases with a much higher number of board 
members including in the case of the US banking organisations (13), and US public (15) 
and private (39) educational institutions as found by Mohamed (2009) and Gordon et al. 
(2002). The range of MFSB BODSIZE (26) is also larger compared to that of Malaysian 
GLC (7; minimum 5; maximum: 12) and Malaysian listed firms (9; minimum 4; 
maximum 13) in studies by Mohamad et al. (2012) and Mak & Kusnadi (2005). One 
interesting issue noted in the results is the maximum board size of MFSB (31). This is 
indeed a very rare case in any organisation, although an almost similar observation has 
been made by Gordon et al. (2002) in their study on US educational institutions.  
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Referring to Table 6.2 below, there are a number of outliers in BODSIZE. As such, this 
variable has been accordingly transformed to address the outlier issue (refer to Section 
4.8.7.3). 
Table 6.2: Frequency of BODSIZE 
Board Size Frequency Per cent 
5 2 1.9% 
6 6 5.7% 
7 8 7.5% 
8 26 24.5% 
9 11 10.4% 
10 12 11.3% 
11 12 11.3% 
12 4 3.8% 
13 3 2.8% 
14 3 2.8% 
15 2 1.9% 
16 6 5.7% 
17 5 4.7% 
18 1 0.9% 
19 1 0.9% 
20 1 0.9% 
22 1 0.9% 
28 1 0.9% 
31 1 0.9% 
Total 106      100.0% 
 
b) Fiscal Stress (FISCSTR) 
Based on Table 6.1, the mean of FISCSTR is 32.49%, with the minimum and maximum 
values of -97% and 39.6% respectively
56
. A negative figure indicates fiscal viability 
while a positive figure indicates stress. This shows that on average, MFSB suffers 
deficits approximately at the amount of almost one-third of its revenue. The mean of 
MFSB FISCSTR (32.49%) is considered high compared to previous studies by Dwyer 
& Wilson (1989) on US municipal cities (-15.7%)
57
 and a follow-up study by Smith 
(2004) on US cities which found a lesser percentage of fiscal stress at -32.8 per cent, 
thus representing fiscal viability. According to Dwyer & Wilson (1989), the ratio of 
more  than 5 per cent is generally regarded as an indicator of potential fiscal stress. 
 
                                                 
56 Take note that as explained earlier in Section 4.8.5, the fiscal stress is measured by the ratio of the surplus/profit (or deficit/loss) 
to total revenue, multiply by -1. Thus, the way to interprete the figure is that the higher the value, the more stress. 
57 Dwyer & Wilson (1989) reported a fiscal viability of 15.7%.  Fiscal viability is in fact simply the opposite of fiscal stress. It is 
measured in a similar way  as fiscal stress is measured, except that the ratio is not multiplied by -1. Hence, this current study 
multiply Dwyer & Wilson (1989) result by -1 in order to obtain the fiscal stress.  
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c) MFSB Size (SIZEMF) 
The average size of MFSB is RM9.1 billion and it ranges from RM3.5 million to 
RM353 billion (refer to Table 6.1). 
The descriptive statistics of the factors in the study are presented in the next section. 
 
6.2.2 Factors 
There are three factors in the study, namely the type of MFSB (TYPEMF), the board 
composition (BODCOM) and the existence of an audit committee (AUDCOM). 
 
a) Type of MFSB (TYPEMF) 
Table 6.3 shows that most MFSB fall under the research and development or education 
category followed by the regulatory category. There are 13 MFSB which are classified 
under ‗others‘. These 13 MFSB are not classified into specific categories based on their 
nature of activity as there are only one MFSB in each category, hence it would not help 
in the analysis. As a result, all these 13 unique MFSB are lumped together into the 
‗others‘ category. An example is the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM) and the Totalisator Board of Malaysia. 
 
Table 6.3: Frequency of TYPEMF 
Types of MFSB Frequency Percentage 
Research & development, & Education 34 32.1% 
Regulatory 17 16.0% 
Banking,Finance, Fund, Investment 11 10.4% 
Area/regional development 10 9.4% 
Socio-economy 8 7.5% 
Transportation 7 6.6% 
Foundation/Scholarship 6 5.7% 
Others 13 12.3% 
Total 106 100% 
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b) Board Composition (BODCOM) 
The number of executive or internal directors in MFSB ranges from 0 to 4. This is 
consistent with the study by Calabrò & Torchia (2011) (0 to 6 members) on Italian local 
authorities. Most MFSB (71.7%) have only one internal member and a quarter (25.5%) 
of MFSB have no internal director on their board. This scenario partly echoes the 
CalPER
58
 guideline of the so-called ‗ideal‘ board where only the CEO should be the 
only employee who is a director (Bryant, 1997).  
 
Table 6.4: Frequency of BODCOM 
Board Composition  Frequency Percentage Percentage 
No internal director 27  25.5% 
At least 1 internal director    
- 1 internal director 76 71.7%  
- 2 internal directors 1 0.9%  
- 4 internal directors 2 1.9% 75.5% 
Total 106 100% 100% 
Mean Percentage of External Directors: 84.7% 
 
Furthermore, the percentage of external directors on average is 84.7 per cent. This 
resembles the case of Australian Commonwealth Statutory Authorities (CSA) where the 
nonexecutive director constitutes 91 per cent of the governing board of 25 CSAs as 
found by Bowrey (2008). However, compared to the common practice in the private 
sector, this can be considered to be high (e.g. Ho & Wong, 2001).  
 
c) Existence of Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
Table 6.5 shows that only an approximate quarter of the MFSB have audit committees 
in their organisation. This is almost similar to the findings by Ho & Wong (2001) on 
Hong Kong listed firms (23.5%) but is much lower than prior findings on companies in 
developing countries such as Kuwait (44%) (Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011), Kenya 
(52%) (Barako et al., 2006) and Jordan (70%) (Al-Akra et al., 2010). 
 
                                                 
58
 CalPER refers to California Public Employees' Retirement System. 
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Table 6.5: Frequency of AUDCOM 
Existence of Audit Committee  Frequency Percentage 
Audit Committee Do Not Exists 79 74.5% 
Audit Committee Exists 27 25.5% 
Total 106 100% 
 
 
From the three frequency tables above (Table 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5), the thesis is able to 
choose the reference category for the regression model. Statisticians (e.g. Field, 2009) 
have recommended that the reference category for factors is the one with the highest 
observation because using a residual category or a category with few cases undermines  
the interpretation of the data
59
.  
 
 
6.3 Regression on Disclosure Index 
The multiple regression results are presented in this section. The thesis runs three 
regression analysis using three different disclosure indexes as found in the previous 
chapter as their dependent variable, namely the (i) Disclosure Index (or DI)- This refers 
to the complete disclosure index which include all the 110 items, (ii) Mandatory 
Disclosure Index (or MDI) – This disclosure index includes only the 45 items required 
to be disclosed by TC4/2007) (refer to Section 6.5.1), and (iii) Voluntary Disclosure 
Index (or VDI) which includes the remaining 65 items which are not required by 
TC4/2007 (refer to Section 6.5.2).  
 
  
                                                 
59 By default, SPSS will take the category which is last alphabetically as reference category (Grace-Martin, 2009). So the thesis 
recode the variable so that that the category with highest cases comes last alphabetically. 
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6.3.1 Identifying the Model  
Table 6.6 presents the results obtained from the regression analysis for the DI. 
 
Table 6.6: Summary of Regression Results (DI) 
  Dependent Variable: Disclosure Index 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP 4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .003* .001* .001* .000* 
H2 BODCOM .184  .100  .085 .041** 
H3 logBODSIZE .285  .250
a
     
H4 AUDCOM .001* .002* .001* .002* 
H5 invFISCSTR .135  .070 .105
a
   
 logSIZEMF .438
a
     
 Adjusted R2 .419 .421 .419 .409 
a. Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
*Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
From the table above, step 1 shows that only two variables (TYPEMF and AUDCOM) 
are significant predictors of DI (p<0.001). The remaining variables and the control 
variable are not significant. As mentioned earlier in Section 4.8.7.2, since there is no 
stepwise analysis in GLM, the insignificant variables will be dropped manually.   
 
Following this, step 2 involves the dropping of the most insignificant variable, 
logSIZEMF (p-value=0.438). This has improved the adjusted R2 by 0.002 (0.421-0.419) 
but there were no additional variables that become significant. MFTYPE and 
AUDCOM remain significant variables while other variables remain insignificant.  
 
Step 3 drops logBODSIZE due to it having the highest p-value (0.250) compared with 
other variables. Results show that the adjusted R2 returned to the original adjusted R
2 
as 
found in STEP 1 (0.419). Additionally, results on variables which are significant and 
insignificant remain as they were in step 1 and 2. 
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Step 4 is undertaken to further remove the insignificant variable, namely the 
invFISCSTR (p=0.105). Upon doing this, BODCOM, which was previously 
insignificant, has now become significant (p<0.05). TYPEMF and AUDCOM remain 
significant (p<0.001). The R
2
 however is reduced slighly to 0.409. Step 4 regression 
confirms the key predictors for the extent of disclosure of accountability information for 
the annual reports of MFSB using the disclosure index method, these being the 
TYPEMF, BODCOM and AUDCOM, hence, the process of removing variables ends 
here.  
 
6.3.2 Discussion on the Final Model 
a) Strength of Effect of the Final Model 
Table 6.7 shows the F test for the corrected model (step 4). It is shown to be significant 
at the <0.001 level. The strength of the model is moderate at partial eta
2  
of 0.460 and R
2 
also 0.460. As discussed earlier, when partial eta
2 
and R
2 
show similar results, the model 
is linear. This confirms the earlier test on linearity assumption (refer to Section 4.8.7.3). 
The proportion of explained variance as measured by the adjusted R
2
 for the regression 
equation is 0.409. In other words, 40.9% of the variation in disclosure level is explained 
by these three predictors (TYPEMF, BODCOM and AUDCOM). This is consistent with 
the study by Gore (2004) who found an adjusted R
2
 of 36% for financial disclosure in 
the financial reports of the US local government. 
 
Compared to most public sector disclosure studies
60
, the adjusted R
2
 appears to be 
higher. This include studies by Arifin et al. (2012a) (24.9%), Laswad et al. (2005) (21.4 
- 23.6%), Smith (2004) (7 – 19%), Giroux & McLelland (2003) (7.9%), Gordon et al. 
(2002) (7.8%) and Gordon & Fischer (2008) (6.8%). Caba Perez et al. (2008) who 
                                                 
60 Comparisons of the adjusted R2 can only be made in relation to public sector disclosure studies in different settings and aspects of 
disclosure given that there is no directly comparable study which focus on MFSB and/or accountability disclosure which uses 
regression. 
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studied internet financial reporting and found that they do not report any adjusted R
2
 
possibly due to the very low value found. The present study‘s adjusted R2 is however, 
lower than two other studies namely Joseph & Taplin (2011) (48% for disclosure 
abundance and 56% for disclosure occurrence) and Yang (2008) (48%) which focuses 
on sustainability and performance reporting respectively. However, none of these 
studies is directly comparable to the present study due to different contexts and aspects 
of disclosure and as such comparison should be approached cautiously. 
 
Table 6.7: Strength of Effect (DI) 
               Dependent Variable: Disclosure Index 
Source       F  Sig. Partial Eta
2
  
Corrected Model 9.068 .000* .460 
Intercept 2927.700 .000* .968 
TYPEMF 4.609 .000* .252 
BODCOM 4.282 .041** .043 
AUDCOM 10.488 .002* .098 
R
2
   .460 
Adjusted R
2 
  .409 
*Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
TYPEMF and AUDCOM are highly significant factors for a disclosure level with a p-
value of 0.0001 and 0.002 respectively. TYPEMF is able to explain 25.2% of the 
variance in DI. BODCOM on the other hand is moderately significant (p-value= 0.041) 
and accounts for small variance (4.3%) in DI. The variable AUDCOM is significant (p-
value=0.002) and small variance (9.8%) in DI can be explained by this variable. The 
other two variables discussed earlier in the thesis hypothesis (logBODSIZE, 
invFISCSTR) did not help explain the disclosure level. The control variable, i.e. 
logSIZEMF as measured by the log of total assets is also not significant.  
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b) Parameter Estimates of the Final Model 
Table 6.8 shows the parameter estimates (equivalent to unstandardized coefficient in 
regression command output) of the significant factors.  
 
Table 6.8: Parameter Estimates (DI) 
    Dependent Variable: Disclosure Index 
Parameter Levels Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Sig. Partial 
Eta
2
 
Intercept  51.679 1.732 .000* .903 
[TYPEMF=1] Transportation -4.383 2.705 .108 .027 
[TYPEMF=2] Area/regional development 4.455 2.376 .064 .035 
[TYPEMF=3] Banking and Finance 8.217 2.454 .001* .105 
[TYPEMF=4] Regulatory -.549 1.919 .776 .001 
[TYPEMF=5] Foundation and Scholarship -6.235 2.971 .038** .044 
[TYPEMF=6] Socio-economy 7.193 2.542 .006* .077 
[TYPEMF=7] Others -1.175 2.184 .592 .003 
[TYPEMF=8] Education, Research & Development 0
a
 . . . 
[BOD=0] Do not have internal director in board -3.325 1.607 .041** .043 
[BOD=1] Have at least 1 internal director in board 0
a
 . . . 
[AUDCOM=0] Do not have audit committee -5.349 1.652 .002* .098 
[AUDCOM=1] Have audit committee 0
a
    
    a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
     *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
Before proceeding, note that when discussing the levels or categories of a factor, 
estimates are relative to the omitted (or reference) category. In this thesis, the reference 
category for TYPEMF is education, research and the development group. It is chosen 
mainly because it has the largest number of cases consistent with the suggestion of Field 
(2009). When there are only two levels, as in the case of BODCOM and AUDCOM, it 
does not really matter which level becomes the reference category as interpretation is 
already much simpler. 
 
Results from Table 6.8 show that not all types of MFSB (TYPEMF) are significantly 
different from each other in relation to their mean DI. But given that TYPEMF is a 
significant predictor of DI as found earlier, it means there is at least one pair of this 
factor which has significant difference in their mean DI. Three pairs of types of MFSB 
showed a significant difference between each other. In particular, the mean of DI of 
MFSB under the education, research and development type is significantly lower than 
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the mean of MFSB which are under the: (i) banking and finance (by 8.217 unit at 
p<0.001), and (ii) socio-economy (by 7.193 unit at p<0.001) category. However, the 
mean DI of MFSB under the education, research and development category is 
significantly higher (at p<0.05) than that of those under the foundation and scholarhip 
category by 6.235 unit.  
 
Results on board composition show that the mean DI for MFSB with no internal 
director is significantly lower (p<0.05) by 3.325 units compared to those with at least 
one internal director on its board (refer to Table 6.8). Similarly, the results also indicate 
that MFSB with and without audit committees differ significantly (p<0.01) in their DI. 
The DI is lesser by 5.349 for MFSB which have no audit committees than those with 
audit committees.  
 
Additionally, although found to be insignificant, the coefficient of covariates is 
presented in Table 6.9 to obtain some understanding on the direction of their 
relationship with DI. It shows that there is a negative relationship between 
logBODSIZE and DI, which is similar with the hypothesized direction. InvFISCTR and 
logSIZEMF are also found to be in the hypothesized direction, that is in a positive 
relationship with DI.  
 
Table 6.9: Coeffiecients of Insignificant Variables (DI) 
 Dependent Variable: Disclosure Index 
Covariates Pred.Sign STEP 1  STEP 2  STEP 3 
  B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
logBODSIZE - -4.814 .285  -5.148 .250    
invFISCTR + 9.430 .135  10.916 .070  9.572 .105 
logSIZEMF + .634 .438       
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c) Pairwise Comparisons of the Final Model 
Pairwise comparison is similar to the post-hoc test in the common regression procedure. 
From Table 6.10 we can see that there are eleven pairs of MFSB types that significantly 
differ from each other in their mean disclosure index. In total – including those in Table 
6.8) - there are fourteen pairs of MFSB types (out of 28 possible pairs) that are 
significantly different.  
 
Table 6.10: Mean Difference between Different Types of MFSB  
        Dependent Variable: Disclosure Index 
(I) TYPEMF (J) TYPEMF Mean Difference 
 (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig.
a
 
TRANSPORTATION Area/regional development -8.837
*
 3.308 .009* 
Banking, Finance -12.599
*
 3.421 .000* 
Regulatory -3.834 2.914 .191 
Foundation/Scholarship 1.852 3.733 .621 
Socio-economy -11.576
*
 3.390 .001* 
Others -3.207 3.138 .309 
AREA/REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Banking, Finance -3.762 2.956 .206 
Regulatory 5.003 2.661 .063 
Foundation/Scholarship 10.690
*
 3.366 .002* 
Socio-economy -2.738 3.110 .381 
Others 5.630
*
 2.729 .042** 
 BANKING, 
FINANCE, FUND, 
INVESTMENT 
Regulatory 8.765
*
 2.692 .002* 
Foundation/Scholarship 14.452
*
 3.582 .000* 
Socio-economy 1.024 3.085 .741 
Others 9.392
*
 2.931 .002* 
REGULATORY Foundation/Scholarship 5.686 3.225 .081 
Socio-economy -7.742
*
 2.768 .006* 
Others .627 2.502 .803 
FOUNDATION/ 
SCHOLARSHIP 
Socio-economy -13.428
*
 3.629 .000* 
Others -5.060 3.181 .115 
SOCIO-ECONOMY Others 8.368
*
 3.002 .006* 
          *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
 
6.4 Hypotheses Results 
Hypotheses were supported if regression p-values were less than 0.05. From Table 6.11, 
two hypotheses (H1 and H3) are supported and three hypotheses (H2, H4 and H5) are 
not supported.  
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Table 6.11: Hypotheses Results 
 Variables Description Hypothesis supported/  
not supported 
H1 TYPEMF There is an association between the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information and the type of 
Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies. 
Supported  
(p-value < 0.001) 
H2 BODSIZE There is a negative relationship between the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information in the annual 
reports of MFSB and the board size. 
Not supported  
(not significant) 
H3 BODCOM There is a positive association between the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information in the annual 
reports of MFSB and the existence of an internal 
member on the board. 
Supported 
(p-value < 0.05) 
H4 AUDCOM There is a negative association between the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information in the annual 
reports of MFSB and the existence of an audit 
committee. 
Not Supported  
(significant but 
positive) 
H5 FISCSTR There is a positive relationship between the extent of 
disclosure of accountability information in the annual 
reports of MFSB and the fiscal stress. 
Not supported  
(not significant) 
 
Before providing further discussion on each hypothesis (in Section 6.6), an additional 
analysis involving regression on sub-indexes, namely the MDI and VDI is provided. 
 
6.5 Regression on Sub-indices  
Additional analyses were conducted on all variables and tested against (i) the mandatory 
disclosure index (MDI) and (ii) the voluntary disclosure index (VDI). Prior to 
conducting the regression analysis on the MDI and VDI, the normality check was 
carried out. From the Q-Q plot, it is apparent that both indexes are normally distributed 
(refer to Figure 6.1, Appendix 6_1) hence regression can be conducted. The regression 
results for MDI is discussed below. 
 
6.5.1 Regression on Mandatory Disclosure Index (MDI) 
The first run of regression resulted in two significant variables (TYPEMF and 
AUDCOM) (refer to Table 6.12). The process of removing insignificant variables is 
repeated until all variables in the model are significant, resulting in the three variables 
becoming key predictors in determining the MDI. The key predictors are TYPEMF, 
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AUDCOM and invFISCSTR. With the exception of TYPEMF and AUDCOM, this 
result is quite different from what has been found in the case of DI. 
 
Table 6.12: Summary of Regression Results (MDI) 
            Dependent Variable: Mandatory Disclosure Index  
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP 4 
   Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .010* .009* .009* .001* 
H2 BODCOM .501  .502
a
    
H3 logBODSIZE .876
a
     
H4 AUDCOM .006 * .006* .005* .006* 
H5 invFISCSTR .101 .085 .074 .024** 
 logSIZEMF .419  .423 .287
a
   
 Adjusted R
2 
0.342 .348 .352 .351 
    a. Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
    *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
 
The model shows TYPEMF, AUDCOM and invFISCSTR significantly predicts MDI, F 
value of 7.316 (p<0.001) (refer to Table 6.13). The three key predictors (TYPEMF, 
AUDCOM and invFISCSTR) are based on the adjusted R
2
 account for 35.1% of the 
proportion of variance in MDI. This is higher than the adjusted R
2
 found by Arifin et al. 
(2012b) (20.9%) in the context of mandatory financial disclosure in Indonesian local 
governments. Most variance in MDI (21.3%) is explained by TYPEMF, while 
AUDCOM and invFISCSTR both explain small amounts of variance in MDI at 7.5% 
and 5.2% respectively.  
 
Table 6.13: Strength of Effect (MDI) 
             Dependent Variable: Mandatory Disclosure Index  
Source     F   Sig. Partial Eta
2
  
Corrected Model 7.316 .000* .407 
Intercept 175.539 .000* .646 
TYPEMF 3.722  .001* .213 
AUDCOM 7.759  .006* .075 
invFISCSTR 5.263    .024** .052 
R
2
   .407 
Adjusted R
2 
  .351 
           *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
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Two types of MFSB (banking and finance, and socio-economy) are significantly higher 
in their mean DI than the MFSB in the education, research and development category 
by 11.725 (p<0.001) and 12.223 (p<0.001) unit respectively (refer to Table 6.14). 
Additionally, MFSB that have audit committees have significantly higher (p<0.01) 
mean DI than those that do not have audit committees. Regarding invFISCSTR, the 
results show that with every unit increase in invFISCSTR, there will be a 17.936 unit 
increase in the MDI.  
 
Table 6.14: Parameter Estimates (MDI) 
        Dependent Variable: Mandatory Disclosure Index 
Parameter Levels Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Sig. Partial 
Eta
2
 
Intercept  56.069 4.705 .000* .597 
[TYPEMF=1] Transportation 6.634 3.634 .071 .034 
[TYPEMF=2] Area/regional development 5.063 3.142 .110 .026 
[TYPEMF=3] Banking and Finance 11.725 3.388 .001* .111 
[TYPEMF=4] Regulatory 4.681 2.579 .073 .033 
[TYPEMF=5] Foundation and Scholarship -3.808 3.883 .329 .010 
[TYPEMF=6] Socio-economy 12.223 3.432 .001* .117 
[TYPEMF=7] Others .695 2.846 .808 .001 
[TYPEMF=8] Education, Research & Development 0
a
 . . . 
[AUDCOM=0] Do not have audit committee -6.212 2.230 .006* .075 
[AUDCOM=1] Have audit committee 
a
 . . . 
invFISCSTR  17.936 7.818 .024** .052 
       a.This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
       *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
Additionally, the coefficients of the insignificant variables are show in Table 6.15. It 
was found that all the insignificant variables for MDI (logBODSIZE, BODCOM and 
logSIZEMF) act in the similar direction as expected for DI. 
  
Table 6.15: Coefficients of Insignificant Variables (MDI) 
       Dependent Variable: Mandatory Disclosure Index  
Covariates Pred.Sign STEP 1  STEP 2  STEP 3 
  B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
logBODSIZE - .964 .876       
[BODCOM=0] + 
(0<1) 
-1.584 .501  -1.571 .502    
[BODCOM=1] 0
a. 
  0
a. 
    
logSIZEMF + .906 .419  .889 .423  1.121 .287 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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The next section discusses the regression results for the Voluntary Disclosure Index. 
 
6.5.2 Regression on Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI) 
The initial run of the regression model resulted in two significant variables for 
predicting the Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI) (refer to Table 6.16). Upon removing 
the insignificant variables one at a time, three key predictors were found to influence 
VDI, namely TYPEMF (p<0.001), BODCOM (p<0.05) and AUDCOM (p<0.01). This 
result is similar to that found in the earlier model predicting DI. 
 
Table 6.16: Summary of Regression Results (VDI) 
           Dependent Variable: Voluntary Disclosure Index  
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2 STEP3 STEP4 
Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .000* .000* .000* .000* 
H2 BODCOM .135 .082*** .047** .043** 
H3 logBODSIZE .070 .061*** .091
a 
 
H4 AUDCOM .008* .008* .008* .008* 
H5 invFISCSTR .366 .265
a 
  
 logSIZEMF .612
a 
   
 Adjusted R
2 
.385 .390 .388 .376 
             a. Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
             *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
The model of TYPEMF, BODCOM and AUDCOM significantly predicts VDI, F (10) = 
7.663, p<0.001 (refer to Table 6.17). The model predicts 37.6% of the variance in VDI 
and is consistent with the adjusted R
2
 as found by Serrano-Cinca et al. (2009) (32.8%) 
on voluntary internet financial reporting. The variable TYPEMF explains the highest 
proportion (27.3%). This is then followed by AUDCOM and BODCOM at 7.2% and 
4.2% respectively. 
Table 6.17: Strength of Effect (VDI) 
   Dependent Variable: Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Source    F  Sig. Partial Eta2  
Corrected Model 8.030 .000* .429 
Intercept 1379.064 .000* .935 
TYPEMF  .000* .273 
BODCOM  .043** .042 
AUDCOM  .008* .072 
R
2 
  .429 
Adjusted R
2 
  .376 
                 *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
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Two types of MFSB are significantly lower in their mean VDI than the education, 
research and development group (refer to Table 6.18). MFSB categorized under 
transportation and foundation and scholarship is lower by 12.095 (p<0.001) and 8.466 
units (p<0.01) in their mean VDI than those in the education, research and development 
group. Additionally, MFSB having at least one internal director in the board and MFSB 
having audit committee in their organisation is significantly higher in their mean VDI 
than those without a director and without an audit committee by 3.445 (p<0.05) and 
4.738 units (p<0.01) respectively.  
 
 
Table 6.18: Parameter Estimates (VDI) 
          Dependent Variable: Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Parameter Levels Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Sig. Partial 
Eta
2
 
Intercept  41.801 1.860 .000* .840 
[TYPEMF=1] Transportation -11.464 2.905 .000* .140 
[TYPEMF=2] Area/regional development 2.898 2.552 .259 .013 
[TYPEMF=3] Banking and Finance 4.381 2.636 .100 .028 
[TYPEMF=4] Regulatory -3.953 2.061 .058 .037 
[TYPEMF=5] Foundation and Scholarship -8.444 3.190 .010* .068 
[TYPEMF=6] Socio-economy 3.784 2.730 .169 .020 
[TYPEMF=7] Others -3.353 2.346 .156 .021 
[TYPEMF=8] Education, Research & Development 0
a
 . . . 
[BOD=0] Do not have internal director in board -3.541 1.726 .043** .042 
[BOD=1] Have at least 1 internal director in board 0
a
 . . . 
[AUDCOM=0] Do not have audit committee -4.843 1.774 .008* .072 
[AUDCOM=1] Have audit committee 0
b
 . . . 
          a.This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
          *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
 
Table 6.19 shows the coefficients of the insignificant variables in explaining VDI 
(logBODSIZE, invFISCTR and logSIZEMF) act in the similar direction as expected for 
DI. 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
Table 6.19: Coeffiecients of Insignificant Variables (VDI) 
       Dependent Variable: Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Covariates Pred.Sign STEP 1  STEP 2  STEP 3 
  B Sig.  B Sig.  B Sig. 
logBODSIZE - -8.815 .070  -9.049 .061  -8.006 .091 
invFISCSTR + 6.108 .366  7.152 .265    
logSIZEMF + .445 .612       
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
6.6 Discussion on Variables 
Out of the five variables tested, two (TYPEMF and AUDCOM) remain as key 
predictors in all three models (DI, MDI and VDI) (refer to Table 6.20) whereas 
BODCOM is useful to predict DI and VDI. The variable invFISCSTR, on the other 
hand is useful to predict MDI only. The variable logSIZEMF is not helpful in 
explaining any of the models. The next section provides further discussion on each of 
these variables in relation to the hypotheses and the results found. 
 
Table 6.20: Summary of Key Predictors in Regression Model 
Variables 
DI MDI VDI 
 Sig. Partial 
Eta
2 
 Sig. Partial 
Eta
2 
 Sig. Partial 
Eta
2 
TYPEMF .000* .252 .001* .213 .000* .273 
BODCOM .041** .043   .043** .042 
logBODSIZE       
AUDCOM .002* .098 .006* .075 .008* .072 
invFISCSTR   .024** .052   
logSIZEMF       
                      *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
6.6.1 Type of MFSB 
The type of MFSB is found to be the main determinant for the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual report of MFSB (refer to Section 6.3.1). 
Fourteen out of 28 possible pairs of the eight types of MFSB are found to be 
significantly different from each other (refer to Section 6.3.2). Therefore, H1 is 
supported (refer to Section 6.4). It should be noted also that the type of MFSB is also a 
significant predictor in determining the extent of disclosure for both the mandatory and 
voluntary items (refer to Section 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 respectively). 
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This results is consistent with results found in the context of local authorities. Such 
studies categorised local authorities in several ways including: (i) the types of activities 
performed (categorised into province or municipalities) (e.g. Marcuccio & Steccolini, 
2009) - which is the most directly related to the present study, (ii) administrative 
structure (categorised into mayor versus manager-governed) (e.g. Giroux, 1989; Ingram 
& DeJong, 1987; Robbins & Austin, 1986), and (iii) voters‘ impact (categorised into 
district versus regional/city categories) (e.g. Laswad et al., 2005). It is however not 
consistent with a study by Joseph (2010b) who found the type of Malaysian local 
authorities (district-municipal-city councils) is not a significant predictor of 
sustainability reporting on the website. It needs to be cautioned however that the above 
findings by other studies are not directly comparable to the current study‘s findings due 
to the different settings, disclosure aspect and disclosure medium being studied, among 
others. 
 
The results found in this study suggest the usefulness of institutional theory particularly 
the normative isomorphism in explaining the level of disclosure. As explained earlier 
(refer to Section 4.6.1), based on the normative isomorphism, disclosure level is 
associated with the types of MFSB as MFSB of similar types tend to imitate others 
within their category particularly those perceived as having superior model of reporting. 
Similar expression was made by interviewee during the interview in Phase 2 (refer to 
Section 7.3.4.3). The homogeneity within similar type of MFSB is also possible as a 
result of undergoing relatively similar professional trainings and activities due to their 
similar nature of business.  
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6.6.2 Board Size 
As discussed in Section 4.6.2, it is expected that board size will have a negative 
relationship with the extent of disclosure of accountability information. However, the 
findings shows that the board size has no relationship with the disclosure level (refer to 
Section 6.3.1). There is a weak negative relationship between board size and the extent 
of disclosure as the results show a negative and insignificant coefficient. Hence, there is 
insufficient evidence to support that MFSB with less members on the governing board 
disclose more information than MFSB with more members. H2 is thus not supported 
(refer to Section 6.4). Additionally, board size is not a significant predictor of 
mandatory as well as voluntary disclosure index scores (refer to Section 6.5.1 and 
6.5.2). 
 
These findings are consistent with that of Gordon et al. (2002) who found no significant 
negative relationship between board size and financial disclosure in the context of US 
higher educational institutions. One possible explanation for the findings of this study is 
that a few board member(s) in any particular MFSB who are relatively influential could 
substantially change disclosure expectations as explained by Gordon et al. (2002), 
resulting in the board size becoming an insignificant variable in this study. These 
findings are supported by the interview in Phase 2. MFSB has pointed out that board‘s 
commitment to transparency and board members representing industry are among the 
reasons for disclosure of accountability information (refer to Section 7.3.5.3). This 
implies that it is not the number of members on the governing board that matters but 
rather their commitment and whether they comprise of industry members.  
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Most private sector studies found board size to be a predictor of disclosure, whether 
positively (e.g. Adawi & Rwegasira, 2011; Al-Akra et al., 2010) or negatively (e.g. 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007) related. The difference in the findings in this study and 
those found in private sector studies could be partly due to the different nature of the 
governing board in the two contexts, as explained by interviewees in Phase 2 (refer to 
Section 7.4.2.5). 
 
Overall, the results suggest that the coercive and mimetic isomorphism may not be 
suitable to predict the relationship between board size and disclosure level. The findings 
do not appear to support the argument based on the informal coercive isomorphism and 
mimetic isomorphism (refer to Section 4.6.2) that MFSB with greater board size are less 
likely to provide more accountability information because they have greater tendency to 
feel contented with their adoption of the formal governance structure from the private 
sector. There appears to be no significant difference of disclosure level between MFSB 
of greater and smaller board size.   
 
6.6.3 Board Composition  
Board composition was a significant variable influencing the extent of disclosure (refer 
to Section 6.3.1). Specifically, the results show that MFSB with a board composed of 
both internal and external directors will show greater levels of disclosure compared to 
MFSB with boards comprising of only external directors. Therefore, H3 is supported 
(refer to Section 6.4). This result is consistent with those found by Adawi & Rwegasira 
(2011). 
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The influence of internal directors on increasing disclosure levels is also supported by 
the interview findings from Phase 2 of the study (refer to Section 7.3.5.2) where it was 
expressed that top management, particularly the Chief Executives, play important roles 
in shaping the reporting outcome including the reporting of accountability information. 
Top management act as the only internal director on the governing board in more than 
two-thirds of MFSB (refer to Table 6.4 of Section 6.2.2). 
 
The results appear to support the usefulness of institutional theory in predicting and 
explaining the association between board composition and disclosure level, particularly 
using the coercive isomorphism concept as discussed earlier in Section 4.6.3. Based on 
coercive isomorphism, MFSB with at least one internal director on the board show 
higher levels of disclosure than those without an internal board member as the internal 
director is more likely to feel obliged and persuaded to respond to any formal or 
informal pressures and expectations to obtain legitimacy as they are more likely to be 
subjected to greater responsibility and scrutiny.  
 
A close examination of the findings suggests that the board composition is also a 
significant predictor in determining the extent of disclosure for the voluntary index but 
not the mandatory index (refer to Section 6.5.2 and 6.5.1 respectively). A possible 
reason for this is that the internal director is more concerned with the pressures by 
stakeholders (the informal coercive isomorphism), and are less concerned with 
complying with external guidelines (the formal coercive isomorphism). This suggests 
that the informal coercive isomorphism is a suitable concept to explain the relationship 
between board composition and voluntary disclosure (refer to Section 4.6.3). At the 
same time, this is also consistent with the public accountability paradigm where internal 
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directors address the stakeholders‘ concern by reporting more accountability 
information. 
 
6.6.4 The Existence of an Audit Committee 
The existence of an audit commmittee was the second most significant predictor of 
disclosure in this thesis, after the type of MFSB (refer to Section 6.3.1). However, the 
coefficient shows a positive relationship between the existence of audit committees and 
disclosure level whereas the expectation was otherwise, i.e. negative relationship, as 
discussed in Section 4.6.4. As such, H4 which argues that the existence of audit 
committee is significantly associated to lesser extents of disclosure is not supported 
(refer to Section 6.4). Additionally, for both mandatory and voluntary disclosure, 
similar results were found (i.e. significant positive relationship) (refer to Section 6.5.1 
and 6.5.2). 
 
This finding is consistent with what has been largely found in the private sector setting 
(e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Ho & Wong, 2001). The consistent result suggests that the 
audit committee in MFSB play the same role as their counterparts in the private sector 
particularly in overseeing the organisation‘s reporting (Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010) 
resulting in enhanced disclosure levels. The significance of the role of an MFSB audit 
committee in setting the direction for the accountability reporting is also supported by 
the interview findings in Phase 2 of the study where the preparer would implement what 
has been decided by the audit committee in their meeting with regards to accountability 
reporting (refer to Section 7.3.5.3). 
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The result is however not consistent with the concept of coercive and mimetic 
isomorphism which was elaborated earlier (refer to Section 4.6.4), and as such the 
association between the existence of audit committee and disclosure level in MFSB may 
not be explained using the institutional theory. This suggests that the establishment of 
an audit committee in MFSB may not be merely due to the legitimacy-seeking 
behaviour nor simply to gain a positive image value as argued earlier using the 
institutional theory. Rather, the audit committee in MFSB plays an important role 
similar to their counterpart in the private sector given that the results found are 
consistent with those found in the private sector. This finding is quite encouraging and 
may be a reason for regulators to encourage or instruct the establishment of an audit 
committee for all MFSB and other public sector organisations (refer to Chapter 8). 
 
6.6.5 Fiscal Stress 
Fiscal stress was an insignificant variable in explaining the extent of disclosure (refer to 
Section 6.3.1). There appears to be a weak positive relationship between fiscal stress 
and extent of disclosure, and as such H5 is not supported (refer to Section 6.4). This 
result is consistent with that found by Smith (2004) and Perez et al. (2008). A possible 
explanation for the weak relationship is that fiscal stress can act both ways (positive and 
negative) in its relationship with disclosure, as suggested by Smith (2001). 
 
A negative relationship may be observed in the following cases. When MFSB face 
resource scarcity, they are able to conduct only a limited number of existing or new 
programs. Reporting of accountability information may be one of the programs which 
need to be sacrificed in this case; the more fiscal stress it has (more scarce resources), 
the less disclosure is practiced. This situation wherein budget constraints is one of the 
contributing factors towards less disclosure is found to exist in MFSB as expressed by 
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interviewees in Phase 2 of the study (refer to Section 7.4.5.1). This argument is referred 
to by Smith (2001) as an incremental view adopted from the incremental budgeting 
literature. The second case of negative relationship is adopted from the reporting 
timeliness literature (e.g. Dwyer & Wilson, 1989), which argued that an organisation 
with less fiscal stress (good news) report sooner than those with more stress (bad news). 
This argument may be transfered to the level of disclosure hence the less stress, the 
more disclosure is practiced.  
 
On the other hand, a positive relationship may also occur between fiscal stress and 
disclosure level as earlier discussed in Section 4.6.5 using the institutional theory. An 
additional explanation is that when reporting is seen as an innovation tool which may 
enhance efficiency, MFSB with more stress will be more likely to report more to assist 
them in enhancing their efficiency (Smith, 2001). Another alternative explanation of the 
positive relationship is that MFSB with higher stress levels are more desperate to get 
additional resources from the government or other stakeholders and are therefore more 
likely to portray themselves as capable of handling the existing resources efficiently and 
effectively. This explains higher disclosure levels in higher stress MFSB. Based on the 
interview in Phase 2, the need for further funding was stated as one reason for 
disclosure but this expression was made by one MFSB that has no fiscal stress (refer to 
Section 7.3.2.2). This perhaps explains why there is no significant relationship between 
fiscal stress and disclosure level as found in this study. 
 
It should be noted that a significant positive relationship was found between fiscal stress 
and the mandatory disclosure index. As such, we may say that the positive relationship 
discussed above and those based on the concept of coercive isomorphism under the 
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institutional theory appear to be more obvious in the case when accountability 
information items are mandated on MFSB (refer to Section 4.6.5). 
 
6.6.6 The Size of MFSB  
Surprisingly the size of MFSB does not help in explaining the extent of disclosure. 
There is a weak positive relationship between the size of MFSB and disclosure level. 
This results is quite unexpected as most studies on disclosure in both the public (e.g. 
Tagesson et al., 2011; Taylor & Rosair, 2000) or private sector (e.g. Petty & Cuganesan, 
2005) commonly found size as being a significant predictor. Nevertheless, the findings 
found in this present study is consistent with findings by Allen & Sanders (1994), Dixon 
et al. (1991), Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009) and Laswad et al. (2005). A possible 
explanation for the surprising results is offered by Christiaens (1999) whereby he stated 
that the concept of size covers at the same time two diverging factors; one is the 
positive and the other is negative (see Christiaens, 1999, for more details) and hence 
may work both ways (i.e. positive and negative relationship with disclosure level). 
 
6.7 Robustness Check or Sensitivity Analysis 
Several additional tests were undertaken to check on the robustness of the findings of 
the study. The test is conducted either by using alternative proxies for the independent 
and control variables or by removing the outliers identified in the initial results. Table 
6.21 below lists the tests conducted for the robustness check. 
 
Table 6.21: List of Robustness Check 
Variable Approach to Robustness Check 
BODSIZE remove outliers  
FISCSTR use different constant  
FISCSTR measure categorically; deficit (0)/surplus (1) 
SIZEMF measure using the log10 of total revenue 
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The first robustness check, which is consistent with Mohamed (2009), involves 
rerunning the regression while excluding five observations which was identified in the 
BODSIZE boxplots as outliers (refer to Figure 4.5(b), Appendix 4_4). This involves 
observations with 19, 20, 22, 28, and 31 board members. The results for both the 
specific variable (BODSIZE) and the overall model remained unchanged where 
BODSIZE remain as insignificant variable and the key predictors remain TYPEMF, 
BODCOM and AUDCOM (refer Table 6.22, Appendix 6_2). 
 
The robustness check also involves recomputing invFISCSTR with different constants, 
namely 1.98, 2.0, 2.2 and 2.4. This approach to sensitivity analysis is suggested by 
Garson (2012b) to note the effects which might change conclusions due to arbitrarily 
choosing a constant to be added to a variable prior to transformation. When the constant 
added is 1.98 and 2.0, the results show similar findings as were found earlier where only 
three variables are significant while invFISCSTR is not significant in determining DI 
(refer Table 6.23 and 6.24, Appendix 6_2). However, when the constant 2.2 and 2.4 are 
used, the invFISCSTR become significant at p-value of 0.41 and 0.35 respectively (refer 
Table 6.25 and 6.26, Appendix 6_2), and the variable BODCOM is no longer 
significant. This implies that the higher the constant chosen, the more significant the 
variable will become, suggesting that researchers should carefully choose the constant 
based on some theoretical reason as this may easily affect the significance level of the 
transformed variable. In this thesis, it is argued that choosing 1.97 as the constant (as in 
the original model) is justified theoretically, that is to remove zeros and negatives from 
dataset because log of zero is undefined and to make the smallest value of fiscal stress 
reach at least a value of 1 as emphasized by Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) and Field 
(2009). 
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Due to the sensitivity of invFISCSTR in measuring the fiscal stress of MFSB, the thesis 
checks the robustness of the variable using a categorical measure that is based on 
whether an MFSB is having a surplus or deficit in its income statement. A value of 
MFSB having surplus is assigned ‗1‘ while those having deficit is assigned a ‗0‘. No 
change is observed from the main results (refer to Table 6.27, Appendix 6_2). 
 
The final robustness check involves replacing the measurement of SIZEMF from the 
log10 of total assets to the log10 of revenue. The results reinforced the results obtained 
earlier (refer to Table 6.28, Appendix 6_2). 
 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter discussed the results for RQ2 that concerns the variables possibly 
associated with the disclosure of accountability information. It began with the 
descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the study which involves three 
covariates (board size, fiscal stress, size of MFSB) and three factors (type of MFSB, 
board composition and the existence of audit committee). In addition, the results of the 
full and the step by step regression model were presented. The final model shows that 
the proportion of explained variance as measured by the adjusted R
2
 (and partial eta
2 
) 
for the regression equation is 0.409 resulting in a moderate level of the model‘s 
strength. Three variables, namely the type of MFSB, board composition and the 
existence of audit committee were significant predictors of disclosure extent.  
 
The hypotheses were revisited to determine whether the results supported the 
hypotheses. Two (H1 and H3) out of the five hypotheses tested were supported. It was 
therefore concluded that ‗there is an association between the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information and the type of MFSB‘. Furthermore, it was concluded that 
‗there is a positive association between the extent of disclosure of accountability 
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information in the annual reports of MFSB and the existence of an internal member on 
the board‘.  
 
Additional regression analyses were then carried out on mandated and voluntary 
disclosure items. The results of the first until the final regression models were 
presented. For MDI, three variables, namely the type of MFSB, existence of audit 
committee and the (inverse of) fiscal stress are significant in predicting disclosure extent 
based on the adjusted R
2
 account for 35.1% of the proportion of variance in MDI. 
Whereas for VDI, the results were similar to the case of DI in relation to the significant 
variables, although the adjusted R
2 
is lower at 37.6%. 
 
The chapter proceeded with a discussion of the results of each variable tested by linking 
them with the theoretical perspectives of the thesis and prior studies. The results of the 
robustness check on the findings were then presented by using alternative proxies for 
three variables, namely the board size, fiscal stress and size of MFSB. Overall, the 
results of the robustness check reinforced the earlier results. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REASON FOR DISCLOSURE AND NONDISCLOSURE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 4, interviews were used to search for an answer to RQ3, i.e. 
―What are the reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure of accountability information in 
the annual reports of MFSB?‖. This chapter presents the findings of the interviews. It 
begins by describing the participants of the interview in Section 7.2. The chapter 
proceeds to discuss the reasons for disclosing accountability information in the annual 
reports in Section 7.3. This is then followed by discussions on the reasons for not 
disclosing accountability information in Section 7.4. Later, in Section 7.5, the thesis 
associates the findings of the interview with the theoretical framework of the thesis. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the major themes of this chapter. 
 
7.2 Interviewees 
A total of thirty-two participants representing twenty MFSB were involved in the 
interview (refer to Appendix 7_1). While twelve MFSB (60%) were represented by one 
participant, eight MFSB (40%) were represented by more than one participants; four 
MFSB (i.e. MFSB4, MFSB13, MFSB7, MFSB56) with two participants, and another 
four MFSB (i.e. MFSB44, MFSB38, MFSB64, MFSB48) with three participants. Group 
interviews were conducted for these eight MFSB.  
  
As emphasised in the letter requesting for the interview (refer to Appendix 4_5), all 
interviewees are either directly or indirectly involved in the preparation of annual 
reports for their respective organisations. The majority of the interviewees hold 
managerial posts such as division heads and directors. Several are officers who hold top 
posts in their respective organisations such as the Director General, Chief Finance 
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Officer or Bursar. The selection of participants was determined by the respective MFSB 
and not the researcher.  
 
Participants belonged to various divisions including the corporate, finance, 
administration, publication and legal division to name a few; with the corporate division 
representing the  highest proportion (37.5% or 12 of 32 participants). The number of 
years of experience of the participants ranged from 2 to 30 years. There is a good 
balance between genders in regards to participation with approximately 44 per cent (i.e. 
14 of 32) male participants and the remaining; female (56%). For ease of use and 
confidentiality, the third-person masculine pronoun is used to refer to each and all 
participants regardless of gender in the discussion of the findings and the quotes or 
passages taken from the transcripts of the interviews. 
 
7.3 The Reasons for Disclosing Accountability Information in the Annual 
Reports 
To recapitulate, interviewees were asked questions on the 
motivations/reasons/incentives of disclosing accountability information. At the same 
time, they were shown their own scores (i.e. 0=do not disclose or 1=disclose) for each 
of the items in the disclosure index and the average score of all MFSB (refer to Section 
4.9.4.1 and Appendix 4_8). 
 
Several steps were involved in the process of data analysis. First, the reasons for 
disclosure, as provided by participants, were identified and coded. At this point, a total 
of 53 reasons were identified and coded (refer to Table 7.1). Secondly, similar reasons 
given by different participants, which were coded, were grouped together into 
categories. The result of this process is a total of 25 categories of reasons for disclosure 
(refer to Table 7.1). Combined, these first two steps can be considered consistent with 
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the meaning categorization approach as discussed in Section 4.9.5 where long 
statements are condensed to simple categories. Following this, the categories were then 
grouped  into themes that emerged from the data. These themes were then given labels 
that best represent all categories included under them. From this process, a total of six  
themes emerged, namely (i) nature of data,  (ii) implication of reporting, (iii) tradition, 
(iv) external influence, (v) internal influence, and, (vi) awareness. Table 7.1 below 
presents the coded reasons for disclosure as offered by MFSB, the specific MFSB 
mentioning them, the frequencies, the reasons after being grouped into categories, and 
their respective themes.  
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Table 7.1: Reasons for Disclosing Accountability Information in the Annual Report 
No. Reasons for Disclosure (Coded) MFSB mentioning them 
Frequencies 
(No. of 
MFSB) 
Categorised Reasons for Disclosure (No. of MFSB) 
Theme  
(Total occurrence) 
1 the issue  reported is part of the core business 21,59,56,27 4 1-Data relates to MFSB‘s core activity (4) Nature of Data  
(13) 2 the item/issue relates to organisation strategies 63,38 2 2-Data is part of MFSB‘s important agenda (6) 
3 the item/issue relates to organisation policy 80 1 
4 the item/issue reported is part of ISO 27 1 
5 the item/issue  reported is part of KPI 78 1 
6 the item is part of organisational chart 38 1 
7 
impact of the activity to the public/organisation 85,78,57 3 3-Data relates to activity that has impact to 
   society/organisation (3) 
8 
implication of reporting, e.g. increased 
involvement  
57 1 4-Positive expectation on the occurrence of a favourable 
change 
   (1) 
Implication of 
Reporting  
(13) 
 9 to attract funding 85 1 5-Positive expectation on the chance to attract future resources  
    (2) 10 to attract industry attention  80 1 
11 
for management and other staff  63 1 6-Positive expectation on the usefulness of the disclosed 
    information for future references (1) 
12 drive staff towards target  44 1 7-Positive expectation on the enhancement of staff 
    competitiveness (3) 
 
13 keep staff organised  44 1 
14 enhance internal competition  27 1 
15 
enhance staff motivation, commitment, 
achievement  
27,13,56,44,63 5 8-Positive expectation on the enhancement of personnel  
    morale and commitment (6) 
 16 enhance board members‘ motivation  13 1 
17 
follow previous annual report 27,63 2 9-Continuation of MFSB‘s own previous reporting practices 
    (2) 
Tradition (2) 
18 required by circular  13,57,63,64 4 10- Compliance to statutory requirements (7) External  
influence/ push 
(33) 
19 
reminded by Auditor General to alert on 
TC4/2007  
13 1 
20 ministry‘s requirement  13, 38 2 
21 guidelines by Bursa Malaysia, Central Bank 44,13 2 11-Adaptation to other external guidelines (3) 
22 guideline by international institutions 44 1   
23 follow others disclosure practice 44,21,27,85,13,57,56,48,44,38 10 12-Adaptation of the reporting practices of others (10)  
24 what society wants to know  85,13,59, 38 4 13-Anticipation of public concerns and interests (4) 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
25 public concern / highlighted in Parliament  38 1 14-Response or feedback to public concerns and interest (2) 
 
 
26 
address customer complaints  85 1 
27 input from ministry  13 1 15-Influence of the ministry and Federal government (5) 
28 government encourage  78,64 2 
29 ministry‘s annual report format  64 1 
30 emphasized by Prime Minister   64 1 
31 
follow parent company practice and their 
comments  
13 1 16-Influence of the parent company (2) 
32 parent company commitment/seriousness  13 1 
33 
supplied by division  63 1 17-Information supplied by other divisions to the reporting  
      unit (1) 
Internal 
influence/push  
(7) 
 
 
34 
management uphold the concept of good 
governance and transparency  
44 1 18-Commitment of management (2) 
35 input from top management  13 1 
36 input from board  13,57 1 19-Influence of board of directors and audit committee (3) 
37 board (culture) which drives for transparency  44 1 
38 input from audit committee  38 1 
39 required by internal financial procedure  13 1 20-Compliance to internal financial procedures (1) 
40 
so that clients know what are our pledges to 
them 
13,27 2 21-Enlighten stakeholders on MFSB functions, aims and 
      activities (9) 
 
Awareness  
(21) 
 
41 
to explain to the public what we are trying to 
achieve  
44 1 
42 
to let people know our function, and what they 
can get from our organisation 
27,44 2 
43 
to avoid confusion by readers, as our business 
operation is unique and new/rare  
44 1 
44 new programme  63 1 
45 so that stakeholders know who‘s who  27,59 2 
46 to show the strength of our organisation 21 1 22-Demonstrate MFSB strength and commitment (6) 
47 to enhance board reputation  59 1 
48 to show personnel commitment  13,63 2 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
49 
to build trust and confidence by the stakeholders 
in the organisation  
27,44 2   
50 
so that public will know where we are  e.g. in 
terms of KPI  
13,27,80 2 23-Provide updates on MFSB achievements (and non- 
      achievements) (2) 
51 justify results and non-performance 27,59,21 2 24-Provide justifications (3) 
52 Justify expenditures 44 1 
53 to allow better understanding of figures 80 1 25-Improve stakeholders‘ understanding on MFSB (1)  
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7.3.1 Theme One: Nature of Data 
During the interview MFSB would commonly decide to disclose accountability 
information when;  
(i) the information or data is related to the core activity of the MFSB;  
(ii) the information or data is part of an important agenda of the MFSB; and/or  
(iii) the information or data is related to activity that has some impact to the 
society/MFSB. 
 
The above reasons suggest a common theme for reasons underlying the disclosure of 
accountability information that relates to the nature of the data or information. This 
theme is labelled in this thesis as the ‗nature of data‘.  
 
7.3.1.1 Data relates to MFSB’s core activity 
Four MFSB (20%) highlighted that their accountability information disclosure partly 
arises from their organisations‘ important activities. For example, MFSB27 (P6) 
commented that they reported on environmental protection because it related to the 
nature of their business or organisation‘s activities, i.e. dealing with flora and fauna. In 
another situation, for example, if the MFSB‘s operation heavily involves the sale of 
products or services, information related to gross margin would certainly be considered 
important information required to be reported: ―concerning gross margins, we certainly 
must report it – because that‘s our business. That‘s also the reason why we include the 
profit and loss‖ (MFSB59, P12). 
 
One MFSB commented that it is important to report such kinds of accountability 
information so as to ensure stakeholders understand the types of business the MFSB is 
involved in. 
We report the list of main assets because it‘s part of our core business activities 
... [and] because our business concerns assets. So if people are unaware of our 
assets, how can people see what are our actual business is, right? (MFSB21, P5) 
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7.3.1.2 Data is part of MFSB’s important agenda  
Accountability information is disclosed because the information or the data itself forms 
part of an important agenda of the organisation is the next reason emerging from the 
‗nature of data‘ theme. Six MFSB (30%) mentioned this as their reason for disclosure. 
For example, in one MFSB, their most recent policy is to make their organisation a 
sustainable organisation. Hence, programs and activities that relate to this new initiative 
- such as environmental conservation efforts - become an important part of the overall 
sustainability agenda and hence information on this is to be reported in their annual 
report. The following quote further explains the situation. 
We have it [i.e. issues on environmental] because we have made it a policy that 
our campus is a ‗sustainable campus‘ meaning that the efforts exhausted 
towards this end are included in the annual report. In fact, it is also part of our 
agenda that any new development around campus will be incorporated into the 
campus‘ policy of sustainability. For example to reduce energy usage, how to 
synergise with the environment and whatnot ... we have also carried out the 
recycling programme. (MFSB80, P17) 
 
 
Apart from being reported because it is related to an organisation‘s policy, 
accountability information is also reported if it is related to an organisation‘s key 
performance indicators (KPI) (MFSB78, P18), ISO (MFSB27, P6) or the strategy of the 
MFSB (MFSB63, P16). In this regard, the following response ensued: ―... because 
inside here [i.e. in the client charter] we include all MFSB63 strategies. So [that‘s why] 
we think the client charter is needed‖ (MFSB63, P16). 
 
Another respondent highlighted that if any information or unit presented ―in the 
organisation chart, there must be a report about it in the annual report‖ as these units 
exist in the organisation chart and reflect the importance attached to it by the 
organisation (MFSB38, P19). Examples given by them include risk management and 
internal audit unit. Accordingly, related reports or information such as that pertaining to 
internal control must be made available in the annual report. Given that there is a low 
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disclosure level on internal control as found in Phase 1 of the study (refer to Section 
5.4.2), this may suggest that not many MFSB regard internal control or internal audit as 
an important agenda. 
 
7.3.1.3 Data relates to activity that has an impact on society/organisation 
Three MFSB (15%) stated that accountability information will be reported if it relates to 
activities which are assessed as having a substantial impact on society or the 
organisation itself (MFSB85, P7).  Accordingly, activities perceived as mundane by the 
organisation will not be reported. This situation is explained by one MFSB;  
We are a bit more careful when we want to report our achievements because we 
focus on our main activities that impact on the society. For activities which are 
too small such as total phone calls answered, [and] total emails answered i.e. the 
things that have little or no impact on MFSB78 as a whole – we will not report 
them. (MFSB78, P18) 
 
 
The next theme discovered from the interview findings is the ‗implication of reporting‘ 
and is discussed next. 
 
7.3.2 Theme Two: Implication of Reporting 
During the interview, participants also highlighted that accountability information will 
commonly be decided to be disclosed if by reporting them, MFSB: 
(i) can expect that some favourable change will occur to the society/MFSB; 
(ii) have higher chance to attract future resources into the organisation;   
(iii) can expect that the information disclosed will be useful for future reference; 
(iv) can expect that staff competitiveness will be further enhanced; and/or,  
(v) can expect that morale and commitment of personnel is improved. 
 
The reasons cited above fall under a common theme, which relates to the implications 
of reporting. The following elaborates each reason. 
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7.3.2.1 Positive expectation on the occurrence of a favourable change 
It was maintained by one MFSB (5%) that accountability information will be reported if 
by doing so a favourable change or implication is anticipated. An example of the 
favourable change given is an increase in the level of participation in the organisation‘s 
activities among stakeholders; 
One of the aims of the bumiputra [division] is to increase the number of capable 
bumiputra entrepreneurs. So when they [i.e. the Bumiputra stakeholders] know 
we have these activities [e.g. sales carnival for Bumiputra product] through our 
annual report, they will approach us. Whether they are capable of joining or not 
depends on the criteria we set. (MFSB57, P10) 
 
 
7.3.2.2 Positive expectation on the chance to attract future resources 
Another reason or motivation for reporting accountability information as indicated by 
two MFSB (10%) during the interview is to attract future resources from external 
sources. The resources may be in the form of direct financial resources from the 
government or in terms of business deals from the industry. One participant, who is an 
employee of a MFSB with no fiscal stress, clarified this situation; 
Yet another matter of which we were informed of during the course [of annual 
report preparation] is that we have to attract the attention of the minister in order 
that they can easily read the report and get the point that this organisation needs 
‗something‘ [i.e. funding]. (MFSB85, P7) 
 
This finding is somehow consistent with the argument by Likierman (1992, as cited in 
Coy et al., 2001) that high quality reporting can be used to influence those in power 
who may deal with the entity. Similar response were also received in Marcuccio & 
Steccolini‘s (2005) study where the social and environmental reporting of Italian local 
authorities is used as a means to obtain funds from the European Union, as it was seen 
as an opportunity for extra inﬂow. Nelson et al. (2003) recorded similar findings where 
increased accountability disclosure in the annual reports of Canadian universities are 
partly driven by the need to support fundraising including from non-governmental 
funding sources. Reporting may also be driven by the intention to attract the attention 
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of the industry in order to commercialise MFSB products ultimately leading to 
increased business to the organisation, such as expressed below: 
That [i.e. staff recognition and awards] is part of our achievements. When we go 
for international exhibitions related to research, for example, and our staff 
receive certain awards, it shows that our research is of recognisable quality and 
the quality has reached a certain stage and thus our product is able to be 
commercialised - that‘s the most important factor. So the information [on staff 
recognition and awards] is included because we are trying to attract the attention 
of the industry - for the purpose of commercialising our product. (MFSB80, 
P17) 
 
 
7.3.2.3 Positive expectation on the usefulness of the disclosed information for 
future references 
The other reason for reporting accountability information is when it is expected to 
benefit members of the organisation itself, particularly management. Such information 
is of use as a frame of reference for current and future staff and management. 
Simultaneously, reporting accountability information indirectly safeguards the 
information and makes it possible for an organisation‘s members to learn about the 
organisation‘s past through its annual reports. One MFSB commented on this 
motivation for disclosure; 
...[We report the information] for the management - for them to take it [i.e. 
information on list of assets] as a reference. [It is] For internal [use] [i.e. staff] ... 
it‘s beneficial to us for example, [for us] to know the current status of our assets. 
(MFSB63, P16) 
 
 
7.3.2.4 Positive expectation on the enhancement of staff competitiveness 
Reporting accountability information assists organisations in enhancing its staff 
competitiveness (MFSB27, P6). Three MFSB (15%) indicated this as one of their 
reasons for accountability disclosure. Reporting accountability information specifically 
assists in driving the staff towards achieving the organisation‘s targets and keeps them 
organised. The following quotation addresses this motivation for reporting; 
It [i.e. publishing KPI] definitely drives us to achieve what we have set out to 
do. It [i.e. KPI] is all about how you manage your organisation. This is one of 
the things that definitely drive how we structure our day-to-day operations. We 
put lots of emphasis on planning and effectively implementing the plan. So that 
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keeps us organised and we feel that it‘s important for us to report such matters. 
(MFSB44, P15) 
 
 
This finding is consistent with one of the benefits of accountability reporting as 
mentioned by Coy et al. (2001) which is for the staff to use the information as part of 
their on-going progress review.  
 
7.3.2.5 Positive expectation on the enhancement of personnel morale and 
commitment 
It was also expressed during the interview by six MFSB (30%) that staff motivation and 
commitment effectively serve as reasons motivating the reporting of accountability 
information. Below are a few examples testifying to this end: ―we think the client 
charter is needed [to be disclosed]. This is to motivate ourselves [as] we will be able to 
understand [clearly] the actual MFSB63‘s charter‖ (MFSB63, P16). Also, ―it [i.e. 
information on staff recognition in chairman statement] is good to have so that staff 
know they are being appreciated ... [and hence it partly serves] as a motivation for them 
(MFSB13,P8). 
 
Besides motivation for an organisation‘s regular staff, reporting is also a means to boost 
the morale of high-level personnel in the organisation such as board members. 
Disclosing accountability information is expected to encourage the future commitment 
of high-level personnel toward achieving an organisation‘s objectives. 
That issue [i.e. board meeting attendance summary] – I think – is a form of 
motivation [for them] as well. It may affect [their attendance] for future 
meetings ... [for example] maybe they‘ll try to attend [future meetings] .... 
(MFSB13, P9) 
 
 
With regards to this, interviewees stated that the relationship between reporting 
accountability information and improving the commitment of high-level personnel in 
MFSB can be traced back to the fact that annual reports are read and assessed by people 
at the ministerial level who are responsible for the appointment of MFSB board 
265 
 
members. In MFSB, board appointment is made by the respective ministers upon 
recommendation by MFSB management. As such, reporting relevant accountability 
information may contribute to increased awareness of board members concerning their 
duties in the organisation as it partly determines their positive image in the organisation. 
This scenario has been explained by an interviewee as follows; 
... because their appointment is through the Minister of XY, so somehow this 
[i.e. the annual report] has to go to that Ministry. So if you [i.e. the board] do 
not comply - [for example] if there are four meetings, and you attend just one or 
two, you know, it would poorly reflect on their image. (MFSB13,P8) 
 
The third theme that emerged from the interview findings is ‗tradition‘, as discussed 
below. 
 
7.3.3 Theme Three: Tradition 
Data from the interview revealed that certain accountability information is disclosed in 
due to it having been previously reported in their organisation‘s annual reports. This 
suggests that the disclosure of accountability information by MFSB is made because a 
particular MFSB follows certain established practices. This thesis classifies it under a 
theme labelled ‗tradition‘. 
 
7.3.3.1 Continuation of MFSB’s own previous reporting practices 
Two MFSB (10%) reported accountability information partly because their previous 
annual reports have reported the information in the past (MFSB63, P16). Accountability 
information was present in the previous annual report and so the current report will 
follow suit assuming that it is the right thing to do and that it is important to report the 
item. The person/s preparing previous reports however, may have had their own 
personal interests and motivations for disclosing such information. To simply continue 
the practice based on it having been previously reported makes the practice somewhat 
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motive free. Arguably, there is a degree of assumption in the merits of reporting 
accountability information based in this reason: ―... [we have that information in our 
annual report] simply because we have been previously reporting this [i.e. financial 
management and accounts committee] – so I think it is important‖ (MFSB27, P6). 
 
7.3.4 Theme Four: External influence / push 
Some MFSB responded that they disclose accountability information for the following 
reasons: 
(i) as a compliance to statutory requirements;  
(ii) as an adaptation to other external guidelines and practices;  
(iii) in anticipation of public concerns or interests; 
(iv) as a feedback or in response to public concerns or interests;  
(v) due to influence of the Federal government; and/or 
(vi) due to influence of parent company. 
 
These factors appear to relate to external influences or push and as such is categorised 
by this thesis under a common theme labelled ‗external influence or push‘ theme.   
 
7.3.4.1 Compliance to statutory requirements 
Several MFSB indicated that their reasons for reporting certain accountability 
information are simply due to them having to follow or comply with certain external 
statutory requirements, as was the case of at least seven MFSB (35%). The external 
requirements include the Treasury circular (TC4/2007) and ministry‘s requirements. 
Among their comments are ―... [we have the board of directors' attendance summary] 
because it‘s among the requirements [of the circular] ...” (MFSB13,P8), ―we do it [i.e. 
report on list of main assets] simply because it is a requirement. Otherwise we are 
indifferent ...‖ (MFSB64, P24), and ―... [we do it i.e. reporting on program‘s impact, 
because] it‘s the requirement by Ministry X ... [under their] policy division. They 
requested [such information]‖ (MFSB38, P9). With regards to the reporting of main 
assets, although it is a requirement under the TC4/2007 to disclose this information, it 
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was observed in Phase 1 of the study as shown in Section 5.4.5 that less than one-
quarter of MFSB disclosed it in their report.  
 
 
With regards to the Treasury circular, it was stated by one MFSB (5%) that the A-G has 
reminded them officially, through written correspondence, of the need to follow the 
circular. This is expressed in the following: ―the Auditor General sent a letter to us to be 
aware of circular 4/2007‖ (MFSB13,P9). Nelson et al.‘s (2003) recorded similar 
findings in the context of Canadian universities where 5.7 per cent of respondents 
agreed that the increase in accountability disclosure in their annual report is due to the 
new government regulation. However, the percentage of respondents saying that 
government regulation is not important is higher (i.e. 26%) suggesting that regulations 
per se may not be strong enough to ‗persuade‘ public sector bodies to disclose more. 
 
7.3.4.2 Adaptation to other external guidelines 
Three MFSB (15%) associated their reasons for reporting accountability information to 
the guidelines on best reporting practices which are provided or meant for others of 
which they are interested to follow. This includes reporting guidelines issued by 
regulatory authorities such as the Bursa Malaysia and Bank Negara (the Malaysian 
Central Bank) on best reporting practices for governance and financial information 
respectively. 
... [we refer to] any other publications related to disclosure. [We also look at] 
some [guidelines on] best [reporting] practice ... for example, [those issued by] 
the Big Four. In relation to the disclosure of [specific issues such as] corporate 
governance, [and] CSR – you look at the Bursa [Malaysia]. They have some 
requirements – [which are meant to serve as] the minimum requirements for 
public listed companies. Even Bank Negara has its own in terms of financial 
statements for banks. (MFSB44, P14) 
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With regards to the reporting of accountability information related to governance, the 
importance of external guidelines such as the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) in influencing MFSB reporting practices cannot by understated – at least at the 
initial stage, as highlighted by the following MFSB: ―that issue [i.e. reporting the board 
attendance] – initially – is because of the corporate governance circular [i.e. Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance]‖ (MFSB13, P8). 
 
7.3.4.3 Adaptation of the reporting practices of others  
Half of the MFSB (10 MFSB) interviewed refer to the annual reports of other 
organisations and apply similar items in their annual reports. This can be regarded as 
the most commonly cited reason by the interviewees. The sample report could be from 
other MFSB, other public sector organisations, other similar organisations in the private 
sector, or similar international organisations. Examples of MFSB referring to another 
MFSB report include MFSB21 (refers to MFSB116), MFSB27 (refers to MFSB109) 
and MFSB13 (refers to MFSB5 and MFSB104). MFSB57, for example, clearly stated 
that they refer to other MFSB running similar operations; especially those they feel are 
superior. This is consistent with the result found earlier in Phase 1 (refer to Section 
6.6.1) where type of MFSB influences the level of disclosure of accountability 
information. 
 
There is also a tendency to look at reports of other organisations within the same 
jurisdiction. For example, MFSB57 looked at the reports of other agencies under the 
same Ministry while MFSB13 referred to report of another MFSB which is also a 
subsidiary of their parent companies. Besides that, some MFSB refer to reporting 
practices of the private sector (e.g. MFSB13, MFSB44). MFSB38 for example 
mentioned that they referred to PETRONAS reports particularly on CSR issues. The 
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following is an excerpt from one MFSB that revealed its practice of referring to the 
private sector annual reports particularly that of public listed companies and adapts 
whatever is relevant to them.  
We take into account the industry practice in regards to corporate disclosure, 
[for example] from the perspective of the statement of corporate governance, 
from the practices of listed companies. (MFSB44, P14) 
 
Besides the local publications on reporting practices, international publications have 
also been referred to by MFSB as benchmarks for their own reports. Selected relevant 
items are adapted and reported accordingly. For example, MFSB48 revealed that it 
referred to similar organisations at the global level namely Europe, Britain, America 
and Japan. Another example of adaptation of international reporting practice was 
revealed by one MFSB in the following; 
There are some publications from UK, some from Australia, some from US and 
Canada – [they] have include certain categories of information to be disclosed. 
Every year we review what is available and we compare [among them and with 
our own report] for our benchmark[ing purpose] ... [particularly] those that are 
relevant to us. (MFSB44, P14) 
 
Additionally, MFSB38 shared during the interview that it refers to another public sector 
organisation (i.e. Institute of Integrity) as the latter has reports that include information 
on internal audit, internal control, risk management, board meetings and board 
attendance. Some MFSB also stated that they referred to more than one sample. For 
example, MFSB85 looked at annual reports of both local and international private 
sector organisations, which run similar operations. 
 
7.3.4.4 Anticipation of public concerns and interests 
Another reason for reporting accountability information is to provide the public or 
stakeholders with what the MFSB perceived – as information that the public are 
interested to know. This was indicated as the reason for disclosure by four MFSB 
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(20%). This finding is consistent with findings by Chatterjee et al. (2012) where 
infrastructure information is reported by the New Zealand local governments partly 
because ―when people ask that [i.e. on how their money are spent], we [the New 
Zealand local governments] can show the report or they [i.e. the citizens] can look it up 
on the website‖ (p. 20). In the case of MFSB, if it is perceived by MFSB that the public 
would be most interested to know about performance, information on achievements and 
performance should be provided or reported in the annual reports: ―[we report 
information on performance] because if people were to ask any questions it would 
mostly concern performance‖ (MFSB85, P7). A similar comment on public interest in 
performance information was made by another interviewee where he expressed that: 
―… as for annual report, what people are more interested to know is about the 
performance of the organisation‖ (MFSB38, P20). These comments may partly explain 
why the performance information category shows the highest level of mean disclosure 
as shown in Section 5.4.4. 
 
Information is also disclosed to avoid future queries: ―[So] we include these things in 
the report otherwise we may need to explain later which would be much more difficult‖ 
(MFSB59, P12). Another example of opinions concerning this issue is: 
From the stakeholder‘s perspective, let‘s say they need to know the financial 
stability of our organisation; it can be [partly] assessed by looking at which bank 
[we are using]. [The reason we think why people may be interested to know 
who our banks are is] because there are some banks where their financial 
stability - you know, can be questioned. (MFSB13, P8) 
 
 
7.3.4.5 Response or feedback to public concerns and interest 
In certain situations, what the public is interested in or concerned with is clear. For 
example, based on Parliamentary debates or news highlights, MFSB are able to draw 
inferences on what matters to the public. Accordingly, the respective MFSB would 
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report such information that addresses those concerns, highlighted by two MFSB (10%) 
during the interview. 
We do it [i.e. preparing annual report] simply for the sake of providing as much 
information so that when people read, they get some picture ... [on 
organisational performance] which is regularly debated in the parliament. So we 
have to make sure such [performance] information is supplied. (MFSB38, P19) 
 
 
The above comment highlighted that it is important to publish performance information, 
as this is among the issues that are raised in Parliamentary debate. This partly explains 
why the Performance category shows the highest level of disclosure compared to Other 
category in the index as demonstrated in Section 5.4.4 and 5.4.6. 
 
At times, public concern or interest is inferred based on customer complaints or 
customer satisfaction surveys: 
When I see those things [i.e. customer complaints], that‘s the circumstances that 
allow me to assess whether certain information should be disseminated [i.e. 
reported] or not. I will tell them [i.e. the board], ―this is the information that I 
am going to include [in the annual report]‖. (MFSB85, P7) 
 
 
This reason for disclosure supports the argument by Mussari & Monfardini (2010) that 
disclosure may serve as a useful tool for organisations to regain lost trust from citizens 
as a result of prior accountability issues. In the above situation, efforts were made by 
one officer in charge of annual reports to disclose accountability information based on 
his experience in the quality assurance division as well as his educational background in 
quality management. According to him, the nature of this division and his educational 
background that emphasises on continuous improvement has indirectly shaped his 
working style in terms of preparing annual reports whereby he has been consistently 
assessing customer complaints in search of what he considers the concerns of the public 
and hence should be addressed in the annual report.  
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It is because I focus on quality [both in my work and studies]. Because of that, I 
have committed to many continuous improvement processes. So [that‘s why] 
sometimes I also look at complaints – although it‘s other people who handles 
[complaints]. (MFSB85,P7) 
 
7.3.4.6 Influence of the ministry and Federal government 
Reporting accountability information, according to five MFSB (20%), may also be 
influenced by the commitment and seriousness of the central or federal government in 
transparency agenda as in the example of monitoring the annual reporting of MFSB and 
in providing input on their annual reports by the respective ministries. This is consistent 
with the study by Nelson et al. (2003) whereby government influence is one reason for 
increased accountability disclosure in Canadian universities‘ annual reports. Among the 
statement made by MFSB in this regard: ―we emphasise on CSR because the [federal] 
government has encouraged that CSR be implemented ... (MFSB78, P18) and ―... 
because there‘s a lot of inputs from all levels ... even up to the ministry [level]. Over 
here, we have many who monitor [our annual report]... [including] Ministry X ... that‘s 
why [we report the items]‖ (MFSB13,P9). 
 
The fact that public sector report is an output of an administrative communication 
between the central agencies and the reporting agencies has been captured in a study by 
Christensen & Skarbaek (2007). According to them, this communication (between the 
central agencies and the reporting agencies) occurs in hidden locations away from other 
stakeholders. Similar observation were made by Ingram & DeJong (1987) in the case of 
the state government‘s influence on local government reporting where the state 
influence the disclosure practices of the local political manager in ways other than 
legislation; instead, the influence is made through the provision of information and 
assistance by the state to help with local government accounting. Furthermore, it was 
indicated in the interview that the degree of seriousness at the ministerial level may be 
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due to the degree of emphasis made on a particular issue by the Premier (or Prime 
Minister). If the ministries focus on the issue and accordingly reported them in their 
annual reports, MFSB are then obliged to follow suit. This is so given the fact that 
ministries compile similar information for the annual reports from MFSB under their 
respective jurisdictions.  
Only when Najib [i.e. the Premier] includes KPI, we also include KPI as well. 
When Najib prioritises KPI, the ministry also prioritises KPI. In the format [of 
the ministry], they already include KPI so we have to follow. Our work must 
follow their format because they are the ones who will compile the report.  
(MFSB64, P25) 
 
7.3.4.7 Influence of the parent company 
The reason for disclosure may also be due to influence from the parent company of the 
respective MFSB, as mentioned by two MFSB (10%). The former may greatly 
influence the latter under their purview (i.e. their subsidiaries) to follow their disclosure 
practices through ‗leading by example‘ and at the same time making constructive 
comments. The following is one remark made regarding the issue; ―that matter [i.e. 
reporting the board attendance] ... [is] because we follow the parent company, that is, 
MFSB X. They have done it and they encouraged us to do so too ...‖ (MFSB13, P8). 
 
The parent company of an MFSB examines the annual reports of MFSB and makes any 
necessary changes prior to submitting their reports to Parliament (MFSB, 13, P9). 
However, a parent company may also indirectly inspire its subsidiaries (MFSB 
included) to follow their disclosure practices on condition that their top management is 
committed towards certain disclosure practices. The comment below illustrates how the 
commitment of the highest ranked personnel in a parent company towards the 
disclosure of information pertaining to governance has greatly influenced the MFSB to 
do the same. 
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Moreover [why we report many governance information is because], our Tan 
Sri Y – [chairman] from MFSB X [which is our parent company] – is very 
particular about the statement of corporate governance. [For example] If you 
look at his companies [such as] Company Z – all of them include [the statement 
of corporate governance]. (MFSB13,P8) 
 
 
7.3.5 Theme Five: Internal influence / push 
MFSB have also mentioned that the disclosure of accountability information in their 
annual reports are due to:  
(i) the information is supplied by other divisions to the reporting unit;  
(ii) the commitment of management;  
(iii) the influence of board of directors; and/or,  
(iv) their compliance with the internal financial procedures. 
 
These reasons cited above suggest that disclosure may be made due to some internally 
driven (internal of the organisation) reasons or motivations. As such, the thesis 
categorised these reasons under a common theme labelled ‗internal influence or push‘. 
Below are the elaborations of each reason. 
 
7.3.5.1 Information supplied by other divisions to the reporting unit 
One reason why accountability information is reported is that when compiling 
information to be included in the annual report, information is given or supplied by 
certain divisions in the organisation to the coordinator of the report. In this situation, the 
coordinator does not make prior decisions or provide strict instructions on what 
information is to be handed over to him/ her to be included in the report but leaves it to 
the discretion of the respective divisions to make the final decision. One MFSB (5%) 
indicated this as their reason for disclosure. 
Ok ... that matter [i.e. number of audit committee meetings] is a report [we 
received] from [the internal audit] division. So the division supplies this 
information...[and also] information on MFSB63 achievements. All such 
information is from the divisions [and I simply compile them]. (MFSB63, P16) 
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7.3.5.2 Commitment of management 
Two MFSB (10%) reported that their motivation to disclose accountability information 
is due to the commitment shown by the top management in upholding the concept of 
good governance and transparency. When top management subscribes to this principle, 
they will exhaust efforts to fulfil reporting requirements as part of their efforts towards 
good governance and transparency and as a result will strive to report the necessary 
accountability information. The following response explains the situation further: 
Because sometimes – if you go back to the [issue of trust], [it is] whether you 
want to uphold good governance and transparency. And if you subscribe to that, 
then you want to look at what would be the best disclosure - to be accountable 
to your mandate, your roles and your responsibility. So in this case, because we 
[i.e. the top management] already subscribed to it [i.e. upholding good 
governance and transparency], that‘s the reason why, on ongoing basis, we‘ll try 
as much as possible to meet the information required to be disclosed. 
(MFSB44,P14) 
 
 
Apart from that, it was also commented by MFSB13 that inputs from the top 
management play a role towards reporting certain accountability information. This 
confirms the findings in Phase 1 as presented in Section 6.6.3 where the existence of 
internal directors serving on the governing board of MFSB increases the level of 
disclosure of accountability information in their annual reports. Apart from that, this 
interview finding is consistent with a study by Nelson et al. (2003) in the context of 
Canadian universities that increased in accountability disclosure scores due to change in 
policy or culture as a result of a new president. 
 
7.3.5.3 Influence of the board of directors and audit committee 
The board‘s commitment to transparency was also cited as one factor influencing 
disclosure (MFSB44,P15) by three MFSB (15%), consistent with the study by Nelson et 
al. (2003) on Canadian universities‘ annual reports. Interviewees mentioned that inputs 
from board members, particularly those representing the industry, have resulted in the 
reporting of accountability information (MFSB13,P9). On the other hand, board 
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members who are representatives from the public sector are less demanding in terms of 
disclosure in the annual reports. They include representatives of various relevant 
government agencies including the ministries and the Treasury. Given their 
circumstances and positions, they are claimed (by the interviewees) to be well informed 
of certain information related to a particular MFSB compared to their counterparts in 
the industry and consequently do not demand as much information to be included in the 
annual reports of MFSB. The following quotation explains the situation: 
Normally [the board will give inputs during] the first draft – because the first 
draft is not yet final...so when they [i.e. the board members] read the draft, they 
will say something like - ―we need input on this and that‖. So they [i.e. the 
related division] has to conduct a study. They need to collect additional 
information. Our board comprises of representatives from the industry and from 
government. Representatives from government normally don‘t have many 
problems [i.e. don‘t require much information to be reported] because they also 
have the information. [But the] Industry representatives, normally when they 
read they are a little bit particular (MFSB57, P11). 
 
Audit committee is cited by interviewees as influential in determining the content of 
annual reports:  
The audit committee - when they have their meeting - do discuss about this too .. 
they said [for example] ―risk management - we do have that, so it means report 
on risk management must be included in annual report‖ …so this has been 
decided in the audit committee meeting .. we at the implementation level will 
just follow. (MFSB38, P19) 
 
The above quotation partly provides an explanation for the findings in Phase 1 on how 
the existence of audit committee may increase the level of disclosure of accountability 
information (refer to Section 6.6.4). Apart from that, it also provides an explanation on 
why risk management information is largely disclosed as identified in Phase 1 of the 
study (refer to Section 5.4.2). 
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7.3.5.4 Compliance with internal financial procedures 
One MFSB (5%) indicated that they disclose certain accountability information (e.g. 
impact of program) because it is required by their internal financial procedures, which 
were adapted from the TC4/2007.  The adaptation mainly removes items that are not 
relevant to the MFSB as perceived by the board. Below is the MFSB comment on the 
adaptation: ―we have our own financial procedures but it doesn‘t stray that far from the 
circular [i.e.TC4/2007]. Normally the board would say - follow [i.e. adapt] whichever is 
relevant to MFSB13‖ (MFSB13, P9). In this regard, indirect adaptation of TC4/2007 as 
internal financial procedures positively influence the disclosure of accountability 
information.  
 
7.3.6 Theme Six: Awareness 
MFSB have also responded during the interviews that reporting of accountability 
information was made in their respective annual reports to;  
(i) enlighten stakeholders on MFSB functions, aims and activities;  
(ii) demonstrate MFSB strength and commitment; 
(iii) provide updates on MFSB achievements and/or non-achievements; 
(iv) provide justifications; and/or 
(v) improve stakeholders‘ understanding on MFSB. 
 
These reasons suggest a common theme, which relates to the aim of creating or 
increasing awareness among stakeholders regarding MFSB. As such, the theme is 
labelled by the thesis as ‗awareness‘.  
 
7.3.6.1 Enlighten stakeholders on MFSB functions, aims and activities 
One of the most common reasons cited for reporting accountability information is due 
to it being a means for MFSB to inform or enlighten their stakeholders on MFSB roles 
and responsibilities as well as what MFSB can offer to their stakeholders (MFSB13, 
P8). Nine MFSB (45%) indicated this during the interview. In the case of the client 
charter, for example, MFSB highlighted that this information needed to be disclosed to 
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ensure their stakeholders are aware of their promises, and in turn, what can be 
demanded or expected of them: ―it [i.e. the client charter] is necessary because we 
would like to inform our stakeholders and customers...[on] our pledges to our 
customers, and what to expect from us. For us it is crucial to disclose [this 
information]‖ (MFSB27, P6). 
 
Similarly, during the interviews it was highlighted that one of the incentives motivating 
them to report accountability information is to communicate to the public so that the 
latter is aware and better understands the organisation‘s objectives and how the 
organisation‘s activities are directed towards fulfilling these objectives. Nelson et al. 
(2003) found similar reasons for disclosure where Canadian universities indicated that 
their increased accountability disclosure was to fulfil the need for better external as well 
as internal communication among stakeholders, including the donors. This motivation is 
explained by one MFSB in the following: 
By reporting this [i.e. KPI], we can at least explain to the public, the kind of 
things we are doing. Secondly, what we are trying to achieve as far as our 
objectives are concerned and how all these things contribute towards fulfilling 
our mandate (MFSB44, P14). 
 
 
In addition, accountability information such as glossaries is important for those MFSB 
having a rare or unique nature of business operations. For these unique organisations, 
reporting certain accountability information helps them to communicate and transfer 
certain knowledge to their stakeholders regarding their unique operations and, as a 
result, avoids unnecessary confusion. This may explain why disclosure levels for 
index/glossary was very low as found in Phase 1 of the study as shown in Section 5.4.1. 
Further, the provision of index/glossary might help stakeholders to have better grasp on 
their organisation: 
 
279 
 
... [We put in the glossary] because we are a new organisation. [And] The 
system that we administer - is a new one. People will get confused when they 
look at the terms so it‘s much better if the terms are included at the back [of the 
annual report]. (MFSB44, P15) 
 
 
Accountability information is also reported to inform readers on the new programmes 
carried out by the organisation (MFSB63,P16). This is in line with findings by 
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005) where social and environmental reporting in Italian 
local authorities is made to signal to their stakeholders (i.e. external or internal 
counterparts) that they were involved in important new activities. According to 
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005) however, this often happened when the actors who 
initiated the social and environmental reporting felt that their job was held in low 
esteem (frustration). In this case, an overview of the programme is first discussed rather 
than directly discussing the programme‘s achievements: ―in case there is a new 
programme, we are going to start our report with that programme ... [starting] with its 
overview and etcetera and not by straight away talking about the achievements related 
to the programme‖ (MFSB63, P16). 
 
 
It is also important to let stakeholders know who is who in the organisation such as who 
sits on the board or at the top management post. For instance: ―hat [i.e. information on 
board members profile including experience] is necessary so that people know who the 
board is. [That‘s why] we include it‖ (MFSB59, P12). 
 
7.3.6.2 Demonstrate MFSB strength and commitment 
Six MFSB (30%) also highlighted that accountability information is reported as a means 
to show the strength of their organisation and to build trust and confidence in 
stakeholders towards the organisations: ―... [we include the information on workforce 
planning] to show the strength of our organisation from one year to the other. Otherwise 
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it may appear as if things do not change from [for example] the 16 staff‖ (MFSB21, 
P5). Another example is as follows: 
Our stakeholders – in general - are the public. That‘s the reason why we need to 
include as much relevant information as possible to reflect that in whatever we 
do, we are performing our mandate, our roles, [and] responsibility to the best of 
our knowledge. And [also] to reflect that our vision, mission and values – are 
upheld. This is reflected through the annual report. It‘s part and parcel of putting 
confidence in the public that the corporation is being well-managed and well-
governed that in the event of anything happening you can trust this organisation. 
(MFSB44, P15) 
 
 
Another way to enhance the organisation‘s goodwill is by enhancing their board‘s 
reputation and by demonstrating the board‘s commitment towards good business 
practices. Reputation and commitment are among the motives for reporting 
accountability information, as indicated by one MFSB: ―we have to include something 
[e.g. the board profile] to enhance their reputations.‖ (MFSB59, P12) and ―we have it 
[i.e. board attendance summary] because - to show the commitment [of the board 
members].‖ (MFSB13, P8) 
 
In the above cases, the findings appear to support the argument by Mussari & 
Monfardini (2010) that public sector reporting is legitimacy-seeking behaviours where 
public agencies try to highlight to the authorities their potentials as well as the 
peculiarity of their managerial approach. It is also used as a signal on their higher level 
of efﬁciency and socially responsible behaviour. At the same time, these findings are 
similar to the findings by Marcuccio & Steccolini (2005) where social and 
environmental reporting in Italian local authorities is partly to search for external 
visibility. A similar reason was provided by Dirsmith & Lewis (1982) and Dixon et al. 
(1991) where the purpose of publishing information is to convince stakeholders that the 
organisation is fit for future action and to gain their positive recognition and support. It 
also supports the view expressed by Likierman (1992, as cited in Coy et al., 2001), that 
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high quality reporting can serve as a public relation vehicle, that assists public sector 
organisations to enhance their public image and professionalism. In this regard, Coy et 
al. (2001, p. 25) had nicely expressed the usefulness of accountability reporting to 
organisations where ―public esteem would be raised by their willingness to submit the 
institutions to this more open and on-going public scrutiny—―a spotlight upon 
institutions which are shy of the public‘s gaze‖. Both institutional and individual (staff) 
reputations could be enhanced‖. 
 
7.3.6.3 Provide updates on MFSB achievements (and non-achievements)  
The next reason as stated by two MFSB (10%) for reporting accountability information 
is to update stakeholders on the achievements of the organisation in terms of meeting 
financial as well as non-financial targets: ―if you [MFSB] show [achievement of KPI], 
it‘s better because the public will know where you are, right?‖ (MFSB13, P8). Another 
MFSB expressed similar opinion: 
Regarding the financial perspective, we‘d like to show our financial status ... we 
have two main items - one is government grants, the other are our internal 
sources. To achieve autonomy, they [i.e. the management] have aspired that by 
2020 we must generate at least 30% of our internal resources. So [in the annual 
report], we can show how many per cent we have achieved. [For example] Last 
year we achieved 20%. Meaning that there‘s information that is very crucial that 
we‘d like to show to the ministry or government [our achievement status]. 
(MFSB80, P17) 
 
 
Besides updating on achievements, interestingly, accountability information is also 
reported in order to communicate to stakeholders the non-achievements (failure) of 
certain targets: ―we still report if we don‘t achieve certain target(s).  There must be 
reasons why we don‘t achieve. So, why must we hide it?‖ (MFSB27, P6). This opinion 
is consistent with what has been highlighted by the public agency in Denmark in 
Christensen & Skaerbaek‘s (2007) study where some ‗inside secrets‘ such as problem of 
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organisations are revealed in their report especially to gain audience confidence on the 
truthfulness of the report.  
 
7.3.6.4 Provide justifications 
Another reason for reporting accountability information is to provide justifications on 
certain issues such as expenditure or non-performance of MFSB. Three MFSB (15%) 
pointed out this as their driving force to report. One example of a justification made by 
MFSB in relation to their expenditure: ―and it [i.e. the KPI] also justifies the kind of 
expenditures that we spend on a yearly basis [so that‘s why we report it]‖ (MFSB44, 
P14). Additionally, some MFSB, which are not able meet their targets, disclose 
accountability information such as the information on the amount of grants received for 
the current year and the previous years to justify to stakeholders that some activities or 
targets were not achieved due to a lack of financial resources. The following remark is 
one example of this situation:  
We get less allocation and [therefore] are unable to conduct a larger number of 
researches. For example, in the end of the Ninth Malaysian Plan, we receives 
less funding. Then [as a result], we have less research findings. [Nevertheless], 
we disclose this [because] we have to tell why our activity is limited. It could be 
in the chairman‘s report or DG report or activity report. (MFSB27, P6) 
 
 
Similarly, the response below by one MFSB indicates that accountability information 
is reported to explain the problems or challenges faced by MFSB in achieving better 
results. This initiative implies that justifications of non-performance is among the 
reasons for reporting accountability information. 
If it relates to production we have to include [in the annual report on] our 
problems. Otherwise people wouldn‘t know why it [i.e. our production] is 
reducing. [For example] In plantation, it [i.e. the problem] relates more to 
farmers and weather factor such as lots of rain (MFSB59, P12). 
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This finding is consistent with Normanton (1971, as cited in Coy et al. 2001) who 
argued that to be accountable means to give reasons for, and explanations of, actions 
taken.  
 
7.3.6.5 Improve stakeholders’ understanding on MFSB 
One MFSB (5%) identified that the reporting of accountability information is driven 
by the intention of the preparers to enhance stakeholders‘ understanding on MFSB. 
For example, analysis of financial performance is made and shown in the reports 
because providing figures per se may not give much meaning to the lay readers. This 
has been highlighted by one MFSB through the following: 
... because that [i.e. analysis of financial performance] is basically our way or 
technique to show our [financial] status. If we don‘t have that, how could we 
show our [financial status?] ... [because] by just reading the financial 
statements, [lay] people won‘t be able to understand [much]. (MFSB80, P17) 
 
This is important as a poorly informed public may make unjustified criticism towards 
public sector entities as claimed by Likierman (1992, as cited in Coy et al., 2001).  
 
In Section 7.3, it was shown in Table 7.1 that there are 25 categorised reasons for 
disclosure identified from the interviews. These reasons are derived from the 53 coded 
reasons. Figure 7.1 above graphically shows that all these reasons can be grouped into 
six themes namely the ‗nature of data‘, ‗implication of reporting‘, ‗tradition‘, ‗external 
influence‘, ‗internal influence‘ and ‗awareness‘. The most common theme is the 
‗external influence‘ where the reasons associated with it was mentioned by interviewees 
33 times. This is then followed by the ‗awareness theme (21 times). The third most 
common theme is both the ‗nature of data‘ (13 times) and the ‗implication of reporting‘ 
(13 times) theme. The ‗internal influence‘ is the fourth common theme (7 times) while 
the ‗tradition‘ theme is the least common theme with only two occurrences.  
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The most common reason cited is ‗adaptation of the reporting practices of others‘ (refer 
to Section 7.3.4.3) and ‗enlightening stakeholders on MFSB functions, aims and 
activities‘ (refer to Section 7.3.6.1) where 50 and 45 per cent of the MFSB respectively 
mentioned these reasons as their motivation to disclose accountability information.  
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7.3.7 Graphical Summary of Reasons for Disclosure 
 
Figure 7.1: Graphical Summary of Reasons for Disclosure 
REASONS FOR 
DISCLOSURE 
NATURE OF DATA 
(13) 
•core activity 
•agenda 
• impact 
IMPLICATION  
OF REPORTING  
(13) 
•change 
• resources 
• references 
•competetiveness 
•morale 
TRADITION 
(2) 
•own EXTERNAL INFLUENCE/PUSH  
(33) 
•statutory requirements 
•other guidelines 
•others' practices 
•anticipate public concern 
• respond to public concern 
•Federal government influence 
•parent company inluence 
INTERNAL 
INFLUENCE/PUSH (7) 
•supply by other 
•management commitment 
•board influence 
• internal procedure 
AWARENESS  
(21) 
• function, activities 
•strength & commitment 
•achievements & 
nonachievement 
• justify 
•understanding 
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7.4 The Reasons for Not Disclosing Accountability Information in the Annual   
            Reports 
 
In analysing the interview data on the reasons or hindrance for nondisclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports, steps similar to those taken in Section 
7.3 were undertaken.  
 
From the analysis, a total of 58 reasons were extracted from the interview data (refer to 
Table 7.2). From there, 21 categories were identified and consequently six themes 
emerged from the data. The themes are: (i) nature of data, (ii) implication of reporting, 
(iii) tradition, (iv) demand, (v) resource, and (vi) preparer. 
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Table 7.2: Reasons for Not Disclosing Accountability Information 
No. Reasons for Nondisclosure (Coded) 
MFSB 
mentioning 
them 
Frequencies  
(No. of 
MFSB)  
Categorised Reasons for Nondisclosure (No. of MFSB) 
Theme  
(Total 
occurrence) 
1 
not important / not significant   
 
4, 21, 85, 59, 
44, 109, 64, 
47, 48 
9 
1-Data is not significant to the MFSB or its stakeholders  
   (12) 
Nature of 
Data  
(34) 
2 not the organisation‘s concern / focus  57, 64 2 
3 not necessary; because internal matters 38 1 
4 not relevant because  do not have the item  
4, 59, 44, 64, 
47, 56, 48, 
57,80,109 
10 
2-Data is irrelevant to the organisation (10) 
5 technical problem  21 1 3-Difficulties in data collection/presentation (9) 
  6 lack of data  21, 64, 48,13 4 
7 no exact information  80 1 
8 information keep changing  80 1 
9 no standard information  38 1 
10 difficult to measure  48 1 
11 negative information – keep internal 21, 63, 64 2 4-Data privacy (3) 
12 confidential  57 1 
13 not useful to the organisation; only useful for other parties  59 1 5-Lack of benefit from reporting (13) Implication of 
Reporting 
(27) 
14 no difference  to the MFSB whether report or not  114, 59 2 
15 
redundant: already available (albeit indirectly) in the annual 
report  or available in other mediums such as in 
memorandum, in another type of report or on website  
21, 63, 64, 4, 
13, 57, 38,56 
7 
16 
redundant: already available in others‘ medium for example 
supplied by parent company in their annual report or 
supplied in ministry‘s website  
13, 56 2 
17 simple data is enough, as long as not misleading  109 1 
18 management assessment on implication of reporting 85 1 6-Avoiding ‗harm‘ to operations, finances, and performance  
   (4) 19 may be harmful to organisation  21, 64 2 
20 avoid loss of customers  21 1 
21 some things are uncontrollable  13, 38 2 7-Avoiding misunderstandings (3) 
22 some things are unavoidable  85 1 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
23 
do not want to expose the organisation to the public and 
focus on core business only  
59 1 
8-Avoiding excessive exposure (4) 
 
  
 
24 small organisation 4, 59 2 
25 have little to offer  21 1 
26 avoid ridicule the board  59 1 9-Avoiding uneasiness among members (3) 
27 to avoid members feeling uncomfortable  80,64 2 
28 following previous practice  21, 47, 85, 19 4 
10-Nondisclosure in previous annual reports (4) 
 
Tradition  
(9) 
29 no query from ministerial level, cabinet  4 1 11-No reporting issues raised by authorities (4) 
 30 never commented by ministry  85 1 
31 not commented / endorsed by Auditor General  85, 48 2 
32 gain exemption from following circular 44 1 
12-Exempted from following Treasury reporting guideline  
     (1) 
33 limited reader / user of the specific information 21 1 13-Lack of users or readers of the information (7) Demand  
(11) 34 not public / readers concern  38, 47 2 
35 people already know  85, 56 2 
36 well understood; reporting not necessary 85 1 
37 limited readers of annual report  47 1 
38 not in circular  114 1 14-Not required or requested by coordinator, management 
or authorities (4) 
 
39 not requested by management  21 1 
40 not requested by the person coordinating the annual report  64 1 
41 available upon request  109 1 
42 avoid overspending  48 1 15-Financial constraint (3) 
 
Resource  
(5) 43 consume page and printing cost  38,  48 2 
44 rushing deadline  64 1 16-Time constraint (1) 
45 not relying on government money  4 1 17-Financial independence (1) 
46 
lack of authority to get information because has no position 
in the organisation   
21 1 
18-Lack of authority/control by coordinators/preparers (11) Preparer  
(24) 
47 
no authority to get information because it‘s other 
department‘s task 
19, 21, 85, 63, 
38, 94, 64 
7 
48 management decide   114 1 
49 do not interfere into chairman message  19 1 
50  beyond MFSB control 38 1 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
51 not aware/ don‘t check the circular  19, 27,94,109 4 19-Lack of awareness and commitment among preparers (6)  
52 overlooked / mistakenly left out  48 1 
53 corporate division don‘t follow the circular  94 1 
54 no collaborative effort among divisions  94 1 20-Lack of collaboration and cooperation among MFSB 
      units (4) 55 no team or committee  85, 94 2 
56 lack of cooperation  21 1 
57 lack of understanding of the item itself  85, 64 2 21-Lack of understanding among preparers (3) 
58 implied lack of understanding  56 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 
 
7.4.1 Theme One: Nature of Data  
MFSB mentioned during the interview that among the reasons why certain 
accountability information is not disclosed is that;  
(i) data is not significant to the MFSB or stakeholders; 
(ii) data is irrelevant to the organisation;  
(iii) difficulties in data collection; and/or  
(iv) data privacy. 
 
The above reasons generally relate to the nature of the information itself and as such can 
be grouped into one common theme, which is labelled ‗nature of data‘. The following 
elaborates each reason under this theme. 
 
7.4.1.1 Data is not significant to the MFSB or its stakeholders 
Through the interview it was gathered from more than half of the MFSB (12 MFSB or 
60%) that it is unnecessary to disclose some of the accountability information because 
the data is not important or significant to the organisation itself (MFSB4,P1). 
Accountability information will not be reported if the information is not the concern or 
focus of that particular organisation (MFSB64,P25). For example, some viewed that the 
attendance of board members in meetings is not an issue of concern in their organisation 
as their Act has already taken good care of this provision and therefore disclosure is 
unnecessary. The following comment was made by one MFSB related to their 
nondisclosure of the board of directors in board meetings: 
 Their [i.e. board members] attendance is conditioned by our Act [where] ... 
unless the quorum is filled, the meeting may not be conducted. [And] Most of 
the time, the quorum is filled. Meaning that, every organisation in the board – 
always makes sure that their representative attends the meeting. So, if it‘s not the 
member who came, the alternate member will come. So our concern is – as long 
as the quorum is filled – [that] should be fine.  And just to let you know – if for 
three consecutive times, an organisation does not attend the board meeting by 
not sending their representative(s) – we can request for the termination of 
appointment – [and] that is stated in our Act. (MFSB57, P11 
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Sometimes, information is not reported simply because it pertains to internal affairs. 
Reporting such matters externally is seen as unnecessary: ―regarding rewards [to staff], 
we don‘t include it in the report - because it pertains to internal affairs‖ (MFSB38, P20).  
 
7.4.1.2 Data is irrelevant to the organisation  
Among the reasons for nondisclosure is the lack of relevance of the information to the 
organisation as argued by 10 MFSB (50%). Some items are irrelevant because the 
organisation does not possess the item in their organisation as in the example of certain 
assets or properties. Several organisations, due to their nature, do not own properties. 
The following comment was made by one MFSB that is not allowed to own properties. 
As such, any accountability information related to properties is regarded as irrelevant to 
this organisation and hence results in nondisclosure.  
 Our regulation doesn‘t allow us to buy any properties such as land, [and] 
buildings. All that we have including farms, plantations and properties – all these 
are owned by Company L – and we [only] manage them. So that‘s why we do 
not disclose things related to properties - because they are not ours. (MFSB59, 
P12) 
 
Another example is in the case of financial ratios, which have a very low disclosure 
level in MFSB annual reports as presented earlier in Section 5.4.3. There was a response 
saying that financial ratios such as liquidity ratio are not relevant for MFSB as they are 
commonly known as a useful analytical tool for the private sector only (MFSB48, P32).  
We are statutory bodies where each of our budget is approved by MOF [i.e. then 
Ministry of Finance]. They give [money] to us, and that is the amount that we 
spent. So the whole thing is about spending the money … and not how much 
profit you get. (MFSB56, P28) 
 
Another MFSB also pointed out the same reason for nondisclosure: ―we follow the 
guidelines – wherever relevant and necessary. Concerning the board of directors, 
financial assistance, and whatnot – we have none [of that, and that‘s why we do not 
disclose them in our report]‖ (MFSB4, P2). Similarly, in the case of the nondisclosure 
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of the main lawyers of MFSB, it was expressed during the interview that the item is not 
relevant to the organisation as no external service is acquired from private legal firms. 
One large MFSB explained that since they have their own legal unit, their lawyers are in 
fact their internal officers (MFSB109, P23) while another MFSB expressed that any 
legal matters are handled by the legal unit of their Ministry (MFSB48, P30). In both 
cases, the information on main lawyers is regarded by the MFSB as irrelevant for 
disclosure. This partly explains the result found in Phase 1 regarding the lack of 
disclosure of information on main lawyers (refer to Section 5.4.1). 
 
7.4.1.3 Difficulties in data collection/presentation 
Almost half of the MFSB interviewed (9 MFSB or 45%) raised issues related to the 
difficulty in data collection and presentation including the insufficient availability of 
data (MFSB21,P5), lack of accuracy in data (MFSB80, P17), constantly changing data 
(MFSB80, P17), non-standardized data (MFSB38,P20) and technical issues in 
measuring data (MFSB48,P30). An example of this is the statutory timeliness 
information. One MFSB (MFSB13, P8) mentioned that their nondisclosure is because 
they have no exact information about it as the agency submitting the report to the 
Ministry/Parliament is their parent company. This may partly provide explanation for 
the lack of disclosure of statutory timeliness as found earlier in Phase 1 (refer to Section 
5.4.1). Similarly, in the case of information on staff satisfaction, it was explained by one 
interviewee that: ―it is not reported because the data is not available. No such survey on 
staff satisfaction was done although it had been done once before‖ (MFSB64, P24).  
This partly provides an explanation on the very low disclosure level found on staff 
satisfaction in Phase 1 earlier (refer to Section 5.4.4).  
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Another respondent (MFSB38, P20) mentioned that non-standardization or complexity 
of data is among the reason for their nondisclosure of accountability information. The 
example given here is on business hours, which is one of the two least disclosed item in 
the index (refer to Section 5.4.1). According to them, there is no standard operating 
hours for their business as it varies among branch locations. For example, branches 
which are located in those states in Malaysia with Fridays and Saturday as their 
weekend while Sundays is a working day (e.g. Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah) will 
have different working hours than the rest, as even their Thursday working hours is less 
by one hour. In addition, if the office has counters, the office hours and the counter 
hours may also vary. These issues complicate the presentation and their report may 
appear cluttered if this information is included. 
 
In Phase 1, we noted the low level of disclosure on efficiency information as shown in 
Section 5.4.4. One of the reasons given for nondisclosure of performance or efficiency 
information is due to the difficulties in measuring data as illustrated below: 
... there are no specific numbers [to be used as a benchmark]. So in what way is 
efficiency measured? Maybe in one year – there seems to be less activities for 
example, only 15 activities. But those activities – their ‗weight‘ may be heavy in 
a sense. [So I felt] Maybe - the quantitativeness issue [to measure efficiency] – 
needs to be looked into [and deliberated upon to allow efficiency and 
performance to be carefully measured]. (MFSB21, P30) 
 
A similar observation was made by Christensen & Skaerbaek (2007) where 
interviewees indicated that preparing public sector annual report in Denmark is a 
frustrating process due to changes in data as well as measurement difficulties. The 
example given is that five-year analysis of profit and loss is not possible or appropriate 
and as such key ratios and unit costs for example keep on changing due to changes in 
activities as a result of changes in political, financial and professional priorities. It was 
also expressed that only 30 per cent of their activities can be appropriately measured. 
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7.4.1.4 Data privacy  
The final reason pertaining to the ‗nature of data‘ theme is the issue of privacy or 
secrecy. This was mentioned as a reason for nondisclosure by three MFSB (15%). It 
was indicated that negative information such as problems faced by organisations in 
carrying out their programs or activities are not suitable to be reported in annual reports. 
Such information should be treated as internal information and accordingly should be 
kept and addressed only internally (MFSB21,P5). As a result, sensitive information 
such as staff satisfaction is not reported (MFSB64,P25). According to MFSB64, their 
organisation is yet to be as ‗strong‘ as those organisations reporting their staff 
satisfaction information in facing the consequences of reporting should there be low 
level of staff satisfaction as will be later discussed in Section 7.4.2.5. Annual reports, 
according to a few MFSB, should be used to highlight achievements and not problems. 
The following response illustrates their view: 
For us, we don‘t have to show to external people the problems we are having - 
simply because it‘s not suitable. When people look at annual reports, they want 
to know about achievements only. So we don‘t have to tell our problems and 
whatnot. [At least] That‘s what we thought. Because problems is for MFSB63 
[i.e. internal], whatever it is, we will solve it internally. [In fact]  I think even 
other agencies don‘t disclose their problems. (MFSB63, P16) 
 
  
Another issue arises from the confidentiality of the information (MFSB57,P10). MFSB 
considers compensation or remuneration of senior management, for example, is 
confidential data and is therefore not disclosed.  
 
7.4.2 Theme Two: Implication of Reporting 
According to several MFSB, sometimes accountability information is not disclosed in 
their annual reports because MFSB;  
(i) do not find any benefit from the reporting of the information;  
(ii) want to avoid ‗harm‘ to their operations, finances and performance; 
(iii) want to avoid misunderstandings;  
(iv) want to avoid excessive exposure; and  
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(v) want to avoid uneasiness among members. 
 
The above reasons appear to focus on post-event issues. As such, the thesis grouped 
them under a common theme named the ‗implication of reporting‘ theme.  
 
7.4.2.1 Lack of benefit from reporting 
More than two-thirds of the MFSB interviewed (i.e. 13 MFSB or 65%) explained that 
their reason for not reporting accountability information partly arises from the lack of 
benefit of reporting certain information to their organisations. In some cases, reporting 
the item either does not make any difference to the organisation (MFSB114,P4), or it 
only benefits other parties (MFSB59,P12). In this case, the organisation will choose not 
to disclose that particular information. The following comment illustrates how the 
decision of nondisclosure is influenced by the fact that the information does not benefit 
the reporting MFSB but rather other parties: ―to us – even if we disclose [information 
on external auditor] – it‘s more like marketing to the external auditor – so we thought 
that it‘s not very relevant information to be included in the annual report‖ (MFSB59, 
P12). 
 
In addition, according to the interviewees, nondisclosure of certain information is 
because there already exists sufficient information which makes disclosing such 
information redundant (MFSB21,P5). The same information is already available albeit 
indirectly. Sometimes, accountability information is already available elsewhere in 
other medium(s) of reporting such as in memorandums to the ministry (MFSB13,P9) or 
in the organisation‘s website (MFSB57,P10). For example, information on business 
hours (ADIS8) is already available on the MFSB website and therefore is not useful to 
be reported in annual reports (MFSB38, P20). This explains why business hours is 
among the least disclosed item of the index as presented earlier in Section 5.4.1. Other 
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times it is available in the reports of other related organisations as in the case whereby 
the information has already been supplied by the parent company in their annual report 
(MFSB13,P9) or in the relevant ministry‘s website (MFSB56,P28). The following 
comment is an example of nondisclosure due to the availability of similar information in 
other organisational mediums: 
Actually, we have another report...FMP [i.e. Financial Management and 
Planning Committee] report. It‘s an internal report for board members. [This 
report is] Sufficient, because that [i.e. the board] is the highest in MFSB57. And 
further, because that report is also viewed by the ministry. (MFSB57, P10) 
 
 
In addition, one MFSB expressed the view that there is no use reporting too much 
information in the annual report. The MFSB maintains that as long as it is not meant to 
mislead the readers, not showing or disclosing certain information or analysis is a non- 
issue. Below is the response of the concerned MFSB made in relation to their 
nondisclosure of comparative financial analysis; 
Some of them [i.e. the figures of previous years], we actually have. The only 
thing is that – we didn‘t disclose the analysis. But to us, [this is just fine as long 
as] it‘s not something that‘s misleading; except that you [read: we] don‘t have 
[read: show] the comparison. [And it‘s] Not [presented] in a way that [i.e. we] 
misleads the public. (MFSB109, P23) 
 
7.4.2.2 Avoiding ‘harm’ to operations, finances and performance  
The next reason that falls under this ‗implication of reporting‘ theme is to avoid 
potential harm to an organisation‘s operations and performance. This was indicated 
during the interview by 4 MFSB (20%). Based on data collected from interviews, 
management‘s assessment on the implications of reporting certain information plays a 
role on the decision to include or exclude that particular information (MFSB85,P7). If 
the assessment shows that reporting a particular piece of information would harm the 
organisation, the MFSB would choose not to report the information. This is consistent 
with the argument by Lee & Fisher (2004) that potential loss of competitive advantage 
may lead to reduce the level of disclosure. Potential harm or loss of competitive 
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advantage may include loosing potential business partners or customers (MFSB21,P5), 
the organisation being taken over by other parties or negative impact on future funding 
(MFSB64,P25). The following comment is from MFSB that fear disclosure might affect 
their opportunities for future projects and therefore opt to not disclose the information 
(on problems encountered). 
[Imagine] If the stakeholders read [the problems encountered by organisation], 
[they would say] ―Uh, there are so many problems in MFSB21, so how are we 
going to get involved with them‖. So [that‘s why] normally they [i.e. the unit 
heads] will only disclose [information] concerning what has already been 
resolved [instead of current unresolved problems]. (MFSB21, P5) 
 
 
There are also MFSB who shared that their disclosure of certain accountability 
information is made reluctantly, as by doing so, they are actually putting themselves at 
risk; risk of losing future funding and risk of losing their assets. This is in line with the 
findings by Christensen & Skaerbaek‘s (2007) whereby the New South Wales public 
agency cautioned that their social and environmental reporting should not result to a 
resource reduction, given that there are 28 agencies competing for the same fund. The 
following comment provide an example of MFSB not disclosing information for fear of 
losing their assets and future funding. 
As for departments and agencies, we are at risk if we disclose whatever assets 
we have because we are statutory bodies, and not private entities. People [i.e. the 
government] can take it away when they know about it. Even now, there are 
many things they already want from us [to the extent] that we are already getting 
tired [of the request] to the extent that we said ―Oh, it‘s so tiring ... just entertain 
them [i.e. by fulfilling their request]‖. For example, they want our complex, they 
want our subsidiaries. And all these are actually [the impact of them knowing 
our assets] based on the data that we provide [in the annual report]. But this [i.e. 
requirement to disclose] is in the circular [so we have no choice]. If they know 
that we have lands here and there they would think ―Oh, MFSB64 has already 
got lots of money so there‘s no need to provide them additional budget [read: 
grant or funding]‖. So it‘s risky for us [to disclose certain information]. 
(MFSB64, P25) 
 
 
298 
 
In Christensen & Skaerbaek (2007), a similar observation was made on the Danish 
public sector agency where the reporting agency explicitly decided to exclude data on 
material it felt might be disruptive to the agency. Similarly, a study found that in the 
case of New South Wales public agencies, the aggregated instead of the individual 
agencies performances are reported mainly to avoid users to adversely using the 
performance information to harm the individual agencies‘ interest. 
 
7.4.2.3 Avoiding misunderstandings 
Nondisclosure may also be due to trying to avoid misunderstanding among stakeholders 
towards the organisation. Three MFSB (15%) described this as their hindrance from 
disclosure. Misunderstanding may occur when the failures or non-performance are a 
result of certain uncontrollable (MFSB13,P9) or unavoidable circumstances (e.g. flood, 
cuts in government budget, etc.) (MFSB85,P7). In this respect, if it is anticipated that 
the disclosure of the failures (non-achievements) or non-performance would wrongly 
and/or adversely impact on the public perception of the respective MFSB, they may 
then choose to exclude reporting such information. The following is from one MFSB 
who believes that the nondisclosure of KPI achievements by some MFSB is to avoid 
such misunderstandings:  
... [They] don‘t want people to know that they haven‘t achieved [the KPI] 
because [for] certain KPI involves costs – that is financial costs. So [for 
example], in the years where we [read: they] get additional grants maybe the 
achievement would be better [than those years without grants]. [Take for 
example,] the maintenance unit. Let‘s say they want to repair the roof which is 
part of the KPI to maintain buildings - but when it comes to allocation – there 
was no allocation for that. (MFSB38, P9) 
 
In the above case, according to MFSB38, it will not be fair for any MFSB to be judged 
against its KPI, because, to achieve the KPI, they rely on allocations from the 
government. Whereas for that year there have been no allocations for that particular 
activity (i.e. maintenance). Hence, KPI achievements are not reported for that year. 
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Another example of this situation is when the attendance of the board of directors is not 
disclosed because their absence is for genuine reasons such as attending other similarly 
important meetings. Hence, to avoid public misunderstanding, such information is not 
reported: 
Their [i.e. board members‘] attendance is quite good but they sometimes have 
many other places that they need to attend. They have many other commitments 
so this is what we do not want to disclose to people, because it will show to the 
public – the indirect stakeholders - what is happening [although the reason for 
nonattendance is justified].  (MFSB85, P7) 
 
 
This finding is consistent with the argument made by Likierman (1992, as cited in Coy 
et al. 2001) that reporting is a vicious circle. If reporting is poor, it may lead to 
unjustified criticisms on public sector entities by a poorly informed public and to 
defensiveness on the part of the entity as a result. In the above case, MFSB disclose 
accountability information to avoid such possible occurrences. 
 
7.4.2.4 Avoiding excessive exposure 
One-fifth of the MFSB (4 MFSB) stated that their nondisclosure of certain 
accountability information is partly to avoid excessive exposure. A few MFSB 
acknowledge that due to their small size or operation, they prepare only a very simple 
and straightforward annual report so as to avoid exposing themselves to the public 
(MFSB4, P1). The content of their annual report therefore only focuses on their core 
business: 
We ourselves are a subsidiary of one [government] agency – we are not a proper 
federal agency. We are a subsidiary of Agency M. We are low profile. [Whereas 
for] Agency A – they have their own reports – of which I can see - are very 
detailed. For us – just as long as what we are doing is there, our activity is there 
– that would be fine. Things like assets – there‘s no need to include them. 
(MFSB59,P12) 
 
In addition, it is also out of fear of not being able to fulfil customer requests that 
disclosure was not made (MFSB21,P5). MFSB argued that they had little to offer to the 
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readers and thus it is safer to avoid comprehensive disclosure than to expose their 
inability to provide sufficient supply in the future. 
 
7.4.2.5 Avoiding uneasiness among members 
The final reason for nondisclosure under this theme is to avoid the feeling of uneasiness 
among members of the organisation. This was the response of three MFSB (15%). This 
finding is consistent with the argument by Normanton (1971, as quoted by Ryan et al., 
2002b) where information that may cause embarrassments can be omitted from annual 
report as they are the ones who decide on its content. For example, in this study, 
disclosing the qualifications and education of the board of directors - which is practiced 
in the corporate world – may ridicule the board (MFSB59,P12).  It was expressed that 
the disclosure of this information may not be appropriate in the context of MFSB due to 
the different natures of the board of directors in these two types of organisation (i.e. the 
MFSB and private corporations), which may justify the difference between the results 
found between MFSB and many private sector disclosure studies regarding the 
influence of board size and disclosure level (refer to Section 6.6.2). The difference lies 
among others, in their nature of appointment, responsibilities and rewards to name a 
few. The following comment elaborates this matter further: 
[The difference is that] Board of directors [in MFSB] are appointed by the 
minister - that‘s one. Being the board member [of MFSB], is unlike the 
corporate [sector] ... whereby in the corporate sector, they are paid ... [I mean] 
they are well paid ... [whereas] over here [in MFSB], it‘s just kind of a token. So 
if we were to have so much requirements for a board [such as disclosure of their 
education and qualification], then we might make them feel it‘s not worth being 
a board member of the MFSB. Based on that, if we [require to] disclose too 
many things [about the board members], we are afraid that they become 
uncomfortable [and hence not interested to serve as board members]. (MFSB80, 
P17) 
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Another example of nondisclosure due to avoidance of uneasiness among members of 
the organisation is in the case of staff satisfaction information. It was expressed that 
disclosing this information may ―embarrass the management particularly when the 
information shows that staff are not satisfied‖ (MFSB64, P25); this partly explains the 
result on low disclosure level found regarding staff satisfaction information as presented 
in Section 5.4.4 of Phase 1. 
 
7.4.3 Theme Three: Tradition  
MFSB mentioned during the interview that certain accountability information is not 
disclosed because;  
(i) it has not been disclosed in previous annual reports; 
(ii) there had been no issues raised by any authorities on the nondisclosure of the 
item in previous reports; and/or  
(iii) MFSB gain exemptions from following the Treasury reporting guideline. 
 
Generally, these three reasons relate to the notion that MFSB do not disclose 
accountability information because they are simply following certain established 
practices. As such, these reasons are classified into one common theme labelled in this 
thesis as ‗tradition‘. The following section explains these three reasons further. 
 
7.4.3.1 Nondisclosure in previous annual reports 
Four MFSB (20%) emphasised that they do not report certain accountability 
information because the item has not been reported in previous annual reports 
(MFSB85,P7). In other words, MFSB are just following what traditionally have been 
done (or rather have not been done) previously. Here is one such comment to this effect: 
―once we have read the first one [i.e. the previous annual report], and then to do the next 
one, we enter ‗auto-pilot‘ [i.e. simply follow the same format] after that‖ (MFSB19, 
P3). The same comment is made by another MFSB when asked on why comparison 
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figures on reserves and noncurrent liabilities are not provided: ―I‘d say mainly because 
... we just follow the same format as previously (MFSB47, P27). 
 
 
7.4.3.2 No reporting issues raised by authorities  
This reason is related to the previous reason. One-fifth of the MFSB (4 MFSB) 
informed that they take it as a form of endorsement of their reporting practices if the 
relevant authority, to whom the annual reports are submitted - such as the A-G or the 
respective ministries - never raise comments on particular disclosure issues or items. In 
the subsequent years following the non-commentary, the same reporting practices will 
be followed. For example, a few MFSB expressed that since the A-G has not 
commented on the nondisclosure of accountability information items related to an 
organisation‘s finances, it implies that nondisclosure of these items is a nonissue and 
thus they can continue reporting on their financial aspects the same way until such a 
time a comment is made. They confidently expressed that the fact that the A-G has 
reviewed and approved their financial reports (with the nondisclosure of certain 
financial-related items) implies that their annual reports – particularly concerning 
financial items - has met the necessary statutory requirements.  No further disclosure is 
thus needed in the coming years although the item is explicitly required by the circular. 
Below are their comments; 
This [i.e. the financial report] has been endorsed by the Auditor General 
Department [in previous years]. So let‘s say if their [i.e. the accounts unit] 
financial report doesn‘t follow the requirements, normally the Auditor General 
would return it back to them [i.e. the accounts unit]. (MFSB85, P7) 
 
What we get from the Audit General [i.e. the financial statement], that is what 
we present in the annual report – that‘s it, because almost every year, it [i.e. the 
situation] is the same. [Nevertheless,] If they request the thing [i.e. the 
information] from us, we‘ll [certainly] do it. (MFSB48, P32) 
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Similarly, according to some MFSB, lack of query and comments from those at the 
ministerial level as well as in the Cabinet and Parliament implies that they have met the 
necessary requirements set by these parties. One MFSB, with a very low level of 
disclosure, makes the following comments as justification for their low levels of 
reporting: 
From my experience since 1999 until now, so far all the annual reports that we 
prepared, the JPM [i.e. Prime Minister‘s Department] never queried. The Cabinet 
also do not say anything. Even the Parliament – when we submit the annual 
report - they don‘t say anything [related to nondisclosure]. That‘s what I‘ve 
experience so far. (MFSB4, P2) 
 
 
In short, the MFSB felt that as long as there are no comments or queries from the 
authorities who read or monitor their annual reports, it implies that their annual report s 
are of an acceptable standard and no further disclosure is necessary. 
 
7.4.3.3 Exempted from following Treasury reporting guideline 
One unique reason for nondisclosure that was revealed during the interview process 
pertains to exemptions from following the circular awarded to certain MFSB. This 
situation is found in one of the interviewed MFSB (5%), namely MFSB44. They 
indicated that their operations resemble a corporation more so than a statutory body. 
According to them, since their inception they‘ve been exempted by the Treasury from 
following the circular (i.e.TC15/1994 or TC4/2007). The reason for this, according to 
them, is that they are adapting a much higher level of reporting guidelines based on 
local and international guidelines and best reporting practices. Accordingly, their 
benchmark of reporting is not the circular but those guidelines and samples of best 
reporting practices. The circular, therefore, has not traditionally been adopted by them. 
As a result, some items in the circular are not reported. Furthermore, certain 
accountability information applicable to many MFSB is also not included in the reports 
of this organisation. The following quote elaborates their peculiar situation: 
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We didn‘t want to basically follow directly the format and the structure of it [i.e. 
the circular]. [It is] Because concerning our disclosure – what we intended was a 
lot more than that. So right from the beginning, we basically went back to the 
Treasury to basically get ourselves exempted from that [requirement]. And we 
started off with a very detailed disclosure right from the start. The justification 
[for the exemption requested and granted] was that our disclosure was above the 
minimum disclosure required under the circular [i.e. TC15/1994]. And it [i.e. the 
exemption] is also [applied] as [it was] advised by our auditors, to make sure that 
we are not caught in any technicalities, as far as the circular‘s requirements are 
concerned, since our financial statements are quite different to all other financial 
statements that were prepared under that circular at that time. (MFSB44,P14) 
 
 
7.4.4  Theme Four: Demands 
The fourth theme that emerged from the data is labelled ‗demand‘. MFSB indicated that 
they are not disclosing information of which:  
(i) there is a lack of users or readers who are interested to know about it; and/or 
(ii) not required nor requested by the coordinator, management or authorities. 
 
7.4.4.1 Lack of users or readers of the information 
The first reason under this theme is that there is a lack of people who will use this 
information. Seven MFSB (35%) stated this as their reason for nondisclosure of some 
accountability information. During the interviews, it was gathered that certain 
accountability information is not considered useful by the public or by those who 
benefit from annual reports. They are neither concerned nor interested in such 
information and as a result such information is not disclosed by MFSB in their reports, 
consistent with findings by Chatterjee et al. (2012) in their study on the infrastructure 
reporting among New Zealand local governments. The following comment illustrates 
this: 
The human resource information related to equal opportunity employment - we 
do not report according to age [for example] – because that‘s too detailed. So we 
just mention the number of our [staff] capacity as at 31
st
 December – and that‘s it 
... because people are not interested to know about that. In the annual report, 
people are more interested to know about performance. (MFSB38, P20) 
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In addition, some information is not disclosed as certain MFSB feel that the information 
may benefit only a very small group of people and thus only that group of people would 
be using such information. Others may not find it useful or relevant: ―actually such 
information – we do have in the system – but ... because our assets are specific – 
specific to specific customer – [whereby] not everyone can think of what they can do to 
develop the x land‖ (MFSB21, P5). Similarly, in the case of financial ratios, it was 
stated that information on financial ratios are not presented in their reports as it is 
perceived that the information is of no use or relevance to their stakeholders – due to the 
non-profit oriented nature of MFSB (refer to Section 7.4.1.2) - and hence no users for 
the information (MFSB48, P32). This partly explains the low disclosure level for 
financial ratios as found in the quantitative phase (refer to Section 5.4.3). Christensen & 
Skaerbaek (2007) in their interview found similar scenario in the context of New South 
Wales public agency where the preparers doubt whether there are people who see the 
need of reporting the performance information. To a greater extent, Steccolini (2004) 
concluded in her study on Italian local government annual reports that they have no 
signiﬁcant role in communicating to external users. 
 
Furthermore, certain information is not disclosed because certain MFSB feel that people 
are already aware of such information by means of the nature of the organisation. Below 
is an example of a comment which shared this opinion: 
This one [i.e. CEO remuneration] is no problem [i.e. not an issue] you know ... 
because DG [i.e. Director General] is [at the salary scale of] BU4, so you know 
the scale because we [i.e. Malaysian civil servants] use such a scheme. So you 
already know [what the salary is for those at the salary scale of] BU4, BU5, 
[and] BU6. [That‘s why] There‘s no need to disclose this. (MFSB56, P28) 
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The example below illustrates a situation wherein nondisclosure is due to the fact that 
MFSB opined that the fact has been well understood by readers and thus does not 
require any disclosure. The information they are referring to is the Parliamentary Act for 
which the MFSB is established. 
We don‘t show the [Parliamentary] Act [of which we are established] because 
firstly, as a government body – they [i.e. readers] already know our Act. I think 
it‘s already understood. If you ask me, it‘s not that I think it‘s not important, but 
I think it is understood ... our statute is under Act X ... and this will remain as the 
statute and will not change [forever]. So basically that‘s why I didn‘t disclose the 
item [i.e. Parliamentary Act]. (MFSB85, P7) 
 
Furthermore, to a larger extent, lack of disclosure of accountability information is 
because MFSB feel that there are no readers of the annual report itself: ―[It is] not useful 
[to disclose the analysis of financial performance] because I don‘t see anyone reading 
the annual reports of statutory bodies. Who are the readers? [I am saying this because] 
They [read: We, the MFSB] don‘t have shareholders, right?‖ (MFSB47, 27). The 
comment above compares MFSB with corporations. The latter, according to the above 
interviewee, has many interested readers of annual reports especially shareholders who 
are keen to know whether the company is doing well or otherwise financially. 
 
7.4.4.2 Not required or requested by coordinator, management or authorities 
One-fifth of MFSB (4 MFSB) argue that items are not included if it is not required by 
the circular (MFSB114,P4).  Example is information on the parent ministry of the 
MFSB. Since there is no requirement by TC4/2007 for MFSB to disclose which federal 
ministry serves as their governing ministry, this information is not disclosed by some 
MFSB. This may partly explain the results found in Phase 1 regarding disclosure levels 
of parent ministry information which shows only slightly more than half of MFSB 
disclosing this information (refer to Section 5.4.1). Chatterjee et al. (2012) found a 
similar reason for the non-reporting of infrastructure information in annual reports of 
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New Zealand local governments where lack of legislative requirements is one reason for 
the nondisclosure. Besides the lack of requirement in the circular, top management may 
also become a factor for nondisclosure. This can happen when higher management fail 
to understand the need of including certain accountability information, and accordingly, 
do not demand and encourage their subordinate(s) to include such information in their 
reports. Lack of directives and emphasis by top management may not only lead to 
nondisclosure but may also make it difficult for the coordinating person, who 
understands the importance and need of reporting the accountability information, to get 
the needed information from his/her colleagues. The lack of managerial support in 
public sector report preparation has also been observed in other studies such as 
Christensen & Skaerbaek (2007). This predicament observed in this present study is 
reflected in the example below which was made in relation to the interviewee‘s 
difficulty to solicit the cooperation of various divisions in supplying the required data to 
be included in the annual report: 
... I don‘t know... maybe after Mr. A came in, [if] he thinks that [information] is 
necessary [that would make it much easier for me to get the information I 
wanted] - because he has served quite some time in the ministry [so, I would 
expect that he may be able to see the importance of disclosing the information]. 
[If that happens then] I would have a strong reason to force them [i.e. the other 
staff] to include [that information]. (MFSB21, P5) 
 
Furthermore, nondisclosure may also be because it was not requested by the person 
coordinating or compiling the annual report, as indicated in the following comment: 
―we have [the KPI] ... just that we don‘t show it in our annual report ... [because] we 
depend on the request of people who are in charge of the annual report‖ (MFSB64, 
P25). It was also specifically stated by one MFSB that although some of the information 
is not disclosed in the annual report, they are always willing to provide it to anyone 
should there be a request made: ―... you [i.e. the readers] are not given the figures for 
previous years [in the same report] ... but then if anyone would like to know the 
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previous years‘ figure, we are all ready to give them the [previous years‘] report‖ 
(MFSB109, P23). 
 
7.4.5 Theme Five: Resources 
Some MFSB have also responded that the nondisclosure of accountability information 
in their annual reports is partly related to the resources that they either have or don‘t 
have. Resource constraints may be in terms of either financial or time constraints. On 
the other hand, their financial independence from government funds is also a reason for 
nondisclosure. These resources-related reasons are categorised under the ‗resources‘ 
theme in this thesis. 
 
7.4.5.1 Financial constraint 
It was revealed from the interview that cost is one factor that influenced three MFSB 
(15%) regarding their decision to disclose or not disclose certain accountability 
information. According to them, more disclosure may mean more printing costs as a 
result of more pages to be printed. An example is the inclusion of information for 
business hours (ADIS8) particularly for those MFSB having a number of branches 
nationwide and those having different office and counter hours (MFSB38,P20). This 
explanation partly clarifies why business hours information is rarely being disclosed by 
MFSB (refer to Section 5.4.1). They are limited by restrictive budgets, which lead to 
limited publications of their annual report. This situation shows that there exists a 
negative relationship between fiscal stress and disclosure level where when the budget 
is restricted, there will be less disclosure (refer to Section 6.6.5). Below is the concern 
expressed by one MFSB on how budget can influence the nondisclosure of information 
on the profile of board members in their annual report: 
... for example, if you want to describe the education level of board members, 
[you must understand that] our board of directors is not few. There are more than 
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10 of them, with a maximum of 20 actually. [So] Let‘s say we were to fulfil all 
the 20 [positions], then [it means] we need to describe [the education 
background of] each of them. That may consume many pages. Actually before 
we send to printing, we already know - for a certain number of pages this is the 
cost [that we may incur]. So we try to keep the page numbers within a certain 
range so that the printing cost is within the budget. Otherwise, I might 
overspend. (MFSB48, P32) 
 
This finding supports the findings by Chatterjee et al. (2012) that lack of space in 
annual reports to report infrastructure information is one reason for its nondisclosure. It 
also confirms the concern expressed by Dixon et al. (1991) that financial constraint 
forms part of the problem of insufficient accountability information. Coy et al (2001) 
raised a similar concern where according to them cost-benefit consideration is 
something that needs to be acknowledged beside the arguments advanced in support of 
comprehensive reporting given that accountability reporting is virtually without limits. 
Nelson et al. (2003) and Coy et al. (2001) however further argued that only the one-time 
start-up cost is substantial for accountability reporting; once the systems are in place, 
the costs of increased accountability information is minimal. In fact, for some 
organisations which have the information readily available as they are required for 
internal purposes, their cost of reporting accountability information is much lower 
 
7.4.5.2 Time constraint 
Time constraints was also highlighted by one MFSB (5%) as a challenge to reporting 
consequently resulting to nondisclosure of accountability information. Compiling 
information consumes time while the deadline for submission given by the respective 
authorities (e.g. Ministry of Finance through the circular) is relatively short. Below is 
one comment that illustrates how a tight deadline may result in nondisclosure: ―there is 
data which is difficult to acquire and takes time to obtain. We are sometimes rushing 
towards the deadline [to the extent] that we can‘t get the data within the allotted period‖ 
(MFSB64, P24). Similar finding was revealed in Chatterjee et al.‘s  (2012) study where 
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the lack of local governments‘ resources in regard to time (or time pressure) was 
highlighted by interviewee (i.e. preparer) as one reason for the nonreporting of most of 
the financial and nonfinancial  infrastructure information in the New Zealand local 
governments‘ annual report. 
 
 
7.4.5.3 Financial independence 
One MFSB (5%) revealed that since their organisation is not relying financially on 
government support, therefore there is no reason for them to follow the circular 
including reporting the required information: ―it is not necessarily for us to follow the 
guideline [including to reporting the required information]. In the case of many other 
MFSB, they have to follow the instruction [guideline], because they receive grants from 
the government‖ (MFSB4, P2). 
 
 
7.4.6 Theme Six: Preparers 
This theme refers to circumstances when nondisclosure is due to the internal issues 
revolving the preparers themselves. It especially arises during the preparation process of 
the annual report. The reasons mentioned by MFSB which fall under this theme are: 
(i) the lack of authority by the coordinators of the preparation of the annual 
report;  
(ii) the lack of awareness and commitment among preparers;  
(iii) the lack of collaboration and cooperation among MFSB units; and/or 
(iv) the lack of understanding among preparers. 
 
7.4.6.1 Lack of authority/control by coordinators/preparers 
It was gathered from the interview that more than half of the MFSB (i.e. 11 MFSB; 
55%) regarded the lack of authority by the person charged with obtaining accountability 
information from the respective personnel as one reason for their nondisclosure. This 
may be due to the person holding an inferior position compared to those from whom 
he/she must collect the necessary information making it difficult for the person to 
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perform his/her task. The following explanation is from a person experiencing such 
difficulties: 
... because we are of the same level [i.e. we are head of the units]. Unless [the 
higher level manager such as] Mr. A [i.e. the new senior manager] says to the 
head units directly – ―You need to do the graphs‖ [then only then will it perhaps 
work]. [So it is mainly] because we [i.e. me and staff in other units] are of the 
same grade. So if I talk to them [it‘s kind of not obliged on them] ... [they can 
easily argue by saying,] ―If I don‘t give, what are you going to do?‖ Of course it 
is ridiculous for me to report this to Mr. A [i.e. the top management] about such 
small matters. It won‘t look professional. (MFSB21, P5) 
 
A similar situation is the case of nondisclosure of financial content. Some MFSB claim 
that anything related to financial information is supplied by the finance or accounts unit 
or to a certain extent the external auditor (MFSB19,P3). They (i.e. the interviewees) are 
mere recipients of such information and thus will report accordingly to what has been 
given to them by the former and no amendments will be made to anything related to 
financial performance (MFSB63,P16). In other words, it was implied that they have no 
authority to ensure the accountability information related to financial matters is 
disclosed. As a result, they have no clue or idea on why certain financial information is 
excluded although required by the circular: ―on the analysis of the items [i.e. the ratios], 
it‘s not my duty. This [i.e. the analysis] is prepared by the finance department and 
whether the finance unit discloses this or not [it all] depends on them‖ (MFSB85, P7). 
The quantitative phase results presented Section 5.4.3 regarding the very low disclosure 
level of financial ratios may be partly explained by this interviewee‘s expression. 
 
In another instance, one MFSB indicated a similar scenario, but in the case of the 
statement of the chairman. The statement of the chairman is solely prepared by the 
chairman and is thus what he/she decides to include in his/her message is beyond their 
control and authority despite clear requirements by the circular to disclose specific 
things in the chairman message.  
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I think that‘s one thing; that‘s my principle. If it‘s the chairman message, you 
[i.e. the chairman] do it, [and] I don‘t do [prepare] it. Because we [i.e. the 
readers] would like to hear what he says. If he doesn‘t follow the guideline 
there‘s nothing much we can do. (MFSB19, P13) 
 
The lack of authority is also implied in the case of another MFSB which shared that 
some of the content in the annual report is solely decided by the management and they 
[i.e. the preparer / the interviewee] simply follow what they have been instructed. The 
following comment was made in relation to the nondisclosure of client charter in the 
organisation‘s report: ―it depends on the management. I don‘t really have the answer [on 
why client charter is not reported here]‖ (MFSB114, P4).  
 
The lack of control is also part of the reason for the lack of disclosure as indicated by 
one interviewee (MFSB38, P20). The example given is related to the information on 
public accountability timeliness. This information was said to have not been provided as 
the timeliness of their publication is not solely determined by them. Some external 
parties, such as the A-G has caused some delay to the publication when reviewing or 
auditing the MFSB accounts. This could help in explaining the very low level of 
disclosure on public accountability timeliness as found earlier in Section 5.4.1. 
 
7.4.6.2 Lack of awareness and commitment among preparers 
Six MFSB (30%) mentioned during the interview that the lack of awareness and 
commitment among preparers is one reason for nondisclosure. A few MFSB mentioned 
that they are not aware that certain items are required to be reported by the TC4/2007: 
―we report [our events] but not together at one place [as required]. I didn‘t know that it 
is mandatory [to list the events]‖ (MFSB27, P6). This comment relates to the 
requirement to disclose the list of main events carried out throughout the year. This 
finding supports the claim by Mussari & Monfardini (2010) that standards and 
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guidelines need to be explained in order for public agencies to adhere to them. The lack 
of awareness may sometimes be because MFSB have not thoroughly reviewed the 
circular which partly relates to their lack of commitment. One interviewee, for example, 
asked the interviewer to show where exactly in the circular that particular requirement is 
mentioned: ―is it there in the circular that they ask for 5 years comparison? Can you 
show me where is it exactly in the circular?‖ (MFSB109,P23). 
 
The fact that some MFSB have not read the circular thoroughly has also been explicitly 
declared by one MFSB, as stated in their comment;   
Thank you for doing this research because then we can also improve our annual 
report – because we never thought of checking – [I mean] really checking the 
guideline. [Now that] You [have] raise[d] this issue, then maybe we should 
really look at that [guideline] again. (MFSB19, P3) 
 
In addition, one MFSB indicated that nondisclosure is due to them having overlooked or 
mistakenly left out the item. ―it‘s good that you highlight this ...  only then did I realise 
that we didn‘t include that information. [I would say] Probably - we overlooked it, or 
mistakenly left it out‖ (MFSB48, P30). 
 
Furthermore, while answering the interview questions another MFSB implicitly 
demonstrated their ignorance of the circular itself. This is reflected when they accepted 
the interviewer‘s offer to provide them a copy of the circular that the interviewer 
brought to the interview scene (MFSB109,P23). Ignorance of the circular has also been 
indicated by another MFSB as follows: ―... and the corporate division is also not aware 
of the existence of circular guidelines. They thought they can just prepare [as they 
wish]‖ (MFSB94, P22). This MFSB complained that the corporate division of his 
organisation does not refer and follow the circular in preparing their annual report and, 
according to him, is far behind other MFSB. Some of these instances suggests a lack of 
314 
 
commitment among preparers in reporting activity. The same observation was made by 
Christensen & Skaerbaek (2007) in the case of the preparation of Denmark public sector 
annual reports where reporting agencies complete this reporting responsibility as a 
routine matter in which they have little passion or real interest.  
 
7.4.6.3 Lack of collaboration and cooperation among MFSB units 
The lack of collaborative efforts within the organisation is identified as hindrance 
towards disclosure by four MFSB (20%). For example, reports are prepared separately 
by each unit and are then simply combined to form the annual report. There was no 
synchronisation or editing process involved to ensure certain standards are met. 
Consequently, some accountability information would be missed out which did not 
solicit any reformatory actions. This occurred in at least one MFSB, as expressed 
below: 
The other issue or reason on why in the 2008 report there were some items left 
out – was because at that time, [in] MFSB94, there was no specific committee 
established to take charge of the report. At that time, what happened was – for 
example, HR [i.e. human resource unit] would prepare for the HR section, the 
finance unit prepared the finance section, faculty prepares their report and so on. 
Then all submit and straight away combine all [without anyone integrating or 
coordinating the whole report]. (MFSB94, P22) 
 
 
Another MFSB indicated that the decision on the content of the annual report is made 
by only one person. There was no team or committee established in making the critical 
decision process, as shared below: 
When preparing the annual report, I‘ll sit down and brainstorm myself – [on] 
what is it that I would like to deliver to those reading it. Here, from my 
experience, the input [read: the content of the annual report] is basically 
everything that comes from my ‗head‘. I have to take the responsibility. So I feel 
- it‘s a bit challenging because you [read: I] need to crack your [read: my] head - 
alone (MFSB85, P7). 
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Besides collaboration issues, there were also issues reported concerning the lack of 
teamwork and cooperation. Since annual reports involve almost all departments in an 
organisation, mutual cooperation is needed to ensure accountability information is 
properly disclosed. An example of this situation is explained by one MFSB as follows: 
These [i.e. the information in the annual report] are basically provided by 
each unit. So if the information is not provided [by them], and even after I 
asked they still don‘t cooperate [there‘s nothing much can be done]. I – as 
the working committee - have done my best and have asked them to pass 
it over [to me]. (MFSB21, P5) 
 
 
7.4.6.4 Lack of understanding among preparers 
Three MFSB (15%) suggested that the lack of understanding among preparers is a 
factor for nondisclosure. They have either explicitly (MFSB64,P26) or implicitly 
(MFSB56,P28) demonstrated their lack of understanding of certain items in the circular 
or in the index which is tantamount to them not reporting it. Among the common  
misunderstandings observed during the interview concerned financial ratios. A possible 
reason for their misconception of financial ratios is their lack of sufficient accounting 
knowledge. As a result, some gave an out-of-context response on why financial ratios 
are not disclosed. Below is an example of a response of one MFSB when asked whether 
she had asked the finance or accounts department to provide financial ratios to be 
reported in the annual report. 
For the Department of Engineering, yes. Normally we will ask when they did 
their maintenance [work], how many machines are out, [and] how many 
machines are in – we have that [information]. But for Finance [Department] – we 
don‘t have it [i.e. ratios]. The ratios that we take are from a centralised manner 
like this [note: she was showing some items in the annual report which are not 
financial ratios] – if this is what you really mean by ratio, for example medicines 
– we did mention a few things like how many reduced and increased [in 
medicine distribution]. (MFSB85, P7) 
 
Following this response, it was obvious why many MFSB fail to report their financial 
ratios as found in Phase 1 (refer to Section 5.4.3). When the person in charge of 
preparing the annual reports does not understand certain terms used in the circular 
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concerning the items required to be disclosed, it is then hopeless to expect that those 
items will be disclosed in their report. The above response actually comes from a person 
who is the person solely in charge of deciding the content of the annual report for his 
organisation. This lack of understanding among preparers may arise partly due to the 
lack of explanation in guidelines particularly the TC4/2007, as suggested by Mussari & 
Monfardini (2010). 
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7.4.7 Graphical Summary of Reasons for Nondisclosure 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Graphical Summary of Reasons for Nondisclosure 
REASONS FOR 
NONDISCLOSURE 
NATURE OF DATA 
(34) 
• insignificant 
• irrelevant 
•difficulties in getting data 
•privacy 
IMPLICATION OF 
REPORTING  
(27) 
• lack benefit 
•avoid harm 
•avoid misunderstanding 
•avoid excess exposure 
•avoid uneasiness 
TRADITION  
(9) 
•previous practice 
•no comment from authorities 
•gain exemption  DEMAND  
(11) 
• lack of users 
•not required / requested 
RESOURCE 
(5) 
• financial constraint 
• time constraint 
• financial independence 
PREPARER 
(24) 
• lack authority 
• lack awareness & commitment 
• lack collaboration & cooperation 
• lack understanding 
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Six themes emerged from the interview findings. They relate to the reasons for the 
nondisclosure of accountability information (refer to Figure 7.2). The themes are ‗nature 
of data‘, ‗implication of reporting‘, ‗tradition‘, ‗demand‘, ‗resource‘ and ‗preparer‘. 
These themes were derived from the 58 coded reasons and the subsequent 21 
categorised reasons for nondisclosure as identified from the interview (refer to Table 7.2 
in Section 7.4). The ‗nature of data‘ is the most common theme for nondisclosure where 
its associated reasons were indicated 34 times by interviewees. The least common 
theme is the ‗resource‘ theme with only five occurrences. The second, third, fourth and 
fifth most common theme is ‗implication of reporting‘ (27 times), ‗preparer‘ (24 times), 
‗demand‘ (11 times) and ‗tradition‘ (9 times) theme respectively. 
 
The most common (categorised) reason cited is the ‗lack of benefit from reporting‘ 
(refer to Section 7.4.2.1) where 65 per cent of the MFSB indicated this as their reason 
for the nondisclosure of accountability information. This is followed by the 
(categorised) reason that ‗data is not significant to the MFSB and its stakeholders‘ with 
60 per cent occurrence during the interview (refer to Section 7.4.1.1).  
 
Table 7.3 below summarizes all the themes for disclosure and nondisclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB as gathered during the 
interview. It is interesting to note that at least three themes that emerged from the 
disclosure and nondisclosure appear to match each other, namely theme one, two and 
three where the emerging themes are the ‗nature of data‘, ‗implication of reporting‘ and 
‗tradition‘ respectively. It can therefore be safely concluded that in considering whether 
to report or not report certain accountability information, MFSB will look carefully at 
the nature of the data, the implications of reporting such information and prior reporting 
practices. 
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Table 7.3: Summary of Themes for Disclosure and Nondisclosure 
THEME REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE REASONS FOR NONDISCLOSURE 
Theme 1 Nature of Data (13) Nature of Data (34) 
Theme 2 Implication of Reporting (13) Implication of Reporting (27) 
Theme 3 Tradition (2) Tradition (9) 
Theme 4 External influence / push (33) Demand (11) 
Theme 5 Internal influence / push (7) Resource (5) 
Theme 6 Awareness (21) Preparer (24) 
 
 
7.5 Linking the Findings and the Theoretical Perspectives 
This section revisits the theoretical perspectives of the study, namely the public 
accountability paradigm and three isomorphisms under the institutional theory to 
ascertain if they can help explain the reporting practices of MFSB. Several reasons for 
disclosure and nondisclosure appear to be consistent with the the public accountability 
paradigm and the isomorphisms. 
 
a) Public Accountability 
It is evident that disclosure of accountability information in MFSB annual reports is 
partly driven by the public accountability paradigm. One example is when MFSB 
quoted that accountability information is disclosed to allow stakeholders to obtain 
understanding about their organisations, for example on their objectives and operation 
(refer to Section 7.3.6.1). This is in line with the argument by Coy et al. (2001) that 
annual reports driven by the public accountability paradigm should enable all 
stakeholders to obtain a comprehensive understanding of an entity‘s objectives and 
performance. 
 
Another example of the consistency of the findings with the public accountability 
paradigm is when some MFSB refer to guidelines which are not imposed on them in 
finding the benchmark for best reporting practices, for example for items related to 
governance, financial and CSR  (refer to Section 7.3.4.2). They referred to guidelines 
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issued by various bodies (e.g. Bursa Malaysia, the Central Bank and the Securities 
Commission) on listed companies as well as the annual reports of international 
organisations which have similar operation to theirs and consequently adapt these 
guidelines or practices accordingly. These initiatives demonstrate MFSB commitment 
towards fulfilling their public accountability role. It is thus consistent with the public 
accountability paradigm which emphasis on the premise of ‗right to know‘ by the 
society instead of the concept of the utility or usefulness of decisions (Coy et al., 2001). 
 
Section 7.3.4 shows that MFSB reporting is consistent with the public accountability 
paradigm where their objective or reason for reporting is not only to serve the higher 
hierarchical authority but also to address the wider range of stakeholders or the society. 
  
b) Coercive Isomorphism 
There is evidence of coercive isomorphism in the reporting process of MFSB. This is 
reflected in the case where MFSB disclose accountability information due to their 
compliance to statutory requirements particularly the TC4/2007 (refer to Section 
7.3.4.1). The coercive isomorphism is further reinforced by the A-G official reminder to 
MFSB to be alert and comply to the Circular. Respective ministries have some role in 
this coercive pressure through the enforcement of their disclosure policy on the 
respective MFSB under their ministry (refer to Section 7.3.4.1). On the other hand, 
MFSB that receive less reminders from the A-G or their parent ministry is little 
concerned on the disclosure in annual reports, do not report as much (refer to Section 
7.4.3.2). This scenario is consistent with the explanation of coercive isoorphism by 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) where they stated that this isomorphism occurs due to the 
regulative and political inﬂuences which stem from pressures exerted on organisations 
by other organisations upon which they are dependent for resources or support.  
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An informal coercive isomorphism was also observed. For example, some MFSB stated 
that disclosure is made as a response to public concern raised during Parliamentary 
debates, news highlights, as well as those gauged from customer satisfaction survey or 
complaint form (refer to Section 7.3.4.5). This is consistent with the informal coercive 
pressure as tauted by Mussari & Monfardini (2010) where public expectations serve as a 
force for MFSB to disclose information, albeit potentially only as ritualistic conformity 
and to gain legitimacy. On the other hand, some other MFSB do not disclose 
information because according to them, there are no demands for the information from 
stakeholders (refer to Section 7.4.4.1). Sometimes it is not required or requested by the 
top management and coordinator of the report (refer to Section 7.4.4.2). These two 
contradicting groups of MFSB (those disclose and do not disclose) may explain some 
variance in the level of disclosure as found in Chapter 4 and further enforced that 
coercive isomorphism exists in some MFSB. 
 
c) Normative Isomorphism 
The normative isomorphism is also evident from the interview. It is maintained here 
that MFSB of similar ministries follow a similar reporting model due to the shared norm 
within the ministry. The shared norm exists within ministries as the ministries seriously 
monitor their respective MFSB reporting practice by providing many inputs and 
comments to MFSB to improve the disclosure (refer to Section 7.3.4.6). Some 
ministries also expect that their MFSB annual report should contain certain 
accountability information as such information is compiled from the respective MFSB 
annual report to be reproduced in their own reports. This represents homogeneity among 
MFSB within same ministries. This supports the notion brought by normative 
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isomorphism, of which the disclosure of accountability information becomes a shared 
norm among the members in the field.  
 
Further, there are also professional networks among MFSB within the same ministry as 
indicated during the interview (e.g. by MFSB85,P7). It was disclosed that one ministry, 
on top of providing a reporting guideline to its MFSB, conducts a biannual course for its 
agencies‘ staff who are involved in preparing annual reports. Again, here we can expect 
homogeneity in the reporting practice among MFSB of the same ministries represented 
by the normative isomorphism, consistent with DiMaggio & Powell‘s (1983) argument 
that this type of isomorphism may occur due to professional network among members 
where professional staff undergo relatively uniform training, and then carry the ideas 
they learnt to the different organisations which employ them (Pollitt, 2001). Further, the  
imitation is driven by their conviction that the model they are following are superior 
(Beckert, 2010). On the other hand, when ministries are not so concerned about the 
reporting practice, their MFSB similarly, will not be disclosing as much information 
(refer to Section 7.4.3.2). 
 
d) Mimetic Isomorphism 
There are evidences that MFSB mimiced the reporting practices of other organisation. 
For example, MFSB responded that their disclosure of a particular accountability 
information is after referring to the annual reports of other MFSB (refer to Section 
7.3.4.3). MFSB take the approach of imitating others as they are left with much 
uncertainty, where the expected reporting form and its aims are not well understood and  
ambiguous, consistent with DiMaggio & Powell (1991). No reporting model or sample 
provided by authority such as the Treasury. Hence, consistent with DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983), the imitation process appears to serve as a medium for MFSB to reduce the 
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uncertainty  at  less  cost  as well as to enhance or maintain their legitimacy. This 
process of imitation represents the concept of mimetic isomorphism or homogeneity 
among some MFSB.  
 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter addresses the RQ3 of the thesis which attempts to understand the reasons 
for disclosure and nondisclosure of accountability information in MFSB annual reports. 
Interviews were conducted with a total of 20 MFSB, which were represented by 32 
personnel who are directly or indirectly involved in the annual report preparation.  
 
In understanding the reasons for disclosure, six themes emerged representing 53 coded 
reasons and the subsequent 25 categorised reasons. The most common theme being the 
‗external influence‘. This was then followed by the ‗awareness‘ theme. The ‗nature of 
data‘ and ‗implications of reporting‘ theme both occupy the third place, and they are 
followed by the ‗external influence‘, ‗internal influence‘ and finally the ‗tradition‘ 
theme. It was also found that the ‗adaptation of the reporting practices of others‘ was the 
most popular reason for disclosure. The next popular reason is ‗enlightening 
stakeholders on MFSB functions, aims and activities‘.   
 
With regards to the nondisclosure, 58 reasons for nondisclosure were coded from the 
interview. They were then further categorised into 21 reasons and from there, six 
themes emerged with the ‗nature of data‘ being the most common theme for 
nondisclosure. The least common theme is the ‗resource‘ theme. The second, third, 
fourth and fifth most common theme were ‗implication of reporting‘, ‗preparer‘, 
‗demand‘ and ‗tradition‘ theme respectively. At the same time, the most common 
(categorised) reason for nondisclosure provided is the ‗lack of benefit from reporting‘. 
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The next common reason being the ‗data is not significant to the MFSB and its 
stakeholders‘. 
 
The thesis then presented some evidences of the link between the interview findings and 
the public accountability paradigm as well as the coercive, normative and the mimetic 
isomorphism.  
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the findings of the interviews that explore the reasons 
for disclosure and nondisclosure of accountability information (i.e. RQ3). This chapter 
concludes the thesis by first summarizing the results and findings obtained for RQ1, 
RQ2 and RQ3 in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 then discusses the implications of the results 
and findings to the practice, the policy makers and regulators, as well as implications on 
theory. The strength of the thesis is then elaborated in Section 8.4, followed by the 
limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future research in Section 8.5 and 8.6 
respectively. Section 8.7 offers concluding remarks that sum up the thesis. 
 
8.2 Summary and Conclusions 
This section provides the summary of results and findings for all the three RQs of the 
study.  
 
8.2.1 Research Question 1: Extent of Disclosure 
The first objective of the study was to determine the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB. To achieve this objective, a 
content analysis was conducted on the 2008 annual reports of 106 MFSB using a 
disclosure index referred to as ADIS. The ADIS consisted of 110 items divided over 5 
categories. 
 
The main results revealed that MFSB provided a moderate level of disclosure in their 
annual report (i.e. 47.8%) with a disclosure level that ranged from 25 to 71 per cent. The 
results also showed that (i) MFSB4, a small foundation, exhibited least disclosure 
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(25%), while MFSB102, categorised as a socio-economic MFSB exhibited the greatest 
disclosure (71%), (ii) the most disclosed category was Performance (57.6%), followed 
by overview (56.7%), Financial (55.2%), Others (i.e. human resource, socio-
environmental and main assets) (34.6%),  and Governance (19%), (iii) all MFSB 
disclosed five disclosure items, namely contents page, balance sheet, income statement, 
statement of chairman and board member, and statutory declaration by the officer 
primarily responsible for the financial management, and, (iv) none of the MFSB 
disclosed information on how the nature and amount of renumeration for senior 
executives is determined.  
  
It was revealed that (i) the 45 disclosure items in Mandatory Disclosure Index (MDI) 
showed only 64.78 per cent disclosure, which was higher than the scores of the entire 
ADIS, and, (ii) the 65 disclosure items in the Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI) 
exhibited only 36 per cent disclosure, which was lower than the overall ADIS score.   
 
To sum up, there is a moderate level of disclosure of accountability information in the 
MFSB annual reports. In addition, the extent of disclosure largely varies accross MFSB 
and categories, and the mandatory items appear to be disclosed more than those of 
voluntary.  
 
8.2.2 Research Question 2: Variables Associated with Extent of Disclosure 
The second objective was to examine whether certain set of variables have significant 
association with the extent of disclosure of accountability information in MFSB annual 
reports. Using the institutional theory and public accountability paradigm, five 
variables, namely MFSB type, board size, board composition, audit committee 
existence and fiscal stress were hypothesized as having influence on the disclosure 
levels with MFSB size as the control variable.  
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Using the stepwise regression approach under the GLM method, the key findings are: 
(i) the strength or the predictability power of the final regression model is moderate at 
0.46 and 0.409 as measured by the partial eta
2 
or
 
(and R
2
) and adjusted R
2
 respectively; 
(ii) three factors are significantly associated with the extent of disclosure namely the 
MFSB type, board composition and audit committee existence. The details are: 
a. MFSB type and audit committee existence are highly significant whereas 
board composition is a moderately significant variable; 
b. the disclosure level of MFSB under the category of education, research and 
development were significantly lower than those categorised under the 
banking/finance and socio-economy type. At the same time, their disclosure 
level is significantly higher than the foundation/scholarship type of MFSB;  
c. the disclosure level of MFSB having no internal directors was significantly 
lower than those having at least one internal director in its board; and 
d. MFSB without audit committees had significantly lower disclosure level 
than those with audit committees.  
 
(iii) Two out of five hypotheses are supported namely H1 and H3, hence; 
a. There is association between the extent of disclosure of accountability 
information and the type of MFSB;   
b. There is a positive association between the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in the annual reports of MFSB and the existence 
of an internal member on the board; and 
c. H2, H4 and H5 were not supported. 
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Similar to RQ1, the RQ2 was also applied on both the MDI and VDI. For MDI, the final 
regression model‘s prediction power was 0.351 for adjusted R2. Three variables, namely 
MFSB type, audit committee and fiscal stress found to have a significant influence on 
the MDI. This result differs from the result for the ADIS except for MFSB type. For 
VDI, the prediction power of the final regression model was much lower than ADIS and 
MDI, i.e. at 0.376 adjusted R
2
. The same three variables, namely MFSB type, board 
composition and audit committee, which were found to have significantly influenced 
the ADIS, also had a significant association with the VDI. 
 
To conclude, the model is more useful in predicting the extent of disclosure of 
accountability information in MFSB annual reports than in predicting the disclosure 
levels of either mandatory or voluntary items only. In addition, although there are three 
factors shown to be significant in influencing disclosure level, only two hypotheses are 
supported.  
 
8.2.3 Research Question 3: Reasons for Disclosure and Nondisclosure 
The third objective of the thesis was to identify the reasons behind the disclosure and 
nondisclosure of accountability information in MFSB annual reports. Based on the 
results obtained from RQ1, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 
preparers and/or managers of annual reports in 20 MFSB. Using the meaning 
categorization approach to coding, a total of 53 and 58 reasons were discovered for 
disclosure and nondisclosure respectively. After categorisation, the reasons reduced to 
25 and 21 which was later grouped into common themes.  
 
Six themes emerged relating to the reason for disclosure. The themes were related to the 
nature of the data for reporting, implication of reporting, traditions and practices in 
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preparing reports, external influences on MFSB, influence from stakeholders within 
MFSB, and creating awareness for MFSB stakeholders. Among the most commonly 
cited reason for disclosure being to adapt others‘ reporting practices and to enlighten 
stakeholders on MFSB functions, aims and activities. 
 
The reasons for nondisclosure were also diverse. Similarly, six themes emerged from 
the interview of which three of them are similar to the themes for disclosure, namely 
data for reporting, implication of reporting and traditions and practices in preparing 
reports. The next three themes are related to the demand of the information, resources to 
report, and preparers of annual reports. The two most common reasons indicated for 
nondisclosure being lack of benefit from reporting and that data is not significant to the 
MFSB and its stakeholders. 
 
In conclusion, there are numerous reasons for both disclosing or not disclosing 
accountability information. Nevertheless, these reasons actually fall within certain 
issues or themes thus indicating common concern among MFSB with regards to their 
reporting practice. 
 
8.3 Implications and Recommendations  
Implications of the study may be derived from both the process of conducting the 
research as well as from the results and findings of the study. The discussion begins 
with the implications and recommendations for  MFSB. 
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8.3.1 MFSB  
a) Improving the accessibility of annual reports: During the data collection process, 
difficulties in obtaining the annual reports of some MFSB was experienced (refer to 
Section 4.8.2 and 5.2). Not all MFSB provide their annual reports online. Further, 
the process of acquiring the hardcopy reports was generally not time and cost-
effective as not all MFSB are sufficiently cooperative. Hence, it is hereby 
emphasised that there is a great need for the management of MFSB to take more 
serious efforts in ensuring greater accessibility of their reports to those interested. 
By doing so, may demonstrate their commitment towards greater accountability and 
transparency. 
 
b) Establishing network among MFSB of similar type: The classification of MFSB 
made by this study, which was based on the nature of their main activities as 
discussed in Section 4.6.1, may be very useful for MFSB in certain ways. By 
knowing which fellow MFSB are of similar groupings as their own may enable 
them to team up with each other either formally or informally and exchange ideas, 
experience and expertise. There could be many common issues faced – for example 
those related to management, accounting and reporting practices - that networking 
such as this can help to clarify and provide solutions to. 
 
c) Applying the ADIS for future reporting: The disclosure index developed (i.e. ADIS)  
is very useful for MFSB to continuously evaluate their own standing in terms of 
reporting. This is evident during the face-to-face interview where several MFSB 
expressed their interest in getting the copy of ADIS as well as their own score as 
found by this study. Their plan is to follow the index closely for their future 
reporting cycles. This might be one success story of this study as it enhances MFSB 
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awareness on what could be good reporting practices, which may consequently 
motivate them to improve their reporting status. 
 
d) Disclosure benchmarking among MFSB: It has been earlier explained that during 
the interview, participants were shown the MFSB average disclosure score. This 
provides an opportunity for benchmarking among MFSB. Besides comparing their 
own scores with the ‗industry‘ best practice, it may eventually become a source of 
encouragement for them to improve their own scores. Eventually, it is hoped that 
wide gap between the most disclosed and least disclosed MFSB as shown in Section 
5.3 is able to be reduced from year to year in the future.  
 
e) Addressing public demand and concern on certain information by MFSB: There 
appears to have been some form of secrecy on the remuneration amount of CEO and 
senior executives as well as on how renumeration is determined. This was reflected 
in both the quantitative (refer to Section 5.4.2) and qualitative phase of the study 
(refer to Section 7.4.1). There has been evidence of public uproar and dissentment 
over the excessive pay received by public sector senior executives. An example of 
this is the case of the Chief Executive Officer of the Islamic Pilgirmage Fund (an 
MFSB) whose monthly pay has been raised to RM85,000 from RM70,000, plus a 
RM700,000 bonus in 2011 (Nantha, 2012). It is recommended here that it is crucial 
for MFSB to change their ‗secretative‘ practice to a more transparent one especially 
on issues that has clearly raised public concern. Information such as this must be 
made available to the stakeholders in their future reports to avoid further public 
dissentment. 
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f) Demonstrating corporate-style management and reporting practices: The next 
implication relates to the governance disclosure which scored the lowest compared 
to the other four groups of information (refer to Section 5.4.6). Given that MFSB 
generally adopt corporate-styled management, it is reasonable to expect their 
governance as well as disclosure of governance information to be parallel to what 
the corporate sector recommended as good governance reporting practice as 
included in the MCCG. That however, is not the case. Therefore, the study argued 
that MFSB must undertake more initiatives to identify and disclose such 
information. By disclosing governance information, it will demonstrate to 
stakeholders that governance is in fact an important agenda in MFSB and not merely 
lips service.  
 
g) Determining the optimum board size of each MFSB: The insignificant result of 
board size on disclosure level (refer to Section 6.3.2) may bring rise to the need of 
questioning board functionality in relation to board size. Individual MFSB may need 
to reassess the role of the governing body in their organisation in promoting public 
accountability. There is also a need to relook into policies on placing too many 
members on MFSB governing board given that the results showed a negative 
insignificant association, suggesting that the number of directors on the board may 
not have significant impact on public accountability in MFSB. Cost-benefit analysis 
may be conducted on MFSB governing boards to determine the appropriate and 
effective number of members on the board so as to avoid using public funds to 
support an ineffective function. 
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Given the benefits of the implications above, it is part of the researcher‘s plan to 
conduct a one-day gathering with all MFSB to present the findings of this study and its 
implications and recommendations for MFSB. 
. 
8.3.2 Policy Makers and Regulatory Authorities 
The policy makers and regulatory authorities may include the National Audit 
Department, the Accountant General Department, the ministries, the Parliament and the 
Treasury which is under the Ministry of Finance. Below are the implications and 
recommendations. 
a) Increasing the accessability of annual reports: It is contended here that there should 
be some form of regulation or requirement by the policy makers or regulators in 
ensuring that annual reports of MFSB are more publicly available, both on their 
websites and the hardcopies. It is important as the public has the right to know 
where and how their money are spent. Authorities should draft a requirement 
imposed MFSB to upload their most current (or more) and the previous annual 
reports on their respective websites. They should also be required to be more 
responsive to public requests for hardcopies or annual report CDs. These measures 
may help avoid public scepticism concerning the performance of MFSB and 
possibly may improve public confidence in them. 
 
At the same time, the policy makers and regulators can play their part by making the 
reports accessible through them. It is suggested here that they, such as the A-G, 
make it mandatory for all MFSB to submit the latter‘s annual reports to them. The 
hardcopies of the annual reports should be placed in the former‘s library collections 
and hence will be made accessible for any interested researchers or public. Whereas 
the softcopies should be published on their websites. This approach echoes the 
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Bursa Malaysia initiative in the context of private sector where the annual reports of 
public listed companies can be easily accessed by researchers on either Bursa‘s 
library or website.  
 
b) Enhancing understanding of item and the need for disclosure among MFSB: From 
the interview, it was reflected that the nondisclosure was sometimes attributed to the 
lack of understanding by MFSB on the importance of certain items and the need of 
disclosing them. It also implies the lack of importance attached by report preparers 
on the MFSB public accountability. For example, in the case of  information of 
board members‘ attendance and rewards to staff as discussed in Section 7.4.1.1. 
Another situation was in the case of the low level of disclosure on financial ratios 
(refer to Section 5.4.3) where their responses implies their lack of appreciation on 
the need for financial analysis, hence could explain why many operate on deficits. 
Hence, it is strongly suggested here that training, briefings and workshops to be 
conducted by the authorities such as the Treasury, the Accountant General 
Department or their parent ministries to help enhancing the MFSB understanding 
and awareness on these items, why they should be reported and how to go about 
reporting them.  
 
c) Enhancing the disclosure of mandatory items: The study also found results which 
showed that approximately two-thirds of the mandatory disclosure items (MDI) 
were disclosed (refer to Section 5.5.1). At the same time, there also appear to be a 
reduced disclosure concerning these items over a number of years as reflected in the 
comparison conducted with earlier study by Azis (2008). This needs to be looked 
into as it may reflect the reduced level of accountability. Here, it is proposed that 
policy makers develop several mechanisms to penalise non-complying MFSB 
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whenever necessary as the current circular appears to be rather non-obligatory in 
nature. This will be part of the enforcement process of the government rules and 
directives which is unfortunately rather poor in Malaysia as noted by prior studies 
(Abu Bakar et al., 2011). Monitoring of MFSB disclosure is argued here to be 
crucial, otherwise, the TC4/2007 may not serve its purpose. One reasonable 
approach that can be done by the authorities to address this is by introducing a 
detailed checklist to assess the compliance of each MFSB to the TC4/2007. Based 
on this checklist, MFSB can be asked to indicate if the item has been disclosed or 
otherwise; if it is disclosed, then provide the location in the report (e.g. page 
numbers) in the report, if otherwise, provide the reasons or justifications. This is 
important so as to avoid penalising MFSB which may have genuine reasons for 
nondisclosure, as indicated during the interview. Acceptable reasons may include 
the irrelevance of the data to their organisation (refer to Section 7.4.1.2), lack of 
authority or control on certain information (refer to Section 7.4.6.1) and being 
exempted from following the TC4/2007 (refer to Section 7.4.3.3). This will 
hopefully help MFSB achieve greater accountability. Nevertheless, it was also 
highlighted by one large MFSB during interview that they had been assessed by the 
Implementation and Coordination Unit (ICU) of the Prime Minister‘s Department 
on their level of compliance with the TC4/2007. This is a positive way forward as 
disclosure is said to be able to be improved if there is intense scrutiny (Allen & 
Sanders, 1994). It is however noted that assessment by the ICU involved only a 
handful of MFSB. Hence, it is contended here that more of that assessments should 
be conducted in the future and to include more MFSB of various natures and sizes. 
 
d) Sustaining the improvement in disclosure: The improvement of almost half of the 36 
comparable mandatory items from nondisclosure to disclosure (refer to Section 
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5.5.1) indicates a positive development of disclosure among MFSB. 
Encouragements and recognition is therefore argued as necessary to sustain this kind 
of improvement in disclosure practice, not only for mandatory items but also for 
overall disclosure. Among the approaches that can be undertaken by authorities is 
by organising annual report competitions among MFSB and give away awards and 
certificates. Several categories can be developed and competed. Examples include 
the ‗best in compliance‘, ‗overall highest disclosure score‘ based on certain 
comprehensive checklist such as ADIS, ‗best governance reporting‘, ‗best financial 
reporting‘, ‗best performance reporting‘, ‗best socio-environmental reporting‘, and 
also ‗best in design‘. The list of award recipients should be widely announce so that 
others can emulate as far as possible the exemplary reports. This may consequently 
create a positive and healthy disclosure environment among MFSB. Also, the 
recognition of external bodies through competition and awards may lend additional 
credibility to the annual report itself. 
 
e) Revising the TC4/2007 to include voluntary items: Most of the voluntary items in 
ADIS are based on the disclosure recommendations by the public sector literature, 
hence suggesting the importance and the need of disclosing these items by public 
sector organisations. Therefore, it is strongly recommended here that the TC4/2007 
be reviewed and revised by the Ministry of Finance to incorporate some of these 
previously voluntary items. By doing this, MFSB in particular and government in 
general will be closer with the international public sector reporting practice and with 
their own pledge to be committed towards transparency and accountability. In fact, 
prior studies such as Allen & Sanders (1994) established that standard assessment 
activities, such as revising the Circular in this context, has been identified as a 
contributing factor towards greater disclosure. The inclusion of these items also 
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could possibly help in increasing their disclosure level which was very low as 
shown in Section 5.5.2. 
 
f) Monitoring disclosure and accountability of low-disclosed type of MFSB: 
Regression results have provided evidence on the association between the type of 
MFSB and their disclosure level. It is recommended that authorities monitor more 
closely those types of MFSB showing relatively low disclosure levels such as the 
foundation/scholarship group of MFSB (refer to Section 6.3.2). Their lack of 
disclosure should not be taken for granted. Despite the fact that they are giving 
scholarships and disbursing their money to the public, they are in fact still using 
public funds and resources although one of these MFSB justified their lack of 
disclosure by mentioning that they are not using public funds and the moneys given 
to the scholarship recipients are from contributions of specific individuals or entities 
(refer to Section 7.4.5.3). This is debatable since it is well-known that those 
individuals or entities mentioned by them
61
 are heavily or substantially funded by 
the public purse. As a matter of fact, no MFSB should be spared from fulfilling their 
accountability obligations to the public even for the so-called self-sustaining MFSB, 
as their initial start-up cost are funded with public money and it is normally given 
free to them. The importance of closely monitoring these low disclosure type of 
MFSB also rests in the fact that low diclosure may be a signal of other internal 
issues. In light of the above, additional cautionary actions are recommended to be 
carried out by authoritative bodies on these MFSB in order to promote greater 
disclosure and accountability. 
  
                                                 
61 No names can be mentioned here due to the confidentiality issue. 
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g) Revising policy on board composition: The results from the regression tests suggest 
that MFSB with at least one internal director are generally higher in their disclosure 
scores compared to those MFSB not represented by internal members on their board 
(refer to Section 6.3.2). Given that there a quarter of MFSB are without an internal 
director (refer to Section 6.2.2), this may compromise the level of disclosure and 
hence accountability function of MFSB. It is thus recommended that policy makers 
should consider formulating a policy for MFSB to have at least one internal director 
on their board. Formulating this policy is justifiable as it is backed by proper 
empirical research. 
 
h) Requiring the establishment of audit committee in MFSB: Results from RQ2 also 
found that audit committees were significanlty associated with disclsoure levels 
(refer to Section 6.3.2). MFSB with audit committees showed higher disclosure than 
those without one. Accordingly, it is proposed that policy makers develop 
governance mechanism for establishing audit committees in all MFSB as it has 
shown to have some bearing towards promoting greater public disclosure. For 
MFSB with no audit committee after the policy is formulated, they should be 
required to disclose the reasons for this in their annual report. The empirical 
evidence brought forth by this thesis justifies this initiative to policy makers and 
regulators in the public sector. 
 
It is also planned that these implications and recommendations will be communicated to 
the respective authorities such as the Treasury and the National Audit Department so 
that the benefit of this study can materialise.  
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8.3.3 Theory and Knowledge 
This implication pertains to the contribution of this study on theory and knowledge 
development.  
a) Usefulness of the MFSB classification: The classification of MFSB based on the 
nature of their activities endeavoured by this thesis (refer to Section 4.6.1) appears 
to be very useful as it acts as a significant explanatory variable capable of explaining 
the differences in the levels of disclosure among MFSB. Future research can adopt 
this categorisation to conduct analysis on various other dependant variables, such as 
financial performance, or the quality of performance reporting.  
 
b) Usefulness of public accountability paradigm: It was revealed from this study that 
the public accountability paradigm is suitable for application in various stages of 
this study in order to understand the issues under research (refer to Section 5.4.6, 
6.6.3 and 7.5). This study has also shown an example on how this paradigm can be 
used together with other theories – in this context, the institutional theory - in one 
study. Future investigations can thus incorporate this paradigm either by its own or 
with other complementing theories as part of their theoretical perspectives.  
 
c) Usefulness of coercive isomorphism: This thesis demonstrates that coercive 
isomorphism is useful in both the quantitative and qualitative phase of the study. In 
the quantitative phase, it was useful in understanding the association between the 
board composition and the extent of disclosure of accountability information as 
explained in Section 4.6.3, 6.6.3. The presence of coercive isomorphism in MFSB 
reporting practice was confirmed from the interview findings as explained in 
Section 7.5. The usefulness of applying coercive isomorphism in these contexts 
provide a new contribution to the public sector as well as governance literature that 
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can be emulated by future studies. However, with regards to the audit committee, 
the results do not appear to support the coercive isomorphism as hypothesized. It is 
argued that there is a possibility that the coercive isomorphism might be useful if the 
characteristics instead of the existence of audit committee is tested against the 
disclosure level, which is beyond the study‘s scope.  
 
d) Usefulness of normative isomorphism: Similar to coercive isomorphism, the 
normative isomorphism appears to be useful in understanding both the quantitative 
as well as the qualitative phase of the study. As discussed in Section 4.6.1, the 
association between the type of MFSB and the extent of disclosure can be explained 
using this isomorphism. In Section 7.5, the isomorphism was apparent during the 
interview. As such, future public sector studies may adopt this isomorphism in 
trying to understand the difference in the disclosure practice among organisations of 
different nature of activities. 
 
e) Usefulness of mimetic isomorphism: The study does not appear to support the 
mimetic isomorphism in its attempt to determine the factors influencing the extent 
of disclosure. The qualitative phase nevertheless provides some evidence that 
mimetic isomorphism does actually exist, as discussed in Section 7.5. This 
isomorphism can be said to be less useful compared to the coercive and normative 
isomorphism in understanding MFSB reporting practice. 
 
f) Usefulness of GLM: GLM command was successfully used by this study in 
analysing the association between the independent and dependant variables (refer to 
Section 4.8.7.2). Given the limited number of studies using this command despite its 
great benefits, it is strongly recommended that more research in the future employ 
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the GLM command to their quantitative research. Currently, this method is popular 
in medical schools while those in the business schools or specifically in accounting 
field are less familiar with it. 
 
g) Possible alternative theory: Although the results and findings from both the 
quantitative and qualitative phase to some extent appear to support the public 
accountability paradigm and institutional theory, it is maintained here that there are 
also reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure which were based on rationality, or 
what has been described as techno-economic forces by Abrahamson (1996). The 
thesis finds that overall, the interview findings are consistent with the concept of 
managerial fashion proposed by Abrahamson (1996) which combines both the 
technical/rational explanations of the adoption of management practices and the 
‗institutional‘ ones. Examples of techno-economic forces is when 
informants/interviewees claimed that budget constraint (refer to Section 7.4.5.1), 
time constraint (refer to Section 7.4.5.2) and lack of collaboration and cooperation 
among units (refer to Section 7.4.6.3) as their reasons for the nondisclosure. In light 
of this, future studies might consider this alternative explanation as their theoretical 
lens.  
 
Based on the above, future research may make use of a similar or alternative theoretical 
framework to further understand this field. The GLM will hopefully be an emerging 
trend for future quantitative research. 
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8.4 Strengths of the Thesis  
The thesis has several strengths worth mentioning. The first strong point of the thesis is 
that in the quantitative phase, almost all the MFSB (95.5%) were investigated (refer to 
Section 5.2). This rate can be regarded as sufficient to generalize the findings across 
MFSB regarding disclosure of accountability information. As for the qualitative phase, 
nearly 20 per cent of MFSB (20 MFSB) and a good number of participants (i.e. 32) 
willingly involved in the interview (refer to Section 7.2), providing the thesis with rich 
interview data from different types of MFSB. 
 
The next strength of the thesis is that although the results showed that not all 
independant variables were significant, the R
2
 of 0.406 was relatively higher compared 
to many of the previous studies where their R
2
 were normally not more than 30 per cent 
except very few (refer to Section 6.3.2), thus implying a relatively more useful model.  
 
The third strength is related to the instrument used (i.e. the disclosure index) for RQ1. 
The instrument was carefully and rigorously developed and took into account various 
sources including government circulars, prior research, and etcetera (refer to Section 
4.8.3). The index was pretested  (refer to Section 4.8.8), checked for validity (refer to 
Section 4.8.3) and reliability by field experts (refer to Section 4.8.9). The strength of the 
index enhanced the usefulness of the results obtained. It also increased the possibility 
that the index will be applied by future research in different settings both locally and 
internationally. 
 
Fourthly, the dual approach to research used by this thesis has minimized the 
presumptions by the researcher on the reasons for disclosure and nondisclosure of 
accountability information on the results found in the quantitative phase (refer to 
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Chapter 5 and 6). This is because the real preparers of the reports and/or the MFSB 
managers have been asked concerning the motivations or impediments that prevent the 
disclosure of certain accountability information (refer to Chapter 7). Many prior studies 
focused on the quantitative phase and were rather presumptious in their explanation of 
the results.  
 
Finally, the thesis shows how institutional theory and public accountability are useful in 
partly explaining the MFSB disclosure level, factors influencing it and reasons for 
disclosure and nondisclosure (for example, see Section 4.6, 6.6 and 7.5). Many previous 
public sector disclosure studies were not supported with a carefully constructed 
theoretical framework that leads to better understanding of the issue. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Thesis 
No study is without limitations. Nevertheless, it must be noted that necessary measures 
have been undertaken to ensure the present study is conducted in the best possible 
manner. This study‘s limitations are explained below. In the section following this 
(Section 8.6), what future research can do to address some of these limitations are 
presented. It must be acknowledged however that not all limitations can actually be 
overcome by conducting more research. 
(i) As explained earlier in Section 4.8.2, this study relates to the 2008 annual report. 
This year represents only a year after the TC4/2007 was published and 
implemented (i.e. year 2007), hence the results found for RQ1 and RQ2 may be 
influenced by the adjustment or learning process by MFSB in familiarising 
themselves to the new circular.  
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(ii) The next limitation of this study is the issue of coding of the interview findings. 
Although the coding process was conducted in the best possible manner, it is 
acknowledged that the qualitative nature of the data makes it rather subjective. 
Due to the research limitations in terms of financial and human resources, only 
one interviewer and coder was present during the interview and coding process.  
 
(iii) Other limitations of the study are related to the attributes of governance. As 
most earlier research related to governance attributes such as board size, board 
composition and audit committee pertain to the private sector context, the results 
of this theses may not be directly comparable. The preciseness of data on audit 
committee is also a limitation of the study as it is solely based on the annual 
reports.  
 
(iv) Additionally, this study focused on the disclosure level and not quality. The 
disclosure level is based on the score obtained from items in the index and the 
scoring system, and in turn, is binary, i.e. disclose or not to disclose. The quality 
of disclosure was not addressed. Moreover, greater disclosure does not 
necessarily imply better quality disclosures (Ho & Wong, 2001).  
 
(v) This thesis focused solely on annual reports as a disclosure medium (refer to 
Section 1.2) while other mediums of disclosure were not assessed. This might 
discriminate MFSB which focus more on other mediums such as websites in 
disseminating their accountability information. 
 
(vi) The items included in the index - based on certain considerations - are presumed 
to be the information  needs of MFSB stakeholders. However, notably, it could 
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be also that few of these items are not representing the stakeholders‘ actual 
needs for information. 
 
(vii) The use of software to analyse qualitative data was argued by a group of 
literature as having some positive influences on the quality, rigour and 
trustworthiness of a particular research (Welsh, 2002).  Thus, should there be 
more time and financial resources, the thesis might have resorted to softwares 
such as NVivo. 
 
8.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis has paved the way for future researchers to further investigate the issue of 
the disclosure of accountability information. Among the suggestions are: 
(i) To address the first limitation, an opportunity for future research is to replicate 
this study with a matched sample to a later year (i.e. after 2008) in order to 
remove or reduce any effects arising from the adjustment or learning period. 
Future studies may also replicate this study for RQ1 and RQ2 on year(s) prior to 
the issuance of TC4/2007 (i.e. before 2008) and compare those results with 
results from 2009 to determine if there is any difference in disclosure pre and 
post TC4/2007. This will help identify the impact of the TC4/2007 on MFSB 
disclosure, if any. Alternatively, a longitudinal study which involves annual 
report analysis of more than a year‘s annual reports to map the changes over time 
for an individual or a group of MFSB can also be conducted. 
 
 
 
346 
 
(ii) For the second limitation, future research may include more than one interviewee 
in the interview settings as well as more than one coder to sit together during the 
coding process. This may reduce subjectivity in the findings although not 
removing it altogether. 
 
(iii) With regards to the third limitation, future research may follow the study by Ho 
& Wong (2001) where data on the existence of an audit committee was collected 
directly from the companies through a postal survey although for other variables, 
it was taken from annual report. This study opted against this approach due to 
resource constraints and that it may affect the sample size as studies on the 
Malaysian public sector often receive a low response rate. 
 
(iv) As for the fourth limitation, future research may want to use a different scoring 
approach in order to differentiate the quality of disclosure. 
 
(v) The fifth limitation can be addressed by future research that examines other 
disclosure mediums such as websites and press releases. This is to take into 
consideration the claim by Christensen & Skaerbaek (2007, p. 102) that ―annual 
reports are only part of the burgeoning growth of accountability acquittals 
required under New Public Management‖. 
 
(vi) Future studies may be interested  to conduct a survey on the perceived  usefulness 
of the items in the disclosure index (ADIS) among various stakeholders. This 
may be able to address the sixth  limitation of the current study. 
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(vii) To allow a more comprehensive insight on public sector disclosure both in 
Malaysia and other countries, future research may apply the disclosure index 
(ADIS) developed by this research to other government bodies in Malaysia and 
abroad such as the state statutory bodies, local authorities, and federal and state 
departments. This will also allow for the external validation of the index itself. 
Applying the index to other government entities in and outside Malaysia may 
also allow a comparison of the disclosure levels not only across the different 
forms of government entities but also between different countries. This can also 
be applied to the statutory bodies at the state level in Malaysia. 
 
(viii) Other suggestions for future research is to include other variables such as the 
ministry under which MFSB is governed. This is because the parent ministry‘s 
influence was mentioned by interviewees as one reason for their disclosure (refer 
to 7.3.4.6).  
 
(ix) Future research may conduct interviews with government regulatory bodies and 
authorities such as the A-G and Treasury to obtain insights on the reasons for 
disclosure and nondisclosure of accountability information as in addition to 
compliance and noncompliance to TC4/2007 from their perspectives. As 
explained earlier, interviews in this thesis involved only the MFSB managers 
and/or preparers of annual reports to understand their motivation and/or 
reluctance towards disclosure. 
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In short, this thesis has paved the way for future researchers to further investigate the 
issue of the disclosure of accountability information. The above suggestions for future 
research are expected to allow stakeholders of government bodies to gain greater 
insights into the disclosure practices of the public sector. 
 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
It is hoped that this thesis is able to provide valuable input for the relevant authorities to 
formulate relevant policies on disclosure requirements or improve the current policies 
particularly for MFSB towards enhancing transparency and accountability. This is 
important as quality policy formulation and decision making requires objective, 
factually-based knowledge and policy expertise in order to safeguard public interests 
and promote the wellbeing of a particular nation. Additionally, it is also hoped that the 
thesis contributes towards the knowledge and literature on public sector reporting.  
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Appendix 4_1 List of Malaysian Federal Statutory Bodies 
No. MFSB Abbreviation 
1 Academy of Science Malaysia ASM 
2 Agricultural Bank Of Malaysia AGROBANK 
3 Armed Forces Fund Authority LTAT 
4 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat (M) Bhd. BRAKYAT 
5 Bintulu Port Authority LPBINTULU 
6 Central Bank Of Malaysia BNM 
7 Central Terengganu Development Authority KETENGAH 
8 Companies Commission Of Malaysia SSM 
9 Construction Industry Development Board CIDB 
10 Cooperative College Of  Malaysia COOP COLLEGE 
11 Council Of Trust For The Bumiputera MARA 
12 East Coast Economic Regional Development Council ECERDC 
13 Employees Provident Fund EPF 
14 Ex-Armed Forces Authority PERHEBAT 
15 Farmers' Organization Authority Of Malaysia LPP 
16 Farmers‘ Association Education Foundation YPMADA 
17 Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority FAMA 
18 Federal Agriculture Marketing Authority FELDA 
19 Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council MAIWP 
20 Fisheries Development Authority Of Malaysia LKIM 
21 Forest Research Institute Of Malaysia FRIM 
22 Golf Subang Corporation* GOLFSUBANG 
23 Hajj Pilgrim‘s Fund Board LUTH 
24 Human Rights Commission Of Malaysia SUHAKAM 
25 Inland Revenue Board Of Malaysia IRB 
26 Institute of Language And Literature Malaysia DBP 
27 Intellectual Property Corporation Of Malaysia PHIM 
28 Iskandar Regional Development Authority IRDA 
29 Johor Port Authority LPJOHOR 
30 Johor Port Authority (Tanjung Pelepas)* 
LPJOHOR-
TG.PELEPAS 
31 Kedah Regional Development Authority KEDA 
32 Kemaman Port Authority LPKEMAMAN 
33 Kemubu Agricultural Development Authority KADA 
34 Klang Port Authority LPK 
35 Kuantan Port Authority LPKUANTAN 
36 Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) KWAP 
37 Labuan Corporation LABUANCORP 
38 Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority LOFSA 
39 Langkawi Development Authority LADA 
40 LGM Properties Corporation LGMPC 
41 Malacca Port Board* LPM 
42 Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation PIDM 
43 Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation MATRADE 
44 Malaysia Health Promotion Foundation HEALTHPROMO 
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45 Malaysia Highway Authority LLM 
46 Malaysia Land Survey Board* JURUKUR 
47 Malaysia Pepper Board MPB 
48 Malaysia Productivity Corporation MPC 
49 Malaysia Technical University of Malacca UTeM 
50 Malaysia Tourism Promotion Board LPPM 
51 Malaysia University of Pahang UMP 
52 Malaysia University of Perlis UniMAP 
53 Malaysia University of Sabah UMS 
54 Malaysia University of Sarawak UNIMAS 
55 Malaysia University of Terengganu UMT 
56 
Malaysian Agricultural Research And Development 
Institute 
MARDI 
57 Malaysian Cocoa Board KOKO 
58 Malaysian Examinations Council MPM 
59 Malaysian Handicraft Development Corporation KRAFTANGAN 
60 Malaysian Industrial Development Authority* MIDA 
61 Malaysian Institute Of Accountants MIA 
62 Malaysian Institute of Road Safety Research MIROS 
63 Malaysian National News Agencies BERNAMA 
64 Malaysian Palm Oil Board MPOB 
65 Malaysian Pineapple Industry Board NANAS 
66 Malaysian Qualifications Agency MQA 
67 Malaysian Rubber Board LGM 
68 Malaysian Timber Industry Board MTIB 
69 Muda Agricultural Development Authority MADA 
70 National Academy of Arts, Culture and Heritage* ASWARA 
71 National Art Gallery Trustee Board SENILUKIS 
72 National Film Development Corporation Malaysia FINAS 
73 National Higher Education Fund PTPTN 
74 
National Population And Family Development Board 
Malaysia 
NPFDB 
75 National Saving Bank BSN 
76 National Sports Council MSN 
77 National Tobacco Board LTN 
78 National University of Malaysia UKM 
79 North Corridor Implementation Authority NCIA 
80 Northern University of Malaysia UUM 
81 Penang Hindu Endownment Fund Board WAKAFHINDU 
82 Penang Port Commission SPPP 
83 Penang Port Commission (Teluk Ewa)* SPPP-TELUK EWA 
84 Penang Regional Development Authority PERDA 
85 
Perbadanan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Dan Pembersihan 
Awam 
PPSPPA 
86 Putrajaya Corporation PUTRAJAYACORP 
87 Perwira Asset Authority Malaysia PPHM 
88 Perwira Niaga Authority Malaysia PERNAMA 
89 Railway Asset Corporation RAC 
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90 
Raja-Raja And The Yang Dipertua-Yang Dipertua 
Negeri Higher Studies Scolarship Fund 
Biasiswa Raja-raja 
91 RRIM Consult Corporation RRIMCONSULT 
92 Rubber Industry Small Holders Development Authority RISDA 
93 Skills Fund Development Corporation PTPK 
94 SME Corporation Malaysia / SMIDEC SMECORP 
95 Social Security Organisation SOCSO 
96 South East Johore Development Authority KEJORA 
97 South Kelantan Development Authority KESEDAR 
98 Stadium Merdeka Corporation PSM 
99 Sultan Idris Education University UPSI 
100 Suruhanjaya Koperasi Malaysia SKM 
101 Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara SPAN 
102 Teachers Provident Fund Board KWSG 
103 Tin Industry (Research And Development) Board TIMAH 
104 Totalisator Board Of Malaysia TOTALISOR 
105 Tun Razak Foundation YTR 
106 Tunku Abdul Rahman Foundation YTAR 
107 Universiti Darul Iman Malaysia UDM 
108 Universiti Malaysia Kelantan UMK 
109 Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia UPNM 
110 Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia USIM 
111 Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia UTHM 
112 University Malaya Medical Centre PPUM 
113 University of Malaya UM 
114 University of Science Malaysia USM 
115 University of Technology Malaysia UTM 
116 University Putra Malaysia UPM 
117 University Technology MARA UiTM 
118 Yayasan Pelajaran Mara YPM 
*Excluded as population or sample of the thesis. 
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Appendix 4_2 Disclosure Index or Checklist and Its Sources 
Category Subcategory No. Disclosure Item Main Source 
O
v
er
v
ie
w
 
BACKGROUND OF 
ANNUAL REPORT 
1 Content page Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
2 Index/ glossary 
Herawaty & Hoque (2007), Gandia 
& Archidona (2008) 
3 
Statutory process timeliness: annual 
report submission to 
Minister/Parliament Lim & McKinnon (1993) 
4 
Public accountability timeliness: 
annual report publication Coy et al. (1994) 
ACCESS 
INFORMATION 
5 Address of registered office 
TC4-2007, Gandia & Archidona 
(2008) 
6 
Contact information 
(Telephone/fax/email) 
Lim & McKinnon (1993), Gandia 
& Archidona (2008), Tooley & 
Guthrie (2007), Nelson et al. (2003) 
7 Webpage Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
8 Business hours Lim & McKinnon (1993) 
BACKGROUND OF 
STATUTORY 
BODIES 
9 Year of establishment 
Gray & Haslam (1990)- implicit 
(history) 
10 
Parliamentary act under which SB 
was established TC4-2007 
11 Governing ministry  Review of MFSB annual report 
12 Role/ function/ main activities TC4-2007 
COMPANY 
OBJECTIVES AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
13 Vision and Mission Ryan et al. (2002) 
14 Values/ethics/philosophy Schneider & Samkin (2008) 
15 Aims/ goals/objectives  TC4/2007, Ryan et al. (2002b) 
16 Client charter Lim & McKinnon (1993) 
CORPORATE 
INFORMATION 
17 Organisation chart TC4-2007 
18 Chairman: name TC4-2007 
19 Chief Executive: name TC4-2007 
20 External auditor TC4-2007 
21 Main bank(s) 
 Review of MFSB annual report 
22 Main lawyer(s) 
 Review of MFSB annual report 
23 List of main events in the year TC4-2007 
CHAIRMAN AND 
CEO MESSAGES 
 
Chairman message 
(Tooley & Guthrie, 
2007) 
24 
Overall comments on programmes, 
activities and projects (PAP) of 
MFSB  TC4-2007 
25 
Achievements and financial status 
of PAP of MFSB & compare with 
previous years TC4-2007 
26 
Events that influence the 
performance of PAP  of MFSB TC4-2007 
27 
Future  prospects and corporate 
strategies TC4-2007 
28 Growth and development of PAP TC4-2007 
29 
Acknowledgement to contributors 
of  the SB success TC4-2007 
30 Minister message Review of MFSB annual reports  
31 Chief executive message Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
32 BOD: members‘ name TC4-2007 
33 BOD: secretary Lim & McKinnon (1993)-implicit 
34 BOD: organisation represented Lim & McKinnon (1993)-implicit 
35 BOD: members' term end/start Lim & McKinnon (1993)-implicit 
SENIOR 
EXECUTIVES 
36 
Senior management: name and 
designation 
TC4/2007, Herawaty & Hoque 
(2007) 
37 
Senior management: education and 
qualification Schneider & Samkin (2008) 
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  38 
Senior management: skils and 
experience (know-how) Schneider & Samkin (2008) 
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 
BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
Governance 
39 
BOD: members' education and 
qualification MCCG 
40 
BOD: members' skills and 
experience of nonexecutive director MCCG 
41 BOD: number of meetings per year MCCG 
42 BOD: meeting dates TC4-2007 
43 BOD: attendance summary  TC4-2007 
44 
BOD: meeting attendance of each 
individual director   MCCG 
45 
BOD: renumeration policy or total 
amount  Ryan et al. (2002b) 
46 
BOD: renumeration amount listed 
by person MCCG 
SENIOR 
MANAGEMENT 
Governance 
47 SM: renumeration amount of CEO Ryan et al. (2002b) 
48 
SM: renumeration amount of other 
senior executives (total or 
individual) 
IFAC 2001, Schneider & Samkin 
(2008) 
49 
SM: how nature and amount of 
renumeration of senior executives is 
determined Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
Financial 
MANAGEMENT 
AND ACCOUNT 
COMMITTEE 
50 FMAC: members' name TC10-2008 
51 
FMAC: required number of 
meetings TC10-2008 
52 FMAC: number of meetings TC10-2008 
53 
FMAC: effectiveness of FMAC in 
handling financial issues TC10-2008 
 
 
 
INTERNAL AUDIT 
  
  
54 
Review and/or appraisal on 
effectiveness of risk management  
MCCG, Herawaty & Hoque (2007), 
Ryan & Ng (2000) 
55 
Review/appraisal of internal control 
systems 
MCCG, Ryan et a. (2002),Ryan & 
Ng (2000) 
F
in
an
ci
al
 
AUDITED Financial 
STATEMENTS 
56 Balance sheet 
TC4-2007, Caba Perez & Lopez-
Hernandez (2009), Stanley et al. 
(2008), Tooley & Guthrie (2007) 
57 Income statement 
TC4-2007, Caba Perez & Lopez-
Hernandez (2009), Stanley et al. 
(2008), Tooley & Guthrie (2007) 
58 Statement of changes in equity 
TC4-2007, Caba Perez & Lopez-
Hernandez (2009) 
59 Cash flow statement 
TC4-2007, Caba Perez & Lopez-
Hernandez (2009), Stanley et al. 
(2008), Perez et al. (2008), Tooley 
& Guthrie (2007) 
60 Notes to the financial statement 
TC4-2007, Caba Perez & Lopez-
Hernandez (2009), Tooley & 
Guthrie (2007) 
ACCOMPANYING 
CERTIFICATE AND 
STATEMENT 
61 Auditor general certificate TC4-2007, Perez et al. (2008) 
62 
Statement of Chairman and a Board 
member for the Group accounts TC4-2007 
63 
Statutory declaration by the officer 
primarily responsible for the 
financial mgmt TC4-2007 
ANALYSIS OF 
Financial Performance 
64 
Comparison figures/charts: on 
assets used  TC4-2007 
65 
Comparison figures/charts: on 
various source of finance  TC4-2007 
66 
Comparison figures/charts: on 
reserve TC4-2007 
67 
Comparison figures/charts: on 
noncurrent liabilities TC4-2007 
68 
Comparison figures/charts: on 
sales/receipts and gross profit 
margin TC4-2007 
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 69 
Comparison figures/charts: on 
surplus/deficit or profit/loss TC4-2007 
Financial RATIOS 
(Stanley et al., 2008), 
(Tooley & Guthrie, 
2007) 
70 
Current ratio (Current 
assets/Current liabilities) GC6-2004 
71 
Liquidity ratio (Liquid 
assets/Current liabilities) GC6-2004 
72 
Debt asset ratio (Total debt/Total 
assets) TC-2007, GC-2004 
73 
Proprietor‘s ratio (Total equity / 
total liability) GC6-2004 
74 Total equity/total fixed asset GC6-2004 
75 Assets turnover ratio TC4-2007 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
KEY Performance 
INDICATORS 
76 Key Performance Indicators DAC2-2005 
77 
Compare targeted KPI and actual 
achievement (in figure/percentage) Wall & Martin (2003) 
CUSTOMER/ 
EMPLOYEE 
SATISFACTION 
INDICATOR 
78 Customer satisfaction  
Tooley et al. (2010), Wei et al. 
(2008) 
79 Staff satisfaction  Wei et al. (2008) 
80 
No. of complaints received on 
MFSB Lim & McKinnon (1993)  
81 No. of valid complaints resolved MAMPU (2002) 
Overview OF 
PROGRAM/ACTIVIT
IES/PROJECTS 
(PAP) 
82 
Objective and description of each 
PAP TC4-2007 
83 
Implemetation progress of each 
PAP TC4-2007 
84 
Problems e ncountered in the 
implementation TC4-2007 
85 
Factors 
(internal/external)influencing 
current performance  TC4-2007 
86 Future plans TC4-2007 
Performance 
MEASURES ON PAP 
87 Input: Financial resources  Tooley et al. (2010), Smith (2004) 
88 
Input: Non-financial resources 
applied to a PAP 
Tooley et al. (2010) ,  
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009), 
Smith (2004) 
89 Output 
Tooley et al. (2010) ,  
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009), 
Smith (2004) 
90 Impact 
TC4/2007, Tooley et al. (2010) ,  
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009) 
91 Efficiency 
Tooley et al. (2010) ,  
Marcuccio & Steccolini (2009), 
Gordon & Fischer (2008), Smith 
(2004) 
92 Effectiveness Tooley et al.(2010) 
93 Productivity  MPC (2008) 
94 
Compare between actual and target 
performance 
Tooley et al.(2010), Tooley & 
Guthrie) 
95 
Compare between current and 
previous year Tooley et al.(2010), Smith (2004) 
O
th
er
s 
HUMAN RESOURCE 
96 
Statistics on staffing (e.g.total staff, 
vacancies) Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
97 
Workforce planning, staff turnover 
and retention Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
98 
Equal opportunity employment (e.g. 
staff by race/gender/age) 
 Coy & Dixon (2004), Tooley & 
Guthrie (2007), Ryan et al. (2002b), 
Schneider & Samkin (2008), Tooley 
& Guthrie (2007) 
99 
Statstics on training and 
development courses/programmes 
for staff 
Herawaty & Hoque (2007), 
Scheneider & Samkin (2008) 
100 
Achievements/impact of staff 
training and development activities 
(general/each) Tooley et al. (2010) 
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101 
Staff recognition through 
awards/rewards/titles Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
102 
Staff recognition: Names of 
awards/titles/rewards recipients Herawaty & Hoque (2007) 
SOCIO-
ENVIRONMENTAL  
103 
Internal/external social 
responsibility efforts/activities  Joseph (2010) 
104 
Financial information on social 
responsibility issues (budget/cost) Joseph (2010) 
105 
Internal/external environmental 
protection efforts/activities Joseph (2010) 
106 
Financial information on 
environmental issues (budget/cost) Joseph (2010) 
PROPERTIES/ MAIN 
ASSETS 
Tooley & Guthrie 
(2007) 
107 List of main assets: location TC4-2007 
108 List of main assets: ownership TC4-2007 
109 List of main assets: size (area) TC4-2007 
110 List of main assets: description/type TC4-2007 
*the highlighted cells contains mandatory items  
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Appendix 4_3 General Linear Model 
 
GLM is basically a mathematical relation between a single (for univariate GLM) or more than one (for multivariate 
GLM) criterion variable and one or more predictor variables (Aron et al., 2009, p. 612). The GLM model can be 
stated in symbols as follows: 
Y = a + b1X1  + b2X2  + b3X3 + ... + e 
 
The principle of GLM is that any subject‘s score on a particular criterion variable is the sum of several influences 
(Aron et a., 2009, p.613) namely (i) some fixed influence that is the same for all individuals (the constant, a), (ii) 
influence of variables you have measured on which subject vary (the weighted influence of several variables, b), and 
(iii) other influences that vary among individuals but are not or cannot be measured (the error, e). 
 
Traditionally, there have been two distinct statistical camps – one dealing with continuous variables (the correlation 
camp), and one dealing with categorical variables (the ANOVA or experimental camp) (McNeil et al., 1996, pg. 4; 
Thompson et al., 2008; Field, 2009, p.349). This notion that there are two camps died with Cohen‘s (1968) article, if 
not with Cronbach‘s (1957) presidential address. Cohen‘s (1968) seminal article was primarily responsible for 
bringing the GLM to the attention of social science researchers (Stevens, 2009, p. 158). According to Cohen (1968), 
in essence, all statistical analyses are correlational and are part of a global general linear model (Thompson, 2008, p. 
98). The difference between the analyses (e.g. between ANOVA and regression) are only in the form of output and 
not in their underlying analysis or mathemathical computation (Meyers et al., 2006, p. 295; Park, 2009).  
 
More specifically, the Big Four test (t tests, ANOVA, correlation and multiple regression) are all special cases of 
GLM and therefore systematically related (Aron et al., 2009, p. 612; Thompson, 2009, p. 362) (refer to Figure 4.4). 
The most general technique is multiple regression, of which bivariate correlation and prediction are special cases. At 
the same time, the ANOVA is also a special case of multiple regression. Finally, the t test can be derived from either 
bivariate correlation/prediction or the ANOVA. Based on the figure, we can say that MLR is therefore basically the 
same thing as GLM.  Specifically, MLR is the univariate case of the parametric GLM (Thompson, 2009, p. 216).  
 
General                   Multiple regression 
 
     Bivariate prediction/ correlation  ANOVA 
 
Specialized                            t test 
Figure 4.4: The Relationships Among the Four Major Statistical Techniques 
 
 
Given the fact that GLM is an umbrella concept of most statistical analyses, this explains why some statisticians 
agreed that mastering GLM concepts is like being in Oz with ruby slippers (e.g. Thompson, 2009, p.217) and students 
who understand the GLM understand the big picture of statistics (Grace-Martin, 2012c, p. 5; McNeil et al., 1996). So 
why then statistical software such as SPSS still keep the regression and ANOVA procedure while incorporating the 
General Linear Model (GLM)? (Hendersen, 1998). This situation has been well-explained some authors (e.g. McNeil  
et al., 1996, p. 294) where they said it is largely due to the development or progress (or rather the lack of it) of IT in 
that particular era when the statistical analyses was developed. For example, Tatsuoka (1975, p.1-2, as quoted in 
Thompson, 2009, p.359-60) explained that ANOVA was invented due to the the incapability of computer program at 
that time to perform calculations needed for MLR. At that time, the MLR (which is essentially what the [univariate] 
GLM is) has in fact been used by the originator of  ANOVA (i.e. R.A. Fisher)  to test for multi-group significance as 
evidenced in his early writings. We can still see the ANOVA functions alongside with MLR and GLM procedure in 
statistical softwares until now. Some argued that many researchers until now were generally taught MLR and 
ANOVA in a very different contexts and many textbooks teach ANOVA in an entirely different way to regression 
(Field, 2009, p.349) leading them to still believe on the myth that ANOVA and correlation test are two different 
things where in fact they are both subsets of GLM (McNeil et al., 1996, p.297; Meyers et al., 2006, p.295).  Many do 
not realise that in fact all conceivable designs in ANOVA, ANCOVA or regression could be handled by a single 
GLM procedure, differing from design to design only in minute technical detail (Tatsuoka, 1975).         
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Appendix 4_4 Testing Assumptions and Conditions of Regression 
 
Table 4.13 : Contingency Table of Factors 
Dependent Variable:DI 
TYPEMF BODCOM AUDCOM Mean Std. Deviation N 
Transportation Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 41.9481 4.99114 7 
Total 41.9481 4.99114 7 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 41.9481 4.99114 7 
Total 41.9481 4.99114 7 
Area/regional development Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 50.6061 8.14808 3 
Audit Committee Exists 45.9091 5.78542 2 
Total 48.7273 6.94131 5 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 50.4545 4.95156 4 
Audit Committee Exists 61.8182 . 1 
Total 52.7273 6.64943 5 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 50.5195 5.86480 7 
Audit Committee Exists 51.2121 10.05495 3 
Total 50.7273 6.74608 10 
Banking, Finance, Fund, Investment Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 50.0000 . 1 
Audit Committee Exists 60.4545 4.49977 2 
Total 56.9697 6.82323 3 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 53.6364 . 1 
Audit Committee Exists 59.0909 5.11574 7 
Total 58.4091 5.11382 8 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 51.8182 2.57130 2 
Audit Committee Exists 59.3939 4.74559 9 
Total 58.0165 5.29803 11 
Regulatory Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 56.3636 . 1 
Total 56.3636 . 1 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 45.6061 7.12487 12 
Audit Committee Exists 48.1818 6.92343 4 
Total 46.2500 6.93834 16 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 46.4336 7.44550 13 
Audit Committee Exists 48.1818 6.92343 4 
Total 46.8449 7.15182 17 
Foundation/Scholarship Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 32.2727 6.57653 4 
Total 32.2727 6.57653 4 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 49.0909 11.57084 2 
Total 49.0909 11.57084 2 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 37.8788 11.32052 6 
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Appendix 4_4 (continued) 
  Total 37.8788 11.32052 6 
Socio-economy Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 50.0000 . 1 
Total 50.0000 . 1 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 51.1364 4.83188 4 
Audit Committee Exists 62.1212 7.73173 3 
Total 55.8442 8.12874 7 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 50.9091 4.21528 5 
Audit Committee Exists 62.1212 7.73173 3 
Total 55.1136 7.80424 8 
Others Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 43.5065 5.87821 7 
Total 43.5065 5.87821 7 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 42.0000 7.93569 5 
Audit Committee Exists 54.5455 . 1 
Total 44.0909 8.75280 6 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 42.8788 6.50762 12 
Audit Committee Exists 54.5455 . 1 
Total 43.7762 7.02069 13 
Research & Development, & Education Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 43.8636 2.01578 4 
Audit Committee Exists 41.8182 11.57084 2 
Total 43.1818 5.50732 6 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 46.0079 5.24200 23 
Audit Committee Exists 55.0909 4.43502 5 
Total 47.6299 6.15253 28 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 45.6902 4.93178 27 
Audit Committee Exists 51.2987 8.79609 7 
Total 46.8449 6.20719 34 
Total Do not have internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 43.6797 8.32936 21 
Audit Committee Exists 49.3939 10.68971 6 
Total 44.9495 9.01131 27 
Have at least 1 internal director Audit Committee Do Not Exists 45.9875 6.35345 58 
Audit Committee Exists 56.4069 6.92627 21 
Total 48.7572 7.95353 79 
Total Audit Committee Do Not Exists 45.3740 6.95274 79 
Audit Committee Exists 54.8485 8.22831 27 
Total 47.7873 8.35932 106 
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(a) DISCLOSURE INDEX 
 
Original mean: 47.7873; 5% trimmed mean: 47.7749 
(b) BODSIZE 
 
Original mean: 10.75; 5% trimmed mean:10.31 
(c) FISCSTR 
 
 
Original mean: 0.3249; 5% trimmed mean: -0.1073 
 
(d) SIZEMF 
 
Original mean: 9.08E9; 5% trimmed mean: 1.22E9 
 
Figure 4.5 : Boxplots to Identify Outliers of Covariates
384 
 
 
 
(a) TYPEMF 
 
Transportation- Original mean: 41.9481;5% trimmed mean: 41.8110 
 
 
 
(b) BODCOM 
 
 
Board composed of at least one internal director- Original mean: 44.9495; 5% trimmed mean: 45.0318 
 
 
(c) AUDCOM 
  
Audit Committee Does Not Exist: Original mean: 45.3740; 5% trimmed mean: 45.5434 
Audit Committee Exist: Original mean: 54.8485; 5% trimmed mean: 55.0954 
Figure 4.6: Boxplots to Identify Outliers of  Factors 
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Table 4.14 : Skewness, Kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk Test (Test on Normality) 
Variables Levels Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistics Sig. 
DI  .050 .114      .993   .894 
TYPEMF Transportation .653 1.153    .934 .584 
 Area/regional development .527 -.921 .938 .533 
 Banking, Finance, Fund, Investment .539 -.195 .956 .727 
 Regulatory .111 -1.089 .943 .361 
 Foundation/Scholarship .884 1.385 .932 .597 
 Socio-economy 1.229 1.482 .870 .150 
 Others -.214 -.446 .964 .811 
 Research & development, & Education -0.038 -.352  .975 .603 
BODSIZE  1.92 5.161      .825 .0001* 
BODCOM Do not have internal director -.177 .334   .975 .734 
 Have at least one internal director .269 -.220  .982 .346 
AUDCOM Do not have audit committee -.272 .315      .985   .481 
 Have audit committee -.628 .987      .954   .272 
FISCSTR  10.035 102.291      .129 .0001* 
SIZEMF  6.868 47.309      .177 .0001* 
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(a) DISCLOSURE INDEX 
 
(b) DISCLOSURE INDEX 
 
(c) BODSIZE 
 
(d) BODSIZE 
 
(e) FISCSTR 
 
(f) FISCSTR 
 
(g) SIZEMF 
 
(h) SIZEMF 
 
Figure 4.7: Histograms and Q-Q Plots (Test on Normality)
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(a) Before transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) After transformation 
 
Figure 4.8: Residual Analysis (Simultaneous Test on Normality, Linearity and 
Homoscedasticity) 
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(a) Before transformation 
 
 
 
(b) After transformation 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Matrix Scatterplots (Test on Linearity) 
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(a) sqrtBODSIZE 
 
(b) sqrtBODSIZE 
 
(c) logBODSIZE 
 
(d) logBODSIZE 
 
(e) logFISCSTR 
 
(f) logFISCSTR 
 
(g) inverseFISCTR 
 
(h) inverseFISCSTR 
 
(i) logASSETS 
 
(j) logASSETS 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Histograms and Q-Q Plots - Normality Test (after transformation) 
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Table 4.16 : Levene’s Test on Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene Statistic Sig 
TYPEMF .732 .645 
BODCOM .000 .985 
AUDCOM .314 .577 
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Appendix 4_5 Letter Requesting Participation in Interview 
 
LETTERHEAD IIUM 
 
 
Ref.: NBAB/PHD/INTW/[MFSB Code No.]               Date: 26 May 2011 
 
 
[Name of the Head of MFSB] 
[Designation of the Head of MFSB] 
[Postal Address of the MFSB] 
 
 
 
Dear Dato‘/ Prof./ Dr./ Encik,  
REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW 
 
I am an academician at the Kulliyah of Economics and Management Sciences, International Islamic University 
Malaysia (IIUM), currently pursuing a PhD in Accounting at the Faculty of Business and Accountancy, University of 
Malaya (UM) under the supervision of Dr. Zakiah Saleh. The research for my PhD studies involves an examination 
of the disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian federal statutory bodies.  
 
To gather important information to assist my research, interviews will be conducted with relevant officers in the 
federal statutory bodies. The purpose of the interview is to obtain information on the reasons underlying the reporting 
or non-reporting of accountability information in the annual reports. The interview session is concerned with the 
experiences and perceptions and is NOT an assessment of the officer's skills or knowledge. I would therefore be 
extremely grateful if your organisation could assist in this study by permitting me to interview you or your officer(s) 
who is(are) involved in the preparation of the annual reports. 
 
I understand that time is valuable to your organisation and because of that, the interview will be conducted in the 
minimum time possible. Additionally, I would like to emphasize that anonymity is guaranteed. All information 
provided will be treated with confidentiality and analyzed in a collective manner, with no dislcosure of any 
individuals or organisations. 
 
I look forward to your positive response. A reply form and self-addressed envelope are enclosed with this letter. 
Alternatively, you may want to reply through email or telephone. It is highly appreciated if the reply is made within 
two (2) weeks upon receiving this letter. A formal letter will be sent later to confirm the date and details of the 
interview, upon receiving your favorable response.  
 
Should you have any query, please do not hesitate to contact me using the correspondence details as provided below.  
 
Thanking you in advance for your contribution and co-operation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
_________________________ 
Nur Barizah Abu Bakar   
Department of Accounting 
Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences 
International Islamic University Malaysia 
P.O. Box 10, 50728, Kuala Lumpur. 
Email: nurbarizah@iiu.edu.my or nur.barizah@gmail.com  
Mobile: 019-288 4540 / Office: 03-6196 4698  
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Appendix 4_6 Reply Form 
 
 
REPLY FORM 
 
Ref.: NBAB/PHD/INTW 
 
Nur Barizah Abu Bakar   
Academic Trainee 
Department of Accounting 
Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences 
International Islamic University Malaysia 
PO Box 10, 50728, Kuala Lumpur. 
Email: nur.barizah@gmail.com / Mobile: 019-2884540  
 
 
Date: _______________________ 
 
 
REPLY TO REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW 
We hereby *agree / disagree that interview be conducted with officer(s) from our organisation regarding your 
doctoral research on the disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian federal statutory bodies.  
 
The interviewee(s) selected is(are): 
     Name            Designation                      Department    
1. _______________________________________________________________________________ 
2. _______________________________________________________________________________ 
3. _______________________________________________________________________________ 
(Note: In case interviewees selected are more than 3, kindly provide their details on a separate sheet) 
 
Please contact  __________________________ (name) at _____________________________ (contact) for further 
arrangements. 
 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
Name: 
Designation:  
 
Organisation: 
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Appendix 4_7 Participation Information Statement 
 
 
 
PARTICIPATION INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
Disclosure of accountability information in the annual reports of Malaysian federal 
statutory bodies 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of this study is to gather opinions about the reasons underlying the reporting or 
non-reporting of accountability information in the annual reports of federal statutory bodies 
(FSB) in Malaysia. Subsequent to analysis of FSB annual reports, a few issues arose which need 
clarification. The interview also aims to determine why certain types of accountability 
information are being widely reported and others are not. 
 
Who is conducting it? 
This study is being conducted by Nur Barizah Abu Bakar under the doctoral program of the 
University of Malaya (Department of Financial Accounting & Auditing, Faculty of Business & 
Accountancy). The study is jointly funded by the Public Service Department, Ministry of 
Higher Education, International Islamic University Malaysia and University of Malaya. 
 
What is your role? 
The study involves obtaining information from the top executives and/or relevant officers who 
are directly involved in annual reporting activities. Permission will be sought from individual 
participants for the interviewer to use a voice recorder in addition to transcribing the answers to 
the particular questions. It is envisaged that no more than 40 minutes will be required of the 
interviewee. 
 
Structure of the interview 
Four (4) main questions will be asked in two parts of the interview. 
Part 1:  This part addresses the role of annual reports as an accountability tool, the process 
involved in the preparation of annual reports and the adoption of the guideline on the 
preparation of annual report. 
 
Part 2: The primary interview issue will be addressed here. The purpose is to understand the 
reason/ motivations/ incentives/ problems/ challenges for disclosure/ nondisclosure of 
accountability information in annual reports of FSB. 
 
Consent to Participate 
Participation in the interview process is completely voluntary; you are not obliged to participate 
– and if you do participate – you can ask the interview to be stopped at anytime. 
 
Confidentiality 
1. Nur Barizah is the only person involved in the research. 
2. Confidentiality of all documentation/interview material is preserved. 
3. Resulting reports and papers will conceal the identity of the federal statutory bodies and any   
    personnel interviewed. 
4. Once collated, a copy of the information will be distributed to the interviewed personnel. 
 
For additional information, kindly contact Nur Barizah Abu Bakar by email at 
nur.barizah@gmail.com  
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Appendix 4_8 Interview Guide 
 
1. REPORTING OF ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION  IN ANNUAL REPORT  
 
Would you agree that all federal statutory bodies (FSB) such as your organisation  should  report... 
 
"a broad range of information  about their organisation including its objectives, financial, performance, 
governance, human resource, social and environmental as well as other information  which may be useful for 
stakeholders to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the FSB and to assess the accountability of FSB as 
well as for FSB to show their accountability to its stakeholders‖ 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the above and why? 
 
 
2. ANNUAL REPORTS AND PROCESS INVOLVED  IN PREPARING ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
2A 
It has been said that annual report is the main medium of discharging accountability to the stakeholders.  
Do you agree or disagree and why? 
 
Related issues that may be included in the discussion: 
 What is(are) the main aim(s) of your organisation‘s annual reporting? 
 Who is(are) the main/ target user(s)/reader(s) of the organisation‘s annual reports? 
 Do your organisation consider other medium(s) (besides annual reports) as the main medium in 
discharging accountability to stakeholders? If yes, what is(are) the medium(s)? 
 To what extent do you think your annual reports are accessible to the stakeholders? What is(are) the 
efforts taken to enhance public accessibility to your annual reports? 
 
2B 
What are the activities or processes involved in preparing your annual reports? 
 
Related issues that may be included in the discussion:  
 Who or which units/divisions are main player(s) in the annual report preparation in your 
organisation?  
 Does accountant(s) play significant role?  
 Is there any reference made to samples of others‘ annual reports? 
 Is there any specific guideline (internal/external) followed in preparing your annual report? 
 How decisions are made with regards to what type of  information to be disclosed in annual report? 
 Is there any pressure from other organisation(s) that have impacted your annual reporting practice?  
 Do you regard the annual reporting practices or the disclosure policies of your annual report is 
constant over time? If yes, why do you think there was no considerable changes? If no, why do you 
think the changes took place? 
 
 
3.  TREASURY CIRCULAR N0.4/2007 
 
To what extent do you follow the guideline in the Treasury Circular no. 4/2007 (TC4/2007)  in preparing your 
annual report? 
 
Related issues that may be included in the discussion: 
 Are you familiar with the TC4/2007? (prior to the interview) 
 Do you think the TC4/2007 is relevant to your organisation?  
 Do you think the TC4/2007 is useful for your organisation in preparing your annual report? 
 To what extent do the Treasury/other bodies guide you in adopting the guideline? 
 How do you regard the Circular? Mandatory or voluntary or anything else? 
 Is(are) there any penalty imposed on your organisation or other FSB that you are aware of? 
 Do you think you need to get more guidance in adopting the guideline? 
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4.  REASONS FOR REPORTING/NOT REPORTING ITEMS IN THE DISCLOSURE 
CHECKLIST  
In relation to accountability information (in Question 1), this research has identified certain items that can 
be considered as ‗accountability information‘ (please refer to the disclosure checklist).  Many of the items 
are extracted from the TC4/2007, while others are based on either past researchs (where the researchs 
identified what items should be included in public sector annual reports) or a review of several FSB annual 
reports.  
 
4A In relation to those ‗accountability information‘ extracted from the TC4/2007 (as identified in the 
checklist under the ‗source‘ column): 
 What are the reasons/ motivation/ incentives for you to disclose these items? 
 What are the reasons/ hindrance/ challenges/ problems for you to not disclose these items? 
4B In relation to those ‗accountability information‘ derived from other sources besides the TC4/2007 (as 
identified in the checklist under the ‗source‘ column): 
 What are the reasons/ motivation/ incentives for you to disclose these items? 
 What are the reasons/ hindrance/ challenges/ problems for you to not disclose these items? 
 
CLOSING 
 
Are there any other comments you would like to make in regards to the matters raised in the interview? 
 
 
Please note that a copy of the interview transcript as well as the conclusion made from the 
interview will be sent to each interviewee for validity check and to corroborate findings. This is 
part of the research process to ensure the credibility and authenticity of the interview data.
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Appendix 4_9 Participant Consent Form 
 
 
Nur Barizah Abu Bakar 
Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Financial Accounting and Auditing 
Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of Malaya 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Disclosure of accountability information in the annual reports of Malaysian federal 
statutory bodies 
 
I, ____________________________________________________________________[name] 
 
________________________________________________________________[organisation] 
 
 freely choose to participate in this study. 
 free to withdraw from the interview without  compromise at any time. 
 free to refuse to answer any question at any time. 
 agree to allow  the interviewer to use digital voice recorder to assist in the provision of a 
true and accurate record of the interview. 
 understand that this interview will be kept strictly confidential. 
 understand that excerpts of this interview may be made part of the final research report, but 
under no circumstances will my name or organisation be included in this report. 
 have read and understand the Participant Information Statement, and any questions I have 
asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been given a copy of the Participant 
Information Statement to keep. 
 hereby agree to participate in this research study. 
 
Signature : _______________________ 
Name  : _______________________________________ 
Date  : _________________________ 
 
Please send me a summary of the findings of this research project:      YES  NO 
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Appendix 6_1 Testing Assumptions and Conditions of Regression-MDI and 
VDI  
 
 
(a) Mandatory Disclosure Index 
        
 
(b)Voluntary Disclosure Index 
 
            
 
Figure 6.1: Q-Q plots of MDI and VDI (Test on Normality)
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Appendix 6_2 Robustness Check  
Table 6.22: Summary of Regression Results – Remove Outliers in BODSIZE 
           Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP 4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .017** .003* .001* .000* 
H2 BODSIZE .960
a 
   
H3 BODCOM .199 .171 .085 .041** 
H4 AUDCOM .001* .001* .001* .002* 
H5 FISCSTR .111 .195 .105
a 
 
 SIZEMF .570
 
.378
a 
  
 Adjusted R
2 
.414 .418 .419 .409 
         a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
        *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
 
Table 6.23:  Summary of Regression Results – Constant 1.98 for invFISCSTR 
           Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .003* .001* .001* .000* 
H2 BODSIZE .284 .249
a 
  
H3 BODCOM .184 .100 .085 .041** 
H4 AUDCOM .001* .002* .001* .002* 
H5 FISCSTR .134 .069 .104
a 
 
 SIZEMF .438
a  
  
 Adjusted R
2 
.419 .421 .419 .401 
        a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
      *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 6.24: Summary of Regression Results - Constant 2 for invFISCSTR 
           Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .003* .001* .001* .000* 
H2 BODSIZE .283 .248
a 
  
H3 BODCOM .185 .101 .085 .041** 
H4 AUDCOM .001* .002* .001* .002* 
H5 FISCSTR .131  .102
a 
 
 SIZEMF .438
a  
  
 Adjusted R
2 
.419 .421 .419 .409 
         a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
        *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 6.25: Summary of Regression Results – Constant 2.2  for invFISCSTR 
           Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .003* .001* .001* .001* 
H2 BODSIZE .273 .240
a 
  
H3 BODCOM .190 .104 .088
a 
 
H4 AUDCOM .001* .001* .001* .001* 
H5 FISCSTR .109 .056 .087 .041** 
 SIZEMF .439
a  
  
 Adjusted R
2 
.421 .423 .421 .409 
        a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
       *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
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Table 6.26: Summary of Regression Results – Constant 2.4 for invFISCSTR 
            Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .003* .001* .001* .001* 
H2 BODSIZE .264 .232
a 
  
H3 BODCOM .195 .107 .090
a 
 
H4 AUDCOM .001* .001* .001* .001* 
H5 FISCSTR .092 .048* .076 .035** 
 SIZEMF .439
a  
  
 Adjusted R
2 
.422 .425 .422 .411 
        a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
       *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 6.27: Summary of Regression Results - Use Surplus/Deficit for FISCSTR 
        Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .003* .003* .002* .000* 
H2 BODSIZE .432 
 
  
H3 BODCOM  .182 .176 .142 .041** 
H4 AUDCOM .002* .001* .001* .002* 
H5 FISCSTR .343 .352 
 
 
 SIZEMF .222 .211 .190  
 Adjusted R
2 
.410 .413 .413 .409 
         a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
        *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 6.28: Summary of Regression Results - Log10(Revenue) for SIZEMF 
                                Dependent variable: DI 
 Variables STEP 1 STEP2  STEP3 STEP4 
 Sig.   Sig.   Sig.   Sig. 
H1 TYPEMF .015* .001* .001* .000* 
H2 BODSIZE .272 .250
a 
  
H3 BODCOM .192 .100 .085 .041** 
H4 AUDCOM .002* .002* .001* .002 
H5 FISCSTR .124 .070 .105
a 
 
 SIZEMF .688
a  
  
 Adjusted R
2 
.416 .421 .419 .409 
          a.Most insignificant variable and thus removed in the next step. 
         *Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level 
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Appendix 7_1 Profile of Interview Participants 
 
 
No. MFSB Interviewee Position Division 
Length 
of 
service 
Gender 
1 MFSB4 
P1 Assistant Secretary Administrative 15 Male 
P2 Administrative officer Administrative 12 Male 
2 MFSB19 P3 Head of Division 
Publications & 
Knowledge 
Management 
2 Male 
3 MFSB114 P4 Assistant Director Public Relation  5 Female 
4 MFSB21 P5 
Public Relations 
officer 
Corporate Affairs 2 Female 
5 MFSB27 P6 
Head of Division cum 
Research officer 
Research & 
Corporate Planning 
16 Female 
6 MFSB85 P7 Head of Division Corporate Affairs 18 Female 
7 MFSB13 
P8 Director Finance 15 Female 
P9 Finance officer Finance 14 Female 
8 MFSB57 
P10 
Asistant Director cum 
Secretariat 
Public Relation & 
Corporate 
Communication, 
Director General 
Office 
2 Female 
P11 Secretariat 
Public Relation & 
Corporate 
Communication, 
Director General 
Office 
8 Female 
9 MFSB59 P12 Manager 
Administrative & 
Human Resource 
9 Male 
10 MFSB44 
P13 
General Counsel cum 
Corporate Secretary 
Legal 6 Female 
P14 
Chief Financial 
Officer 
Finance 6 Male 
P15 
Chief Operating 
Officer 
Operation  6 Male 
11 MFSB63 P16 Assistant Director Strategic Planning 2 Female 
12 MFSB80 P17 Bursar Bursary 30 Male 
13 MFSB78 P18 
Principal Assistant 
Director 
Administrative 11 Female 
14 MFSB38 
P19 Head of Division Corporate Service 28 Male 
P20 Assistant Director Corporate Service 9 Female 
P21 Assistant Director Corporate Service 13 Male 
15 MFSB94 P22 Bursar Bursary 3 Male 
16 MFSB109 P23 Head of  Division 
Corporate 
Development and 
Policy 
9 Male 
17 MFSB64 
P24 Deputy Director 
Planning & Corporate 
Affairs 
10 Female 
P25 Assistant Director 
Planning & Corporate 
Affairs 
7 Female 
P26 Deputy Director 
Planning & Corporate 
Affairs 
25 Male 
18 MFSB47 P27 Senior Manager Finance & Accounts  Female 
19 MFSB56 
P28 Director General Administrative 27 Female 
P29 Head of Division Publication & Library 28 Female 
20 MFSB48 
P30 Curator Publication 6 Male 
P31 Assistant Curator Publication 7 Male 
P32 Accountant Finance n/a Female 
 
